Debates on assisted dying remain controversial and call out for conceptual clarification. What is the moral basis for assessing competing arguments, and what is the best way to frame these arguments in terms of actual and potential human rights? This article aims to investigate whether autonomy alone suffices as a moral source for human rights and whether, on this basis, there should be a positive human right to assisted dying, and a negative human right to assist others in dying. Drawing upon discussions in political theory, medical ethics, and human rights scholarship, the article develops an account of autonomy as multidimensional and subject to trade-offs. Autonomy is divided into the dimensions of liberty, opportunity, capacity, and authenticity. Furthermore, there is a common intuition that human beings ought to be endowed with a domain of core autonomy that must never be compromised in any trade-off. This analytical framework is used to map conflicts and trade-offs concerning assisted dying. By way of conclusion, it is argued that autonomy suffices to describe what human rights protect, but not why they do so. Furthermore, it is argued that the terminology of rights used in debates on assisted dying risks misrepresenting what the debate is actually about, and that the debate should be framed in terms of the right to health and exceptions to the right to life, rather than general rights related to assisted dying. Thus, assisted dying should be seen as an extreme option, where death is not the end, but the means, and ought to be considered alongside other means, as a last resort, already in the legislative process.