Malmö University Publications
Change search
Refine search result
1 - 27 of 27
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Contested Institutional Facts2019In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, no 5, p. 1047-1064Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A significant part of contemporary social ontology has been focused on understanding forms of collective intentionality. It is suggested in this paper that the contested nature of some institutional matters makes this kind of approach problematic, and instead an alternative approach is developed, one that is oriented towards a micro-level analysis of the institutional constraints that we face in everyday life and which can make sense of how there can be institutional facts that are deeply contested and yet still real. The model is applied to two main examples, sexism and racism, and it is argued that on this approach it can make sense to understand both of them as institutions in our societies.

    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 2.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Critical moral thinking without moral theory2015In: Against boredom: 17 essays on ignorance, values, creativity, metaphysics, decision-making, truth, preference, art, processes, Ramsey, ethics, rationality, validity, human ills, science and eternal life ; to Nils-Erik Sahlin on the occasion of his 60th birthday / [ed] Johannes Persson, Göran Hermerén, Eva Sjöstrand, Fri Tanke Förlag , 2015, p. 33-42Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Ethics2017In: Handbook of Mereology / [ed] Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt, Guido Imaguire, Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Philosophia Verlag GmbH, 2017, p. 208-210Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Evidence-Based Medicine, Clinical Guidelines, and the Role of Patient Preferences2018In: Science and Proven Experience Johannes / [ed] Nils-Eric Sahlin, VBE, Lund University , 2018, p. 31-40Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 5.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Evidence-Based Policymaking under Exceptional Circumstances2021In: Science and Proven Experience / [ed] Nils-Eric Sahlin, Lund: Media-tryck , 2021, p. 29-38Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 6.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Evidensbasering i politiken: två problem och en enkel tumregel2018In: Vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet politik / [ed] Nils-Eric Sahlin, VBE, Lunds universitet , 2018, p. 51-60Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 7.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Future generations as rightholders2016In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, ISSN 1369-8230, E-ISSN 1743-8772, Vol. 19, no 6, p. 680-698Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many people believe that we have obligations with respect to future generations concerning the state of the environment that we pass on to them. Apart from the practical problem of people not really acting on such beliefs, there are also conceptual or philosophical issues that make these obligations problematic. The so-called non-identity problem is especially difficult: depending on which courses of action we adopt, different people will be born in the future, which means that even future people who due to our behavior will live under fairly poor circumstances might not have any ground for complaint. Had we not behaved as we did, they would not even have existed. It is argued here that, at least within a rights-theoretical approach, the non-identity problem can be solved by moving from considering individual rights to generational rights, rights which future generations hold qua generations.

  • 8.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Good Life, The2017In: Handbook of Mereology / [ed] Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt, Guido Imaguire, Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Philosophia Verlag GmbH, 2017, p. 239-241Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Good-making and organic unity2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 6, p. 1499-1516Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and it is suggested that we should distinguish between two kinds of wholes, collections and complex unities, where the latter can involve values that do not pass on their value to the greater whole in which they are included. Given this distinction we are then able to distinguish between two kinds of organic unity phenomena, the first involving a form of goodness that emerges on the level of the whole, the second involving a form of goodness that is embedded on the level of parts. In order to properly understand the latter form of goodness, there is also a need to distinguish final value from inherent value.

    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 10.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Institutions, Ideology, and Nonideal Social Ontology2019In: Philosophy of the social sciences, ISSN 0048-3931, E-ISSN 1552-7441, Vol. 49, no 2, p. 137-159Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Analytic social ontology has been dominated by approaches where institutions tend to come out paradigmatically as being relatively harmonious and mutually beneficial. This can however raise worries about such models potentially playing an ideological role in conceptualizing certain politically charged features of our societies as marginal phenomena or not even being institutional matters at all. This article seeks to develop a nonideal theory of institutions, which neither assumes that institutions are beneficial or oppressive, and where ideology is understood as a structuring and stabilizing phenomenon that helps maintain specific distributions of rights and duties by conferring perceived legitimacy onto them.

  • 11.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Means Paternalism and the Problem of Indeterminacy2023In: Moral Philosophy and Politics, ISSN 2194-5616, E-ISSN 2194-5624, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 47-67Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many contemporary defenders of paternalist interventions favor a version of paternalism focused on how people often choose the wrong means given their own ends. This idea is typically justified by empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics. To the extent that paternalist interventions can then target the promotion of goals that can be said to be our own, such interventions are prima facie less problematic. One version of this argument starts from the idea that it is meaningful to ascribe to us preferences that we would have if were fully rational, informed and in control over our actions. It is argued here, however, that the very body of empirical results that means paternalists typically rely on also undermines this idea as a robust enough notion. A more modest approach to paternalist interventions, on which such policies are understood as enmeshed with welfare-state policies promoting certain primary goods, is then proposed instead.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 12.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Moral disunitarianism2016In: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 66, no 264, p. 481-499Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper puts forward and develops a position called moral disunitarianism, according to which moral generalities, to the extent that they exist, are at best domain-specific. Unlike the particularist, the disunitarian is open to some forms of ethical theorizing, although such theorizing will always have to be specialized and divided into distinct areas, e.g., biomedical ethics, business ethics, the ethics of war (and so on). Two main arguments for disunitarianism are discussed, one starting in recent research in psychology, the other in the need to make sense of moral dilemmas. It is suggested that while these arguments are far from conclusive, they still provide reason to take disunitarianism seriously as a meta-normative position.

  • 13.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Ohälsosamma vanor och folkhälsopolitisk paternalism2015In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, E-ISSN 2002-3383, Vol. 19, no 2, p. 1-12Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Paternalistiska åtgärder från samhällets sida förkastas ofta med hänvisning till att de innebär att vuxna personer behandlas som barn. Samtidigt visar modern psykologisk forskning på att vi även som vuxna är långt ifrån de rationella beslutsfattare som filosofer och ekonomer ofta har utgått från i sina modeller. I den här texten argumenterar jag för att det utifrån en mer realistisk syn på människors beslutsfattande går att identifiera beteenden där relationen mellan samhälle och medborgare är parallell med den mellan förälder och barn, samt att det då på vissa områden, till exempel inom folkhälsopolitiken och i relation till ohälsosamma vanor, går att rättfärdiga en mer starkt interventionistisk politik än vad samhället bedriver i nuläget.

  • 14.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    On the Epistemic Legitimacy of Government Paternalism2018In: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 11, no 1, p. 27-34Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Some contemporary paternalists argue in favor of government interventions based on how experimental psychologists and behavioral economists have found that our behavior often diverges from what would be predicted by rational-choice models. In this article it is argued that these findings can, more specifically, be used to identify decisional trouble spots where paternalist interventions may be legitimate. It is further argued that since the epistemic legitimacy of government paternalism ultimately rests on centralized decision-making having a comparative advantage, it also depends on the possibility of such interventions being governed by an ideal of evidence-based policy-making. The article asks how stringently this requirement should be understood, and to what extent government can legitimately engage in what might be called experimental policy-making of a paternalistic character.

  • 15.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Oombedda hälsoråd2020In: Vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet: Hälsoråd / [ed] Nils-Eric Sahlin, Lund: Media-tryck , 2020, p. 27-36Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 16.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Patients as Rights Holders2017In: The Hastings center report, ISSN 0093-0334, E-ISSN 1552-146X, Vol. 47, no 4, p. 32-39Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The dominant value in much of contemporary clinical ethics and research ethics has been that of autonomy understood as individual choice and with informed consent as the primary mechanism through which autonomy is exercised. This emphasis on autonomy is discussed here in the light of a critique formulated by Onora O’Neill. Given that there is something to this critique, two main lines of response are identified. The first is to replace the mainstream conception of autonomy with an alternative conception, like the Kantian one. The second is to keep the standard notion, but to embed it within a richer set of person-centered values, with a human-rights approach being a prime example. It is then argued that the latter approach is the preferable one.

  • 17.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Patriarchy as Institutional2021In: Journal of Social Ontology, ISSN 2196-9655, E-ISSN 2196-9663, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 233-254Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In considering patriarchy as potentially institutional and as a characteristic also of contemporary Western societies, a fundamental issue concerns how to make sense of largely informal institutions to begin with. Traditional accounts of institutions have often focused on formalized ones. It is argued here, however, that the principal idea behind one commonly accepted conception of institutions can be developed in a way that better facilitates an explication of informal institutions. When applied to the phenomenon of patriarchy, such an approach can then also allow us to ontologically make sense of gray areas and hierarchies of authority, as well as the intersectionality of social positions.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 18.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Principles of justice and the idea of practice-dependence2019In: Ethics & Global Politics, ISSN 1654-4951, E-ISSN 1654-6369, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 1-16Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years, several political theorists have argued that reasonable principles of justice are practice-dependent. In this paper it is suggested that we can distinguish between at least two main models for doing practice-dependent theorizing about justice, interpretivism and constructivism, and that they can be understood as based in two different conceptions of practices. It is then argued that the reliance on the notion of participants that characterizes interpretivism disables this approach from adequately addressing certain matters of justice and that a better way of developing the idea of practice-dependence can be found in a constructivism that starts from the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus, but which shifts the focus of that approach from societies to a more open-ended category of domains, and which understands the parties to a possible overlapping consensus as stakeholders in a certain set of interconnected practices.

    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 19.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Reflektivt ekvilibrium: tre utvidgningar2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 2, p. 3-16Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Regulating Compensatory Paternalism2019In: Res Publica, ISSN 1356-4765, E-ISSN 1572-8692, Vol. 25, no 2, p. 167-185Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Some recent arguments for paternalist government interventions have been based in empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics that would seem to show that adult human beings are far removed from the ideals of rationality presupposed by much of philosophical and economic theory. In this paper it is argued that we need to move to a different conception of human decision-making competence than the one that lies behind that common line of philosophical and economic thinking, and which actually still lies in the background of some of these recent approaches to paternalist interventions. An alternative picture of human decision-making competence is outlined and four criteria for identifying areas where paternalist interventions have a basic moral and political legitimacy are then identified on the basis of this picture.

    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 21.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Respect for Persons in Bioethics: Towards a Human Rights-Based Account2017In: Human Rights Review, ISSN 1524-8879, E-ISSN 1874-6306, Vol. 18, no 2, p. 171-187Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Human rights have increasingly been put forward as an important framework for bioethics. In this paper, it is argued that human rights offer a potentially fruitful approach to understanding the notion of Respect for Persons in bioethics. The idea that we are owed a certain kind of respect as persons is relatively common, but also quite often understood in terms of respecting people’s autonomous choices. Such accounts do however risk being too narrow, reducing some human beings to a second-class moral status. This paper puts forward a political approach to our standing as persons and a strongly pluralistic account of human rights that lays the ground for a more broadly applicable conception of Respect for Persons. It is further argued that this model also provides an example of a more general approach to philosophical ethics, an approach which is here called taxonomical pluralism. When it comes to Respect for Persons specifically, this principle is developed in terms of five distinct core concerns (autonomy, dignity, integrity, privacy, and vulnerability).

    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 22.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Social positions and institutional privilege as matters of justice2021In: European Journal of Political Theory, ISSN 1474-8851, E-ISSN 1741-2730, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 510-528Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Liberal political theory is often understood as being underpinned by an individualistic social ontology, and it is sometimes objected that this type of ontology makes it difficult to address injustices that involve social groups and informal forms of privilege. It is argued here that, to the extent that liberals do fail to properly address such structural injustices, the main problem can instead be understood to lie with a rules-centric understanding of institutions – one which is actually out of line with a proper ontological individualism. If institutions are instead understood as distributions of right and duties, held by individuals, it becomes much more straightforward to identify institutional privilege in terms of inequalities in those distributions. The relevant rights and duties can be explicated in terms of informal Hohfeldian incidents and it is argued that patterned distributions of such incidents can come to exist, and be maintained, through how we develop a largely intuitive sense of where our interpersonal boundaries run and form social expectations about which kinds of behaviour will typically receive pushback in some form.

  • 23.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    The Independence of Medical Ethics2018In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 5-15Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper discusses the relation between medical ethics and general moral theory, the argument being that medical ethics is best seen as independent from general moral theory. According to this independence thesis, here explicated in terms of what is called a disunitarian stance, the very idea of applied ethics, which is often seen as underlying medical ethics (as well as many other more specific fields of ethics), is misguided. We should instead think of medical ethics as a domain-specific ethical inquiry among other domain-specific ethical inquiries. On this alternative kind of picture, such ethical inquiries should start with looking at the particularities of the domain under consideration and then proceed from there. Some possible consequences of this idea for medical ethics are then identified and discussed.

    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 24.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Towards a Nominalist Understanding of Institutions2019In: Maurinian Truths - Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday / [ed] Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Robin Stenwall, Institute for Educational Sciences, Lund University, Sweden, 2019, p. 89-96Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    FULLTEXT01
  • 25.
    Brännmark, Johan
    et al.
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Brandstedt, Eric
    Lund University.
    Rawlsian Constructivism: A Practical Guide to Reflective Equilibrium2020In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 24, no 3, p. 355-373Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many normative theorists want to contribute to making the world a better place. In recent years, it has been suggested that to realise this ambition one must start with an adequate description of real-life practices. To determine what should be done, however, one must also fundamentally criticise existing moral beliefs. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of doing both. Yet, its practical usefulness has been doubted and it has been largely ignored in the recent practical turn of normative theorising. This paper offers a complementary methodology to the method of reflective equilibrium, referred to as Rawlsian constructivism, which brings forth its practical merits. With the support of Rawlsian constructivism, the method of reflective equilibrium becomes a tool for public reasoning about practical problems which aims to facilitate shared solutions. The process of reflective scrutiny is used, not in the search of moral truth, but rather to highlight what stands in the way of solutions to problems agents face in different domains of social life. The practical value lies in scrutinising reasons for action that are taken for granted, explicating new rationales for action and highlighting neglected points of agreement. The paper exemplifies this approach with a process of justifying individual obligations to combat climate change. Normative theorists who share the practical agenda have correctly noted the importance of bottom-up investigations of subject domains. This paper argues that the next step should be to utilise this version of the method of reflective equilibrium to explore the potential for morally progressive solutions to these problems.

    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 26.
    Brännmark, Johan
    et al.
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Brandstedt, Eric
    Rawlsian Constructivism and the Assumption of Disunity2019In: The Journal of Political Philosophy, ISSN 0963-8016, E-ISSN 1467-9760, Vol. 27, no 1, p. 48-66Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Sahlin, Nils-Eric
    et al.
    Lund University.
    Brännmark, Johan
    Malmö högskola, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    How can we be moral when we are so irrational?2013In: Logique et Analyse, ISSN 0024-5836, E-ISSN 2295-5836, Vol. 56, no 221, p. 101-126Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Normative ethics usually presupposes background accounts of human agency, and although different ethical theorists might have different pictures of human agency in mind, there is still something like a standard account that most of mainstream normative ethics can be understood to rest on. Ethical theorists tend to have Rational Man, or at least some close relative to him, in mind when constructing normative theories. It will be argued here that empirical findings raise doubts about the accuracy of this kind of account; human beings fall too far short of ideals of rationality for it to bemeaningful to devise normative ideals within such a framework. Instead, it is suggested, normative ethics could be conducted more profitably if the idea of unifying all ethical concerns into one theoretical account is abandoned. Such a disunity of ethical theorizing would then match the disunited and heuristic-oriented nature of our agency. Some preliminary suggestions about what ethical theorizing might look like instead are provided here along with some remarks about how these relate to other approaches in the literature.

1 - 27 of 27
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf