Soviet electoral processes invited popular approbation by encouraging ‘everybody to the polls!’ (‘vse na vybory!’), even in the absence of multiple candidates. The 99.9% turnout in the 1984 Supreme Soviet election was claimed, without irony, to provide ‘convincing new evidence … of the working people’s full support for the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state’ (Pravda, 7 March 1984: 1).  But how do modern electoral authoritarian regimes — which hold nominally pluralist elections but combine ‘formal institutions of democratic representation’ with ‘severe and systematic manipulation’ (Schedler 2013) — maintain and demonstrate their popular support? 

Even in the absence of genuinely free and fair elections, the pretence of legitimacy through the ballot box is a key part of the toolkit for electoral authoritarian regime survival.  The paper examines the Russian Federation since the early 2010s, where regional political machines have been used by the regime to mobilise the pro-Kremlin vote in key regions, whilst demobilising voters in more opposition-inclined districts – ensuring that the margin of victory is enhanced even if the level of turnout is not.  Through a detailed examination of regional turnout patterns from official election results over the last three rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections, the paper shows that the 2024 presidential contest – the first national election since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – represented the most successful use hitherto of the joint mobilisation/suppression strategy.  Vladimir Putin’s margin of victory was significantly enhanced – by nearly 20% - by differential levels of turnout across the country.  As in previous cases, the electoral campaign and its outcome were used to bolster societal control and, above all, legitimacy claims.