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# Soft Power and the Social Construction of Collective Identity

Why Does the European Union Fail to Attract the British  
Public?

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## **Abstract**

The European Union is claimed to exercise significant soft power in world politics due to its numerous 'soft power resources' (Nye, 2004: 11) that make it attractive to international audiences. A puzzle arises, however, when we notice that despite its vast 'resources', the EU fails to attract the British public, as demonstrated by the recent 'Brexit' referendum and the low support for the Union in the UK already before it. In this paper, I challenge the dominant resource-centric understanding of the EU's soft power by adopting a constructivist approach that links attraction between subjects to perceived collective identity between them. By studying implicit frames in the British 'identity discourse', I discover the EU only weakly represented in the United Kingdom's construction of the 'self'. Based on my results, I argue that the EU fails to attract Britons, because they perceive their country to have little collective identity with the Union.

My results demonstrate that when it comes to studying soft power, the focus needs to be on the audience's perception. Also, more attention needs to be paid to the EU's attractiveness to its own populations particularly these days, when the Union appears threatened by increased Euroscepticism in the member states.

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## **1. Introduction**

### 1.1. The Puzzle

The European Union is widely depicted to exercise significant soft power in world politics (e.g. Patalakh, 2017: 149; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015: 942). Scholars commonly argue that this is due to the EU's numerous 'soft power resources', that according to Nye's (2004: 6, 11) theory make the Union attractive to populations that come in contact with it. However, we witness a case where the EU, despite its allegedly significant soft power resources, fails to attract its audience, and where this failure seems to recently have led to dramatic worsening of relations: The United Kingdom.

The lack of support in the UK for the EU is no new phenomenon. From 2000 to 2005, for example, only approximately thirty percent of Britons considered their EU membership a good thing, when the number for most other member states was fifty or higher (European Commission, cited in Alistair, 2007: 158). The failure to attract the British public has meant that the EU-UK relationship has always been rather difficult. Oliver (2015: 78) calls it a 'history...of aloofness, vetoes, and opt-outs', with too much involvement by the UK government in the EU causing outcry among the British public, and too little causing frustration among the other member states. As we all know, this relationship culminated unprecedentedly in the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union after the 2016 'Brexit' referendum.

Nye (2004: 11) argues that soft power stems primarily from three 'soft power resources', which according to him are one's culture, values, and policies. The case of the UK however suggests that the EU's possession of these 'resources' does not alone ensure its attractiveness. In this paper, I seek to understand why the EU, despite its allegedly numerous soft power resources, only manages to attract some populations but not others. The precise research question that motivates the paper is:

RQ: Why does the European Union fail to attract the British public despite its allegedly vast soft power resources?

## 1.2. My Response

My response to the research question is structured as follows. In part two I first situate my argumentation within the field by reviewing existing International Relations literature on power and more particularly on EU power. After this, I start my investigation of the research question by exploring how scholars before me have studied the EU's soft power. I end up finding this literature unable to provide an answer to my research question. The literature largely limits itself to 'counting' the EU's soft power resources and pays almost no attention to how these resources are interpreted by the audience.

After this, in order to expand our understanding of soft power beyond counting resources, I discuss the concept in the light of Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 48) influential 'taxonomy of power'. I discover some fundamental problems in Nye's theorizing, as his conceptualization of 'attractive power' (Nye, 2004: 7-8) appears to make it something that works similarly to Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 49-50) 'compulsory power', thus contradicting soft power's non-coercive nature.

To escape these problems, I adopt a constructivist approach to soft power, which guides me to focus on how the construction of identities can lead to attraction. Having reviewed more existing literature, I find Feklyunina's (2016) linking of soft power to the discursive construction of collective identity potentially able to answer my research question. Her theory suggests that the lack of attraction to the EU among the British public can be a result of the lack of collective identity between the UK and the EU, as perceived by that public.

To test this hypothesis, in part three I build a research design based on Hellsten et al.'s (2010) automated analysis of implicit frames. The design utilizes semantic maps created by computer software from a large number of British newspaper articles to explore the salience of the EU to the UK's 'identity discourse', i.e. a discourse where the UK is constructed as a subject of international politics by its population. The results of my study are presented and discussed in part four. They show that the EU is not particularly salient to the UK's construction of the 'self', which indicates that collective identity between the two, as perceived by the British public, is likely to be low.

The results are further discussed in the conclusion in part five. I respond to my research question by arguing that the EU fails to attract the British public, because

this public perceives their country to have little collective identity with the Union. This in turn is a result of the peripheral role that the EU plays in the UK's construction of the self. I argue further that viewing attraction as something that stems more or less naturally from certain resources that one possesses is problematic in a wider sense, and instead the construction of state level identities in the receiving end of soft power should be viewed as the primary way how attraction is generated. Thus, the academic focus should be more on the audience and its interpretation rather than on the wielder of soft power and its resources.

The existing literature on the EU's soft power also tends have its focus on soft power that the Union directs outwards. With this paper, I also seek to encourage scholars to pay more attention to soft power that occurs in the relationships between the Union and its own member states. Understanding why the EU is or is not perceived as attractive by its member states' populations should be particularly important these days, when the Union is threatened by the rise of nationalism and Euroscepticism in the member states.

## **2. Literature Review**

I start this part by going through some definitions that I use in this paper, because they may slightly differ from the commonly used ones. First, when I talk about the European Union, or 'the Union', I refer not only to the union that was established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, but also to its predecessors, such as the European Economic Community. Using only one term avoids confusion in the next section, where I discuss how the Union's power has been studied already before the Union existed under the name 'the EU'. Secondly, with the word 'British' I refer to the whole of the United Kingdom and not only to the island of Great Britain. Likewise, by 'Briton' I mean a person from the United Kingdom.

Thirdly, my definition of 'public discourse' relies on Dahlgren's (2005: 148) definition of 'public sphere', which according to him is 'a constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates...and also the formation of political will (i.e., public opinion)'. I define 'public discourse' as the circulation of information, ideas, and debates in this public sphere.

By 'identity discourse' I in turn mean one part of a national public discourse, in which the identity of the country is discursively constructed.

It is important to note that while my argumentation relies heavily on Feklyunina's (2016) theorizing, my definition of 'identity discourse' differs from hers in terms of the level of analysis. My definition assumes that each state has one 'macro discourse', in which the state's identity is constructed by its entire population. Feklyunina (2016: 780) instead considers each state to have multiple identity discourses, because different sub-state groups within the state often narrate their identity differently. In this paper, my focus is on *state level identity building* by the UK, which is why I treat the British population quite monolithically. This is something that Feklyunina (2016: 780) would criticize. However, as the last part of my study, I also explore the construction of the 'UK' by the English and by the Scottish separately to ensure that I adequately engage with her theorizing.

I hope that spelling out and discussing these definitions helps to avoid confusion in the subsequent sections and parts. Next, I start the main part of this literature review.

### 2.1. The European Union and the Study of Power

Power has always been one of the core subjects of study in the field of International Relations, and much discussion and debate has revolved around whether power should primarily be understood in material or immaterial terms. Max Weber (1918, cited in Gerth and Mills, 1946: 5-6) in his famous 'Politics as a Vocation' distinguishes between three ways to maintain one's domination: physical violence, material reward, and social honour. This 'trinity of power', which includes both material and immaterial elements, has been greatly influential to the study of power in all social sciences (Manners, 2013: 310). In the field of IR, however, studying power later became almost synonymous to realist theorizing (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 40), which meant that material or capabilities-centric understandings of it became dominant at the expense of the immaterial ones.

This domination of realism over the study of power meant that for long, the discussion about the EU's power was focused on the Union's economic and military capabilities, and arguments such as the Union's being an 'economic giant and political dwarf' (Patalakh, 2017: 149) were commonplace. These arguments refer to

the asymmetry between the EU's great economic significance, consisting as it does of some of the world's richest states, and its allegedly weak political influence in world affairs. They echo the realist understandings of power, according to which international political influence requires military force to back it up (Smith, 2014: 105), which is something that the EU has always lacked.

The same realist understandings even made many scholars fundamentally question the Union and its role in the world by arguing, for example, that "Europe' is not an actor in international affairs' (Bull, 1982: 151), but merely a cluster of sovereign states. Other scholars responded by developing new conceptualizations about the EU, such as the one of 'civilian power', i.e. an actor whose global influence does not rely on military, but instead on more progressive forms of power, primarily economic power (Duchêne, 1972, 1973, cited in Manners, 2002: 236). Even though these conceptualizations challenged military-centrism, they still largely relied on material understandings of power.

However, two post-Cold War developments in the field managed to widen our understanding of power beyond the material realm and thus greatly affected also the study of EU power. The first was Ian Manners's (2002) introduction of the concept of 'normative power Europe' as a response to Bull's (1982) earlier-mentioned criticism of the EU's 'actorhood'. According to Manners (2002: 239, 242), the EU is 'different to pre-existing political forms', and thus studying its power relying on state-centric conceptualizations of 'civilian' or 'military' is problematic. He argues that the Union is built upon a 'normative basis' that 'predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics' (Manners, 2002: 252). The EU's role in the world is to diffuse this normative basis, which includes such 'core norms' as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights, through various mechanisms, such as 'informational' and 'procedural' diffusion, 'transference', and 'contagion' (Manners, 2002: 242, 244-245).

The second major post-Cold War development in the field was Joseph Nye's (1990, 2004) introduction of 'soft power' that works through attraction as an alternative to the traditional 'hard power' that relies on military and economic capabilities. As Manners's (2002) 'normative power', Nye's concept suggested that the EU can have influence in world politics even without possessing significant military power, which is why it quickly provoked a lively discussion within EU

studies scholarship. This discussion undoubtedly overlaps with the academic discourse on Manners's (2002) 'normative power Europe'. However, in this paper I clearly distinguish them as two parallel discourses instead of viewing them as one big academic discussion. The fact that attraction is so central to my research question makes this paper part of the soft power discourse, which I will next review in more depth. Throughout this paper I will however sometimes also refer to the 'normative power' discourse.

### 2.1.1. The European Union's Soft Power

Nye (2004: x, 5) defines soft power as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments' or 'getting the others to want the outcomes that you want'. Since its introduction, Nye's concept has inspired many scholars to explore whether the EU can influence world affairs by being able to attract others and if so, what makes the EU attractive. Nye (2004: 77-78) himself argues that big part of the Union's attractiveness comes from its perceived pacifying influence on Europe and positive impact on solving global problems, such as armed conflicts, terrorism, poverty, and environmental issues.

Other scholars claim that the EU is able to gain soft power from its performance in many areas, such as technological progressiveness, human development, and environmental protection (Patalakh, 2017: 152-153). The European social model, even if not necessarily an EU policy, is also often presented as an attractive alternative to the neo-liberal American model, and thus as a soft power resource for the Union (Rohrbacher and Jeníčková, 2011: 193; Nye, 2004: 80). Scholars also often argue for the attractiveness of the EU's values, which in line with Manners's (2002) above-discussed argumentation include democracy and human rights (Patalakh, 2017: 154), but also such values as environmental responsibility, cosmopolitanism, and 'global consciousness' (Rohrbacher and Jeníčková, 2011: 193, 195).

Some scholars however warn us not to view the EU's soft power too idealistically. They argue that the material benefits that come with being part of the West or Europe might in many cases trump the attractiveness of certain values or governance mechanisms (Rohrbacher and Jeníčková, 2011: 193). Their intervention is a good reminder of how soft power and hard power capabilities often overlap, as noted by Nye (2004: 9). Referring to my above discussion, in the case of the EU it

should be its economic rather than military power that can be attractive to others. In fact, Goldthau and Sitter (2015) found that in the field of energy, the Single European Market (SEM) provides the Union with a major soft power resource and a way to export its regulations by attracting non-EU businesses.

Hard power appears to be present also in many other cases of EU soft power. For example, the Union's perceived positive impact on solving global problems (Nye, 2004: 78) arguably relies on the economic support and crisis management personnel that the Union provides. Interestingly, hard power seems to also be part of Manners's (2002) 'normative power Europe'. His 'transference' means that the EU is able to diffuse its norms through, among others, trade and aid, which according to Manners (2002: 245) sometimes includes the "carrot and stickism" of financial rewards and economic sanctions'.

It is perhaps harder to argue that the European Union is able to gain soft power from its culture. The EU is a relatively young institution, and thus does not possess similar cultural heritage as in many cases hundreds of years old nation-states. Nye (2004: 75-76), when discussing Europe's cultural soft power, talks about that of European states and not of the European Union. However, Sianos (2017) argues that the EU's European Capitals of Culture (ECOC) program has become a source of soft power for the Union. According to him, European states are attracted to get the ECOC title and are willing to 'surrender' their culture to Europe (Sianos, 2017: 23).

Based on the above-reviewed literature, I find the academic discussion of the EU's soft power failing in two respects. First, the literature is heavily resource-centric, by which I mean that it limits itself almost entirely to searching for an explanation to the EU's attractiveness in factors that are directly attributed to the Union itself. In most cases this means establishing a descriptive understanding of the EU's 'soft power resources' (Nye, 2004: 11) that allegedly make it attractive. Roselle et al. (2014: 71) criticize that 'soft power analysis has largely resulted in sophisticated counting of tools or resources', and the above literature appears to make no exception.

Such heavy focus on the EU and its resources suggests that the literature leans toward a relatively naturalistic understanding of attraction, according to which certain factors or resources are more or less naturally or universally attractive (see Bially Mattern, 2005: 591). This does not take sufficiently into account that these

resources can be interpreted differently by different audiences (Feklyunina, 2016: 775). My criticism however does not apply to all the above scholars, since some of them (e.g. Patalakh, 2017) clearly specify the context of their study and thus do not claim to draw universally applicable conclusions about the Union’s attractiveness.

Secondly and more importantly, the literature cannot explain why the EU fails to attract the British audience, since it gives us no obvious explanation to why the EU’s numerous ‘soft power resources’ would not produce attraction in the UK the same way as anywhere. In fact, the UK as a European country should share many of the EU’s values and cultural characteristics, which according to Nye (2004: 11) should make it particularly likely that these resources produce attraction among Britons.

The two problems discussed here are clearly interrelated, and they may be an indication of some deeper problems in Nye’s conceptualization of soft power. Next, I discuss soft power in the light of Barnett and Duvall’s (2005: 48) ‘taxonomy of power’ in order to problematize some commonly held beliefs and to widen our understanding of it.

## 2.2. Problematizing Soft Power

In their influential work, Barnett and Duvall (2005) describe power as having two dimensions; on one hand it works either in the interactions between already-constituted subjects or in the constitution of these subjects, and on the other hand it works either in direct or diffuse relations. These two dimensions create a two-by-two ‘taxonomy’, and the four possible types of power are compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 48).

		Relational specificity	
		Direct	Diffuse
Power works through	Interactions of specific actors	Compulsory	Institutional
	Social relations of constitution	Structural	Productive

Figure 1: Taxonomy of power.  
Source: Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 48.

Nye builds his definitions of soft power and power in general upon relatively fixed subjectivities of 'self' and 'other'. By defining power as 'the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants', Nye (2004: 2) makes clear that to him power, and thus also soft power, is something that actors possess and can use to shape the actions of other actors (see Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 45). In other words, power is something that works primarily in the interactions between already-constituted subjectivities and not in their constitution. These two notions make me argue that according to Nye's conceptualization, power, and thus also soft power, can only be *compulsory* and/or *institutional* (see Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 45, 48).

This demarcation of Nye's to the nature of soft power goes often unnoticed, because it is built into his conceptualization of *all power*, not only soft power. This demarcation also explains why 'soft power resources' are so central to Nye's concept. If subjects are relatively fixed in their nature, variation in their attractiveness has to stem from variation in what they *possess* rather than what they *are*. Hence the emphasis of resources. As noted by Feklyunina (2016: 775), Nye's emphasis of resources has guided scholars to adopt an excessively recourse-centric view of soft power, which in turn explains why I above found the literature on the EU's soft power to be so resource-centric.

Above I also criticized the literature on the EU's soft power for leaning toward an unrealistically naturalistic understanding of attraction. For this, the blame can however only partially be put on Nye, because even though his 'language of resources' (Feklyunina, 2016: 775) clearly leans toward naturalistic understandings, he simultaneously talks about the importance of the audience's reception and interpretation (Nye, 2004: 16). By including both naturalist and interpretivist elements, Nye unfortunately makes his account on the nature of attraction inconsistent. As criticized by Bially Mattern (2005: 591), Nye seems to simultaneously talk about the 'allegedly universally attractive values of cosmopolitanism, democracy, and peace' and claim that attraction is a social construct.

I argue that this ambiguity of Nye's about the nature of attraction combined with his emphasis of resources is what has encouraged scholars before me to merely

'count' the EU's soft power resources without paying attention to how these resources are interpreted in the receiving end. Such excessive naturalism/universalism perhaps is not as prevalent within the academic discourse on 'normative power Europe', because in my opinion Manners (2002: 245) states clearer than Nye that a 'cultural filter' exists that affects the diffusion of the EU's norms.

Thus far I have established that Nye's conceptualization makes soft power fall inside the two top boxes of the taxonomy. Nye (2004: 7-8) further divides soft power into attractive power and agenda-setting power, and this division in turn falls somewhat in line with Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 47-48) distinction between direct and diffuse power. Nye's agenda-setting power is diffuse and highly compatible with Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 51-52) 'institutional power'. Both rely on institutions, the rules of which limit the amount of policy choices the 'other' has to choose from (Nye, 2004: 7-8; Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 51). Attractive power, on the other hand, works more directly; there is no mediating institution, but instead actor B changes its behaviour because it is directly influenced by the attractiveness of actor A. In other words, there is a more direct link between A and B, even if it is not as 'immediate and generally tangible' as Barnett and Duvall (2005: 47) would like.

While Nye's agenda-setting power can well be understood as institutional power, problems quickly appear when one tries to understand his concept of attractive power. Nye's conceptualization seems to give us few options but to understand it as something that resembles compulsory power, and in some respects the two concepts even appear quite compatible. For example, Nye's (2004: 6, 11) claim that one's attractiveness stems from one's soft power resources is in line with Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 49): 'A is successful because it has material and ideational resources at its disposal that lead B to alter its actions'. In fact, out of the four types of power in the taxonomy, compulsory power is the only type that relies on resources that an actor possesses, which means that if anything, attractive power should be compulsory.

On the other hand, however, compulsory power requires that the object of power feels compelled to alter its behaviour, which strongly contradicts some of soft power's basic tenets. For example, Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 49) argument that 'A

and B want different outcomes, and B loses' cannot be reconciled with Nye's (2004: 5) basic idea of 'getting the others to want the outcomes that you want'.

The problems I discovered particularly in Nye's (2004: 7-8) 'attractive power' have consequences that are relevant to this paper. First, the above-reviewed literature on the EU's soft power is largely built on the concept of attractive power rather than agenda-setting power. The literature has its focus not on how the EU is able to set the agenda, but instead on how its numerous soft power resources make it attractive to others, enabling it to exercise soft power over them more directly. This leads me to argue that our knowledge about the EU's soft power is largely built on a problematic conceptualization.

Secondly, as comes clear from Nye's (2004: x) definition of soft power as something that works 'through attraction rather than coercion or payments', attractive power forms the core of his entire concept. This means that the problems I discovered to some degree undermine the credibility of his entire concept of soft power. To escape these problems, I need to widen our understanding of the concept. Next, I introduce my constructivist approach to soft power, which I believe has a better chance to explain why the EU fails to attract the British public.

### 2.3. The Social Construction of Soft Power

According to the constructivist school of International Relations, power cannot only be understood in material terms, but also as the 'capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike' (Hopf, 1998: 178). To understand what interests motivate actors to act, constructivists highlight the importance of understanding what identities these actors attribute to themselves and others (Hopf, 1998: 175; Wendt, 1999: 122). Another fundamental constructivist tenet is the mutually constitutive relationship between agency and structure. While it is the intersubjective structure that ultimately determines what meanings and identities actors attribute to themselves and others, their own actions and particularly interactions with other actors constantly shape and reproduce this structure (Hopf, 1998: 175).

Approaching my research question from a constructivist perspective can provide a fresh insight to soft power, because it challenges Nye's above-problematized conceptualization. Instead of exploring what resources a pre-constituted 'EU' may

possess that make a pre-constituted 'UK' attracted to it, this approach guides me to explore how these subjectivities are socially constructed in the first place and how this can lead to attraction between them. Next, I will explore what the constructivist school has to say about soft power.

Bially Mattern (2005: 602, 604) argues that the most common process through which attraction is constructed in world politics is 'verbal fighting', which includes coercing the target to accept one's subjective interpretation of reality using 'representation force'. She argues that after 9/11 the United States framed the war on terror as a righteous response to the attacks and then linked this interpretation to the threatening argumentation of 'you are either with us or with the terrorists'. This way it was able to linguistically coerce states such as Jordan to accept its interpretation of reality and embrace the war on terror as an attractive policy (Bially Matter, 2005: 606, 608-609).

Roselle et al. (2014) in turn introduce the concept of 'strategic narratives' as a means to understand soft power in world politics. According to them, narratives 'explain the world and set constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and shape perceived interests', and sometimes political actors *strategically* shape and are shaped by these narratives (Roselle et al., 2014: 76-77). Szostek (2017) took their concept a step further by applying it empirically to the case of Ukraine, where the public has since the ousting of president Yanukovich been exposed to conflicting Western and Russian strategic narratives. Using survey data, she found that having a social or communicative linkage to a foreign state, for example through regular travels, language, or consuming media that originates from the state, increases individuals' support for the foreign state's strategic narrative (Szostek, 2017).

Finally, Feklyunina (2016) links soft power to the discursive construction of collective identity between subjects. She argues that the level of soft power state A has vis-à-vis state B is determined first by the extent to which different audiences in state B accept collective identity with state A and secondly by the ability of these audiences to influence state B's foreign policy. In her study on Ukraine, Feklyunina (2016: 786-789) analyzed the content of political speeches given by Ukrainian political elites as well as already-collected survey data on the Ukrainian public's understanding about Russia's goals toward Ukraine and their attitudes toward integration with Russia. She argues that between the late 2000s and early 2010s,

Russia had only limited soft power vis-à-vis Ukraine, because its projection of collective identity through the promotion of the 'Russian world' narrative was largely rejected by Ukrainians (Feklyunina, 2016: 789).

The results of Köse et al.'s (2016) study on the impact of ethnic, sectarian, and religious identity on the soft power of different regional and international actors in the MENA region support Feklyunina's argumentation. By analysing survey data from Egypt and Iraq, Köse et al. (2016) found that, for example, individuals with Sunni-identity were more likely to view Turkey or Saudi-Arabia positively, whereas individuals with Shiite-identity tended to view Iran more positively. They however point out that 'crosscutting cleavages' also play a role, with for example Sunni Kurds viewing Turkey less positively than other Sunni groups (Köse et al., 2016: 370).

Out of the reviewed constructivist literature, Feklyunina's (2016) framework appears the most promising for my purposes. It proposes a clear factor with possibly a lot of power to explain why the EU fails to attract the British public: *lack of collective identity between the UK and the EU, as perceived by Britons*. Indeed, while I cannot find Feklyunina's theory been applied to the case of the EU before, I find arguments in other literature giving it support. For example, collective European identity on an individual level is often argued to be important for legitimizing the EU (e.g. Hinderliter Ortloff, 2005: 36). Nye (2004: 77) also argues that 'the European Union as a symbol of a uniting Europe itself carries a good deal of soft power', albeit he refers primarily to the Union's attractiveness to non-EU audiences.

However, before I can use Feklyunina's (2016) framework for my own study, I need to address two limitations that it has. First, Feklyunina downplays the role of attraction, and instead argues that collective identity generates soft power via interest alignment. According to her, actors that have compatible identities are likely to also have compatible interests, which counts for soft power (Feklyunina, 2016: 777). Even though I find her focus on identities and interests to be well in line with the above-reviewed basic constructivist tenets, I need to add Nye's attraction to her framework to make it better compatible with my research question. Thus, in this paper I consider collective identity between states A and B to produce soft power between them due to the mutual attraction it generates among their populations.

Secondly, I unfortunately find Feklyunina's method for measuring perceived collective identity slightly ambiguous. For example, I do not find survey data on the

Ukrainian public's understanding about Russia's goals to be a reliable source to draw conclusions from regarding Ukrainians' perception of collective identity with Russia (see Feklyunina, 2016: 788-789). She however uses multiple data sources, which to some degree compensates for these weaknesses. To find a more suitable method for my own study, I finish this literature review by exploring more existing literature on collective identity, focusing particularly on what methods scholars before me have used to study it.

#### 2.4. The Construction of Collective Identity

Collective identity is widely studied in the field of social movement studies, with many scholars arguing for its importance for mobilizing collective action (e.g. Jenkins, 1983: 538; Lu and Chan, 2016). The level of analysis in these studies and my study is slightly different, since where their focus is on sub-state groups, mine is on the entire British population. However, besides the fact that the strength of perceived collective identity might be different, I do not find a reason why their concepts and theories would not be applicable also on a national level.

During the past decades, there has been a shift within the field from a structural/Marxist understanding of collective identity toward a more discursive one (Flesher Fominaya, 2010: 394). In Barnett and Duvall's (2005) terminology, we can understand this as a shift from viewing the construction of collective identity as something *structural* to viewing it more as something *productive*. The structural/Marxist view of collective identity corresponds with the idea of 'class consciousness' (Flesher Fominaya, 2010: 395), and according to it collective identity results primarily from the individuals' structural position, such as social class, that in Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 53) terminology 'shapes their [collective] self-understanding and subjective interests'.

According to the discursive/productive view, on the other hand, collective identity is better understood as a continuous and dynamic process. It is a shared cognitive framework that is continuously (re)constructed through individuals' repeated interactions and that includes for example the use of common language, rituals, practices, and cultural artefacts (Melucci, 1995, cited in Flesher Fominaya, 2010: 394-395). Barnett and Duvall (2005: 55) would call these common rituals etc. shared 'systems of knowledge and discursive practices'.

Feklyunina's framework is built upon the discursive/productive understanding of collective identity (see Feklyunina, 2016: 773), which is why I also adopt it. Thus, in this paper I consider collective identity between the UK and the EU, if it exists, to be a result of continuous discursive construction rather than something that stems from the UK's structural position.

At the same time, however, I recognize that structural position may as well affect one's perception of collective identity with the Union. Consider for example the rise of nationalism and Euroscepticism in Europe, which while occurring almost everywhere seems to occur the strongest in many of the EU's eastern members, such as Poland and Hungary, which can be seen as occupying a weaker structural position than their wealthier Western European colleagues. On the other hand, the fact that the United Kingdom, which can be seen as one of the stronger members, is leaving the EU seems to contradict this observation.

Adopting the discursive/productive view of collective identity makes me ask more precisely through what mechanisms can collective identity be discursively constructed. One such mechanism that is well-studied is framing (e.g. Ackland and O'Neil, 2011; Lu and Chan, 2016; Trumpy, 2016). Framing is best understood as a way to structure and 'make sense' of the complex world through *selection* and *salience*. According to one of the most widely used definitions:

*'To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'* (Entman, 1993: 52, italics in original).

Frames however exist not only in communicating texts, but also in people's minds as a way to organize their beliefs and thinking about the world (Entman, 1993: 52-53). It is important not to confuse these 'quiet' frames with frames that are used strategically in communication (Skovgaard, 2017: 92), even though the two are mutually constitutive. The quiet frames are often referred to as *schemata* (Entman, 1993: 52; Wendt, 1999: 115), which is a concept that I will also use in this paper as opposed to communicative frames.

In framing terminology, the above-discussed shared cognitive framework that stands behind collective identity is the same as a collection of frames that are shared by a social group (Snow et al., 1986; see also Entman, 1993: 53) and that constitute the group's identity. These frames often draw clear 'identity boundaries' (Trumpy, 2016: 167) that distinguish 'us' from 'them' (Tucker, 2013: 86). Wendt (1999: 123-124) argues that the same way as individuals or groups, states hold certain 'self-schemas' about themselves that constitute and shape their identity and relationship to the world.

If states construct their own identity through framing, we can expect it to be how they also construct collective identity with other states or actors. In fact, Wendt (1999: 124) refers to this as 'we-ness schemas' that states hold toward other states. Wendt's state-centrism however leaves open the question of exactly whose schemata these self-schemas and we-ness schemas are part of; is it that of the entire population or that of a small political elite? In other words, whose beliefs is it that constitute state identity?

Since my focus is on the collective identity with the EU *as perceived by the British public*, the only UK state identity that matters to this paper is the one that exists in what Entman (1993: 53, my italics) calls *culture*, i.e. 'common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of *most [British] people*'. Thus, the UK's identity and its possible collective identity with the EU are constructions that exist in the schemata that are shared by most Britons, or what I call the British 'cultural schemata'. These identities shape and are shaped by communicative frames that exist in the British public discourse, particularly in the part of the discourse that I earlier defined as the British 'identity discourse' (see the beginning of this part). This mutually constitutive relationship between communicative frames and schemata allows me to study the UK's identity using communicative frames as proxies.

Hellsten et al. (2010: 592-593) divide communicative frames into explicit and implicit. An issue can be framed *explicitly* by selecting a certain perspective and certain words to describe it. For example, if I choose to talk about the pressure that asylum seekers put on the host countries' public resources, I *explicitly* frame the issue very differently compared with if I choose to talk about the basic human rights of asylum seekers, which in turn promotes a different solution to the issue (see e.g. Greussing and Boomgarden, 2017: 1751).

*Implicit* frames in turn are more latent, and they give an issue meaning through ‘spurious correlations between word (co-)occurrences in communications’ (Hellsten et al., 2010: 593). Here, words get their meaning because they exist in a certain semantic context that limits their alternative interpretations (Hellsten et al., 2010: 593). This semantic context can be understood as approximately the same as the ‘dominant meaning’ (Entman, 1993: 56) of a certain issue within a discourse.

One key difference between explicit and implicit framing lies in agency. Explicit framing in many cases includes some level of intention from the communicator to frame an issue in a particular way, whereas implicit frames exist in texts even when the communicator tries to be objective. Implicit frames exist because the communicator, regardless of how devoted they may be to the journalistic standards of objectivity, is always bound to view the issue through some conventionalized schemata that dictates over the ‘underlying repertoire’ of words that they have in their disposal to describe the issue in the first place (Hellsten et al., 2010: 592-593).

Consider, for example, how Finland is practically never framed as a military threat in the Swedish public discourse. This is hardly because Swedish journalists continuously make conscious decisions not to frame it as such, but because the Swedish cultural schemata and most likely also the journalists’ personal schemata make them not think about it as such in the first place. In Hellsten et al.’s (2010: 592-593) terminology, ‘threat’ is outside the Swedish ‘underlying repertoire’ about Finland.

Lately, the increased use of computers and partially automated methods has allowed frame analysts to dramatically increase the number of studied texts and by doing so improve the validity of their results. Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017), for example, were able to include up to 10,606 newspaper articles in their automated analysis of the frames used in the Austrian printed media during the 2015 refugee crisis. Computers have also made it possible to study semantic maps to explore what dominant meanings exist in different discourses. Hellsten et al. (2010), for example, used computer software to create semantic maps from the New York Times discourse on artificial sweeteners during different periods of time. These maps reveal for each time period the occurrence of single words and their relations to other words, which allowed them to uncover the dominant underlying repertoire of the discourse and its evolution over time.

## 2.5. Summary

In this part of the paper, I found that the existing literature on the EU's soft power is not only unable to provide an answer to my research question, but it is also built upon a problematic conceptualization of soft power. To escape these problems, I adopted a constructivist approach to soft power and found Feklyunina's (2016) argumentation about collective identity generating soft power a powerful theoretical framework to build my own study upon. I also found framing theory to provide me with good methodological tools for applying her framework empirically to my case. Drawing from what I have learnt, in the next part I present my research design for studying why the EU fails to attract the British public.

## **3. Methodology**

I established in the literature review that viewing the European Union's attractiveness as stemming from certain resources that it possesses has theoretical problems, as it turns soft power into something that resembles Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 49) 'compulsory power', thus contradicting soft power's non-coercive nature. Instead, attraction to the EU among the British public should be understood as something that is generated through the identities that are given to the 'UK' and the 'EU' in the British public discourse. In Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 45-46) terminology, this means viewing soft power as something that works in the social relations of constitution rather than in the interactions between already-constituted subjects. Thus, the best way to find an answer to my research question is to adopt a method that explores these identity constructions.

I found Feklyunina's (2016) theory about soft power being generated through the discursive construction of collective identity to possibly have a lot of explanatory power, which is why it is adopted as the theoretical framework upon which my study is built. Knowing that the EU fails to attract the British public, the following working hypothesis is formulated:

WH: There is little collective identity between the United Kingdom and the European Union, as perceived by the British public.

As Feklyunina (2016: 773), I adopt a discursive/productive view of collective identity. In my study, I focus on exploring what role the EU plays in the UK's construction of the 'self', i.e. in the discursively constructed identity that the British public gives to their country. The choices I have made regarding the focus of my study can be criticized in two respects. First, according to constructivists (see part two, section three), attention should be paid to the identity that the UK gives not only to itself, but also to the 'other', in this case to the EU. The method I am about to present is however far better at detecting signs of collective identity with the EU in the UK's construction of the self than in its construction of the 'EU', which is why my focus is on the 'UK'.

Secondly, one can criticize my study for focusing entirely on Feklyunina's (2016) first determinant of soft power, i.e. the perceived collective identity by the public, and not paying any attention the second one, i.e. this public's ability to influence their country's foreign policy. However, in this paper I seek to explain the lack of attraction to the EU among Britons and not any particular outcome in the UK's foreign policy. Thus, my linking of attraction to perceived collective identity in the literature review guides me to focus solely on Feklyunina's first determinant, while I view her second one more as an obstacle that still needs to be overcome for attraction to manifest as certain foreign policy outcomes.

Before I go deeper into introducing the technical details of my research design, I briefly discuss the ontology behind it. What makes my design interesting is that, using Patomäki and Wight's (2005, cited in Jackson, 2011: 28) terminology, its 'scientific ontology' is constructivist, while its 'philosophical ontology' is positivist. By 'scientific ontology' I refer to the choices I have made about the 'catalog of objects, processes, and factors' (Jackson, 2011: 28) that my study considers to exist and to be meaningful subjects of inquiry. The fact that I consider identities, particularly discursively constructed collective identity, to have power to explain a social outcome makes my design heavily constructivist in this regard.

By 'philosophical ontology' on the other hand, I refer to Jackson's (2011: 37) 'philosophical wagers' of mind-world dualism/mind-world monism and phenomenism/transfactualism. My research design, while focusing on ideal factors, still assumes that they, together with the rest of the social world, exist

independently of my interpretation of them as a researcher. Thus, there is a dualist rather than monist relationship between the world I study and my mind that seeks to study it.

In addition to this, my study limits itself to exploring the relationship between factors, i.e. collective identity and attraction, that can be observed empirically through an elaborate research design without going into the 'unobservable elements of social life' (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 36) that can perhaps provide a deeper understanding of this relationship. In Jackson's (2011: 36-37) terminology, this means making a phenomenalist philosophical commitment, and it allows me to test hypotheses about the social world, such as the one formulated above. This, together with my commitment to mind-world dualism, makes the philosophical ontology behind my research design positivist, or 'neopositivist' in Jackson's (2011: 37) terminology.

### 3.1. Method: Automated Analysis of Implicit Frames

I discovered framing theory to be useful for understanding the construction of collective identity, which is why frame analysis is adopted as the methodological framework for my study. As was discussed in the literature review, the UK's identity and its possible collective identity with the EU should primarily exist as constructions in the British cultural schemata. This means that they should manifest as communicative frames in British texts, while these communicative frames should also continuously shape these identities by shaping the schemata.

My research design investigates how the 'UK' is framed as a subject of international politics in the British public discourse, and what role the 'EU' has in these frames. I have chosen Hellsten et al.'s (2010) automated analysis of implicit frames as my precise method. It can uncover what words are used to discuss the 'UK' and how these words co-occur across a large number of British texts that cover international politics. This way it can give me an understanding of what kind of language or 'underlying repertoire' (Hellsten et al., 2010: 592) dominates the British discourse in which the 'UK' is constructed as a subject of world politics, or what I call the British 'identity discourse'.

The reason why I chose a method that explores implicit rather than explicit frames is that implicit frames focus almost entirely on structure at the expense of

agency and thus should give me a more non-interfered access to the British cultural schemata, where I believe the answer to my research question lies. As was discussed, explicit frames often include intention from the communicator to frame a certain issue in a particular way and thus are often influenced by the communicator's personal schemata. Implicit frames, on the other hand, refer to the highly conventionalized 'repertoires which are available for the communication' (Hellsten et al., 2010: 592-593) in the first place. These repertoires should be a product of the cultural rather than any personal schemata, which makes them less corrupted for my purposes. By downplaying agency, these repertoires also fit better than explicit frames together with Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 55) 'constitutive social processes that are, themselves, not controlled by specific actors'.

To get a better understanding of what kind of 'self' constructions are specific to the United Kingdom, I have chosen to apply Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method first to the UK and then to Ireland as a comparative case. Ireland is chosen as the comparison for two reasons. First, as revealed by the below graph, Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2017) suggests that on an individual level, having at least a partial European identity is somewhat more prevalent among the Irish than the British population. This can mean that differences exist also in how the two nations discursively construct themselves as collective subjects in relation to the EU, which would provide me with a good comparison. The Irish also seem to support their country's EU membership more than the British (European Commission, cited in Alistair, 2007: 158), which suggests that a link between collective identity and attraction may indeed exist.

The second reason for choosing Ireland is practical, and it is that English is widely spoken in the country. While the computer software that I will use to analyze word co-occurrences across texts should allow analyzing texts also in languages other than English, I prefer not to do so to remove the chance of error caused by possible variance in 'framing practices' across different languages. One can of course in many cases find English-language texts that cover international politics also from non-English speaking countries. However, using them would also risk causing error, because these texts are often targeted at audiences other than the domestic, and thus their ability to represent the true local public discourse is questionable.




Figure 2: The percentage of respondents reporting to identify as wholly or partially European.

Source: European Commission, 2017.

Note: Data missing for 2006-2009 and 2011.

### 3.1.1. The Selection of Texts

Using newspaper articles to represent public discourse appears to be widely used in frame analysis (e.g. Hellsten et al., 2010; Greussing and Boomgarden, 2017; Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2017), which is why they are chosen as the texts in my study as well. To isolate what I call the British ‘identity discourse’ from the rest of the British public discourse, I use specific search words when retrieving the newspaper articles. Using these search words limits the collected texts to articles in which the ‘UK’ is discussed in an international context.

Some scholars (e.g. Rietveld, 2014) use texts or speeches from governmental or parliamentary actors to study the national identity discourse. However, due to their political nature, these texts arguably include more intentional or explicit framing, which is why I believe that the gap between them and cultural schemata is somewhat wider than is the case with a large set of newspaper articles. To increase the amount of texts, I however do not exclude editorial and opinion articles, which also include intentional framing, from my data.

The political affiliation of newspapers arguably affects their coverage of international politics more than, for example, their coverage of artificial sweeteners, which is why using articles from only one newspaper as Hellsten et al. (2010) did would increase the risk of sampling error. Because of this I have chosen to gather

my sample of texts for the UK from the total of sixty British newspapers. Unfortunately, due to a limited access to Irish newspaper articles, my comparative sample will consist of articles from only three Irish newspapers. A clear strength of Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method is that, being highly automated, it allows me to include a great number of texts in my samples (total n=1680), which should also be an effective remedy against sampling error.

I will build three 'corpus' of texts regarding the United Kingdom. The first corpus consists of British newspaper articles that were published in 2005 and 2006, the second of articles published in 2010 and 2011, and the third of articles published in 2016. As Hellsten et al.'s (2010), my intention is to explore how the underlying repertoire may evolve, and particularly how the EU's role in the British repertoire about the 'UK' may evolve over time. These particular time periods were chosen because they allow me to explore the effects of two major events, the 2008 financial crisis and the 2016 'Brexit' referendum, on the discourse. The first corpus represents the identity discourse before both these events, the second the discourse after the financial crisis but far before the referendum, and the third the discourse around the time of the referendum.

Due to the above-mentioned limited access to Irish newspaper articles, I was only able to build one corpus regarding Ireland. It consists of articles mainly from 2013 to 2018 and of some individual articles that were published before this. Building several corpora from the set of Irish articles that I was able to access and download would have meant that the individual corpora would have consisted of only some tens of articles, which I consider too low to represent the Irish identity discourse. On the other hand, having only one corpus takes away my ability to study the evolution of the Irish discourse over time.

### 3.1.2. Data Collection

Newspaper articles for the corpora were collected from two online databases: Newsbank<sup>1</sup> and Mediearkivet<sup>2</sup>, both accessed via Malmö University library. Newsbank formed the main data source, and Mediearkivet was only used as a complementary source to increase the amount of Irish newspaper articles.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.newsbank.com/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.retriever.se/product/mediearkivet/>

From Newsbank, all articles published in British newspapers that include the word 'UK' and at least one of the words 'international', 'global', or 'world' in the leading paragraph were retrieved for each above-mentioned time period. For Ireland, the same search was made from Irish newspapers, but without any time demarcation and using the word 'Ireland' instead of 'UK'. The search results for both countries were further narrowed down by first excluding all articles that were not published in the 'international', 'politics', or 'editorial/opinion' section of the newspaper or that do not include the word 'politics' in them, and finally by manually going through the article titles and excluding articles that were clearly not related to politics, such as articles about international sporting or cultural events or individual international corporations.

One can critique my decision to exclude articles about sports and culture, since in many cases they can be a major source of national identity and even collective identity and, as was discussed in the literature review, they can even be relevant to soft power generation (Sianos, 2017). However, my focus is on the discourses in which the 'UK' and 'Ireland' are constructed as international *political* actors.

Mediearkivet was used as a complementary source for Irish newspaper articles, because Newsbank provided me with articles from only one Irish newspaper: The Irish Times. From Mediearkivet, all articles from Irish newspapers that again included the word 'Ireland' and at least one of the words 'international', 'global', or 'world' in the leading paragraph were retrieved. Articles that do not include the word 'politics' were excluded, and again by going manually through the article titles, articles that were clearly not related to politics were also excluded. Finally, articles published in The Irish Times were excluded to avoid getting duplicate articles in the corpus.

Tables one and two in appendix A present the names of the newspaper outlets and the number of articles per outlet that I ultimately downloaded for each corpus. There is a certain risk of error caused by the strong asymmetry between the amount of British articles and the amount of Irish articles that I was able to retrieve. While the amount of the retrieved British articles was so high that I could easily build a corpus for each time period, the amount of the retrieved Irish articles was so low that I was forced to use a complementary source to be able to build one corpus. As revealed by table two, the Irish corpus also consists of articles from only three

newspaper outlets. This limits the corpus's ability to represent the true Irish identity discourse and thus to some degree undermines the validity of my comparison.

### 3.1.3. Data Analysis

The newspaper articles for each corpus were first downloaded into separate text (.txt) files. The raw newspaper articles included a lot of metadata, such as keyword and location information intended for internet search engines. All metadata except for publication information, i.e. the place and time of publication and the name of the newspaper outlet, were removed. As a result, each text file consisted of the article title, followed by brief publication information and the actual article text. Publication information was not removed to enable the creation of tables one and two and to enable me to later isolate English and Scottish newspaper articles from corpus two into their own control corpuses. I will disclose what these corpuses were used for later in the paper. Not removing publication information however also led to minor problems in the semantic maps that were created later in the study. I will discuss this in more detail below.

Having removed the metadata, I further pre-processed the texts following Hellsten et al.'s (2010: 597) method. All the letters in the texts were transformed into lower case letters, after which all apostrophes ( ' ) were removed. Finally, the letter 's' was removed from all word endings, in order to turn most words in plural form into their singular form. This pre-processing made the computer software that was used later in the study better recognize different forms of the same word as one.

Having pre-processed the texts, I used the computer program Wordij<sup>3</sup> to create a word frequency list for each corpus. The list presents how many times each word exists in the entire corpus. The program's own stop-word list, i.e. a list that allows the automatic exclusion of words such as 'a' and 'to', was used, and the program was told to also exclude words that contain numbers. The ready frequency lists were limited to approximately one hundred most frequent words in each corpus, and words that clearly came from the names of newspaper outlets, such as 'times', 'scotsman', and 'guardian', as well as words that clearly carry very little information for my purposes, such as 'set', 'day', and 'including', were excluded.

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<sup>3</sup> Freely available for registered users at: <http://www.wordij.net/>

Having established the approximately one hundred most frequent words in each corpus, I ran all the texts in each corpus through the computer program Fulltext<sup>4</sup>, telling it to look for cosine-normalized co-occurrences of these words across the texts. Cosine-normalization was used to follow Hellsten et al.'s (2010: 596) method. As a result, the program created a cosine-normalized word co-occurrence matrix for each corpus. These matrices were transformed into `##d/##h` format using the computer program UCINET<sup>5</sup> to be able to upload them to the program NetDraw<sup>6</sup> for visualization.

NetDraw created a semantic map for each corpus, which presents the approximately one hundred most frequent words and their co-occurrence across texts. In the maps, each word is represented by a grey sphere, the size of which corresponds to the frequency of the word in the corpus with a bigger sphere indicating higher frequency. The co-occurrence of two words across the texts in the corpus in turn is represented by a line between the words. Following Hellsten et al.'s (2010: 606) method, I removed lines that represent co-occurrences that are weaker than the mean of all co-occurrence strengths. In other words, a line between two words in the semantic map means that the words co-occur stronger than average in the corpus. The visualization software 'pushes' words that are not linked further from each other, while keeping linked words closer to each other.

There are thus two pieces of information that the semantic maps disclose for each word. First is the sphere size, which indicates how many times the word exists in the corpus in total. It however by itself only poorly indicates the importance of the word to the discourse, because it tells us very little about how commonly the word exists *across the texts* in the corpus. In other words, even a rarely used word can get a relatively big sphere if the few articles that mention it mention it many times. The more important information for my analysis is the proximity between different words in the map. It tells us how commonly the words tend to co-occur across texts, with words located closer to one another indicating stronger co-occurrence. This in turn can be interpreted as stronger association of the words together in the discourse that the map represents.

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<sup>4</sup> Freely available for academic use at: <http://www.leydesdorff.net/software/fulltext/index.htm>

<sup>5</sup> Borgatti et al., 2002. Trial version freely available at: <https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/downloads>

<sup>6</sup> Borgatti, 2002. Freely available at: <https://sites.google.com/site/netdrawsoftware/home>

My earlier decision not to remove publication data from the newspaper articles before uploading them to Fulltext caused certain words to get corrupted in the semantic maps. Because each British article always includes one or more of the words 'England', 'Scotland', 'Northern', 'Ireland', or 'Wales', and a city name, most commonly 'London', 'Belfast', 'Edinburgh', or 'Glasgow', in its publication data, these words ended up disproportionately central in the semantic maps and needed to be removed. When it comes to the Irish semantic map, the word 'Dublin' was removed as corrupted.

In addition to this, there was a small number of words, such as 'Irish', 'financial' and 'independent', that can stand for many and even important things, but that are *also* included in 'The Irish Times', 'Financial Times', and 'The Independent'. This means that the words were included in the publication data of many articles and thus most likely ended up disproportionately central in maps, which is why they were also removed as corrupted. Removing all these words, while unfortunate, should not significantly affect the relationships between the remaining words in the semantic maps.

The main part of my study consists of analyzing these semantic maps, the units of analysis hence being single words. My research question guides my attention to words such as 'EU', 'European', 'Union', and 'Europe', because their location in the maps can tell me what role these concepts play in the UK's and Ireland's identity discourses, thus allowing me to make claims about possible collective identity with the EU. However, I decided to focus almost solely on the word 'EU' in the maps. This demarcation was done partially due to the length limitations of this paper and partially because the word 'EU' is the only single word that almost certainly refers solely to the European Union. This demarcation unfortunately prevents me from getting a more nuanced understanding about, for example, the role of 'Europe' in the UK's identity building, which can be very different from the role of the 'EU'. In the next part, I present the ready semantic maps as well as analyze and discuss them.

## 4. The Results and Discussion

### 4.1. The Semantic Maps

Following the steps disclosed in the methodology, I created four semantic maps; one for each corpus. The maps can be found in figures four to seven in appendix B. They are named after their corpuses, with for example the 'UK 2005-2006' map representing the British identity discourse from 2005 to 2006.

The maps reveal a relatively clear core-periphery structure, with the words 'uk' and 'ireland' at the center of their respective maps. The centrality of these words comes from that I used them as unconditional search words when retrieving the newspaper articles, which makes them occur in all the articles of their respective corpuses. This means that the proximity of other words to these words is practically the same as their centrality in the entire map, which in turn can be interpreted as the importance or *salience* of the word to that particular identity discourse. This view can be disputed, since social network analysis (SNA), on which the method relies, tells us that there are different ways to define the centrality of a 'point', in this case a word, to the 'network', in this case the semantic map (e.g. Scott, 2000: 82-99). However, for my purposes it is enough to visually determine how central each word is in the map to make claims about its salience to the discourse and thus about its importance to the UK's or Ireland's construction of the self.

Another thing one has to take into an account is that the semantic maps do not necessarily tell whether a word is central or peripheric to a given discourse in *absolute* terms. This is because the outlook of the maps is heavily influenced by my decision to limit the amount of words in them to the approximately one hundred most frequent ones. As Hellsten et al. (2010: 597), I did this to make the visualizations more manageable. Had I instead included for example one thousand most frequent words in each corpus, the maps would have appeared very different, with words that now appear peripheric most likely existing very close to the core. The power of the maps, however, comes from that they reveal the *relative salience* of a given word, when compared with other words both in the same map and across maps.

Words 'international', 'global', and 'world', which were also used as part of the search criteria in article retrieval, tend to as well be central in the maps, as expected. Another set of words that seem central across maps are words such as 'government',

'policy', 'political', 'state', 'people', and 'public'. I interpret this as a sign that the search criteria I used for article retrieval was fairly successful. The discourses I want the maps to be samples of are the British and Irish identity discourses, i.e. the British public discourse on the 'UK' and the Irish public discourse on 'Ireland' as subjects of international politics. The centrality of the latter set of words indicates that the corpus texts clearly tend to discuss the 'UK' or 'Ireland' as collective public actors, and the centrality of the words 'international', 'global', and 'world' in turn reveals that they are predominantly discussed in an international context.

Another sign that the semantic maps indeed quite well represent the discourses that I want them to represent is that the maps reflect big international political events that occurred during or close to the chosen time periods. For example, the 'UK 2005-2006' map indicates that the Iraq war that started in 2003 was present in the discourse on the 'UK' during those years. This can be seen from the cluster in the upper right periphery of the map that includes words such as 'iraq', 'war', 'nuclear', 'american', 'bush' (from George Bush), and 'tony' (from Tony Blair).

The 2008 financial crisis in turn, as expected, is reflected in the 'UK 2010-2011' map, with words such as 'bank', 'imf', 'fiscal', 'debt', 'budget', 'economic', 'crisi[s]', 'finance', and 'spending' forming a long cluster that reaches from the bottom right periphery to the core of the map. Finally, and as expected, the 'UK 2016' map reveals the salience of the 'Brexit' referendum to the discourse in 2016, with the word 'eu' being highly central in the map and accompanied by words such as 'brexit', 'referendum', 'vote', 'leave', and 'remain'. The referendum was also reflected in the Irish discourse, with the words 'brexit', 'british', 'uk', 'referendum', 'member', and 'eu' forming a long cluster that reaches from the left periphery of the map to the core.

I started my analysis by introducing the created semantic maps and by arguing for their validity in representing the discourse that I want them to represent. Next, I use the maps for what they were created for, that is, for the analysis on the role that the EU plays in the UK's construction of the self.

#### 4.2. The Role of the EU in the Construction of the 'UK'

As already discussed, the centrality of a given word in the semantic map indicates the salience of that word, and thus the concept that it describes, to that particular identity discourse. In this section, I focus on the salience of the EU to the different

discourses and seek to make claims about how important it is for the UK's construction of the self. I have circled the word 'eu' in each map with red color to make locating it easier.

To guide my analysis, I link Feklyunina's (2016) discursive construction of collective identity between states A and B to Entman's (1993: 52, italics in original) argumentation about '*selection and salience*'. The argument goes that for the construction of collective identity with state A in state B's cultural schemata, it is a prerequisite that A is salient to B's identity discourse. As was discussed in the literature review, collective identity does not occur 'naturally' from one's structural position but is instead a result of continuous construction and re-negotiation. This means that for state B's population to be able to perceive having collective identity with state A, state A needs to be more or less continuously present in state B's identity discourse.

The salience of state A to state B's identity discourse does not however alone ensure the production of collective identity between them. As was mentioned, this salience needs to first of all occur over a *longer time period* to have an effect. Social movement studies also tell us that it is not enough that A is continuously discussed in B's identity discourse, because *how* A is discussed also plays a role. As was discussed in the literature review, one part of constructing collective identity through framing is the establishment of 'us and them' (Tucker, 2013: 86). Social movement organizations, for example, often seek to draw such 'identity boundaries' (Trumpy, 2016: 167) by framing clearly who 'we', the protagonists, are and on the other hand who 'they', the antagonists who are supposed to be countered, are. On state level this means that the salience of state A to state B's identity discourse can mean that B is constructing its identity either *in line with A*, using Wendt's (1999: 124) 'we-ness schemas', or *in opposition to A*, using what I call 'othering schemas'.

What can be considered a weakness of Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method is that it can only reveal the salience of the EU to the UK's identity discourse and not whether the EU is framed as part of 'we' or as the 'other', because the latter is usually done through explicit framing. This means that one cannot draw a definite conclusion that collective identity exists even if the EU according to my results is highly salient to the UK's identity discourse over a longer time period. However, the results can be

used to *cancel out* the possibility of collective identity if the EU is *not* salient to the discourse.

The maps reveal that the EU is not particularly salient to the British identity discourse in 2005-2006 and 2010-2011. In the 'UK 2005-2006' map, the word 'eu' appears to be approximately as far in the periphery as 'china', and almost as far as 'india'. These three words are interestingly also located close to one another, which could indicate relatively equal treatment of the concepts they describe in the texts.

When it comes to the 'UK 2010-2011' map, the word 'eu' appears to be even further in the periphery and approximately as far as 'imf' and 'china', albeit this time the three words are not located close to one another. One important thing to know is that the word 'us', which seems to be often used in the newspaper articles to refer to the United States, is excluded from the maps, because 'us' is also a pronoun and thus included in the stop-word list that I used. I could have told the program to ignore this stop-word, but this would have meant that the word, because of its double-meaning, would have been disproportionately elevated in centrality and thus would have given us a misleading picture.

As was expected, the 'UK 2016' semantic map differs dramatically from the two earlier discussed ones. Here the word 'eu' is both elevated in centrality, and it even appears to be the second most mentioned word in the corpus. This suggests that the EU has in five years been transformed from being not particularly important to being a highly salient part of the UK's construction of the self. The speed of this transformation made me suspect that the salience of the EU to the British identity discourse was only temporarily, or one could even say unnaturally, elevated in 2016 by a single political event: the 'Brexit' referendum.

To see if this is the case, I decided to control the referendum's effect. Creating a semantic map that represents the UK's identity discourse around, for example, the year 2020 would reveal if the salience of the EU indeed was only a temporary thing or if the EU has truly become a more integral part of the British identity discourse. Because this is still impossible, I created a second semantic map from corpus three, but this time I excluded all articles that were clearly about the 'Brexit' referendum. First, I excluded all articles that have the word 'brexit' or 'referendum' in their title or at least twice in their main text. After this, I went manually through the remaining

articles and excluded those that were otherwise clearly mainly about the referendum.

The semantic map created as the result of my control procedures can be found in figure eight in appendix B. The map reveals that the centrality of the word 'eu' in the 'UK 2016' semantic map is indeed mainly a result of the discourse that surrounded the 'Brexit' referendum that year. When one excludes this discourse from the UK's general 2016 identity discourse, the EU falls back to periphery. This indicates that outside the 'Brexit' referendum, even during the year 2016, the EU occupied a position only approximately similar to the UN's in the UK's construction of the self.

One must not interpret this control procedure as my attempt to downplay the importance of the 'Brexit' referendum to the United Kingdom's identity construction in general. Probably many people, particularly on the 'leave' side, consider 'Brexit' to be one of the very defining moments in the history of the UK. My method however only allows me to make claims about the possibility of collective identity with the EU based on the Union's *long-term salience* to the British identity discourse. Dramatic political events can, as was the case here, give a misleading picture about the EU's true long-term salience, which is why the control procedure was done.

Theoretically speaking, one can say that my approach considers long-term regularities and developments in the identity discourse to be more important for the constitution of the UK's identity than single, even dramatic, political events. Here I agree with Nye (2004: 16-17), who argues that soft power is particularly important when it comes to the realization of long-term, or 'milieu', goals. Because my approach links soft power and identity construction, it is logical that long-term developments are more important than single political events to both of them. This view can however be disputed. It is argued, for example, that the 9/11 attacks greatly defined the identity and thus the future interests and behavior of the United States (Tallman, 2014).

Thus far I have established that the EU does not appear particularly salient to the British identity discourse over time, which indicates that collective identity between the two, as perceived by the British public, is likely to be low. The maps suggest that the EU plays a role approximately similar to that of China, the UN, or the IMF in the UK's construction of the self. The 'Brexit' referendum clearly elevated the EU in

salience in 2016, but my control map suggests that this salience is likely to be only temporary.

To assess whether it is common or uncommon for an EU member state to have the EU so weakly represented in its identity discourse, I will next analyze the semantic map on 'Ireland' for comparison. In the 'Ireland' semantic map, the word 'eu' appears highly central, even though its sphere is relatively small. This indicates that even though the word 'eu' is not mentioned in the corpus as many times as for example the words 'government' and 'world', it co-occurs highly with 'ireland' across texts. As was discussed above, it is the latter that indicates the salience of the word to the discourse, which means that thus far the EU appears clearly more central to Ireland's construction of the self than what it was for the UK.

However, a control procedure is needed for the 'Ireland' map as well. Because most of the downloaded Irish newspaper articles were published from 2013 to 2018, a period that includes the 'Brexit' referendum, there is again a risk that this single political event corrupts my findings. Articles that are mainly about the 'Brexit' referendum were again excluded using the same exclusion criteria, except that the exclusion of articles that have the word 'referendum' in their title or at least twice in their main text was done manually instead of using computer automatics. This is because Ireland held a referendum on same-sex marriage in 2015, and I did not want articles about it to get excluded.

The created control map is presented in figure nine in appendix B. From the map one can see that the word 'eu' has moved outwards but is still clearly part of the darker core and far more central than for example the words 'un' and 'imf'. This means that even with the 'Brexit' referendum controlled, the EU indeed appears more salient to Ireland's than to the UK's construction of the self. These findings are in line with the earlier-mentioned results of the Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2017), according to which individual level European identity is somewhat more common among the Irish than the British. This could indicate a link between individual level and state level identity building, which in turn would support and further clarify Hinderliter Ortloff's (2005: 36) earlier-mentioned argument about individual level European identity legitimizing the EU.

One has to however keep in mind that my method does not allow me to draw positive conclusions about the existence of collective identity, but only to cancel out

its possibility in certain cases. This means that my findings only allow me to argue that collective identity with the EU, as perceived by the population, is more likely in the case of Ireland than in the case of the UK. The fact that I was only able to collect enough Irish newspaper articles to build one corpus, even if the articles in it were collected from a longer time period, also to some degree undermines the arguments made about the *long-term salience* of the EU to the Irish identity discourse.

Thus far my findings have supported my working hypothesis. The EU does not appear to be more salient to the British identity discourse than for example the UN, China, or the IMF, which in turn suggests that collective identity between the UK and the EU, as perceived by the British public, is likely to be low. These findings are further supported by the EU appearing more salient to the identity discourse in Ireland, where the Union also has stronger support from the public (European Commission, cited in Alistair, 2007: 158).

As the last part of my study, I isolated English and Scottish newspaper articles from corpus two into two extra control corpuses and created semantic maps for them as well. As was discussed in the beginning of the literature review, Feklyunina (2016: 780) highlights that the population of a state is unlikely to be monolithic, and that differences often exist in the identity construction by different sub-state groups. To ensure that this paper adequately engages with her theorizing, I wanted to explore if there is a difference between how the 'UK' is discursively constructed by the English and by the Scottish population.

This part was also inspired by the result of the 'Brexit' referendum. As can be seen from the below illustration, the Scottish tended to vote predominantly for staying in the EU, while the English tended to vote for leaving. This may indicate that the Scottish perceive the UK to have more collective identity with the EU than the English do, which in turn could manifest as differences in their respective semantic maps. I chose to isolate the control corpuses from corpus two and not from corpus three, because using corpus three would have again required controlling the effect of the 'Brexit' referendum. This in turn would have limited the newspaper articles in the control corpuses to a dangerously low amount.




Figure 3: Illustration of the 'Brexit' referendum result.  
Source: Glaze, 2016.

The ready semantic maps can be found in figures ten and eleven in appendix B. The maps again support, albeit weakly, my hypothesis. Where the word 'eu' is highly peripheral to the English discourse, it is slightly less so to the Scottish one. This suggests that the Scottish are somewhat more likely than the English to perceive the UK to have collective identity with the EU. The difference is however so weak that drawing definitive conclusions from it is not recommended.

As a whole, the results that I have presented in this part support the working hypothesis. This leads me to respond to the research question by arguing that the EU fails to attract the British public because Britons perceive the UK to have little collective identity with the Union. This in turn is a result of the weak role that the EU plays in the UK's construction of the self. The results of my study also show how a constructivist approach to soft power can provide an explanation in a case where the more traditional resource-centric literature fails. This in turn, I hope, encourages scholars in the future to pay more attention to the audience's interpretation when they study the EU's soft power. Next, I finish this part by discussing the limitations that Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method sets to my findings.

#### 4.3. The Limitations of My Findings

As becomes clear from the above parts and sections, I utilized Hellsten et al.'s (2010) automated analysis of implicit frames to explore the salience of the EU to the British and Irish identity discourses. I have argued that for the collective identity with the EU to be possible, it is required that the Union is salient to these discourses over a longer time period. My findings have supported the working hypothesis that I made earlier, with the EU appearing relatively peripheral to the UK's identity discourse. Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method however sets two important limitations to these findings.

The first limitation has already been discussed, and it is that the method does not allow me to argue *for* the existence of collective identity based on positive findings, but only to cancel out its possibility in the case of negative findings. However, my findings regarding the UK fall within the latter. The maps reveal that the EU is no more salient than the UN, the IMF, or China to the UK's identity discourse, while it is clearly more salient than any of those actors to the Irish identity discourse. This means that collective identity with the EU is likely to be lower when perceived by the British than by the Irish public.

The second limitation of the method is that it cannot distinguish between, for example, 'Iraq', as a geographical location, and 'Iraq', as a subject of world politics. This means that the word 'iraq' can be elevated in its centrality in a semantic map because of, for example, an intense media coverage of the conflict in the geographical location of 'Iraq' during that time period and not because 'Iraq' as an international political actor is central to the discourse.

This should however not be as big a problem when it comes to the 'EU', because in my experience of the data, the word 'EU' is primarily used to describe a political entity rather than a location. This is probably because the EU is a supranational institution and young when compared with most nations-states and particularly when compared with many EU member states. This leads to that it does not possess the same level of conventionalization in our language, which means that while we can, for example, use the word 'France' to describe both a location and a political actor, we are still largely unable to refer to the 'EU' as a location. By browsing through the articles, I however found that sometimes such place references do exist, for example:

'There are nearly 2,000 universities in the EU...' (Lambert, 2006).

Because the 'IMF' and the 'UN' are also seldom, if ever, referred to as locations, this second limitation should only be a minor problem when I compare the EU's centrality to that of China or India in the maps. In sum, the two limitations of Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method that were discussed here do not undermine my results. Next, I end this paper with a conclusion.

## **5. Conclusion**

The European Union's soft power is by no means an untouched subject of study. Scholars before me have already discovered many elaborate ways to argue why the Union is able to exercise soft power in world politics and get outcomes it wants 'through attraction rather than coercion or payments' (Nye, 2004: x). Most of these scholars, however, search for an explanation to the EU's attractiveness almost solely in different factors that are directly attributed to the Union itself, most commonly in its numerous 'soft power resources' (Nye, 2004: 11). Focusing on the EU's resources leans toward a naturalistic understanding of attraction, which unfortunately fails to take into account that these resources can be interpreted differently by different audiences.

I discovered that the case of the United Kingdom seems to contradict the mainstream understanding of the EU's soft power, because the existing literature cannot explain why the Union, despite its allegedly significant soft power resources, fails to attract the British population. This apparent puzzle became the foundation for my research question that motivated this entire paper.

By discussing and problematizing soft power in the light of Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 48) influential 'taxonomy of power', I found that Nye's conceptualization, upon which the existing literature on the EU's soft power is largely built, has some fundamental problems. Viewing soft power as stemming from one's possession of soft power resources makes it something that works similarly to Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 49-50) 'compulsory power', which contradicts the allegedly non-coercive nature of soft power.

I decided to challenge both the mainstream understanding of the EU's soft power and Nye's conceptualization upon which it is built by adopting a constructivist approach. It made me view soft power as working primarily in Barnett and Duvall's (2005: 45-46) 'social relations of constitution' and attraction as being linked to the construction of state level identities. I found Feklyunina's (2016) argumentation about soft power being generated through the discursive construction of collective identity possibly capable of providing an answer to my research question. I also found that frame analysis could provide me with a good methodological framework for applying Feklyunina's theory to my case.

Knowing that the EU fails to attract the British public, I hypothesized that the level of collective identity between the UK and the EU, as perceived by the British public, is likely to be low. By reviewing existing literature on framing, I discovered that both the UK's identity and its possible collective identity with the EU should exist primarily in the British cultural schemata, and that I could access these schemata by using communicative frames in British texts as proxies. However, because communicative frames are also influenced by the communicator's personal schemata and intentions, I needed a method that focuses heavily on structure rather than agency. I found Hellsten et al.'s (2010) automated analysis of implicit frames to do this, because rather than explicit frames, it explores underlying repertoires, which are likely to be a product of the cultural rather than any personal level schemata.

Applying their method to my case gave me results that support my working hypothesis. The created semantic maps indicate that during the three time periods studied, the EU did not occupy a particularly salient part in the UK's identity discourse when compared with other international actors. This cancels out the possibility of the EU's long-term salience to the British identity discourse. Comparing the UK's and Ireland's identity discourses further supports my hypothesis, since in Ireland, where the EU is more supported by the public, it also appears to be more salient to the identity discourse. Thus, my results suggest that the EU has only a peripheral part in the UK's identity construction, which makes collective identity between them likely to be weak.

Based on the results of my study, I respond to my research question by arguing that the European Union fails to attract the British public because this public

perceives the United Kingdom to have only little collective identity with the Union. This in turn is a result of the relatively weak role that the EU plays in the UK's construction of the self. Based on my discussion in the literature review, I also make a secondary argument regarding the nature of attraction. I argue that understanding attractiveness as a more or less natural result of one's possession of certain soft power resources is problematic not only in this case, but also in a wider sense. The constitution of state level identities by the audience of soft power should instead be viewed as the primary way how attraction is generated. Feklyunina's (2016) discursive construction of collective identity can provide a good framework for understanding soft power not only in the case of the EU, but also more generally.

The latter argument is made to emphasize that with this paper I also seek to contribute to the wider International Relations discourse on soft power by addressing two apparent gaps in existing literature. First, I want to promote a constructivist understanding that highlights the audience's interpretation regarding the generation of attraction. Such focus can provide a fresh insight to soft power, because at least when it comes to the study of EU soft power, the field seems to be dominated by studies that focus almost entirely on the resources of the wielder of soft power.

Secondly, I want to bring light to a soft power relationship in which the distinction between the 'one' and the 'other' is blurred. I believe that because distinguishing these subjectivities as pre-constituted is so central to Nye's conceptualization of soft power, scholars are unencouraged to apply his concept to relationships such as those between the EU and its own member states. This in turn unnecessarily impoverishes our understanding of soft power. In the case of the EU, it may also be that the absence of such studies is a result of Manners's (2002) concept of 'normative power Europe' dominating the field of EU studies too strongly. In any case, studying why the EU attracts or fails to attract populations not only outside but also inside the Union ought to be particularly central to the academia in times like these, when the EU is challenged by the rise of nationalism and EU-criticism in its member states.

Finally, my study did not utilize the full potential of the semantic maps that were created using Hellsten et al.'s (2010) method. One clear way how this paper could be developed further is by analyzing what role concepts other than the 'EU' play in

the UK's construction of the self. Provided that one manages to overcome the language problem and the problems I faced with data availability, one could also study what role the 'EU' and other concepts play in more than just the British and Irish identity discourses. Particularly interesting would be to study what role 'Europe' plays, and if this role is in line or in contradiction with the role of the 'EU'.

Another way to develop this paper further would be to investigate *why* the British public perceives their country to have little collective identity with the EU. One could for example search for an explanation in the UK's history as a great power and an imperial center. This would mean stepping into the 'unobservable elements of social life' (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 36), which this paper consciously abstained from.

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## APPENDIX A

Table 1: Number of articles per newspaper outlet, corpuses one and two.

Corpus 1		Corpus 2	
British newspaper articles from 2005 and 2006.		British newspaper articles from 2010 and 2011.	
Number of articles per newspaper outlet:		Number of articles per newspaper outlet:	
<i>The Banker (England)</i>	1	<i>Birmingham Mail (England)</i>	2
<i>The Birmingham Post (England)</i>	3	<i>The Birmingham Post (England)</i>	2
<i>Bristol Evening Post (England)</i>	2	<i>Bristol Evening Post (England)</i>	1
<i>Daily Post (England)</i>	4	<i>Cheddar Valley Gazette (England)</i>	1
<i>Daily Record (Scotland)</i>	2	<i>Daily Mirror (England)</i>	14
<i>Daily Star (England)</i>	1	<i>Daily Post (England)</i>	3
<i>Daily Telegraph (England)</i>	6	<i>Daily Record (Scotland)</i>	1
<i>Durham County Publications (England)</i>	1	<i>Daily Star (England)</i>	1
<i>Edinburgh Evening News (Scotland)</i>	4	<i>Daily Telegraph (England)</i>	11
<i>The Evening Standard (England)</i>	4	<i>Edinburgh Evening News (Scotland)</i>	11
<i>Evening Times (Scotland)</i>	2	<i>The Evening Standard (England)</i>	15
<i>The Express (England)</i>	12	<i>Evening Times (Scotland)</i>	3
<i>Financial Times (England)</i>	137	<i>The Express (England)</i>	4
<i>The Guardian (England)</i>	64	<i>Financial Times (England)</i>	105
<i>The Herald (Scotland)</i>	13	<i>The Guardian (England)</i>	49
<i>Hertfordshire County Publ. (England)</i>	1	<i>The Herald (Scotland)</i>	55
<i>Hull Daily Mail (England)</i>	2	<i>The Independent (England)</i>	30
<i>The Independent (England)</i>	17	<i>Investors Chronicle (England)</i>	1
<i>Investment Adviser (England)</i>	1	<i>The Journal (England)</i>	5
<i>Investors Chronicle (England)</i>	3	<i>Lancashire Telegraph (England)</i>	2
<i>Leicester Mercury (England)</i>	2	<i>Leek Post and Times (England)</i>	1
<i>News Letter (Northern Ireland)</i>	4	<i>Leicester Mercury (England)</i>	3
<i>Nottingham Post (England)</i>	2	<i>Manchester Evening News (England)</i>	5
<i>The Observer (England)</i>	3	<i>News Letter (Northern Ireland)</i>	33
<i>The Scotsman (Scotland)</i>	8	<i>News ofThe World (England)</i>	2
<i>South Wales Echo (Wales)</i>	3	<i>The News (England)</i>	1
<i>The Times (England)</i>	1	<i>Nottingham Post (England)</i>	2
<i>Western Daily Press (England)</i>	12	<i>The Observer (England)</i>	3
<i>Western Mail (Wales)</i>	13	<i>Peterborough Telegraph (England)</i>	1
<i>Western Morning News (England)</i>	3	<i>The Scotsman (Scotland)</i>	26
<i>Yorkshire Evening Post (England)</i>	3	<i>South Wales Echo (Wales)</i>	8
<i>Yorkshire Post (England)</i>	2	<i>The Sun (England)</i>	14
		<i>The Times (England)</i>	51
		<i>Western Daily Press (England)</i>	4
		<i>Western Mail (Wales)</i>	17
		<i>Western Morning News (England)</i>	7
		<i>Yorkshire Post (England)</i>	31
<b>Total amount</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>Total amount</b>	<b>525</b>

Table 2: Number of articles per newspaper outlet, corpuses three and four.

Corpus 3		Corpus 4	
British newspaper articles from 2016.		Irish newspaper articles.	
Number of articles per newspaper outlet:		Number of articles per newspaper outlet:	
<i>The Banker (England)</i>	2	<i>Irish Examiner</i>	6
<i>Birmingham Mail (England)</i>	2	<i>Irish Independent</i>	52
<i>The Bolton News (England)</i>	1	<i>The Irish Times</i>	175
<i>Brentwood Gazette Series (England)</i>	1		
<i>Bristol Evening Post (England)</i>	1		
<i>The Daily Mirror (England)</i>	6		
<i>The Daily Telegraph (England)</i>	30		
<i>Edinburgh Evening News (Scotland)</i>	3		
<i>Evening Chronicle (England)</i>	2		
<i>The Evening Standard (England)</i>	29		
<i>Evening Times (Scotland)</i>	2		
<i>Exeter Express and Echo (England)</i>	2		
<i>The Express (England)</i>	10		
<i>Financial Times (England)</i>	133		
<i>The Guardian (England)</i>	122		
<i>The Herald (Scotland)</i>	39		
<i>Hull Daily Mail (England)</i>	1		
<i>The Independent (England)</i>	57		
<i>Isle of Thanet Gazette (England)</i>	1		
<i>The Journal (England)</i>	4		
<i>Lancashire Telegraph (England)</i>	1		
<i>Liverpool Echo (England)</i>	2		
<i>M2 Presswire (England)</i>	2		
<i>News Letter (Northern Ireland)</i>	4		
<i>The News (England)</i>	1		
<i>North Devon Journal (England)</i>	1		
<i>The Observer (England)</i>	12		
<i>Pension Expert (England)</i>	1		
<i>The Scotsman (Scotland)</i>	29		
<i>The Sentinel (England)</i>	1		
<i>South Wales Argus (Wales)</i>	3		
<i>South Wales Echo (Wales)</i>	1		
<i>The Star (England)</i>	1		
<i>The Sun (England)</i>	4		
<i>Swindon Advertiser (England)</i>	18		
<i>This Is Local London (England)</i>	2		
<i>The Times (England)</i>	37		
<i>The West Briton (England)</i>	1		
<i>Western Daily Press (England)</i>	2		
<i>Western Mail (Wales)</i>	7		
<i>Yorkshire Post (England)</i>	8		
<b>Total amount</b>	<b>586</b>	<b>Total amount</b>	<b>233</b>















