As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility toregional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.

Fallacies and wishful thinking: on Russia studies, Putin, and the lead-up to the warWhen President Putin over the years repeatedly raged and ranted about how Russia had been deceived by the West over NATO’s eastward expansion, how Ukraine’s rightful president allegedly had been illegally overthrown in a coup instigated by the West, and how these actions had the hidden purpose of bringing destruction and devastation to Russia, few were inclined to believe that he was not just repeat-ing a mantra, but actually believed in what he said and prescribed a program of action. This essay provides a background to the steady growth of the authoritar-ian essence of the Putin regime and its growing ambitions beyond Russia’s borders and discusses what academic area studies specialists in the West and other Russia pundits generally should have been able to foresee about Russia’s aggressiveness and its upcoming assault on Ukraine. Perhaps the current situation could have been avoided, had there been a greater inclination to bring together the clues that were there and take preventive action to meet the danger

Vladimir Putin’s power position has long been sustained by the successful communication of major political myths and his acclaimed role in them. This chapter discusses such myths to assess whether they are still useful for the regime as tools of legitimation after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, and Russia’s lack of success on the battlefield thereafter. I introduce the distinction between overarching master myths and more supplementary myths, arguing that the master myths about Russia’s pre-determined great power status, Russia as a phoenix rising from the rubbles of another Time of Troubles, and Russia as a bulwark against the evil West retain their relevance and are ruthlessly exploited by the regime. Several supplementary myths have most likely had their credibility reduced. However, unless the master myths are affected, the regime is not likely to face a major loss of legitimacy among the population at large.

Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement

The objective of this chapter is to provide a Swedish perspective on the 30th anniversary of the fall of Communism in eastern Europe. The most evident contrast when comparing Sweden in 1990 and 2020, was that the country was now a committed, even if also somewhat disillusioned, member of the European Union. Little remained of the so-called policy of neutrality that had been so cherished during the times of the Cold War. The euphoria of the early 1990s, those brief years when everything seemed possible, was clearly gone. The years when Sweden had been a relentless champion promoting enlargements of the European Union as the standard recipe for ensuring peace and democracy in Europe had come and then waned considerably. The European Partnership had largely brought disappointing results. Whereas optimism about general developments used to be almost unbridled in official Sweden by the end of the Cold War, disillusionment seemed to reign ever since the mid-2010s, when moves toward illiberal democracy, populism and Russian violations of international law defined much of the order of the day in Europe. Grey and somber realities characterized for the most part the everyday, and it was left to the Swedish government to deal with this in its practical policies.

This book brings together a strong and international team of linguists, historians, and social and political scientists renowned for their expertise on North and South Caucasus. Their contributions paint a compelling picture of the region’s contested past and highlight some of the enduring challenges still confronting it. Taken together, the ten chapters of the book enhance our understanding of the region’s ancient languages, shed light on historical events of crucial significance, and uncover mechanisms behind political conflict and cooperation in the tinderbox that is the Caucasus.