This thesis investigates why, despite initial diplomatic successes, the 2018–2022 Ethiopia–Eritreapeace process fell short of producing enduring peace. It looks at the structural and relationalfailings of the process using conflict transformation theory as a framework. This study examineswhy the 2018–2022 peace process failed to align with conflict transformation principles. Thisstudy employs a qualitative single case study methodology, discussing the 2018 AsmaraDeclaration in conjunction with regional media coverage, expert analyses, and human rightsdocuments. It encompasses four fundamental elements derived from conflict transformationtheory: addressing historical grievances, participation of marginalised stakeholders, fulfilment ofeconomic commitments, and construction of justice institutions. The results indicate that the peaceprocess was orchestrated by elites, exclusive, and symbolic. It did not successfully involveimpacted communities, especially in Tigray and border areas, nor did it create frameworks fortruth-telling and responsibility. Promised economic collaboration, including reopening bordersand resuming trade, rapidly stagnated due to insufficient institutional implementation andstakeholder agreement. The method consequently lacked the essential relational, participatory, andjustice-oriented elements required for sustainable transformation. This thesis contributes to Peaceand Conflict Studies by demonstrating how the lack of inclusive engagement, institutional reform,and local ownership can threaten formal peace agreements. It underlines the limitations of topdowndiplomacy and the need to include notions of conflict transformation into projects aimed atpeace-building. Ethiopia and Eritrea’s predicament shows that maintaining peace calls for facingthe underlying reasons and real experiences of war, not only for formal accords.