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Publications (10 of 27) Show all publications
Brännmark, J. (2023). Means Paternalism and the Problem of Indeterminacy. Moral Philosophy and Politics, 10(1), 47-67
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Means Paternalism and the Problem of Indeterminacy
2023 (English)In: Moral Philosophy and Politics, ISSN 2194-5616, E-ISSN 2194-5624, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 47-67Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Many contemporary defenders of paternalist interventions favor a version of paternalism focused on how people often choose the wrong means given their own ends. This idea is typically justified by empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics. To the extent that paternalist interventions can then target the promotion of goals that can be said to be our own, such interventions are prima facie less problematic. One version of this argument starts from the idea that it is meaningful to ascribe to us preferences that we would have if were fully rational, informed and in control over our actions. It is argued here, however, that the very body of empirical results that means paternalists typically rely on also undermines this idea as a robust enough notion. A more modest approach to paternalist interventions, on which such policies are understood as enmeshed with welfare-state policies promoting certain primary goods, is then proposed instead.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Walter de Gruyter, 2023
Keywords
paternalism, policy-making, rationality, welfare, preferences
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-49197 (URN)10.1515/mopp-2021-0032 (DOI)000734167900001 ()2-s2.0-85121785570 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2022-01-10 Created: 2022-01-10 Last updated: 2023-07-04Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2021). Evidence-Based Policymaking under Exceptional Circumstances. In: Nils-Eric Sahlin (Ed.), Science and Proven Experience: (pp. 29-38). Lund: Media-tryck
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Evidence-Based Policymaking under Exceptional Circumstances
2021 (English)In: Science and Proven Experience / [ed] Nils-Eric Sahlin, Lund: Media-tryck , 2021, p. 29-38Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Lund: Media-tryck, 2021
Series
Vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Global politics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-40393 (URN)978-91-519-3913-1 (ISBN)
Available from: 2021-02-03 Created: 2021-02-03 Last updated: 2022-07-19Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2021). Patriarchy as Institutional. Journal of Social Ontology, 7(2), 233-254
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Patriarchy as Institutional
2021 (English)In: Journal of Social Ontology, ISSN 2196-9655, E-ISSN 2196-9663, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 233-254Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In considering patriarchy as potentially institutional and as a characteristic also of contemporary Western societies, a fundamental issue concerns how to make sense of largely informal institutions to begin with. Traditional accounts of institutions have often focused on formalized ones. It is argued here, however, that the principal idea behind one commonly accepted conception of institutions can be developed in a way that better facilitates an explication of informal institutions. When applied to the phenomenon of patriarchy, such an approach can then also allow us to ontologically make sense of gray areas and hierarchies of authority, as well as the intersectionality of social positions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Walter de Gruyter, 2021
Keywords
social ontology, institutions, patriarchy, intersectionality
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-50576 (URN)10.1515/jso-2021-0033 (DOI)2-s2.0-85121749973 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2022-03-10 Created: 2022-03-10 Last updated: 2024-02-05Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2021). Social positions and institutional privilege as matters of justice (ed.). European Journal of Political Theory, 20(3), 510-528
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Social positions and institutional privilege as matters of justice
2021 (English)In: European Journal of Political Theory, ISSN 1474-8851, E-ISSN 1741-2730, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 510-528Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Liberal political theory is often understood as being underpinned by an individualistic social ontology, and it is sometimes objected that this type of ontology makes it difficult to address injustices that involve social groups and informal forms of privilege. It is argued here that, to the extent that liberals do fail to properly address such structural injustices, the main problem can instead be understood to lie with a rules-centric understanding of institutions – one which is actually out of line with a proper ontological individualism. If institutions are instead understood as distributions of right and duties, held by individuals, it becomes much more straightforward to identify institutional privilege in terms of inequalities in those distributions. The relevant rights and duties can be explicated in terms of informal Hohfeldian incidents and it is argued that patterned distributions of such incidents can come to exist, and be maintained, through how we develop a largely intuitive sense of where our interpersonal boundaries run and form social expectations about which kinds of behaviour will typically receive pushback in some form.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Sage Publications, 2021
National Category
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalisation Studies)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-1409 (URN)10.1177/1474885118788973 (DOI)000672619000007 ()2-s2.0-85052568071 (Scopus ID)26125 (Local ID)26125 (Archive number)26125 (OAI)
Available from: 2020-02-27 Created: 2020-02-27 Last updated: 2024-02-06Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2020). Oombedda hälsoråd. In: Nils-Eric Sahlin (Ed.), Vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet: Hälsoråd (pp. 27-36). Lund: Media-tryck
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Oombedda hälsoråd
2020 (Swedish)In: Vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet: Hälsoråd / [ed] Nils-Eric Sahlin, Lund: Media-tryck , 2020, p. 27-36Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Lund: Media-tryck, 2020
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-40394 (URN)978-91-983575-9-2 (ISBN)
Available from: 2021-02-03 Created: 2021-02-03 Last updated: 2022-03-10Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. & Brandstedt, E. (2020). Rawlsian Constructivism: A Practical Guide to Reflective Equilibrium. Journal of Ethics, 24(3), 355-373
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Rawlsian Constructivism: A Practical Guide to Reflective Equilibrium
2020 (English)In: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 24, no 3, p. 355-373Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Many normative theorists want to contribute to making the world a better place. In recent years, it has been suggested that to realise this ambition one must start with an adequate description of real-life practices. To determine what should be done, however, one must also fundamentally criticise existing moral beliefs. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of doing both. Yet, its practical usefulness has been doubted and it has been largely ignored in the recent practical turn of normative theorising. This paper offers a complementary methodology to the method of reflective equilibrium, referred to as Rawlsian constructivism, which brings forth its practical merits. With the support of Rawlsian constructivism, the method of reflective equilibrium becomes a tool for public reasoning about practical problems which aims to facilitate shared solutions. The process of reflective scrutiny is used, not in the search of moral truth, but rather to highlight what stands in the way of solutions to problems agents face in different domains of social life. The practical value lies in scrutinising reasons for action that are taken for granted, explicating new rationales for action and highlighting neglected points of agreement. The paper exemplifies this approach with a process of justifying individual obligations to combat climate change. Normative theorists who share the practical agenda have correctly noted the importance of bottom-up investigations of subject domains. This paper argues that the next step should be to utilise this version of the method of reflective equilibrium to explore the potential for morally progressive solutions to these problems.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2020
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Global politics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-18398 (URN)10.1007/s10892-020-09333-3 (DOI)000704318100008 ()2-s2.0-85084491168 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2020-09-24 Created: 2020-09-24 Last updated: 2024-02-05Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2019). Contested Institutional Facts (ed.). Erkenntnis (5), 1047-1064
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Contested Institutional Facts
2019 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, no 5, p. 1047-1064Article in journal (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

A significant part of contemporary social ontology has been focused on understanding forms of collective intentionality. It is suggested in this paper that the contested nature of some institutional matters makes this kind of approach problematic, and instead an alternative approach is developed, one that is oriented towards a micro-level analysis of the institutional constraints that we face in everyday life and which can make sense of how there can be institutional facts that are deeply contested and yet still real. The model is applied to two main examples, sexism and racism, and it is argued that on this approach it can make sense to understand both of them as institutions in our societies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2019
National Category
Humanities and the Arts
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-1504 (URN)10.1007/s10670-018-9994-7 (DOI)000492168600005 ()2-s2.0-85044779412 (Scopus ID)24849 (Local ID)24849 (Archive number)24849 (OAI)
Available from: 2020-02-27 Created: 2020-02-27 Last updated: 2024-02-06Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2019). Institutions, Ideology, and Nonideal Social Ontology (ed.). Philosophy of the social sciences, 49(2), 137-159
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Institutions, Ideology, and Nonideal Social Ontology
2019 (English)In: Philosophy of the social sciences, ISSN 0048-3931, E-ISSN 1552-7441, Vol. 49, no 2, p. 137-159Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Analytic social ontology has been dominated by approaches where institutions tend to come out paradigmatically as being relatively harmonious and mutually beneficial. This can however raise worries about such models potentially playing an ideological role in conceptualizing certain politically charged features of our societies as marginal phenomena or not even being institutional matters at all. This article seeks to develop a nonideal theory of institutions, which neither assumes that institutions are beneficial or oppressive, and where ideology is understood as a structuring and stabilizing phenomenon that helps maintain specific distributions of rights and duties by conferring perceived legitimacy onto them.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Sage Publications, 2019
National Category
Humanities and the Arts
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-1872 (URN)10.1177/0048393118823265 (DOI)000458784800003 ()2-s2.0-85060587280 (Scopus ID)27900 (Local ID)27900 (Archive number)27900 (OAI)
Available from: 2020-02-27 Created: 2020-02-27 Last updated: 2024-02-06Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. (2019). Principles of justice and the idea of practice-dependence (ed.). Ethics & Global Politics, 12(3), 1-16
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Principles of justice and the idea of practice-dependence
2019 (English)In: Ethics & Global Politics, ISSN 1654-4951, E-ISSN 1654-6369, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 1-16Article in journal (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In recent years, several political theorists have argued that reasonable principles of justice are practice-dependent. In this paper it is suggested that we can distinguish between at least two main models for doing practice-dependent theorizing about justice, interpretivism and constructivism, and that they can be understood as based in two different conceptions of practices. It is then argued that the reliance on the notion of participants that characterizes interpretivism disables this approach from adequately addressing certain matters of justice and that a better way of developing the idea of practice-dependence can be found in a constructivism that starts from the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus, but which shifts the focus of that approach from societies to a more open-ended category of domains, and which understands the parties to a possible overlapping consensus as stakeholders in a certain set of interconnected practices.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Taylor & Francis, 2019
National Category
Humanities and the Arts
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-1986 (URN)10.1080/16544951.2019.1667132 (DOI)000490141200001 ()2-s2.0-85073958917 (Scopus ID)30302 (Local ID)30302 (Archive number)30302 (OAI)
Available from: 2020-02-27 Created: 2020-02-27 Last updated: 2024-02-06Bibliographically approved
Brännmark, J. & Brandstedt, E. (2019). Rawlsian Constructivism and the Assumption of Disunity (ed.). The Journal of Political Philosophy, 27(1), 48-66
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Rawlsian Constructivism and the Assumption of Disunity
2019 (English)In: The Journal of Political Philosophy, ISSN 0963-8016, E-ISSN 1467-9760, Vol. 27, no 1, p. 48-66Article in journal (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2019
National Category
Humanities and the Arts
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-1573 (URN)10.1111/jopp.12157 (DOI)000458288500003 ()2-s2.0-85061360608 (Scopus ID)24691 (Local ID)24691 (Archive number)24691 (OAI)
Available from: 2020-02-27 Created: 2020-02-27 Last updated: 2024-02-06Bibliographically approved
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