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  • 1.
    Blackburn, Matthew
    et al.
    University of Warsaw.
    Hutcheson, Derek Stanford
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus Regional Research (RUCARR).
    Petersson, Bo
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus Regional Research (RUCARR).
    Tsumarova, Elena
    Department of Comparative Political Studies North-West Institute of Management Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    Covid-19 and the Russian Regional Response: Blame Diffusion and Attitudes to Pandemic Governance2023In: Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, ISSN 2562-8429, Vol. 16, no 1, p. 29-54Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility toregional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.

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  • 2.
    Blackburn, Matthew
    et al.
    Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Petersson, Bo
    Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Russia and the Caucasus Regional Research (RUCARR). Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).
    Parade, plebiscite, pandemic: Legitimation efforts in Putin’s fourth term2022In: Post-Soviet Affairs, ISSN 1060-586X, E-ISSN 1938-2855, Vol. 38, no 4, p. 293-311Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement

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    fulltext
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Citation style
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