Recent calls to study international practices stand out for their attempts to bridge the material ideational divide, viewing international relations as a realm of competent acts engendering the international system. Foreign policy, as a bureaucratic enterprise of protocol and institutional practices, is the ideal ground to assess the value of practice in International Relations. But as our case study of sanctions relief in Sudan shows, crossing the levels of analysis is hardly a smooth process as clashes emerge and challenge the status quo requiring departures from existing norms. When descending the levels of analysis into the very weeds of actual diplomatic issues, one finds a range of practices that challenge a singular view of international practices. Success or failure of policy, its direction, and evolution must address the harmony or clash of practices across these levels. This paper assesses the value of practice by studying a case with a clear evolution in practices in the development of sanctions relief in Sudan.

This paper seeks to reconcile performative theorizing, which captures the place of systems of thought on foreign policy practice, and broader sociological approaches that link networks and institutions across space, especially as they relate to the global economy. Once developed, the theory, which is termed here ‘spatial performativity’, is applied to recent efforts to promote industrialization through the development of special economic zones in Ethiopia. In doing so, attention is drawn to a burgeoning area of African and Chinese foreign policy and economic cooperation.

Despite vociferous disagreement by scholars and ambivalence by China over a "China Model" of development, China is still held up as an exemplar of development. Nowhere is this clearer than in the theory of New Structural Economics (NSE) promulgated by the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Justin Lin. We seek to critically engage Lin's theory apropos of China and China's geopolitical and economic interests in Africa. Lin argues that developing countries can learn from China's development experience, and his theory, NSE, fills this experience with theoretical content. China, though often dismissive of a "China Model," gains a soft power advantage from its association with NSE as an exemplar and from Lin's own role in rationalizing China-Africa economic interests in purely analytical and intellectual terms. In Ethiopia, the regime actively heeded Lin's policy advice and implemented development policies in line with his theoretical model. Justin Lin's "China Model" is not an antagonistic model, but part of mainstream economic theorizing. It does not represent a competing counter-hegemonic model. It is complementary to the global capitalist system. This is the unorthodox orthodoxy of Justin Lin's "China Model."

China's economic success has prompted both academic political economists and applied policy analysts to speculate about the implications of a new 'China model' of economic development and global economic governance. A particular issue is the degree to which the China model involves developing in opposition to or in cooperation with the pre-existing norms of global economic governance. Recognizing the ambiguity of the China model, we consider two alternative interpretations of China's role in global economic governance: China Challenge (CC) and Business as Usual (BaU). We flesh out these contrasting interpretations using evidence from the lending behavior of four major development finance institutions in which China plays a leading or determinative role: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), the Silk Road Fund (SRF), and the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) of the China Development Bank. We find that (at least in the restricted domain of international development finance) China's role in global economic governance is largely characterized by BaU behavior, and although on a regional level this does represent a challenge to the historical role of Japan, it nonetheless suggests that the China model is not so revolutionary as many analysts suppose.

This introductory article examines the concept of strategic localization, which is central to the theme of this Special Issue ofPolitics & Policy. We focus on how African states, for regime survival and/or pragmatic reasons, reinterpret China's development discourse and preferences and implement them in their local contexts. We hypothesize that the China model of development has become a rhetorical commonplace used to legitimize policies perceived to be: (1) better for regime survival (e.g., no political conditionalities; dissemination of resources to elites); and (2) superior to other development models (more suitable for developing countries, better at developing strong states). The article will also give a synopsis of the other articles in the Special Issue-highlighting their main arguments and findings.

There is a widespread feeling that globalization represents a major system change that has or should have brought world society to the forefront of international relations theory. Nonetheless, world society remains an amorphous and undertheorized concept, and its potential role in shaping the structure of the international society of states has scarcely been raised. We build on Buzan's (2018, 2) master concept of ‘integrated’ world society (‘a label to describe the merger of world and interstate society’) to locate the integration of world society in the globalization of social networks. Following the advice of Buzan (2001) and Williams (2014), we use conceptual frameworks from international political economy to systematically explore the structure of integrated world society along six dimensions derived from Mann (1986) and Strange (1988): military/security, political, economic/production, credit, knowledge, and ideological. Our empirical survey suggests that, on each of these dimensions, power has centralized as it has globalized, generating steep global hierarchies in world society that are similar to those that characterize national societies. The centrality of the United States in the networks of world society makes it in effect the ‘central state’ of a new kind of international society that is endogenized within integrated world society.

Is Sweden a failed state in the making or a paradise on earth? Neither. Sweden is a functioning democracy but it faces serious challenges. This article attempts to make sense of them. It considers issues of law and order and the emergence of parallel structures of power. It shows that Sweden, following an unprecedented wave of immigration, is experiencing an ongoing struggle to define the nation.

The article scrutinizes Armenia’s foreign policy trajectory since its independence. It applies a model of foreign policy analysis that takes into account structural, dispositional, and intentional dimensions and outlines a more dynamic structureagency interplay. By contrast to reductionist system-level explanations, the argument is that individual-level factors such as the perceptions and beliefs of Armenia’s presidents are central to understanding why Armenia embarked on a foreign policy path where it became economically and militarily absorbed by Russia. The case study of Armenia’s foreign policy serves as a plausibility probe that illustrates the relevance of individual-level factors in foreign policy decision making. The article thus offers insights into the foreign policy of a small state.

The tentative argument made in this article is that “failed states” have failed to develop successful projects of internal colonialism. Yet, in the present era, human rights norms and world society governance models denounce states that pursue internal colonial projects. This paradox highlights the great challenge of state making in the present age.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate about “Chinese assertiveness”. The paper dissects the central articles on the topic and evaluates their conceptual and theoretical insights. It ascertains that the concept of assertiveness is poorly substantiated; that proponents of “Chinese assertiveness” largely claim that it derives from structural factors that produced effects in Chinese foreign policy behavior prior to the US pivot to Asia; and ultimately, that critical accounts, since they reject the very concept, lack theories that can explain Chinese assertiveness. This article attempts to address these shortcomings. First, the article reconceptualizes assertiveness and connects it to grand strategy change. Second, this change is reactive and occurs after, not prior to the US pivot. Third, in order to provide greater theoretical adequacy, this article combines material factors with institutional factors and show how they dialectically interact with status aspiration, as part of the struggle for the positional good of leadership. To show the conceptual and theoretical plausibility of the argument, the paper outlines the dialectical interplay between positional barriers in the ADB and the US pivot to Asia, on the one hand, and reactive Chinese assertiveness and the AIIB, on the other.

On the surface, the unveiling of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in October 2014 could be seen as a welcome addition to a region in desperate need of infrastructure to support growth. But much more was at stake. The AIIB represents a significant milestone in China’s emergence as a regional leader, and Washington’s ham-fisted opposition to its creation dismayed its allies in Asia and even Europe and played into China’s hands, writes John H.S. Åberg