This article seeks to fill a research gap by analysing refugees’ voting behavior, using Sweden (known for high refugee immigration, relatively liberal enfranchisement rules, and comprehensive electoral data) as a case study. Relying on register data on turnout from Swedish municipal elections, the article sheds new light on how the political integration of refugees varies. We test theories of resocialization and examine the extent to which a refugee’s political integration is affected by the surrounding environment, focusing on the political culture of the areas surrounding their neighborhoods. The results show that two major factors strongly affect refugee turnout rates: the acquisition of citizenship, and the degree of diversity of nationality in the districts in which refugees live, based on different experiences of “bonding” and “bridging” with the surrounding environment.

Stephen Leonard White was born in Dublin in 1945, to a literary and culturalhousehold. He attained his first degree at Trinity College Dublin in 1967 before movingto the University of Glasgow to pursue doctoral studies. He remained in Glasgow for therest of his career, spending his last three decades as professor, and was viewed as one ofthe world’s leading scholars of Soviet and post-Soviet history and politics. Author andeditor of more than 500 books, articles and edited volumes, and a frequent commentatorin the media, he was known for his prodigious work ethic, attention to detail, depth ofhis scholarship and generosity of spirit. In addition to his own scholarly output, he supervised or mentored an extended family of grateful scholars now spread across the world.He died in November 2023 after an exemplary career spanning more than 50 years.

This chapter examines immigrants’ electoral participation. It focuses on four questions: Should immigrants be allowed to vote? In which countries can they vote? How much do they vote? And why do they vote? Providing a comprehensive overview of the latest research on the normative and empirical debates around these questions, it presents the state of the art in the study of immigrant electoral turnout. It ends with an in-depth examination of immigrants’ electoral participation in Sweden, one of the countries in the world that is most liberal in granting non-citizens the right to vote in sub-national elections, and for which newly available, comprehensive data allow us to develop a more nuanced understanding of immigrants’ turnout patterns.

After decades of forced participation, one of the major changes from communist to post-communist elections (apart from multiple candidates) was the option of abstention from voting.  Although some post-Soviet states have returned to mobilised authoritarian elections, electoral turnout levels in the democratic post-communist states generally continue to be lower than in Western Europe (Kostadinova and Power 2007; Zagorski 2022).  Studies (e.g., Hutcheson and Russo 2021, Hansen 2021; Maškarinec 2022) indicate that this pattern also exists amongst their diasporas abroad.  Where they have voting rights in other countries’ elections (e.g., at municipal or European Parliament level), or can participate in their own countries’ elections from abroad, electoral participation rates of citizens from former communist states still tend to be several percentage points lower than those of migrants from other parts of the EU and the rest of the world (Kostelka 2017).

The paper takes a closer look at the reasons for this.  Examining the political participation of diasporas from post-Soviet and post-communist states, it studies the phenomenon of low electoral turnout amongst post-communist citizens both at home and abroad.  Using a combination of detailed register data and focus groups with post-communist diasporas in Sweden (where all residents can vote in local elections after a certain period of minimum residence), and studies of the infrastructure around elections more generally, it examines the central question of whether the low electoral turnout of post-communist citizens relates to aspects of the political culture, or other contingent factors.

The Covid-19 epidemic came at a sensitive time for Russia’s leadership, which was attempting a political reset and structural reforms, including the removal of President Putin’s presidential term limits. This article examines how issues related to the pandemic provided new opportunities for the systemic opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who emerged as the main beneficiaries after capitalising on opportunities created by the epidemic. The underappreciated role of systemic opposition parties in electoral authoritarian systems, which balance “voice” and “loyalty” to benefit both themselves and the regime, is examined in the context of the Covid-19 crisis. 

The electoral arena is an area in which all four aspects of authoritarian resilience have been in evidence in the case of the Russian Federation in recent years. Drawing on the concept of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013), the paper will examine the engineering of the electoral and party system in a manner that has systematically favoured the ruling elite; drawn lessons from other regimes’ attempts to systematically disenfranchise political opponents; used the threat of foreign interference in the electoral system to justify ever-more stringent restrictions on campaign activity, funding and candidacy; and increasingly given up even the pretence of pluralism and open debate in the electoral arena.  With the aid of a detailed examination of electoral law and party system development, the paper will focus on the key question of whether electoral authoritarian regimes inevitably tip into full authoritarianism, as has happened in Russia in recent years.  Alternatively, could the early 2000s model of ‘managed democracy’ (relatively free competition within a moderately-controlled arena) have created the conditions for a consolidated democracy in the right circumstances?  A particular focus is on the ‘toolkit’ of measures used to constrict competition and ensure favourable electoral outcomes for the Kremlin and its associates, and on public confidence (or the lack thereof) in the legitimacy of the electoral process.  

Soviet electoral processes invited popular approbation by encouraging ‘everybody to the polls!’ (‘vse na vybory!’), even in the absence of multiple candidates. The 99.9% turnout in the 1984 Supreme Soviet election was claimed, without irony, to provide ‘convincing new evidence … of the working people’s full support for the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state’ (Pravda, 7 March 1984: 1).  But how do modern electoral authoritarian regimes — which hold nominally pluralist elections but combine ‘formal institutions of democratic representation’ with ‘severe and systematic manipulation’ (Schedler 2013) — maintain and demonstrate their popular support? 

Even in the absence of genuinely free and fair elections, the pretence of legitimacy through the ballot box is a key part of the toolkit for electoral authoritarian regime survival.  The paper examines the Russian Federation since the early 2010s, where regional political machines have been used by the regime to mobilise the pro-Kremlin vote in key regions, whilst demobilising voters in more opposition-inclined districts – ensuring that the margin of victory is enhanced even if the level of turnout is not.  Through a detailed examination of regional turnout patterns from official election results over the last three rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections, the paper shows that the 2024 presidential contest – the first national election since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – represented the most successful use hitherto of the joint mobilisation/suppression strategy.  Vladimir Putin’s margin of victory was significantly enhanced – by nearly 20% - by differential levels of turnout across the country.  As in previous cases, the electoral campaign and its outcome were used to bolster societal control and, above all, legitimacy claims.  

Variance in electoral turnout among immigrants may lead to certain groups being systematically under or over-represented in political decision-making. Voting is a valuable indicator of integration in civic life, and the project casts new light on the dynamics of immigrant electoral participation and its implications for the health of democracy. Sweden – which enfranchises all over-18s in local and regional elections after three years of residence, and has one of the highest foreign-born populations in the EU – features as a case study.

The talk presented the current Swedish Research Council project of the same name, outlining preliminary findings and planned research activities. For the first time, register-data on the whole electorate from three consecutive elections (2018-26) allows the investigation of long-term bases of immigrant electoral turnout. The project delves deeper into the heterogeneity of political resocialisation, examining the links between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ through interviews and focus groups, and examines whether the election of foreign-born public representatives increases the turnout of immigrant voters. Third, it looks at the facilitating and inhibiting factors to immigrants’ participation, through extensive focus groups with key groups of voters.