This article investigates Russian mainstream media's coverage of the 2013 legislation banning "propaganda for non-traditional sexuality". Inspired by theories on belonging, media and visibility, it reconstructs a dominant narrative representing non-heterosexuals as threatening the future survival of the nation, as imposing the sex-radical norms of a minority onto the majority, or as connected to an imperialistic West which aims to destroy Russia. This story, it is argued, functions as a hegemonic grammar regulating how non-heterosexuality is seen and heard in the public sphere. However, it is argued that sometimes the linearity and cohesiveness of the narrative breaks down, when things appear that do not fit this model of interpretation. The analysis illustrates how contestations of belonging in contemporary media are increasingly structured according to the logic of visibility: dominant actors attempt to regulate what can be seen and heard in the public sphere whereas oppositional actors attempt to establish their own visibility in the mediated space of appearance, putting forward alternative constructions of the nation and who belongs to it.

In Russia, as in some other countries around the world, we are currently witnessing a wave of politically sanctioned homophobia, most concretely manifested in the 2013 law against “homosexual propaganda”. By examining Russian mainstream media reporting, this article aims to reconstruct a dominant narrative on homosexuality and LGBT rights. It is found that this narrative revolves around three tropes: 1) that non-heterosexuals are a threat to the nation, 2) that LGBT rights are about imposing the minority´s norms onto the majority; and 3) that LGBT rights is bound up with Western modernity, to which Russia offers an alternative. Discussing the findings in light of theories on nationalism, gender and sexuality, I argue that homophobia in Russia must be understood in a global geopolitical perspective: as an attempt to negotiate a meaningful international role for Russia in a world order where LGBT rights have become a symbolic marker of Western modernity.

The theoretical point of departure of this paper is that the perspective of political myth adds to the understanding of political developments in Russia. The upcoming Olympic Winter Games in Sochi in 2014 are discursively constructed as a manifestation of Russia's return to great power status. In official Russian discourse, there is an encounter between the Russian great power myth and the myth of Olympism, both of which are employed to strengthen the status of Russia and of President Putin personally. Thus, the Olympic values of humanism, internationalism, and progress are merged with Russian great power ideals. But there are also examples where the prevailing myths are turned around to criticise the regime and the Sochi Games. However, the most serious challenge to the Putin regime may stem from the great power myth itself, should the regime prove unable to deliver what it requires.

Mediated mega-events are essentially projects of belonging: about imagining communities and about creating attachment to such collective selves. However, events like the Olympic Games are not only an opportunity for states to reinforce official constructions of belonging but can also be sites for the articulation and dissemination of contesting identity narratives. This article investigates Russian media narratives around the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, mainstream as well as alternative. It is argued that the Russian regime uses the Olympics to create national and global visibility for a specific project of belonging: that of a re-emerging great power – strong and united – but also an inclusive and tolerant place which can serve as an international example of ethnic and religious conviviality. This imagined community, however, rests on exclusions and silences. In addition, three alternative projects of belonging, emerging from the Circassian diaspora, LGBT rights activists and Islamists, are examined. Although these are very different, they all attempt to use the spotlight of the Sochi Olympics to disrupt the mainstream narrative and create visibility for challenging imaginations of community. On the more general level the article argues that the media contestations around the Sochi Olympics provide an insight into how the quest for visibility has become a central dynamic in the Russian media environment.

This article examines what kind of Russia is being projected in official rhetoric about the Sochi Olympics, arguing that the imagined community of Sochi-2014 is a diverse, inclusive and tolerant nation, even an international example of ethnic conviviality. The article puts this narrative in historical perspective, relating it to the mnogonatsionalnost policies of tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. It is argued that this imagination, though explicitly very inclusive, rests on important exclusions and silences. By selective exhibitions of minority-groups the other is domesticated, stereotyped and reduced to kitsch and folklore, glossing over conflict-ridden histories and prevailing inequalities.

This article explores how the image of the USA has developed in two major Russian daily newspapers, Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda, in a time period comprised of a total 20 weeks’ of study in the years of 1984, 1994, 2004 and 2009. For Russia this time span was dramatic: it moved from seemingly stable superpower in the 1980s, over the chaos after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, to the partial comeback to great power status at the beginning of the 21st century. While telling the story of how the image of the USA has evolved, the article also describes how Russian self-images have developed. The image projected of the USA was Manichean in the 1980s, whereas the most benevolent images were found in the 1990s. The examples from 2004 and 2009 reflect an assertive Russia that is back on the world stage. The USA is here again often criticized, but also — as before — comprises the scale against which Russia itself is measured.