Moral disunitarianism
2016 (English)In: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 66, no 264, p. 481-499Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]
This paper puts forward and develops a position called moral disunitarianism, according to which moral generalities, to the extent that they exist, are at best domain-specific. Unlike the particularist, the disunitarian is open to some forms of ethical theorizing, although such theorizing will always have to be specialized and divided into distinct areas, e.g., biomedical ethics, business ethics, the ethics of war (and so on). Two main arguments for disunitarianism are discussed, one starting in recent research in psychology, the other in the need to make sense of moral dilemmas. It is suggested that while these arguments are far from conclusive, they still provide reason to take disunitarianism seriously as a meta-normative position.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2016. Vol. 66, no 264, p. 481-499
National Category
Humanities and the Arts
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-1341DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqv114ISI: 000379780500003Local ID: 19850OAI: oai:DiVA.org:mau-1341DiVA, id: diva2:1398069
2020-02-272020-02-272022-06-27Bibliographically approved