As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility toregional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.

Fallacies and wishful thinking: on Russia studies, Putin, and the lead-up to the warWhen President Putin over the years repeatedly raged and ranted about how Russia had been deceived by the West over NATO’s eastward expansion, how Ukraine’s rightful president allegedly had been illegally overthrown in a coup instigated by the West, and how these actions had the hidden purpose of bringing destruction and devastation to Russia, few were inclined to believe that he was not just repeat-ing a mantra, but actually believed in what he said and prescribed a program of action. This essay provides a background to the steady growth of the authoritar-ian essence of the Putin regime and its growing ambitions beyond Russia’s borders and discusses what academic area studies specialists in the West and other Russia pundits generally should have been able to foresee about Russia’s aggressiveness and its upcoming assault on Ukraine. Perhaps the current situation could have been avoided, had there been a greater inclination to bring together the clues that were there and take preventive action to meet the danger

Vladimir Putin’s power position has long been sustained by the successful communication of major political myths and his acclaimed role in them. This chapter discusses such myths to assess whether they are still useful for the regime as tools of legitimation after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, and Russia’s lack of success on the battlefield thereafter. I introduce the distinction between overarching master myths and more supplementary myths, arguing that the master myths about Russia’s pre-determined great power status, Russia as a phoenix rising from the rubbles of another Time of Troubles, and Russia as a bulwark against the evil West retain their relevance and are ruthlessly exploited by the regime. Several supplementary myths have most likely had their credibility reduced. However, unless the master myths are affected, the regime is not likely to face a major loss of legitimacy among the population at large.

Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement

The objective of this chapter is to provide a Swedish perspective on the 30th anniversary of the fall of Communism in eastern Europe. The most evident contrast when comparing Sweden in 1990 and 2020, was that the country was now a committed, even if also somewhat disillusioned, member of the European Union. Little remained of the so-called policy of neutrality that had been so cherished during the times of the Cold War. The euphoria of the early 1990s, those brief years when everything seemed possible, was clearly gone. The years when Sweden had been a relentless champion promoting enlargements of the European Union as the standard recipe for ensuring peace and democracy in Europe had come and then waned considerably. The European Partnership had largely brought disappointing results. Whereas optimism about general developments used to be almost unbridled in official Sweden by the end of the Cold War, disillusionment seemed to reign ever since the mid-2010s, when moves toward illiberal democracy, populism and Russian violations of international law defined much of the order of the day in Europe. Grey and somber realities characterized for the most part the everyday, and it was left to the Swedish government to deal with this in its practical policies.

This book brings together a strong and international team of linguists, historians, and social and political scientists renowned for their expertise on North and South Caucasus. Their contributions paint a compelling picture of the region’s contested past and highlight some of the enduring challenges still confronting it. Taken together, the ten chapters of the book enhance our understanding of the region’s ancient languages, shed light on historical events of crucial significance, and uncover mechanisms behind political conflict and cooperation in the tinderbox that is the Caucasus.

Using the Russian president’s major public addresses as the main source, Bo Petersson analyzes the legitimization strategies employed during Vladimir Putin’s third and fourth terms in office. The argument is that these strategies have rested on Putin’s highly personalized blend of strongmanimage projection and presentation as the embodiment of Russia’s great power myth. Putin appears as the only credible guarantor against renewed weakness, political chaos, and interference from abroad—in particular from the US.

After a first deep crisis of legitimacy manifested itself by the massive protests in 2011–2012, the annexation of Crimea led to a lengthy boost in Putin’s popularity figures. The book discusses how the Crimea effect is, by 2021, trailing off and Putin’s charismatic authority is increasingly questioned by opposition from Alexei Navalny, the effects of unpopular reforms, and poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Moreover, Russia is bound to head for a succession crisis as the legitimacy of the political system continues to be built on Putin’s projected personal characteristics and—now apparently waning— charisma, and since no potential heir apparent has been allowed on center stage. The constitutional reform of summer 2020 made it possible in theory for Putin to continue as president until 2036. Yet, this change did not address the Russian political system’s fundamental future leadership dilemma.

This chapter focuses on the final stage of the history of the Soviet Union, from 1985 to 1991, when the last Communist Party and Soviet state leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to reform his country by making economic life more effective, widen the scope of political participation, open up history and culture for debate, and introduce a new, peaceful thinking in international affairs. Gorbachev wanted to save the Soviet system but ended up destroying it. His initially successful strategy of taking a middle-of-the road position to gain support worked well during the first years of reform, but the mid-position became successively narrower until it finally dissolved. Gorbachev’s increasingly desperate attempts to negotiate a new and revised union treaty led in 1991 to the failed August coup which, in turn, dealt the final death blow to the Soviet Union. By way of conclusion, political mistakes are often difficult to distinguish from failures caused by structural problems. As is illustrated by the case of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, this is particularly salient in societies in which statist power and cultural patterns have traditionally played decisive roles in historical developments.

In this chapter contemporary Russian nationalism is treated as sentiments of national identity diffused throughout Russian society and demonstrated in policies led by the incumbent president, Vladimir Putin. The chapter deals with the shapes nationalism has taken under Putin’s authoritarian leadership and discusses what explains his apparent popularity at home. To provide context for the analysis, the historical background is briefly accounted for. What sentiments have been used to pave the way for Putin’s ascent to power and what were the means used to bring him to this position?  The central argument is that Vladimir Putin’s popular appeal lies in the fact that he has managed to get across that he is uniquely suited to safeguard Russia’s status as a great power –  a core value of Russian national identity –, to preserve order and stability at home, and hold Russia’s own against an outside world often depicted as hostile.

Using enemy images and securitization as theoretical points of departure the paper discusses and analyzes the landscape of Swedish security threats as made up of traditional, militarily defined threat perceptions and the looming specter of an invasive migrant Other. The paper uses a two-fold analytical focus. Firstly, the last decade or so has seen a notable return of hard security thinking to the Swedish political debate, particularly in relation to a resurgent Russia. To illustrate this, the paper analyzes political discussions surrounding the establishment of the Gotland Regiment, situated on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. The regiment became operational by January 1, 2018, following a political near-consensus that the Swedish preparedness for military defense against Russia needed to be strengthened, not least in the wake of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The old regiment on Gotland was dismantled in 2004, and the decision about its reestablishment had significant symbolic value. Secondly, the old-school hard security threat perceptions coexist with less traditional threat perceptions, notably those connected to migration, particularly so in the wake of the so-called migration crisis of 2015 when Sweden in short time received an all-time high number of asylum-seekers and refugees. The Sweden Democrats, nowadays the third largest political party in the Swedish Parliament, has managed to capitalize on widespread perceptions that migrants pose threats to the physical security, economic well-being and moral and cultural values of the Swedish majority population, and has, through its success at the polls reshaped the Swedish political landscape.  

After a background discussion of the dilemmas raised by the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the issue of a common identity for the EU and where this might reside is addressed. The argument is that the existence of a common identity based on shared values is critical to trust within the Union, as well as to its influence and standing in the world. The discussion then turns to the challenges nowadays being directed at the shared fundamental values of the EU: from the “illiberal democracies” of Hungary and Poland; from authoritarian states outside the EU, such as Russia and Turkey; and from populist currents across the entire EU and outside it. The chapter ends with a summation and recommended action to safeguard shared values, common identity and trust within the Union.

As president of Russia and a prominent political leader, Vladimir Putin has consistently endeavored to legitimize his rule by appealing to central political myths and taken-for-granted truths in Russian society. In rhetoric and official communication, he emerges as the guarantor of domestic order and stability, the protector of traditional values, and a staunch advocate of Russia’s status and position as a great power in a world often depicted as hostile. What is being communicated here, and apparently finds resonance among broad segments of public opinion, is that on all these parameters Putin is uniquely qualified to lead Russia. Four times in the course of 18 years, Putin has been elected president in the first round of elections, and throughout this period he has received high rankings in regular monthly opinion polls. However, his legitimation strategies have been so firmly linked to the persona of Putin that we may speak of an emerging dilemma with his fourth presidency. Who could fill his shoes as his successor? The article analyzes this dilemma, taking its point of departure in Weber’s seminal theorizing on types of legitimate authority and the routinization of charisma. It discusses the evident dearth of credible successor candidates, and concludes by discussing possible actions for dealing with or postponing the issue of succession.

In her new book The Return of Ideology Cheng Chen argues that as a nation makes the transition from Communism to democracy or something else, its regime must construct a new political ideology that can guide policy and provide a sense of mission and national togetherness. This is needed for engendering legitimacy among the populace as well as the support of domestic political and economic elites, and is a precondition for the regime’s long-term viability. In the book, Cheng Chen compares the Russian Federation after 1991 and post-Deng China during roughly the same period, and investigates the degree of success of the ideology-building projects in the two great powers.

In this article we discuss the effects of the Sochi Olympics on the indigenous Circassian population in North Caucasus. The Circassian situation was paradoxical in the sense that whereas this indigenous group fiercely opposed the organization of the Winter Games in Sochi, the Games themselves denoted a rare opportunity for them to make their voices heard internationally. During the run-up to the Olympics they all of a sudden had a global audience for their claims for recognition of their cause. This was quite simply their ‘fifteen minutes of fame’, a rare and short-lived period of celebrity and worldwide attention. The paper will look into whether the anti-Sochi activism helped to unite Circassians in the diaspora and abroad around common claims, and to what extent the Circassians managed to use media attention to make their cause more widely known by international society.

This is a review of a highly topical volume on alternative history writing in contemporary Russia.

Migration-related events have received overwhelming attention in mainstream media coverage within Europe in recent years. This study investigates the metaphorical framing of migration issues by comparing dominant discursive patterns from two national and two regional daily newspapers in Sweden and Germany. Applying a corpus-based critical metaphor analysis, the spotlight falls on metaphors prevalent in media articles published during the EU Valletta Summit on migration held in November 2015. The article is inspired by Lakoff and Johnson’s classic work, Metaphors We Live By, according to which metaphors are components of everyday language with a pervasive influence on thoughts and actions. Adhering to this logic, metaphors become most powerful when taken for granted (»naturalized«) and therefore evade readers’ attention. Apart from tracing naturalized metaphorical framings in mainstream Swedish and German media coverage, this study discusses how the discursive connotations conveyed by dominant metaphors are likely to influence readers’ interpretation of migration-related issues and policies.

Efter en kortfattad bakgrundsdiskussion om östutvidgningens dilemman behandlas frågan om en gemensam identitet för EU och vari denna kan tänkas bestå. Argumentet är att förekomsten av en gemensam identitet byggd på gemensamma värden är nödvändig för tilliten inom unionen, liksom för dess inflytande och anseende i världen. Därefter diskuteras de utmaningar som nu riktas mot EU:s gemensamma värdegrund: från de illiberala demokratierna Ungern och Polen, från auktoritära stater utanför EU som Ryssland och Turkiet samt från populistiska strömningar över hela EU-området. Kapitlet avslutas med en summering och några handlingsrekommendationer för hur en gemensam värdegrund, identitet och tillit kan värnas inom unionen.

For decades now, President Vladimir Putin has consistently enjoyed markedly high approval rates and seemingly benefitted from charismatic legitimacy, whereas systemic legal-rational legitimacy has remained on a low level. This article discusses how, through the successful communication of political myth, legitimacy has become ever more personalized in Putin’s Russia, and considers some of the dilemmas inherent in non-democratic settings where legitimacy builds on grounds that are not legal-rational in the Weberian sense.

With the elimination of Soviet state communism in the early 1990s, the ideational foundation of politics in the five Central Asian former Soviet republics had to undergo fundamental rebuilding. Instead of the defunct basis of Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism, the rulers of the suddenly independent Central Asian states urgently had to identify other ways and means of legitimizing their hold on power. The following is an analysis of how this quest has fared in the case of Kazakhstan, a resource-rich state with regional great-power aspirations.

The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia, were during the preparations and run-up phase intensely followed by the global community and were generally associated with a vast array of problems: political, democratic, economic, ecological and securityrelated. When the hosting of a mega-event such as the Olympic Games has been awarded to a site in an authoritarian state, the global community has moral responsibilities to live up to. There is a need and an obligation to raise one’s voice and criticize where criticism is due also after the Games are concluded. For Sochi, as for sites of all major sports events, continued critical attention is therefore warranted also after the competitions. It is essential to try to gauge the extent to which predicted problems materialized, what happened afterwards, and what have been the more long-term consequences and local effects. This is the general perspective that brought the authors of this special issue together.

In the absence of legal-rational legitimacy in the Weberian sense, any president succeeding Vladimir Putin in contemporary Russia would be hard put to find a recipe to maintain popularity and, ultimately, stability and order. The paper discusses these principal problems from the analytical perspective of classical and newer theories of legitimacy and also reflects on what implications the dominant mix of legitimation strategies may have should a situation of political succession suddenly arise. Against the backdrop of recent processes of political succession in other authoritarian settings, Weber’s writings about the routinization of charisma – how charismatic legitimacy can conceivably be converted into other, more durable kinds - are drawn upon and interpreted in light of contemporary developments.

The paper discusses the dynamics of local ethnic, racial and social relations in a traditionally multi-ethnic Central European small town that has been heavily influenced by the establishment of a transnational company. The town in question is the traditionally triethnic (Slovak, Hungarian, Roma) Galanta in Slovakia, where the Korean transnational company Samsung since some then years back has established its presence. The paper combines theories on the everyday workings of ethnicity and race with theories on how transnational labour migration impact on interethnic relations. The focus is on categorization practices and discursive frames. In particular, the authors address to what extent engrained ethnic and racial stereotypes are maintained among the local population and to what extent they are challenged and reconstructed.

Survey evidence suggests that Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy rests on three pillars: domestic order, economic prosperity, and the demonstration of great power status internationally. This is problematic inasmuch as it is based on high degrees of personal popularity which inhibits and contravenes the legal-rational legitimacy of state institutions. This requires continued delivery in all three areas in order to maintain the legitimacy of the regime. This framework allows us better to interpret the 2014 Ukraine crisis as an attempt to shore up support in one ‘pillar’ as performance-based legitimacy recedes.

In this chapter, we will turn our attention to three areas that before the Sochi Olympics were often discussed as particularly acute problems in relation to the Olympics. The first one of these is related to infrastructural investments in the area and the risk of them being turned into so-called white elephants, costing a lot of money and being of no actual use, neither by the local population nor by tourists to the region. The second theme regards the feared environmental degradation due to the organization of the mega-event and the extent to which the prognosticated problems have come to materialize. These two are matters that in one shape or another seem to be brought up in relation to all Olympics in contemporary times, possibly with the exception of the Lillehammer Olympics of 1994. The third theme, which enjoyed substantial attention before the Olympics, is however specially related to the Sochi Olympics. It deals with the indigenous Circassian population and the extent to which its members were maltreated, marginalized and squeezed out from the geographical area which constitutes their homeland. Despite their seeming disparity, the basic reason for bringing up the three subjects in the chapter is the same: to argue the need for continued attention to perceived trouble-spots even after the close of the Games.

In their chapter, “Ukraine and the Disenchantment of Europe”, Bo Petersson and Cecilie Stokholm Banke take up the current and acute situation between the EU, Russia and Ukraine, asking if Russia with its behavior and attitude towards Europe indeed will come to act as the ’other’ and eventually give the EU new momentum as a project. By analyzing the way the Crimean crisis from early on was framed with historical references both by Western commentators, politicians and historians , but indeed also by Vladimir Putin, the authors show how present the past is in this crisis. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its heavy-handed de facto involvement in the civil war in eastern Ukraine has severely challenged the European normative order as defined by the EU tenets of democracy, human rights and respect for national sovereignty. It shows how Russia aspires to define its own norms and implement them on behalf of Europe. This has led to the deepest political crisis between Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and the EU, on the other, since the Cold War. As recently argued by the American historian Timothy Snyder, the Russian government designated in 2013 for the first time the European Union as an adversary: ”In its media and indeed in official foreign policy pronouncements it has characterized the European Union as ‘decadent’, in the sense of being about to disintegrate”(Snyder 2014). This reflects the traditional Russian disdain for weakness and points towards a Russian allegation that the EU is a mere illusion only reflecting the policies and preferences of the United States. It may well be, argue Petersson and Stokholm Banke, that the weakness of the European Union as perceived by the Russian government can come to serve as a future raison d’etre for the EU, providing the Union with new vitality and strength of appeal.

The ongoing Eurozone crisis frequently makes front-page news, but aspects of its deeper implications are more rarely discussed in media. In Crisis and Migration the authors analyse the current situation and its effects on politics and migration. In case studies they show how the economic downturn affects daily life on a local, national, and European level. The authors reflect on the crisis from mutually rewarding micro-to-macro perspectives. Their focus is geared away from the crisis as an acute phenomenon – instead they investigate it as a potential symptom of a chronic decline of the EU in relation to other regions. It is imperative to address the long-term consequences of the development and that scholars engage in that critical discussion. Alongside its senior authors, Crisis and Migration features contributors of a new generation of scholars who are likely to be prominent in the field in years to come. The book is vital reading for researchers in migration and European studies, policymakers, and journalists.

The ongoing Eurozone crisis frequently makes front-page news, but aspects of its deeper implications are more rarely discussed in media. In Crisis and Migration the authors analyse the current situation and its effects on politics and migration. In case studies they show how the economic downturn affects daily life on a local, national, and European level. The authors reflect on the crisis from mutually rewarding micro-to-macro perspectives. Their focus is geared away from the crisis as an acute phenomenon – instead they investigate it as a potential symptom of a chronic decline of the EU in relation to other regions. It is imperative to address the long-term consequences of the development and that scholars engage in that critical discussion. Alongside its senior authors, Crisis and Migration features contributors of a new generation of scholars who are likely to be prominent in the field in years to come. The book is vital reading for researchers in migration and European studies, policymakers, and journalists.

Review of Julie Wilhelmsen; ”How War Becomes Acceptable: Russian re-phrasing of Chechnya”. University of Oslo: Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2014. 389 sidor. ISSN: 1504-3991.

The theoretical point of departure of this paper is that the perspective of political myth adds to the understanding of political developments in Russia. The upcoming Olympic Winter Games in Sochi in 2014 are discursively constructed as a manifestation of Russia's return to great power status. In official Russian discourse, there is an encounter between the Russian great power myth and the myth of Olympism, both of which are employed to strengthen the status of Russia and of President Putin personally. Thus, the Olympic values of humanism, internationalism, and progress are merged with Russian great power ideals. But there are also examples where the prevailing myths are turned around to criticise the regime and the Sochi Games. However, the most serious challenge to the Putin regime may stem from the great power myth itself, should the regime prove unable to deliver what it requires.

This paper discusses the Russian great power myth in relation to the upcoming Winter Games in Sochi in 2014. This paper examines how the mega-event is discursively constructed as a manifestation of Russia’s return to great power status. The successful carrying out of the Games would strengthen the legitimacy of President Putin personally. The holding of safe and secure Games in the volatile area of the North Caucasus region would connote the final vanquishing of domestic insurgents and maybe mute Putin’s emerging domestic critics at the same time. Politically this is a calculated risk, however, and the stakes are high.

In this article I argue that Vladimir Putin’s strong promotion of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and his hardline stance against the Ukraine are highly consistent with the basic modes of legitimation that he has been using throughout his three presidential tenures. His line of action is intimately bound up with his interpretation of Russia’s role and privileges as a great power. This great power theme is closely linked to fundamental sentiments of Russian national identity and therefore highly popular among the public. Moreover, through his actions Putin has demonstrated that he still is a formidable force to be reckoned with. The message is conveyed to the electorate that he is a strongman who is virtually irreplaceable at the helm of Russian state power. By many tokens Putin’s personal popularity was waning at the beginning of his third presidential term in office, but the conflict with Ukraine will at least in the short-term perspective mean a boost for his domestic popularity.

President Vladimir Putin’s claim and policies to resurrect Russia as a great power have been a cornerstone for the construction of the hegemonic position of power that he has for so long successfully exerted and upheld. This paper discusses the Russian great power ambitions in relation to national identity and popular appeal, and puts them in relation to the upcoming Winter Games in Sochi in 2014. The paper examines how this mega-event is discursively constructed as a manifestation of Russia’s return to great power status, and as such is meant to convey certain messages internally as well as externally. The successful carrying out of the Games would no doubt constitute an important component in the undergirding of the – otherwise visibly dwindling - legitimacy of President Putin. They would be an important display window for manifesting the prowess of the Russian great power, and the location of the Games to the Caucasian city of Sochi in the Russian South would have a deeply symbolical aspect. If the Games can be successfully carried out in a region that has for so long been experienced as volatile and unruly, then it must surely mean that internal order has been restored in the Russian great power. However, it is argued in the article that there are several potential tripwires on the way towards achieving these symbolically important goals. Problems of security, terrorism, geopolitical volatility, large-scale corruption and inter-ethnic tension loom large, and may all turn out to be formidable obstacles and render the hosting of the Games a counter-productive enterprise. The paper puts official discourse (as in official speeches, media interviews, et cetera) in relation to scholarly analyses of the problems and potentialities of the Sochi Olympics, all in the general framework of Russia’s self-image and identity as a great power.

This paper advances the idea that two partly symbiotic, partly countervailing and very potent political myths, one about Russia’s historically preordained great power status and the other about the frequent inhibitions to its great power aspirations due to domestic weakness, foreign intervention and Times of Troubles, reflect and reveal major dynamics of contemporary political life in Russia. The perspective provides a key to the understanding of Vladimir Putin’s longstanding domestic popularity and legitimacy as a president. An analysis of President Putin’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly shows how these myths have been drawn upon in contemporary Russian political rhetoric and practice during the periods 2000-2008 and from 2012 onwards.

For a variety of political, climatic, ecological, security-related and other resons, the Russian summer resort of Sochi by the Black Sea would seem a most unlikely candidate for the Olympic Winter Games. Despite this, the Games will be held there in February 2014, and the Russian leaders regard the Games as a highly prestigious project underlining Russia's return to a status of great power in the contemporary world. This book conducts a thorough inventory of the contexts, characteristics and challenges facing the Sochi Games. It deals with the problems from Russian, Georgian, Abkhazian and Circassian pespectives and makes in-depth analyses of profound challenges related to matters such as identity, security, and ethnic relations. The book brings together an international group of eminent scholars representing different disciplinary perspectives, including political science, sports science, ethics, ethnology, and Caucasian studies.

For a variety of political, climatic, ecological, security-related and other reasons, the Russian summer resort of Sochi by the Black Sea would seem a most unlikely candidate for the Olympic Winter Games. Despite this, the Games will be held there in February 2014, and the Russian leaders regard the Games as a highly prestigious project underlining Russia’s return to a status of great power in the contemporary world. This book conducts a thorough inventory of the contexts, characteristics and challenges facing the Sochi Games. It deals with the problems from Russian, Georgian, Abkhazian and Circassian perspectives and makes in-depth analyses of profound challenges related to matters such as identity, security, and ethnic relations. The book brings together an international group of eminent scholars representing different disciplinary perspectives, including political science, sports science, ethics, ethnology, and Caucasian studies.

Det är nu mer än 15 år sedan jag senast sysslade med den svenska neutraliteten, vilken bl a utgjorde ämnet för min doktorsavhandling i statsvetenskap. Den distans som jag därigenom kan anlägga borgar emellertid för andra infallsvinklar än dem som jag använde mig av under min tidiga akademiska karriär. I min presentation kommer jag att diskutera den svenska neutraliteten under kalla kriget med utgångspunkt i resonemang om nationell identitet, nationell självuppfattning och politisk myt. Dessa perspektiv anläggs för att begripliggöra den särposition som föreställningen om den svenska neutraliteten hade i svensk politik och samhällsdebatt under efterkrigstiden.