The electoral arena is an area in which all four aspects of authoritarian resilience have been in evidence in the case of the Russian Federation in recent years. Drawing on the concept of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013), the paper will examine the engineering of the electoral and party system in a manner that has systematically favoured the ruling elite; drawn lessons from other regimes’ attempts to systematically disenfranchise political opponents; used the threat of foreign interference in the electoral system to justify ever-more stringent restrictions on campaign activity, funding and candidacy; and increasingly given up even the pretence of pluralism and open debate in the electoral arena.  With the aid of a detailed examination of electoral law and party system development, the paper will focus on the key question of whether electoral authoritarian regimes inevitably tip into full authoritarianism, as has happened in Russia in recent years.  Alternatively, could the early 2000s model of ‘managed democracy’ (relatively free competition within a moderately-controlled arena) have created the conditions for a consolidated democracy in the right circumstances?  A particular focus is on the ‘toolkit’ of measures used to constrict competition and ensure favourable electoral outcomes for the Kremlin and its associates, and on public confidence (or the lack thereof) in the legitimacy of the electoral process.