



MALMÖ UNIVERSITY  
FACULTY OF CULTURE  
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# Who is a climate refugee?

A critical discursive analysis on what the factors are for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee

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## **Abstract**

There is a global concern for climate induced migration and a concern on how to tackle climate refugees. Climate refugees is a term that is not yet defined both internationally and at a European Union level. This thesis is researching the relation between climate refugees and the European Union. By using a critical discourse analysis this thesis analyses the internal factors for the European Union not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee. By using material from the EU official website this thesis focuses on the textual, discursive and social practices based in Fairclough's three dimensional model. This thesis found five factors for the European Union not reaching a common definition: the view on security, the lack of responsibility, financial and national interests and a view on that climate refugees are not a European problem.

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# 1. Introduction

Tina Acketoft, a Swedish member in the European Parliament calls the phenomenon of climate refugees “a challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century” and establishes that there are around 30 million people every year that are victims of catastrophes, which outnumber refugees from both war and violence. Acketoft calls upon the member states of the EU to, among other things, investigate the gaps in law, the protection mechanisms and to elaborate national legislation to recognize environmentally induced migrants or climate refugees (Acketoft, 2008). Climate change and migration are both global concerns which do not consider traditional state borders. It is recognized that the impact of climate change can vary across nations, regions, and local areas (Karakitapoglu, 2017, P. 39). Climate change and migration is a new nexus that will challenge the future for both the EU and internationally. According to researchers more than 200 million people might have to give up their homes due to climate change by the year of 2050 (Biermann & Boas, 2008, P. 10). Climate refugee is a term that as of today is still undefined both internationally and at an EU level. The EU have not yet agreed upon a common definition for the term *climate refugee*, this because there are different obstacles that prevent the EU for reaching a common definition. A common definition is needed to create both law and policy to address and help these people.

## 1.1 Purpose and research questions

The aim of this research is to identify what the internal factors are for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term *climate refugees*. Meaning that this thesis is going to identify the obstacles that prevent the EU from reaching a common definition for the term. The EU has identified the problem with climate change induced migration but still have not come to a common definition of the term climate refugees. The lack of a definition creates a gap within both EU law and policy on climate induced migration. This thesis will examine what type of internal factors there is that prevents the EU from reaching a common definition. Internal factors are the factors within the EU and its member states. By identifying the factors for the EU not reaching a common decision, we gain a wider understanding for the discourse around climate refugees and most importantly why a common definition does not exist within the EU.

The research question of this thesis will be the following:

- 1.) What are the *internal* factors for the EU not reaching a common definition of the term climate refugee?

## **1.2 Disposition**

The structure of this thesis will be presented in this chapter to give the reader an overview and insight in the thesis as a whole. In the beginning there was an introduction, introducing the subject. Then there was a part presenting the purpose of this thesis and its research areas and question. After this dispositions section comes a part presenting the delimitations of the thesis, where the parts not analyzed in this thesis will be presented. Then there is a background part, presenting an overlooking view of the research areas to provide us information about previous research on the subject of climate refugees. After this comes the theoretical framework which present the theory choices of this thesis and why they are relevant to the subject. After this is the section about method and material. This section presents both the method and material used, but also an operationalization of the theories and method of the thesis, meaning how this research will use the theories and method. After this comes the analysis which is divided into three subcategories. One on only climate change, one on only migration then the last one is the link between them which analyzes the discourse on climate refugees within the EU. The last part is the conclusion which presents the results from the analysis and provides an answer for the research question presented in the “Purpose and research question” part.

## **1.3 Delimitations**

This thesis will not research internally displaced persons. This because the safety and work against IDP's is not the same as for climate refugees, and IDP's are protected by other both policy and law agreements on international, regional, and national levels.

This thesis will not present how and if other regional and intergovernmental organizations approaches climate refugees, and if they have established a legal definition for the term climate refugee. This because to answer the research questions of this thesis,

it is not relevant to examine how other regional organization approach the subject to understand the factors for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term. This thesis were first going to also analyze external factors, meaning international factors. However, to narrow down the thesis I choose to only go with internal factors. Another delimitation of this thesis is in relation to the method and theory choice of a discourse analysis. This thesis will not research the interpretation of the consumers since the material used does not allow us to do that, and it is not of relevance for answering the research question.

## **2. Background and previous research**

This chapter will present three themes or cores from previous research that are relevant to the research question of this thesis. By presenting these themes we get an understanding on what the existing research field looks like and also where this thesis places itself within the scholar field. The cores that will be presented are the general impact that climate change has on migration, security and migration within the EU, the nexus between human security and state security and the international understand for climate refugees. These four themes are relevant for us to understand the existing research field. The mixture of these four cores is where this thesis is, to understand the factors, this thesis lays in the middle of these four themes.

### **2.1 Climate change and its impact on migration**

The relationship between climate change and migration is a relatively researched subject. Climate change and migration are both global concerns which do not consider traditional state borders. It is recognized that the impact of climate change can vary across nations, regions, and local areas. Migration due to climate change can both be forced and voluntary. This is one of the obstacles the international community faces in reaching a common definition on climate refugees, which makes a policy response difficult to achieve (Karakitapoglu, 2017, P. 39). Climate change is a rapid growing problem which the global community steady tries to find solutions for. An example of this is the coastal erosion on various places around the world making people move from their homes. The coastal erosion poses a serious threat to peace and security. The climate change problems

vary from other problems we have seen in the past. Events in the past were often with low impact and high frequency or high impact and low frequency. Coastal erosion and climate change in general are event that often have high impact and high frequency (Edwards, Kerber & Wirsching, 2012, P. 23). There is no working or existing instrument for asylum policy for climate refugees within the EU. The political will of Member States to recognize another group of persons in need of protection in EU asylum instruments or to open labor markets appears to be weak. Even if the EU talks about a common immigrations policy within the EU, the member states have the right to control immigration into their states. Approximately four fifths of the worldwide refugee population stay within the regions of origin. But still there is a need and an international obligation for the more developed countries to have asylum systems and reception capacities in place (Mayrhofer & Ammer, 2014, P. 428).

## **2.2 Migration from a security perspective**

It is researched that it is not the migrants themselves who are in need of protection, it seems rather that the state is in need of being protected from the migrants, therefore the state security is prioritized. The European Commission has been describing migrants as a threat to political stability since the volume of migrants can put pressure on the member states welfare systems. This in turn can result in a breakdown of the EU resource management. Therefore the EU would not function with open borders. The external EU borders and the member state national borders needs to be controlled to ensure the states of security for the citizens. This attitude towards migration is a general attitude across Europe, but the extent on how much security vary within the member states (Skillington, 2015). Foresight (2011) recognizes an overall negative attitude against migrants across Europe and the European Union does not seem to be an exception. Even if the EU greets migrants and refugees, they still invest in militarized borders. Like earlier mention the article by Skillington (2015) people fleeing due to climate change are doubly disadvantaged. Firstly, because climate change forces people to leave their both homes and even states, and secondly because of the repressive legal violence caused by being an irregular migrant, that means that these people fall out of the legal protection. Skillington (2015) means that this clash with the vision of the EU which is to be a liberal, democratic union with both open borders and open minds for migrations and refugees. In order to

overcome these legal barriers caused by being named as an irregular migrant is to provide legal ways for climate induced migrants but that requires a legal definition of the term, therefore a definition of the term climate refugees. Irregular migration is one of the pillars in the EU GAMM, which means that the problem is identified and understood but not yet prioritized or handled.

### **2.3 The nexus between human security and state security.**

It is identified that there is a nexus or dilemma between the human and state security within the EU. The debate on climate induced migration has been considered a way to promote environmental actions and new forms of governance of migration inspired by human security. The development of such forms of governance would be quite relevant, given the role of the EU in both migration and environmental policy and its emphasis on non-traditional instruments to ensure security. The general environmental problem has in many scholars been linked with the security issue. The problem with protecting security then can arise hinders in cooperation (Trombetta, 2014. P. 132). The Human security paradigm is often considered a way to escape the confrontational problematic logic of state security through the focus on human needs. This is a problem that the human security perspective holds. Not only because they tend to disempower the people involved but also because human security is turning into a strategy to govern at distance keeping people in places (Trombetta, 2014. P. 133). When integrating climate change to the security discourse two central theories are most relevant: state security theory or human security theory (Detraz & Windsor, 2014). State security theory is a widely debated theory within the field of international relations and goes back to the Westphalian peace 1648 which is referred to as the foundation of the national state and its qualifications. The state security discourse emphasizes military preparedness and border control. In relation to the state security theory is control. Control is in this case used to understand two associations: control over the entry and exit of both state and the EU and the political control over the citizens. Migration can pose a threat to national security, meaning that it could threaten the state in terms of sovereignty, national identity and economical threats (Detraz & Windsor, 2014).

In contrary to the state security theory is the human security theory, which is focusing on citizens rather than the security of the state. This means that the human

security is the center of this theory. The theory was developed during the 1990's and emphasizes the responsibility to protect and using security more widely than the other theoretical perspectives. Security is not only freedom from fear, but also about tackling extreme vulnerabilities like war, political violence and extreme weather. It is argued that the human security perspective is best applicable when discussing climate refugees since they are exposed to both natural and man-made disasters which both creates material and physical insecurity (Kaldor, 2007). This means that the human security theory is an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual, not the state. The causes of human insecurity are threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety. Policy initiatives generated through the application of the human security framework have incorporated considerations far beyond the traditional focus on military force, greatly reducing the emphasis on armies, if not replacing them altogether. (Jolly & Ray, 2006). The human security theory can be connected to humans increased vulnerability because of climate change. It is suggested that the human security perspective should use the narratives of vulnerability when discussing climate induced migration since it includes social, financial and physical factors (Detraz & Windsor, 2014).

#### **2.4 International approaches for climate refugees**

Human rights laws can be applied to climate change, but there are still challenges when utilizing a human rights framework to address the climate change issue. Human rights treaties have been successful in many instances, but not in the matter of protecting climate refugees (Apap, 2019. P. 6). Existing laws at national, regional and international level can be potentially useful but it remains to be seen whether a new specific legal framework is both necessary and feasible, or whether persons moving in the context of environmental change can be adequately assisted and protected under existing frameworks. The OHCHR studied the effects of climate change on human rights in 2008 and found three obstacles that need to be overcome before climate change could be treated as a human rights violation. These are proving that one country's emissions cause a specific effect on another country; showing that human rights issues are caused solely by global warming; and, considering the fact that the human rights framework is usually utilized in response to violations, whereas climate change regulation is concerned with potential future harm

(Apap, 2019. P. 7). The Agenda 2030 is a UN based framework that was adopted in September 2015. The Agenda 2030 has seventeen global goals to sustainable development that includes: gender equality, climate change and reducing poverty. The Agenda 2030 is related to climate refugees, and some of the SDGs points out key issues within the matter. The SDGs 10, 13, and 16 which points out safe migration, climate action and strong institutions are particularly related to the problem of climate refugees. But it is important to acknowledge that the Agenda 2030 does not acknowledge the correlation between climate change and migration, and how institutions should handle climate refugees (United Nations, 2015).

*“that international approaches to sustainable development strategies, linking environmental, and human security discussions need to be grounded in transnational contexts defined as local frameworks that cross nation-state borders. It makes these arguments for two reasons: (1) threats to environmental security often cross borders and for this reason, domestic policies are no longer sufficient to address these threats. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is a necessity today in transnational environmental governance aimed at resolving specific environmental problems. Moreover, inter-state competition can contribute to the exacerbation of threats to environmental security; (2) throughout the world, the proliferation of regional integration has added an important level of governance in the field of human security which is often ignored”* (Koff & Maganda, 2016. P. 654p). This quotation from previous research shows how cross-border environmental security relates to international discussions of human security, such as those that characterized in the SDGs. The SDGs is focusing on a safer world for the humans meaning that the humans are at the main aim of the SDGs. Since the 1990's when both the UN and EU worked with traditional development work, the work have shifted from focusing on economic development to ecological development. The SDGs have a including approach towards its participants and is focusing to achieve a better world (Koff & Maganda, 2016. P. 655).

### **3. Theoretical framework**

This thesis is based on Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and with this follows different central concepts and assumptions that will characterize the thesis. CDA is both a method and theory, which is also how it will be used in this paper. By analyzing the role of the discursive practices in relation to the maintenance or transformation of the social order, CDA claims to identify the relationship between language and social practice. This section begins with the CDA and then moves on to different terms that can be related to the CDA and suitable for the research problem. Then the central concepts and analytical tools used in the essay are presented, meaning how the theories is operationalized.

#### **3.1 Fairclough's critical discourse analysis**

CDA is based on a critically realistic ontology, which means that the world is seen from two dimensions, the natural and the social, whose existence is independent of whether they are understood or how well they are understood. The assumption is made that these two dimensions differ in the sense that only the social world is dependent on human action for its existence and is therefore socially constructed. This means that the social world is created by human actions (Fairclough, 2013, P. 4). The social world is constructed in advance, which means that the social construction of the social world does not prevent that there are aspects of it that people do not know or have inaccurate knowledge of (Fairclough, 2013, P. 355). Therefore, Fairclough believes that the CDA should not be seen as a part of pure social constructivism but rather as a contingent of it (Fairclough, 2013, P. 4p). The view of the social and material world is also the clearest distinction between Fairclough's critical discourse analysis and other more postmodern discourse analyzes. Fairclough mean that discourse should not only be understood as the use of language through speech or writing, but as a form of social practice, which means that language use is an active act that can affect its environment. Furthermore, there is a dialectal relationship between discourse and social structures (Fairclough, 1992, P. 63p). Discourses can be understood as the overall social process where language usage should be analyzed on the basis of the product (the text), the production and the interpretation as well as the relationships and the social relations between them (Fairclough, 1989, P. 24). The social world affects the discourse, but the discourse also affects the social world. The

function of discourse, according to Fairclough, is to constitute the social world, such as social identities and relationships (Fairclough, 1992, P. 65), which is partly achieved through the production, consumption and interpretation of discursive practices (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 67). The constructive function of the discourse is therefore of central interest to CDA, but a distinction is made between the constructive and representative effects of the discourse. The world is discursively represented, but which representations that have socially constructive effects depend on various factors. For example different power relations (Fairclough, 2013, P. 4p). By examining the constructive function of the discourse, the study aims to see how climate refugees are both represented and constructed within the EU. By understanding this, we then can understand what factors are preventing the EU from having a common definition for the term.

In critical discourse analysis, discursive practices are viewed as contributing to creating and reproducing unequal relations of power between social groups, these are regarded as ideological effects (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 69). Linked to power is the concept of ideology, an important concept within the critical discourse analysis, central to understanding how power and discourse are interconnected. "Meaning in the service of power" is how Fairclough himself has chosen to define the term ideology (Fairclough, 1995, P. 14). Fairclough argues that discourses first become ideological as they contribute to production, reproduction as well transformation of existing power relations (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 79).

Fairclough views social institutions as a kind of container for various ideologically discursive formations. The formations are then associated with various groups within the department. The formations can be exemplified by the social institution "European Union" which contains various groups in the form of member states. The groups/states then usually have a dominant ideological-discursive formation whose typical traits are to naturalize ideologies, in other words to gain acceptance for them as non-ideological and reach a "common sense" (Fairclough, 2013, P. 31). Linked to ideology is the term hegemony, which is the name of the negotiations process that creates consensus of meanings, where the significance of discourses is established. Hegemony will be further explained in a chapter of its own. The significance of discourses is never definitive but is rather an unstable and changing process where consensus never becomes absolute (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 80). This means that the dominant discourse is only temporary. This collection of discursive formations can be called the institution's

discourse order. Discourse schemes consist of different discursive practices, how text is produced and interpreted. Discursive practices are characterized by genres which are definite ways of acting (Fairclough, 2013, P. 75). For example, a neo realistic genre which is common within the EU.

Interdiscursivity describes how different discourses work within and between different discourse schemes to maintain or question the social order (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 77). Interdiscursivity means that discourses are based on and mixed with other discourses. What characterizes a change in a discourse order is when new discourses are incorporated and mixed in new ways, while very little renewal and conventional mixing of discourses suggests a preservation of the prevailing social order (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 77). One concept that is closely related to interdiscursivity is intertextuality. Intertextuality denotes the assumption that communicative events are always based on past events (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 77). For example the European Union has been plagued by three existential crises in the past decade: the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and the British membership crisis (Smeets & Beach, 2019. P. 1) The European refugee crises is one past event that is relevant to climate refugees, since the refugee crisis changed the discourse and view on migration after the crisis.

### **3.2 The three-dimensional model**

Fairclough's three-dimensional model assumes that each instance of language use is a communicative event that has three distinct dimensions. The dimensions are text, discursive practice and social practice (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000 P. 74). These levels can be distinguished analytically and analyzed separately. The model is illustrated below.



### 3.2.1 *The textual dimension*

The textual dimension refers to different forms of language use, such as speeches, different documents or images. When analyzing the text level, the focus is on the linguistic properties of the text. This involves a focus on inter alia: interactional control (the relationship between speakers, who controls the conversation?) And ethos (how identity is constructed through language and bodily traits metaphors, word choice, order, modality, transitivity, and grammar) (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000. P. 87). This thesis will focus mainly on the concepts of modality and transitivity. This selection was made on the basis of the empirical material and research questions of the thesis.

Modality is based on the author or speaker's authority; this authority can be directed in two different directions and therefore there are two dimensions of modality. These dimensions are authority over others or the authority over the truth or probability. These dimensions are called relational modality and expressive modality (Fairclough, 1989, P. 126). Relational modality can be the power to grant different obligations or permits. Example by talking about things someone should do. Relational modality does not have to be about being able to enforce the requirements, it is rather about the authority to establish the requirement or the obligation. It is also interesting in this case to see whether the basis for authority is pronounced or unspoken, implicit or explicit power (Fairclough, 1989, P. 126p). An example of how implicit power can be used is to study the use the words "we" and "you". These words, according to Fairclough, have relational values. The pronoun "we" can act inclusive or exclusive. These we assertions often give the impression of implicit power and are often used in sentences with a high relational modality (Fairclough, 1989, P. 127p). An exclusionary form is a way to distance or waive

one's own responsibility. Examples of this is: *“To a certain extent, EU leaders had already acknowledged that climate migration may well become a problem: in the Stockholm Programme, agreed upon in 2009 as the EU's main strategy for internal security, they called for greater focus on climate change as a driver of security-relevant migratory flows. A strategy paper for a European Commission project with a €179 million budget over the 2011–2013 period, which included funds for 'cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum', explicitly committed to working more on the nexus between climate change and migration”* (Apap, 2019, P. 8). The quotation above shows partly relational modality in the form of distance since they distance the problem with climate refugees to third world countries. Expressive modality instead refers to the author's degree of authority over truth or probability. This type of modality is about categorical statements about the truth or representation of reality (Fairclough, 1989, P. 129). Both expressive and relational modality are expressed through modal support verbs. These verbs express a form of authority, for example: must, can, cannot, should, should not. These verbs are often overlapping when it comes to relational and expressive modality. Therefore, the type of modality cannot be determined solely by these verbs but the whole context must be considered (Fairclough, 1989, P. 128p).

Modality is of interest to this study because it can show partly what obligations are associated with climate refugees and with which security a certain representation of reality is presented. It is also interesting to see when a state security or also a sovereign view is used exclusively or inclusively. The concept of transitivity focuses on publishing how processes and events can be linked (or not) to subjects and objects (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 87). The concept mainly refers to how passive form and nominalization lead to impersonality (Fairclough, 2013, p. 107). In the use of passive form and the omission of the agent, an event is presented as inevitable. When a statement is constructed in this particular way, it relieves the agent of all the responsibility by shifting the emphasis to the consequences and not the actual processes and actions that led to them. Nominalization is another feature that diminishes partnership, where a noun replaces the whole process (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 87). The concept of transitivity is of interest to the study as it can show how responsibility and obligation in relation to climate refugees in member states of the EU are portrayed. A diminishing of partnership in relation to problem formulations related to climate refugees may give the impression what structural barriers are.

### *3.2.2 The discursive practice*

The next step in the three-dimensional model is to analyze the discursive practice. Discursive practice is about how a text is produced and consumed (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 85). Here the focus is mainly on how existing discourses and genres are used in the production of the text and how the consumer of the text uses current discourses and genres to interpret the text (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 75). The text in this case is the product of the production and the resource for consumption. The challenge lies in identifying the genres and discourses that underlie production and interpretation. Analyzing the consumer's interpretation is nothing this thesis does since the empirical material does not allow it.

The study will instead focus on the production, how the author uses discourses and genres in the production of a text. To the extent of this study, intertextuality becomes relevant in the form of identifying whether documents are based on other documents or refer to each other. This is followed by the assumption that texts do not exist in a vacuum but are part of an intertextual chain that is joined by each text utilizing aspects of previous text sources (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 77). Interdiscursivity will also be investigated at this stage. The concept will be relevant for the study to identify published reproduction and change around the climate refugee question within the European Union, in other words how certain discourses are reproduced and changed.

### *3.2.3 The Social Internship*

The third and final step in the analysis process is the analysis of social practice. This dimension is often criticized for being speculative and difficult to reach. To reach this dimension, the consumption of text should be analyzed as well as how it contributes to cultures and norms. Social practice is the final step and involves taking the textual analysis and discursive practice and comparing them to the broader social practice that they form part of (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 90). Social practice is, in simplified terms, about the actions and language that manifest cultures and norms, this can be anything from regulations around uniform in the school to what the factors are for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee.

### 3.3 Hegemony

Hegemony in a society is defined by the fact that a social class has succeeded in gaining dominance over the economic, political, cultural and ideological fields of society (Fairclough, 2010, P. 61p). A certain social class never achieves permanent or complete dominance over a society, but rather an unstable and temporary dominance based on alliances with other social forces and classes. Furthermore, such dominance is achieved not only through coercion, but also through control and leadership over the world of thought and the values that govern and shape a society (ibid., P. 128). It is because of hegemony that social change does not occur through direct confrontations between different interest groups, but instead occurs through discursive struggle, meaning the struggle to establish the discourses that define what these interests are and which are included in these groups. At the same time, dominant discourses and hegemony differ in the former tending to exist at a local level that concerns a specific part of society while the latter exists as a societal structure (ibid., P. 63). For example, the dominant discourse is within a certain part of civil society, e.g. on how to safeguard the rights of refugees, widely separated hegemonic domination of society at large. Discourses are local while hegemony exists at the level of social structures. At the societal level, the discursive hegemonic struggle takes place by linking and disconnecting discourse schemes to each other, thereby fundamentally reshaping the way something is represented and thus talked about. Based on the same example as above, this could be that migration policy ceases to be a topic discussed in fields where issues of integration and human rights are central and instead become an issue for actors otherwise linked to government finances and the economy. The migration policy discourse scheme in this example is thus disconnected (disintegrated) from its previous discursive connections and instead linked (integrated) with another and new discourse order. The effect this has is that the whole way a question is discussed - like the language used to discuss the question - is changed or replaced. Thus, rather than the discussion itself changing in the local discursive struggle within a certain field, the conditions for discussion fundamentally change in the social hegemonic struggle.

## **4. Method and material**

### **4.1 Fairclough's critical discourse analysis**

In this thesis, I have chosen to use a critical discourse analysis whose focus is on analyzing and problematizing the relationships between discursive practice and social as well as cultural development in different social contexts (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 66). I use Norman Fairclough's theories and methods in which he argues that the mission of critical discourse analysis is to clarify the role of discursive practice in the constitution and reproduction of the social world, including the social relations that lead to unequal power relations. The critical discourse analysis research focus is on the discursive practices that create worldviews, social subjects, different social relations and power relations in our society. To then also highlight the role these discursive constructions, have in promoting the interests of particular social groups (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 69). In this study, the discourse and the unequal power relations that will be clarified, problematized and thus criticized is was internal factors there is within the EU for not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee. To understand the discourse, we can identify and analyze the factors. The purpose of the critical discourse analysis, like this study, is to contribute to a social change in the direction of more equal power relations in communication processes and in society as a whole. As well as the purpose of the critical discourse analysis, this thesis stands on the side of the less privileged social groups, its analysis and criticism will thus convey the form of unequal power relations maintained by the EU member states and its authorities when setting conducting policies for its member states (Winter Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, P. 69p). With the help of the critical discourse analysis, this study will analyze and problematize the factors that prevent a definition. In the following part the material used to answer the research question and the selection of material to best answer the research question.

### **4.2 Material**

This thesis will use policy documents and press releases from the EU. I have used different documents from the EU:s official website. The EU website had the most comprehensive collection of EU policy documents and press releases compared to any other source. Furthermore, EU: s official website offers the highest guarantee that the opinions in the documents reflect the EU regarding the subject. Therefore it ensures the

documents authenticity and credibility. This thesis will not analyze out of a specific timeframe. Even if newer documents reflect the most recent opinions and discussions, this thesis will look at documents that might include factors for the EU not reaching a common definition. The EU official website categorizes policy documents under different policy areas. Initially, I looked through all the policy areas to get an overview of where the material relevant for this research was located. Thereafter I made my first selection to only proceed with two policy areas: environment and justice freedom and security. The environment policy area included documents about climate change policy and the justice freedom, and security policy area included documents about immigration and asylum policy. These two areas had the most relevant material for the research. I also used Google to see if the EU had any documents that my search at the EU official website did not find. I found only two documents that addressed climate refugees directly. One is a briefing presented from the European Parliament called "*The concept of 'climate refugee' Towards a possible definition*" the other one is also a study presented from the European Parliament called "*Climate Refugees - Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration*". Within these documents they refer to other EU policy documents that also will be analyzed but these two documents are the starting point of this thesis. For example the Global Approach on Migration and Mobility. The thesis will also look at national values and views on security to understand how this affect the definition and how migration in the past might be one factor or not.

#### *4.2.2 Strengths of the material*

I consider the material to have several strengths. First, the documents gave different perspectives rather than repeating each other which increased the amount of empirical material. These two documents also refer to other documents and law within the European Union to explain where the legal and policy gaps are. This thesis then analyzes to find the internal factors for the EU not reaching a common definition.

Since I only analyzed documents from the EU, this research does not get a perspective of how the discourses are resisted and received outside the EU. For example, an additional analyze of NGO documents or news articles would have shown how EU discourses are countered and received by other institutions. This is also explained in the method part that the method and theory will not be looking at how institutions receive the EU discourses on

climate refugees. This limitation is done since I believe that this is not relevant for the research questions since the receiving comes after the discourse, this thesis what to evaluate the factors that shape the discourse itself.

#### *4.2.3 Processing the material*

When I read the two main documents, I understood that I needed to code the content to identify the discursive pattern and the internal factors. I identified general themes and coding categories that I later used as starting point for the analysis. The categories that I came up with were: The problems with immigration to Europe, Security: both European and national security of the member states, Strategies to tackle the immigration problem, Strategies to tackle climate change and external European aid for climate change.

I highlighted the parts in the documents that I saw relevant for each coding category with different colors in order to make it easier to navigate in the material. Thereafter I went through each category and made some preliminary interpretations. I looked for interrelationships between discourses and representations and I mapped out absences and silences in the discourses. I also mapped out underlying effects the discourses had and outlined the background to the issue. More about the analysis of discourse can be read in theoretical framework chapter 3.

### **4.3 Operationalization**

The following section describe how the three-dimensional model and the linguistic tools will be applied in the analysis of the empirical material of this thesis.

The first step is to apply the concepts of modality and transitivity to the encoded material. In applying the concept of modality, I mainly looked for modal support verbs among the discourses and themes I had found, mainly in relation to when the word “security” is used. To investigate transitivity, I mainly looked for instances of passive forms and nominalizations, in relation to problem formulations or solutions related to climate refugees within the EU. The use of exclusionary and inclusive pronouns is also analyzed on occasions when degrees of modality or examples of transitivity is found. These were often highlighted in the different texts. The same methodology was used when

identifying different discourses. In order to analyze the discursive practice, we have mainly used the concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. In the last stage of the analysis the social practice is analyzed. In this part of the analysis it will be sought to identify central themes and discourses and then compare them. This section is more about looking at the possible overall effects of the various discourses and whether they challenge or reproduce the existing discourse order. For example climate refugees might exist within discourses within security and human rights, but might move on to sovereignty and financial concerns for the member state. The analysis of the social discourses is the one that will give an answer to the research question of this thesis since it will understand the effects of the various discourses regarding climate refugees that are the factors for the EU not reaching a common definition.

## 5. Analysis

In this part of the thesis, the study's analysis is presented on the basis of the theoretical framework and methodological approaches described in the previous chapters. Since the study is based on several different dimensions, it can sometimes be difficult to follow the reasoning as a reader. In the next chapter which is the conclusion, the conclusions on the dimensions is summarized for the reader to get a clear view on the findings and the answer to the research question. As the study is based on Fairclough's (2009) three-dimensional model, this chapter touches on the different dimensions that Fairclough brings up: text analysis, discursive practice and social practice. However, the structure is based on the overall themes that we have identified based on the analysis, while at all times we have intended to relate to Fairclough's different dimensions. The analysis will be divided into three parts: Climate change and security, migration and security and climate refugees and link between climate change and migration. This division is done because there are only some documents which mentions climate refugees and climate induced migration. To get a deeper understanding on the factors that prevent the EU from reaching a common definition for the term climate refugees it is important to look at the discourses around both migration and climate change.

### 5.1 Climate change and security

The potential effects of climate change on geopolitical security is an increasing concern of both researchers and policymakers. The European Commission states that the impact of climate change on international security is not a problem of the future but already of today and one which will stay with us. The document 'Climate Change and International Security' by the High Representative and the Commission directly addressed the relation between climate change and the security for the EU. The document contained both modality and transitivity. The document as a whole showed high relational modality since the text uses Europe as a distance to other regions and states. Meaning that the EU security problems are distanced to other regions or countries problems, creating a we and them scenario (See Chapter 3.2.2). For example the sentences "*It is important to recognise that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests (European Commission, 2008, P. 2)*" and "*This report focuses on the impact of climate change on international security and*

*considers the impact of these international security consequences for Europe's own security, and how the EU should respond (European Commission, 2008, P. 2)''*. In these sentences there are a clear distance between the international security and the European security. Through the whole document this kind of distance exists between the European security and the international security. This is shown by both the pronounced and unspoken way of referring to the EU as a "we" is directly linked to implicit power. Different verbs that are linked to both relational and expressive modality is used through the whole document. One of the sentences presented above show one example where the authors use the verb should (See Chapter 3.2.1 and European Commission, 2008, P. 2). The verbs (See verbs in chapter 3.2.1) are used on various places through the document (European commission, 2008).

The document uses Geographical examples which presents the threats and pressure that climate change has on other regions. The effects on the EU is also presented here. One example is Africa where the security is threatened by climate change by creating rising sea levels, diseases and creating food and water insecurity. And that this can result in migration both to or through Europe (European Commission, 2008, P. 6). Two other examples are the Middle east and South Asia. The water systems in the Middle East are already under stress due to climate change and roughly two-thirds of the Arab world depends on sources outside their borders for water. Existing tensions over access to water are almost certain to intensify in the Middle East which could lead to further political instability with detrimental implications for Europe's energy security and other European interests. The sea level rise in South Asia may threaten the habitat of millions of people as 40% of Asia's population (almost 2 billion) lives within 60km from the coastline. This type of water stress and loss of agricultural productivity will make it difficult for Asia to feed its constantly growing population who will additionally be exposed to an increase of infectious diseases. There might occur conflicts which will lead to instability within the region which is an important economic partner of Europe with factors of production and distribution concentrated along vulnerable coastlines (European Commission, 2008, P. 7). Here we can see a clear distance for the consequences of climate change between the EU and other regions. This type of distance is directly linked to transitivity and is also distancing the EU from the problem with climate refugees.

The Stockholm Programme states that the EU disaster management is built on two main principles: the responsibility of Member States for providing their citizens with

the necessary protection in view of the existing risks and threats, and solidarity amongst the Member States to assist each other both before, during and after disasters, if catastrophes overwhelm national capacities or affect more than one Member State. Where there is a clear balance of the responsibility at an EU level and a national level (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 53). The Stockholm Programme calls upon maintain a close cooperation with international organizations and in particular the United Nations. The United Nations has an overall coordinating role in the international humanitarian response and concludes interventions in third countries, both on the ground and in terms of preparedness. In accordance with the 2007 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid a strong EU coordination and EU's given role will enhance the overall international humanitarian response, including concerted efforts to improve the humanitarian system, and would also reinforce the EU ambition of working closely with other humanitarian actors. *“The safety and security of the EU requires continuous dialogue and cooperation with third countries, and in particular neighbouring countries and countries with a Member State perspective. The Union’s increasing initiatives for strengthening regional cooperation, e.g. for the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea area and the Black Sea, as well as the Eastern partnership, are designed to contribute to this”* (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 54). The Stockholm Programme show the same traces of high expressive modality in the question regarding humanitarian aid and climate disasters where there is a clear expressed distance between assistance among the member states and assistance to third world countries. This type of distance creates a different view pending on where the aid is actually needed. In these documents we can see a clear distance between the problem which in turn associates the problem with climate refugees to third world countries. There is also high traces of transitivity and normalization which is showed to the framing of partnership and the way of presenting the EU member state as one whole and the importance of solidarity. The Stockholm Programme also show upon partnership with countries outside the EU to tackle climate change and climate disasters. Which based on the findings so far is done as a part between humanitarian aid and a way to maintain a secure European Union (See Chapter 3.2.1). In the documents used for this chapter there is one dominant representation of climate change, that climate change is a global threat to all of humanity. This representation is presented in rather general terms without going in to details or elaborating. See example: *“The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place. The UN estimates that all but*

one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related. In 2007 the UN Security Council held its first debate on climate change and its implications for international security” (European Commission, 2008, P. 1). This representation is placed in the beginning of the document which forms an introduction to the topic to then narrow it down to how the EU security is affected. The representation is then followed by a more detailed representation of climate change, where the EU is the center of the matter rather than the whole world. In the discourse regarding climate change this representation carry an important meaning about the view of climate change within EU discourses. The ‘Climate Change and International Security’ by the High Representative and the Commission in the beginning brings up different ways on how the globe might be affected by climate change, where environmentally induced migration is one factors brought up. There is a clear representation that climate change is negative and that it hurts us. The “we” in this part is divided to both the world as a whole against climate change but also the “we” of the EU against other regions since the document highlight how climate change affects in other regions might affect the EU. Furthermore, it is also interesting to analyze how it is not mentioned how industrialized countries have the biggest responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions that have caused climate change. The effect of not mentioning human responsibility can be analyzed where the silences is viewed as constitutive for the discourse. In relation to expressive modality this silence can be a reflection of implicit power used in an exclusionary form in the text. In this case, the absence of a discussion of responsibility deflects attention from industrialized counties guilt for causing climate change. Meaning that the responsibility for climate change is rather distanced and unspoken of in the document. This creates a distance between the EU and the responsibility as an actor that causes climate change. Furthermore, this absence about responsibility in the discourse can be seen as discursive strategy to normalize the idea that the EU system is guilt free for causing climate change (See chapter 3.2.1 and European Commission, 2008).

As mentioned above there is a discourse on the world against climate change and there is a discourse where the EU is against the world and climate change. Here the discourse positions the EU as the subject rather than the whole world. In this representation the “we” have changed from the globe to just the EU. It identifies the EU as a leader and role model in fighting climate change. An example of this representation can be seen through the whole documents but will be illustrated in the following quote: “*The*

*EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal. Moreover, the security challenge plays to Europe's strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, and as a key proponent of effective multilateralism”*

(European Commission, 2008, P. 2). The quote shows that the EU is framed as a leader against climate change and presents a positive position of the EU against climate change.

In relation to this is the way that the document refers to climate change in relation to the EU and to other regions in different ways. An example of this is how Africa and Latin America might be affected by climate change: *“Africa is one of the continents most vulnerable to climate change because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity. In North Africa and the Sahel, increasing drought, water scarcity and land overuse will degrade soils and could lead to a loss of 75% of arable, rain-fed land. The Nile Delta could be at risk from both sea-level rise and salinisation in agricultural areas while 12 to 15% of arable land could be lost through sea-level rise in this century with 5 million people affected by 2050. Already today, climate change is having a major impact on the conflict in and around Darfur. In the Horn of Africa reduced rainfall and increasing temperatures will have a significant negative impact on a region highly vulnerable to conflict. In southern Africa, droughts are contributing to poor harvests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with millions of people expected to face food shortages.*

*Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify. In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is expected to have a negative effect on health, in particular due to the spread of vectorborne diseases further aggravating tensions”* (European Commission, 2008, P. 6).

Or *“In drier areas of Latin America climate change will lead to salinisation and desertification of agricultural land and to decreasing productivity of important crops and livestock. This will have adverse consequences for food security. Sea-level rise is projected to cause increased risk of flooding in low-lying areas. Increases in sea surface temperature due to climate change are projected to have adverse effects on coral reefs, and cause shifts in the location of fish stocks. Latin American and Caribbean countries are already subject to the detrimental effects, including many extreme events, associated with the El Niño cycle. Changes in rainfall patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to significantly affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture*

*and energy generation, for example in the Andes region. Countries in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico are already increasingly affected by major hurricanes. This will be further exacerbated by climate change and result in social and political tensions in a region with often weak governance structures” (European Commission, 2008, P. 8).*

These quotes are examples of ways that the EU frame themselves as separated from different regions and states: *“The East coasts of China and India as well as the Caribbean region and Central America would be particularly affected. An increase in disasters and humanitarian crises will lead to immense pressure on the resources of donor countries, including capacities for emergency relief operations” (European Commission, 2008, P. 4).* And: *“Climate change may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face. The inability of a government to meet the needs of its population as a whole or to provide protection in the face of climate change-induced hardship could trigger frustration, lead to tensions between different ethnic and religious groups within countries and to political radicalisation. This could destabilise countries and even entire regions” (European Commission, 2008, P. 5).* This shows that the EU considers itself separate from other developing countries. In other words, other developed countries are not as good at fighting climate change as the EU and also that the problem regions and states face from climate change also varies. This can be viewed in relation to what was mentioned before about idea that the EU is the leader and the best at fighting climate change. Furthermore, the representation that EU is already doing its best leaves no room for critique and improvement in the EU strategy. Also the fact that the document points out on that all security threats are from the outside of EU or based on that other regions and states are affected. One can say that the absence of criticism against the EU is a discursive strategy that enforces the discourse that the EU is best at fighting climate change. In this document we can see the representation of EU as leaders in fighting climate change as a discursive norm. This way of comparing and judging other developed countries in relation to the EU regions or problematizing other regions, can be seen as a way of inscribing the idea that EU is the best at fighting climate change.

There is a distinction made between developed countries and developing countries in this representation. The EU compares itself to other developing countries in the fight against climate change. This can be seen as an acknowledgement of difference in ability to adapt to climate change between different developing and developed countries.

In there is also an explicit acknowledgement that developed countries have more responsibility for causing climate change than developing countries. One example of this is in the chapter *Cooperation with third countries* which creates a distance between developed states and third countries. There is one quote from that chapter that illustrated where they refer to third world countries as vulnerable. *“Further integrate adaptation and resilience to climate change into EU regional strategies (for example Northern Dimension, European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-Africa Strategy, Barcelona Process, Black Sea Synergy, EU-Central Asia Strategy, Middle East action plan). Special attention should be given to the most vulnerable regions and potential climate security hot spots. The Global Climate Change Alliance between the EU and the most vulnerable developing countries should be built upon”* (European Commission, 2008, P. 11).

The interdiscursivity of this document is that the discourse about climate change is directly reproduced as a security problem rather than just discussing climate change as a problem. The discourse also showed patterns that rather move from a human centered perspective into a perspective where security and economical factors are framed important. What is interesting in this document is the way of putting the EU against other regions and also as a distance from the problem. The way of promoting the EU as international leaders is a way of showing a European norm, where the European way of combating climate change is the right way. This wider context of showing the norm also confirms that there is a distance between the EU and other regions and the way that other regions should learn from the “European way” (See Chapter 3.2.3 and European Commission, 2008).

## **5.2 Migration and security**

The Global Approach to Migration also called GAMM can be described as the external dimension of the EU migration policy. The GAMM covers three different thematic areas: legal migration, irregular migration and migration and development. While the relation between migration and climate change was absent from the initial debates on the Global Approach to Migration, the Stockholm Programme that was adopted by the European Council in 2009, underlines, that the connection between climate change, migration and development needs to be further explored, and that the European Council therefore invites the Commission to present an analysis of the effects of climate change on international

migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the Union. The Stockholm Programme will be further analyzed later in this chapter. The European Commission have noted that there is an urgent need for an agreed terminology and definition at international level and to clarify the legal status of people migrating due to climate change to ensure adequate legal protection. The European Commission also highlighted a wide concern about the uncertainty in predicting how climate change is likely to influence migration patterns in particular to the European Union. Despite this uncertainty the EC urges for an international approach where migration, tackling climate change, development cooperation and humanitarian action are policy fields are produced in which the international community (Kraler, Cernei & Noack, 2011. P. 63p).

The human rights of migrants are at the centre of the GAMM through the four pillars. It is brought up to attention that *“The GAMM should also be migrant-centred. In essence, migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’, it is about people. In order to be relevant, effective and sustainable, policies must be designed to respond to the aspirations and problems of the people concerned. Migrants should, therefore, be empowered by gaining access to all the information they need about their opportunities, rights and obligations. The Commission has set up the EU Immigration Portal to provide such information together with other measures. The human rights of migrants are a cross-cutting dimension, of relevance to all four pillars in the GAMM. Special attention should be paid to protecting and empowering vulnerable migrants, such as unaccompanied minors, asylum-seekers, stateless persons and victims of trafficking. This is also often a priority for migrant source countries. Respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is a key component of EU policies on migration. The impact on fundamental rights of initiatives taken in the context of the GAMM must be thoroughly assessed. More will also need to be done to explain the EU legal framework, including the new Single Permit Directive, to the EU’s partners and to migrants”*. The GAMM states that the respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is a key component of EU policies on migration, which will be further analyzed later in this chapter (GAMM, 2005, P. 6).

*“Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility. The legitimacy of any policy framework relies on this. The well-being of migrants and successful integration largely depend on it. The EU will step*

*up its efforts to prevent and reduce trafficking in human beings. It will continue to improve the efficiency of its external borders on the basis of common responsibility, solidarity and greater practical cooperation. It will also reinforce its operational cooperation geared towards capacity-building with its partner countries (GAMM, 2005, P. 5).* According to discourse theory, discourses (constructions of meaning) have material effects. The discourses analyzed in the GAMM have material effects in the EU external policies on migration. It has been established that EU discourses see immigrants as a threat and danger to Europe and that this discourse is culminating in more restrictive and selective immigration policies. In other words, the effect of the discourses analyzed limits the possibilities for asylum seekers to get protection in Europe. The quote presents that without border controls the EU migration policy would not function. The border control can be directly linked to the security perspective. Also the word solidarity creates a high trace of high relational modality since it states solidarity between EU countries is seen as remedy to the challenges of migration. This creates the understanding that there is a danger outside the EU that can only be met if the member states of the EU stand together and unites (See Chapter 3.2.1). Like previous mentioned, the GAMM is a strategy paper for the EU external work on asylum and migration. The GAMM uses regional protection programs which in the document are represented as a way to meet the asylum seekers needs of assistance in their own region rather than accepting them to Europe. The idea of the increased collaboration with third countries is stated to reinforce protection capacities in regions of origin. The GAMM approach is represented as both rational and logical considering that these regions receive far greater more of the world refugees than the EU actually does. But one unmentioned effect is that when EU puts its attention to assisting refugees outside the EU in so called third world countries it gives less attention to the internal protection of refugees. The quotes presented from the GAMM earlier in this chapter illustrates how regional protection programs are both legitimized and normalized. In the quotes we can see that refugees are represented as victims that are in need of this assistance. Further, the GAMM is framed as a positive, humanitarian, and way to help refugees outside EU borders. What is interesting is that the EU does not problematize migration when it occurs outside the EU in the refugee's regions of origin but rather only when it is inside the European borders. The GAMM document does not frame that refugees pose a threat or problem to the receiving country in another region. The absence of such a reflection contrasts with how both migration and refugees are spoken of when

Europe is the receiving region. Based on the GAMM it is framed that immigrants and asylum seekers are only viewed as a threat when they come to Europe but when they migrate within their region of origin they are just represented as victims and people in need of their human rights. The EU engagement in external aid for refugees is represented as the best possible strategy the EU can take to help refugees. This because that the vast majority of refugees remain in their region of origin and suggests that the idea that refugees stay in their region of origin is unchangeable. The fact that most refugees remain in their region of origin is framed as something neutral and unproblematic. This representation can be seen as a discursive strategy to legitimize the use of different regional and external protection programmes and justify the way of separating the problem from the EU. Since the established discourse clearly says that refugees need most help and assistance in their region origin, the GAMM appears as a reasonable and good strategy. This type of representation can therefore be understood as a way to normalize and legitimize the decreasing protection to refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. Discourse theory actually holds that absences and silences construct meaning in the text. In this case, the framing on refugees in other regions and states and lack of critique against the idea that immigrants stay in their region of origin, enforces and justifies the discourse that the EU is doing the right thing to put more resources to external work in protection rather than allowing more immigrants and asylum seekers to Europe. In the wider discourse and in relation to the Stockholm Programme, which is a paper on internal security within the EU external strategy for refugees can be viewed as both a response and solution to the idea that immigration constitutes a threat to Europe. Assisting potential asylum seekers to the EU in their region of origin instead of in Europe is consistent with the idea in EU discourse that asylum seekers and refugees are a threat to the European internal security (See chapter 3.2).

The Stockholm Programme also brings up the fact that internal border controls have been removed in the Schengen area and that the external borders of the EU are now managed in a more coherent manner. Through the development of the GAMM, the external dimension of the EU's migration policy focuses on dialogue and partnerships with third countries, based on mutual interests (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 2). The European Council have also considered that a priority for the near future will be to focus on the interests and needs of citizens. The challenge will be to ensure respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing security in Europe. It is of

paramount importance that law enforcement measures and measures to safeguard individual rights (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 3). In relation to the previous mentioned analyze of the GAMM, the Stockholm Programme show the same type of high relational modality. What is interesting with this is that mutual interests are mentioned which also creates a distance since it claims that this cooperation with third world countries rather bases on European interests than humanitarian aid. The idea that Europe must work together through solidarity to face the outside threats of immigration can be seen through the concept of normalization. The normalization of the meaning can be seen as a potential exercise in hegemonic power. Like mentioned in previous chapters the reception and the resistance of the EU discourses is not analyzed in this thesis and can therefore not directly determine if the EU discourses have hegemonic status in the wider societies of the member states. However, based on what we know, EU is a powerful democratic supernatural institution and both the consent and agreement of many people across member states is necessary in the construction of policies at a European level. Therefore, the probability that the discourses analyzed in this research include a hegemonic power is high.

The European Council recognizes both opportunities and challenges posed by increased mobility of persons and underlines that creating a well-managed migration can be beneficial to all stakeholders, both the EU and other actors. In the Stockholm Programme states that *“The European Council equally recognises that, in the context of the important demographic challenges that will face the Union in the future with an increased demand for labour, flexible immigration policies will make an important contribution to the Union's economic development and performance in the longer term. The European Council is of the opinion that the long-term consequences of migration, e.g. on the labour markets and the social situation of migrants, have to be taken into account and that the interconnection between migration and integration remains crucial, inter alia with regard to the fundamental values of the Union”* (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 59). Even though EU at times have both economic crisis and high unemployment rates, European Union countries are about to face labor market both shortages and vacancies which cannot be filled by the domestic workforce in specific sectors, e.g. in health, science and technology. This means that migration is already and will maintain key importance in the EU, with net migration contributing 0.9 million people or 62 % of total population growth in 2010. All indicators show that some of the additional and specific

skills needed in the future could be found only outside the EU, and therefore there is a importance of migration for not just only humanitarian aid but also European internal interests (GAMM, 2005, P. 2p). In relation to this is the way of viewing migration. Where the European Council underlines the need to take further actions to maximize the positive effects and minimizing the negative effects of migration on development in line with the Global Approach on Migration. Effective policies can provide the framework needed to enable countries of destination and origin and migrants themselves to work in partnership to enhance the effects of international migration on development (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 62). Within these two documents there are high traces of both relational and expressive modality. The expressive modality can be showed through how both documents does their representation of the reality, regarding what the facts are, what the interests are and what might develop. The relational modality is shown through the way that the text uses the authority of being enabled to enforce requirements. For example, on how the EU should not look at the negative aspects of migration through a security perspective but rather through a human rights perspective to understand the possibilities that migration can give (See Chapter 3.2.1).

This analysis of the Stockholm Programme will be presented to give the reader an understanding of the textual analysis of this document and if there are traces of both modality and transitivity. *“The Union must continue to facilitate legal access to the territory of the Member States while in parallel taking measures to counteract illegal immigration and cross-border crime and maintaining a high level of security. The strengthening of border controls should not prevent access to protection systems by those persons entitled to benefit from them, and especially people and groups that are in vulnerable situations. In this regard, priority will be given to the needs of international protection and reception of unaccompanied minors”* (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P, 55). And *“Promoting solidarity within the EU is crucial but not sufficient to achieve a credible and sustainable common asylum policy. It is therefore important to further develop instruments to express solidarity with third countries in order to promote and help building capacity to handle migratory flows and protracted refugee situations in these countries”* (The Stockholm Programme, 2009, P. 72). From these quotes there are words which are of interest when analyzing the text. For example: must, security, border controls, should not and solidarity. The document shows both relational modality and transitivity. Transitivity can be viewed in the way that partnership is promoted *“to express*

*solidarity with third world countries*". The way that the text expresses what the EU should and should not do shows traces of high relational modality and explicit power through the way that the EU is framed in distance from third world countries and the problems is also framed to be distanced (See Chapter 3.2.1).

### **5.3 Climate refugees and the link between climate change and migration**

The document 'Climate Change and International Security' by the High Representative and the Commission addresses the problem with climate induced migration and security. The quotes: *Some countries that are extremely vulnerable to climate change are already calling for international recognition of such environmentally induced migration. Such migration may increase conflicts in transit and in destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure* (High Representative and the European Commission, 2008. P. 4). And: *Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognize that the risks are not just of humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests. Moreover, in line with the concept of human security. It is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security are interlinked requiring comprehensive policy responses. For example, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals would be at considerable risk because climate change, if unmitigated, may wipe out years of development efforts* (High Representative and European Commission, 2008. P. 3). In this document the relation between climate change and migration is acknowledged and mentioned as a direct security risk to European countries. The chapter on climate change and security mentioned there are high traces of both relational and expressive modality in this document. The parts mentioning climate refugees or climate induced migration, the usage of relational modality is not that high. We can clearly see an exclusionary form of relational modality in this subject based on just the two quotes above. There is a clear distance to the problem of climate refugees and Europe. Where climate refugees are rather a problem that might come to Europe and hurt the European policies and security. Meaning that the text is clearly showing a distance to climate refugees (See Chapter 3.2.1). This is something we also saw identified with the

relation on security and climate change, were the distance and the responsibility is mentioned to rather third world countries or just other countries outside the EU (See Chapter 5.1). The text also showed high traces of transitivity. The traces are showed by revealing the agent of the responsibility by shifting the emphasis to the consequences and not the actual process or actions that lead to them (See Chapter 3.2.1). The quotes *“It is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security are interlinked requiring comprehensive policy responses. For example, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals would be at considerable risk because climate change, if unmitigated, may wipe out years of development efforts”*, *“Such migration may increase conflicts in transit and in destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure”* and *“it is important to recognize that the risks are not just of humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests”* show a great example on how transitivity is used in the text but outlining the direct consequences for European states and also a clear distance from the roots of the problem (See Chapter 3.2.1). After this in April 2013, the Commission published a staff working document on climate change and migration, which downplayed the likelihood of mass influx migration into Europe as a result direct from climate stress in developing countries. Instead it focused on population movements within these developing countries and related problems to IDPs. Many developing countries have emerged the EU to afford climate migrants the status of refugees. Individual EU Member States have not supported the idea of creating a new category of climate refugees. The Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs had suggested a status of “permanently forced migration” as a new category to get around the refugee status problem, and the above-mentioned April 2013 document argued that there was no need for refugee protection specifically on climate-related grounds. Later this view evolved, as evidence by Jean-Claude Juncker's 2015 State of the Union speech (Apap, 2019. P. 8). Here we can see an exact example on the previous mentioned regarding the distance.

In relation to the previous chapter on migration and security, a short discussion based on in that chapter will be presented to analyze the discourse regarding climate refugees. *“The connection between climate change, migration and development needs to be further explored, and the European Council therefore invites the Commission to present an analysis of the effects of climate change on international migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the European Union”*(The Stockholm Programme,

2009, P. 63). The Stockholm Programme main topic is an open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen, also a paper on internal security. The GAMM which is an external policy for migration states *“Finally, the Stockholm Programme recognised climate change as a global challenge that is increasingly driving migration and displacement and invited the Commission to present an analysis of this phenomenon, beyond merely its potential effects on immigration into the European Union. Addressing environmentally induced migration, also by means of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, should be considered part of the Global Approach”* (The GAMM, 2005, P. 6). That is interesting in wider discourse of migration that is showed in these two quotes is that climate refugees are mentioned in a document regarding internal security but not recognized in a paper on the EU global approaches for migration. This is a way of portraying the discourse regarding climate refugees to be a matter of internal security rather than a matter of global humanitarian aid. One other aspect of it is that the GAMM portrays that the Stockholm Programme acknowledges climate refugees as something very positive. Where the fact is that these quotes presented above from the Stockholm Programme is the only sentences in the entire document that mentions climate refugees, or climate induced migration. This means that the problem with climate refugees is only acknowledged and barely mentioned, but the GAMM frames it in a positive matter to make the readers believe that the climate refugees are acknowledged and will be dealt with. In this matter we can see intertextuality where the texts are a part of an intertextual chain that bases on each other (See Chapter 3.2.2).

At the national level of the member states of the EU there are several dozens of non-EU harmonized protection statuses that can be granted to asylum related applicants. However, there are only four member states that have stipulations about protection in the case of environmental disasters: Sweden, Finland, Cyprus and Italy. In other member states the legislation might be interpreted in its broader meaning as applicable towards environmentally displaced individuals too. The decision on granting protection to ‘environmentally displaced individuals’ might be of political character without necessarily having legal stipulations, which exists in Belgium. Nonetheless, there are no officially recorded cases of granted protection to the category of individuals concerned (Kraler, Cernei & Noack, 2011. P. 73). Down here the four member states national laws that touch upon the matter of climate refugees will be presented.

The Cyprus Article 29 (4) of the Refugee Law of 2000 provides that:

*“No refugee or a person with a subsidiary protection status shall be deported to any country where his life or freedom will be endangered or he will be in danger of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or persecution for reasons of sex, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion or because of armed conflict or environmental destruction.”*

Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that this protection is only available to persons who have already been granted refugee status or humanitarian protection. The entitlement to receive refugee status requires the element of persecution; natural disaster is not covered in the grounds for granting refugee status, therefore there remains a dilemma here.

In the case of Finland, in Section 109(1) of the Aliens Acts it is presented that:

*“Temporary protection may be given to aliens who need international protection and who cannot return safely to their home country or country of permanent residence, because there has been a massive displacement of people in the country or its neighbouring areas as a result of an armed conflict, some other violent situation or an environmental disaster.”* At the same time, Section 88a (1) of the Aliens Acts provides for humanitarian protection if: *“An alien residing in Finland is issued with a residence permit on the basis of humanitarian protection, if there are no grounds under section 87 or 88 for granting asylum or providing subsidiary protection, but he or she cannot return to his or her country of origin or country of former habitual residence as a result of an environmental catastrophe or a bad security situation which may be due to an international or internal armed conflict or a poor human rights situation”*. The total length of which temporary protection can be provided in Finland is the maximum of three years.

In Italy, Art.20 of Legislative Decree nr 286 of 25.07.1998 on consolidated text of provisions governing immigration and the status of the foreigner provides for extraordinary measures in case of exceptional events and reads as follows: *“By decree of the Prime Ministers [...] the temporary protection measures should be adopted, as an exception to the provisions of this single text, in the case of major humanitarian needs, on the occasion of conflicts, natural disasters or other particularly serious events in countries outside the EU”*. Although only theoretically, as it has never been implemented into practice, this provision allows the provision of temporary protection in case of environmental disasters. The section 2(3) of the Swedish Aliens Act provides that a ‘person otherwise in need of protection’ is an alien who in cases other than those referred

to in Section 1 [refugee grounds] is outside the country of the alien's nationality, as he or she is unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster. Nonetheless, the applicability of this provision is limited to cases of sudden environmental disasters, therefore, slow onset environmental changes are not considered in this case (Kraler, Cernei & Noack, 2011. P. 56p).

Another briefing presented 2019 from the EU also aims at climate refugees, but mentions basically the same points as the text from Kraler, Cernei and Noack. One quote from this briefing is interesting: *“The main challenge remains for those arriving to the EU from outside. A 2016 Commission staff working document on the Next steps for a sustainable European future, which reports on the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, makes references to migration in relation to Goal 10: reducing the inequality within and among countries as a need to reduce the irregular migration to the Union and to 'build dialogue and partnerships with countries of origin and transit, based on solidarity and shared responsibility'. Migration is viewed in the context of human development, one of the five priority areas in the 2014- 2017 Roadmap for the Joint Africa-EU strategy. Furthermore, the roadmap states that the EU will cooperate with the African nations in 'the field of international protection and asylum' and work on promoting respect for migrants' human rights. Africa is one of the regions that will be the most negatively affected by climate change, which poses a threat to lives, livelihoods and access to food and water”* (Apap, 2019, P. 9). As we saw in previous chapters (See Chapter 5.1 and 5.2) there is a clear distance in the discourse for EU and other regions and states, where the discourse for climate, migration and climate refugees presents a clear distance.

There are limited documents within the EU on the connection between climate change and human displacement. The absence of this clearly creates a distance between the EU and climate refugees. This distance is something that was shown through all the documents. This can begin to make out an explanation of why the EU has not fully recognized the existence of climate change induced migrants. The discourse of the European identity is used as way to normalize and legitimize the harmonization of the European asylum/immigration system. The absence of recognition and assistance to climate refugees within the EU seems to be compatible with the idea that immigrants from third countries

constitute a threat to Europe. This is something we can see that is commonly occurs that climate separately, migration separately, and climate refugees is often mentioned in the relation to security. Even if there is an acknowledgement of the existence of human populations displaced by climate change by the EU, there are still no definition for the term actually show that the problem is really acknowledged and to assist the Union to tackle climate refugees. This would go against EU: s interest of more selective and stricter regulations of non-skilled immigration from developing countries. Which is something that is both unspoken and spoken about. In relation to the discourse on climate change in the an earlier chapter (See Chapter 5.1) and the part that analyzes the discourse on EU leadership in fighting climate change is part of the European identity has implications for how climate induced migration are treated by the EU. European leadership in the fight against climate change is represented as something normal and natural for Europeans. This creates a social norm in the discourse about the European identity. Further, the EU climate change strategy discourse is framed as completely exhaustive of all available solutions and approaches. The absence of an acknowledgment of climate induced migrants can be seen as necessary for the EU to represent its strategy as exhaustive. Since it is a part of both migration and climate change and that the fields are therefore not exhaustive. Another aspect of the discourse saying that the EU is doing all that can be done regarding climate change relies on the idea that the EU has identified all the problems that climate change causes. Without this idea the EU would not be able to claim the leadership and exhaustiveness in its climate change strategy that the EU clearly does in the documents. But the lack of acknowledgement of climate refugees is necessary for the EU to represent its climate strategy as leading because if they do not for example define the term climate refugees the field of climate change is not exhaustive since It does not cover climate refugees or climate induced migration.

As previously mentioned by the briefing from 2019 and also earlier on in the analysis an acknowledgement that developed countries are particularly responsible for causing climate change could lead to more pressure on the EU to provide asylum to climate refugees in Europe. The distance creates a distance to the matter of climate refugees since the problem is rather referred as a problem for third world countries. The absence of an acknowledgement that developed countries are particularly responsible for causing climate change can be seen as a way to legitimize and justify the lack of protection to climate refugees but at the same time the silence about responsibility can be

seen as a discursive strategy to enhance the idea that EU is leading the fight against climate change.

The discourse on how migration is an internal security problem and a threat to the EU. Climate induced migrants fall in the same category as ordinary asylum seekers because they often come from developing countries and are therefore perceived as incompatible with the EU labor market. Just like refugees protected by the Geneva Convention, their residence in Europe would be given for humanitarian reasons rather than because of a connection and contribution to the labor market. With this in consideration the absence of a wider acknowledgment that climate change causes human displacement falls in line with the idea in EU discourse that migrants from developing countries and specially unskilled immigration constitutes a threat to Europe that has to be fought before it breaches EU's internal security. The ideas in the discourses, that unskilled immigration from third world countries constitutes a threat to the European identity, and that Europe is the leader in fighting climate change can both be seen as a means to normalize and legitimize the absence of a protection for climate change induced migrants.

In the European discourse there still an idea that refugees are victims in need of protection. Refugees are for example represented as victims in the context of Regional Protection Programs and within the general discourse on the global approach. This approach and way of framing the discourse gives the impression of a fact or a norm of that climate refugees are better aided in their country of origin than in Europe. This gives the impression that there is no need for assisting climate refugees within EU. This idea is supported by saying that it is more efficient for the EU to aim its aid in third world countries instead of within the EU, since it is where most refugees are situated. This part of the discourse is a part of the genre of the EU distancing to the rest of the world in both responsibility and approaching. Discourses and their construction of meaning have material effects. The discourses analyzed in this analysis have material effects in determining who is welcome and who is rejected to Europe, where climate refugees are one of those who in this time are not fully acknowledged. It has been established in this analysis that EU discourses see migration as a threat and danger to Europe. In other words, the effect of the discourses analyzed limits the acknowledgement of climate refugees. As a concluding part of this analysis the reader can see that is next into impossible for climate refugees to seek protection in Europe.

## 6. Results

This part will present the results based on the analysis of this thesis. By using a critical discourse analysis, the EU discourses on migration, climate and climate refugees are analyzed to identify what the internal factors for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee. This chapter will go through all the findings in the analysis that be understood as factors and give an answer to the research question.

*The question is what are the internal factors for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee?*

One thing that the discourses in migration, climate change and climate refugees have in common is that they are directly linked to security, where security is the main spoken and unspoken concern of the documents. For example the document 'Climate Change and International Security' by the High Representative and the Commission directly addressed the relation between climate change and the security for the EU. The document presents Europe in distance to other regions and states. Meaning that security problems are distanced to other regions or countries problems, creating a "we" and "them" where the EU is at the center of concern. Through the whole document this kind of distance exists between the European security and the international security. One example from the analysis where EU is distanced from another region is in the quote regarding the Middle East. Where it is presented as a fact that the Middle East is already under stress due to climate change. An example is the shortage of water supply which can lead to further political instability with detrimental implications for Europe's energy security and other European interests. One thing that this example also highlights is that there might occur conflicts which could lead to instability within the region which is an important economic partner of Europe with factors of production and distribution concentrated along vulnerable coastlines. To maintain security and safety for the EU cooperation with third world countries is required. The Stockholm Programme is one document that shows upon partnership with countries outside the EU to tackle climate change and climate disasters. Although the meaning of this might be viewed from a humanitarian perspective focusing on human rights, the security perspective is at the center. Distance towards acknowledging climate refugees was something that was shown through all the documents in all of the discourses. This can begin to make out an explanation of why the EU has not fully recognized the existence of climate change induced migrants and also make us understand

why a EU definition for the term climate refugee have not been successfully established yet. What we could see in the discourses that commonly occurred is that climate refugees are often mentioned in the relation to security and are always mentioned in relation to the security problem if it is inside EU border. If it is outside is rather a humanitarian problem that needs to be dealt with. Even if there is an acknowledgement of the existence of human populations displaced by climate change by the EU, there are still no definition for the term actually show that the problem is really acknowledged and to assist the Union to tackle climate refugees.

Another factor for the EU not reaching an internal definition for the term is showed in how the EU discourse is how the role of responsibility is framed. In different documents EU was identified as both leaders and role models in fighting climate change. Where the EU presents itself to be at a unique position to respond to climate change and its impact on security since the EU has a leading role. Where the EU is framed to have the strengths and knowledge to combat climate change, meaning that the EU discourse is putting the EU itself in a positive position towards climate change. This leading role that the EU is framed to have in the discourse creates the understanding that the EU is doing their best and doing best in the world regarding climate change. This representation leaves no room for neither critique nor improvement on the EU strategy. One can say that the absence of criticism against the EU is a discursive strategy that enforces the discourse that the EU is best at fighting climate change. Meaning if the discourse is claiming that the EU has a leading role in the fight against climate change, it is very obvious that climate refugees is one aspect that is still not acknowledged. Based on the discourse the EU is not seeing itself as responsible for climate refugees since they have a leading role in fighting climate change. The European leadership in the fight against climate change is portrayed as something normal and natural for Europeans. There is a social norm in the discourse about the European identity. Further, the EU climate change strategy discourse is framed as completely exhaustive of all available solutions and approaches. The absence of an acknowledgment of climate induced migrants can be seen as necessary for the EU to represent its strategy as exhaustive. Since it is a part of both migration and climate change and that the fields are therefore not exhaustive. Another aspect of the discourse saying that the EU is doing all that can be done regarding climate change relies on the idea that the EU has identified all the problems that climate change causes. For the EU to represent its climate strategy as leading it cannot frame climate refugees as a European problem

because they will need to handle the matter to be leading and exhaustive within the field. Therefore, the credibility that the EU climate approaches are exhaustive is not that high. The problem here might be that the EU denies that climate refugees will be that big of a problem and especially for the EU. The way to put EU against other regions is one example of how the discourse puts a distance from the problem. The way of promoting the EU as international leaders is a way of showing a European norm, where the European way of combating climate change is the right way. This European norm is the way of promoting European leadership and solidarity within its member states towards the entire world. The European norm in this discourse is therefore presented to be the best, very strong, and have high acknowledge in the matter. The document 'Climate Change and International Security' by the High Representative and the Commission addresses the problem with climate induced migration and security. In contribution to the security aspect of climate refugees two quotes from different documents gives us an overall view on how climate refugees are viewed from only a security perspective. The quote: *"Some countries that are extremely vulnerable to climate change are already calling for international recognition of such environmentally induced migration. Such migration may increase conflicts in transit and in destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure"*. In this document the relation between climate change and migration is acknowledged and mentioned as a direct security risk to European countries. It is also important for this analysis to acknowledge that this paper is only a paper on security. In the document there is a clear distance to the problem of climate refugees and Europe. Where climate refugees are rather a problem that might come to Europe and hurt the European policies and security. As presented before the distance and the responsibility is mentioned to rather third world countries or just other countries outside the EU than as a European problem. Another quote from the Stockholm Programme states that: *"The connection between climate change, migration and development needs to be further explored, and the European Council therefore invites the Commission to present an analysis of the effects of climate change on international migration, including its potential effects on immigration to the European Union"*. The Stockholm Programmes main topic is an open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen and also a strategy for internal security. The GAMM, which were previously presented is an external approach for migration. The GAMM which is an external policy for migration states *"Finally, the Stockholm Programme recognised climate change as a global challenge that is*

*increasingly driving migration and displacement and invited the Commission to present an analysis of this phenomenon, beyond merely its potential effects on immigration into the European Union. Addressing environmentally induced migration, also by means of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, should be considered part of the Global Approach*". What this section presents is a clear example of the entire European view on security in relation to climate induced migration. What is interesting is that climate refugees are mentioned in a document regarding internal security but not recognized in a paper on the EU global approaches for migration. This is a way of portraying the discourse regarding climate refugees to be a matter of internal security rather than a matter of global humanitarian aid. Which ironically portrays the problem of climate refugees as only a security problem. The GAMM discourse frames it in a positive matter to make the readers believe that the climate refugees are acknowledged and will be dealt with. Which is in fact not a truth since the two quotes presented in this results part from the Stockholm Programme is the only one mentioning climate change and migration together and touches upon the nexus of climate refugees.

The Global Approach to Migration is an external dimension of the EU migration policy. The document is pointing out to be human centered and focusing on humanitarian aid. Still there are parts of the text that refer to well-functioning borders and an effective return policy for the EU. Even though this is a European human centered perspective where humanitarian aid is the core, the discourse on security must exist. This means that there is an intertextual matter that moves the discourse on migration and climate change as a humanitarian problem to be a security problem. The analysis gives us a clear view that the EU discourses see immigrants as both threats and dangers to Europe. In other words, the effect of the discourses analyzed limits the possibilities for asylum seekers to get protection in Europe. The fact that security is a dominated discourse within the subject of migration, this restrains migration assistance and aid to refugees since EU security is always at the center through the discussions. What is interesting is that the discourse within the GAMM is framed as a positive, humanitarian, and way to help refugees outside EU borders. But what is more interesting is that the EU does not problematize migration when it occurs outside the EU in the refugee's regions of origin but rather only when it is inside the European borders. Here we can also see a direct link to security measures. It was clearly showing that the GAMM document does not frame that refugees to pose a threat or problem to the receiving country in another region. Meaning that the view of

migration is outside the EU borders viewed as a problem in need of humanitarian aid but within the EU borders it is viewed as a security problem and threat. The fact that most refugees remain in their region of origin is framed as something neutral and unproblematic. This representation can be seen as a discursive strategy to legitimize the use of different regional and external protection programmes and justify the way of separating the problem from the EU. This representation in the migration discourse is a clear example on a factor that a definition for the term climate refugee is not established within the EU. Based on what has been presented so far in this result section, the EU is not framing both migration and climate change to be European centered problem which could explain why climate refugees not defined within the EU since the security perspective is dominate within these discourses. If developed countries were viewed as particularly responsible for causing climate change could lead to more pressure on the EU to provide asylum to climate refugees in Europe. But the literature rather discusses the approaches in third world countries than the responsibility in developed states. The distance creates a distance to the matter of climate refugees since the problem is rather referred as a problem for third world countries. The absence of a responsibility can be viewed as a way to legitimize and justify the lack of protection to climate refugees but at the same time the silence about responsibility can be seen as a discursive strategy to enhance the idea that EU is leading the fight against climate change.

Moving on to the financial perspective as a factor the Stockholm Programme states that The European Council equally recognizes that the Union in the future with an increased demand for labor. This results in that flexible immigration policies will make an important contribution to the Union's economic development and performance in the longer term. This can then be viewed as a financial perspective of the question regarding climate refugees. European Council underlines the need to take further actions to maximize the positive effects and minimizing the negative effects of migration. For example, how the EU should not look at the negative aspects of migration through a security perspective but rather through a human rights perspective to understand the possibilities that migration can give. This section gives us the understanding that the financial discourse is of relevance for the debate on climate refugees. What is interesting is that the financial aspect of increased labor overtrumps the negative view of security which is dominated through all of the literature. The discourse on how migration is an internal security problem and a threat to the EU. Climate induced migrants fall in the same

category as ordinary asylum seekers because they often come from developing countries and are therefore perceived as incompatible with the EU labor market. Just like refugees protected by the Geneva Convention, their residence in Europe would be given asylum for humanitarian reasons rather than because of a connection and contribution to the labor market. In other words, climate refugees should be assisted because they need the help rather than the financial gain of the Union. With this in consideration the absence of a wider acknowledgment that climate change causes human displacement falls in line with the idea in EU discourse that migrants from developing countries and specially unskilled immigration constitutes a threat to Europe that has to be fought before it breaches EU's internal security. The ideas in the discourses, that unskilled immigration from third world countries constitutes a threat to the European identity, and that Europe is the leader in fighting climate change can both be seen as a means to normalize and legitimize the absence of a protection for climate change induced migrants. The attitude here shows us an understanding that if migration is not profitable it is not suitable for the European Union.

Another factor that was found was national interests, meaning how member states viewed and acknowledged climate refugees. At the national level of the member states of EU there are several dozens of non-EU harmonized protection statuses that can be granted to asylum related applicants. However, there are only four member states that have stipulations about protection in the case of environmental disasters: Sweden, Finland, Cyprus and Italy. The EU is built upon its member states and it is still the member states that have the highest power within the organization. A problem here that is unspoken about but yet understood is that there are different views on migration in the member states which also is a factor for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee. The key here is the word "common" it is hard to reach a common definition for a word that is dividedly defined and differently prioritized and valued. The document that mentioned national interests and showed Sweden, Finland, Cyprus and Italy as examples did only mention it as a good example on how a vast minority of the member states acts and constitutes. There is still a majority of member states that do not acknowledge climate refugees or pressure the EU actually find a definition for the term climate refugee. If there is no pressure or commitment to define climate refugees, climate refugees will not be defined.

The last factor was something we saw in all the other factor that refugees, protected by the Geneva Convention are all victims in need of protection and climate refugees are viewed in the same way. Climate refugees are acknowledged as victims outside of the EU borders but as only security threats within the EU. The factor therefore is that even if the EU have acknowledged climate refugees in small doses, they have not acknowledge climate refugees in a way that makes it possible to handle the problem, since climate refugees are a security breach within the EU borders. The discourses analyzed in this analysis have material effects in determining who is welcome and who is rejected to Europe, where climate refugees are one of those who in this time are not fully acknowledged. It has been established in this analysis that EU discourses see migration as a threat and danger to Europe.

This thesis found five internal factors for the EU not reaching a common definition for the term climate refugee: climate refugees as a security threat, the non-acknowledged responsibility for climate refugees in the EU, financial factors, national interests of the member states and a distance in viewing climate refugees and other refugees in different ways where climate refugees are not prioritized.

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