The Ethics of Denationalization

An argumentative analysis of the removal of citizenships in liberal democratic states

Matilde Winther Anttila

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Supervisor: Anders Melin
Abstract

In recent years, due to the threat of terrorism, there has been a return of banishment, in contemporary terms better known as citizenship revocation or denationalization. The aim of this thesis is to critically assess the most common arguments used for and against liberal nations’ power to revoke citizenships as punishment and as a means to protect national security. This thesis presents an argumentation analysis of some of the most common philosophical arguments used for and against citizenship revocation in liberal democratic states. The arguments are first described and then evaluated based on their evidentiary strength in order to determine whether citizenship should be unconditional. The thesis concludes that the argumentation analysis indicates that citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal democratic state.

Key words: citizenship, denationalization, liberalism, counterterrorism

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1. Introduction

The power to revoke citizenships and thus ‘denationalize’ individuals, is one which historically has been claimed by nations, but which has been in disuse in the last several decades. However, since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’ denationalization has been reconsidered by scholars and political actors (Lenard, 2018, p. 99), and several liberal nations have recently chosen to revoke citizenships of nationals involved or suspected to be involved with terrorist organizations (Pokalova, 2020, pp. 126-128). This thesis aims to critically assess some of the philosophical arguments used for and against liberal nations’ power to revoke citizenships as punishment and as a means to protect national security, in order to get an indication of whether citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state.

1.1 Aim

The first aim is to describe the chosen arguments used for and against unconditional citizenship in a liberal state and how they are related to each other. The second aim is to evaluate in detail the identified arguments, according to my judgements. Finally, the third aim is to draw my own conclusion regarding whether or not denationalization coincide with liberal principles and if citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state.

1.2 Research question

The research question chosen for this thesis is:

Should citizenship be unconditional in a liberal democratic state?

This is a normative question which aims to explore how things ought to be, in this case, if citizenship ought to be unconditional in liberal states, and denationalization a thing of the past, or if citizenship instead should be conditional, meaning liberal states should have the power to revoke citizenships from individuals not meeting, or breaching, these conditions. This question is rather grand, and therefore, I do not expect to reach a definite conclusion, but instead, aim to get an indication based on the argumentation analysis, whether citizenships ought to be conditional or unconditional in liberal democratic states.

1.3 Relevance to Human Rights

Citizenship is relevant to Human Rights in multiple ways. Firstly, the right to nationality is considered a fundamental human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948, p. 4). Furthermore, citizenship is a kind of ‘meta right’,
as Lenard (2016, p. 75) describes it, because it appoints the state responsible for ensuring those rights, and the absence of citizenship places all rights in the balance (Lenard, 2016, p. 75). For example, without a citizenship or nationality, an individual may have difficulty accessing basic rights such as education, healthcare, work, and freedom of movement (UNHCR, u.d.).

1.4 Delimitations
Contemporary debates on denationalization majorly focus on removal of citizenships as a form of punishment and as a means to protect national security, particularly as a response to terrorism. However, denationalization takes place in other instances, such as for fraudulently acquired citizenships or voluntary citizenship renunciation. The focus of this thesis is limited to denationalization as punishment and means of protecting national security against those “participating in a foreign state’s military, treason, spying, or committing acts that otherwise threaten the national security of one’s state.” (Miller, 2016). Furthermore, the thesis is limited to liberal democracies, as the aim of the thesis is to determine whether or not citizenship should be unconditional in liberal democratic states. Unconditional citizenship in this thesis means that a citizenship cannot be removed as punishment or means to protect national security and does not apply to cases where the citizenship was initially acquired fraudulently or voluntarily renounced. Argumentation analysis has been chosen due to the normative nature of the research and the focus is on philosophical arguments.

1.5 Discussion of the thesis’s academic, social and ethical implications
The arguments in this thesis are assessed based on my judgements, but I aim to be as objective as possible in order to minimize bias. In order to strengthen this objectivity, appendix 1 includes an argumentative scheme with the arguments’ assessed evidentiary strength and reasons for these assessments, and appendix 2 includes quotes from which the arguments are derived from, allowing a critical reader to make their own judgements. For respect for intellectual property, other people’s work is acknowledged with proper references, and quotations where appropriate. Whilst this thesis discusses moral and ethical issues, it is theoretical and evaluative and there are therefore no direct ethical implications.

1.6 Background
Denationalization has a long history. In the ancient world, revocation of citizenship accompanied by physical expulsion, known as banishment, was common practice (Gibney, 2013, p. 647). Banishment continued into the early modern state (Gibney, 2013, p. 648)
where it was endorsed by prominent philosophers Hobbes, Beccaria, and Kant (Gibney, 2013, p. 647). During the eighteenth century it was practiced in Holland, Germany and France to punish criminals. In England, convicts were transported to North America and Australia (Gibney, 2013, p. 648). In late 18\textsuperscript{th} to mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century, a rise in nationalism and heightened consciousness of foreigners meant nations became less willing to accept rejects from other states and a new emphasis on reform and reintegration of criminals made banishment less common. The penitentiary was a way of punishing criminals within the state without endangering public security and in line with emerging principles of democratic equality (Gibney, 2013, p. 648). Use of denationalization power was later exacerbated by war. In Britain during World War I, there was huge distrust and hostility towards naturalized citizens\textsuperscript{1} of German and Austrian descent. Changes were made to UK legislation which made removal of citizenships for naturalized citizens easier, and between 1918 and 1926 163 Britons were denaturalized\textsuperscript{2} (Gibney, 2013, p. 649). In the United States, denationalization powers were extended due to anxiety over communists during the Cold War (Gibney, 2013, p. 649). 1438 US citizens were denationalized between 1945 and 1954 (Gibney, 2013, p. 650). In the last several decades denationalization has largely been in disuse. However, recent terrorist events have prompted scholars and political actors to reconsider denationalization and its role in democratic societies (Lenard, 2018, p. 99) and there has been a resurgence denationalization (Macklin, 2018, p. 163). Some states use citizenship revocation against naturalized dual citizens, others extend the practice to dual citizens born in the country, and others again revoke citizenships of nationals who have no other citizenships (Pokalova, 2020, p. 126). In the Netherlands, dual citizens risk losing their Dutch nationality when convicted terrorist offenses, and at least six Dutch nationals have been subject to citizenship revocation after joining terrorist organizations (Pokalova, 2020, p. 126). In France and Belgium only naturalized dual citizens convicted of terrorism-related offences risk citizenship revocation (Pokalova, 2020, p. 127). In Denmark, revocation laws are applied equally to naturalized and Danish-born dual citizens. For example, Said Mansour, a naturalized Danish citizen who was originally from Morocco, had his Danish citizenship revoked in 2016 following terrorist-related activities, and Hamza Cakan, a Danish-born citizen whom also possessed a Turkish passport had his citizenship revoked in 2017 after fighting for IS in Syria (Pokalova, 2020, p. 127). Australia’s revocation laws similarly apply to both naturalized and native-born citizens.

\footnote{1 A naturalized citizen is a non-native-born citizen (Gibney, 2013, p. 652).}

\footnote{2 Denationalization is denationalization of naturalized citizens (Gibney, 2013, p. 652).}
A few Australian citizens have had their citizenship revoked, including former Melbourne rapper Neil Prakash, who also held Fijian citizenship, and acted as IS recruiter (Pokalova, 2020, pp. 127-128). Most Western states limit denationalization power to cases where individuals will not become stateless. However, in the United Kingdom, a person can be denationalized as long as there is reasonable grounds to believe the individual could obtain citizenship elsewhere (Pokalova, 2020, p. 128). More than 150 suspected terrorists who have been stripped of their British citizenship, including Shamima Begum, a British-born citizen, who had her citizenship revoked on the premise that she, due to her Bangladeshi ethnicity, was eligible for citizenship in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi authorities, however, denied any responsibility for Begum and would not allow her into Bangladesh (Pokalova, 2020, p. 129).

1.7 Theoretical framework

This section goes through the theoretical framework of the thesis and clarifies the most important terms.

1.7.1 Liberalism and liberal citizenship

Liberalism is a political and moral philosophy based on principles of liberty and equality. Contemporary liberalism is a defence of freedom and an attempt to treat all persons with equal respect and concern. By creating a political authority, liberalism addresses potential conflicts arising from individuals different interests and varying moral perspectives, but because the government may itself become oppressive it must be constrained by citizens strong individual rights including freedom of speech and conscience, equal civil status, and constitutional restraints on any form of government (Honohan, 2017, p. 87). Political legitimacy is often tied to social contract theory, which is a philosophical and political theory associated with the liberal tradition, as it presupposes the freedom and equality of those entering into a political arrangement. From this starting point, social contract theory develops an account of political legitimacy based on the idea that naturally free and equal human beings cannot exercise power over one another, except if there is mutual consent (Neidleman, 2012). The liberal perspective is open to recognizing some common goods, but this is better understood as accumulation of individual goods or the prerequisite for this, such as a peaceful society. There are three distinct dimensions to citizenship: legal status and rights, activity, and membership (Honohan, 2017, p. 91). Liberal theory view citizenship as a formal legal status and body of individual rights with some corresponding duties, but with no emphasis on commitment or civic virtue (Honohan, 2017, p. 87), as opposed to republican conception of
citizenship as loyalty to the state (Sykes, 2016, p. 1), the liberal conception thus in a way prioritize the dimension of legal status and rights, whilst the republican prioritize action (Honohan, 2017, p. 91). Due to liberalism’s emphasis on freedom, liberal citizenship, in theory, does not impose many obligations on citizens (Lister & Pia, 2008, p. 10). Locke argued that within a political community, an individual’s only responsibility is respecting the rights of others, and all other obligations are based upon consent (Lister & Pia, 2008, p. 10). According to John Rawls, any political virtues tied to participation citizens should develop, and practice is rationality and impartiality (Honohan, 2017, p. 91). In practice many liberal states put obligations on citizens, such as obeying the laws, paying taxes, in some countries serve on juries (Honohan, 2017, p. 91), and military conscription (World Population Review, 2020). When it comes to globalization and immigration, because liberal conceptions of citizenship are not defined in terms of membership, there is no immediate right of political communities to exclude non-citizens. Therefore, it has been argued, people should be free to migrate wherever they wish. For migrants already within the borders of a liberal state it has been suggested a broad range of rights should apply to all and migrants should have relatively easy access to full citizenship through naturalization (Honohan, 2017, p. 100). Other liberals have, however, argued that political communities have a right to freedom of association which supports state powers to exclude migrants and make citizenship conditional (Honohan, 2017, p. 100). This shows there is considerable disagreement within liberal traditions of citizenship (Honohan, 2017, p. 101). In this thesis liberal principles refer to equality, non-discrimination and liberal citizenship as a legal status involving individual rights.

### 1.7.2 Clarifications

#### 1.7.2.1 Nationality/citizenship

Citizenship is a legal status which includes a set of rights and duties (Macklin, 2018, p. 165). Nationality refers to where an individual has been born or holds citizenship. Nationality is usually acquired automatically at birth, either through the individual’s parents or the country they are born, or through naturalization (UNHCR, u.d.). The right to nationality can be found in article 15 of the Universal declaration of human rights: "Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality" (UN General Assembly, 1948). For the purpose of this thesis nationality and citizenship are used interchangeably.
1.7.2.2 Liberal democratic states

Liberal democracy is a form of government where representative democracy operates under principles of liberalism. This type of government is typically associated with Western democracy and characterized by elections, separation of powers, rule of law, market economy and respect and protection for human rights (McCabe, 2011, p. 2). Liberal democracy is the predominant political system in the world (Honohan, 2017, p. 83).

2. Literature review

Given the argumentative and value-laden nature of this thesis, this literature review is an argumentative review. The purpose is to develop a body of literature which establishes a contrarian viewpoint. The first section reviews what I here have termed ‘philosophical canon’ which consists of texts by prominent philosophers arguing either for or against denationalization, or banishment as it was called by some of these philosophers. The second section reviews argumentative texts by scholars arguing either for or against denationalization in contemporary liberal states.

2.1 ‘Philosophical Canon’

Though these texts may not relate to contemporary society, they are important for understanding the underlying norms surrounding denationalization, and they are part of the body of literature in which this thesis is situated. Note not all of these authors are part of the liberal tradition, however, they were deemed relevant due to their prolific influence, and because they are referenced in the contemporary debate (Gibney, 2013, p. 648) (Lenard, 2018, p. 102) (Macklin, 2018, p. 166).

Though Hobbes’ political prescriptions have distinctly illiberal features, he is accepted as part of the liberal tradition for his contribution to social contract theory, which sees humans as free and equal and so argue any limitation on freedom and equality must be justified (Gaus, Courtland, & Schmidt, 2018). Hobbes, like Kant, did not question the state’s right to banish citizens, but Hobbes also did not consider banishment a real punishment, stating “the mere change of air is no punishment” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 194). If banishment is accompanied by loss of land or goods, it is this loss that is punishment, not exile (Hobbes, 1651, p. 194).

Likewise, Immanuel Kant influenced social contract theory, and argued all states should respect the dignity of their citizens as free and equal persons (Gaus, Courtland, & Schmidt,
In Kant’s *The Philosophy of law*, one chapter is dedicated to immigration, banishment and exile (Kant, 1887, p. 205). According to Kant’s philosophy, the state has the right to banish criminal individuals to a country abroad and by such deportation, the banished individual does not acquire any share in the rights of citizens of the country he is banished to. The state also has a right to impose exile generally, according to Kant. This means the citizen is sent into the “*wide world as the out-land*” (Kant, 1887, p. 206) and the government withdraws all legal protections from the individual making him an “*outlaw*” (Kant, 1887, p. 206).

The foundations of Cesare Beccaria’s ideas on punishment are social contract theory and utilitarianism which are both strands of liberalism and he attempts to reform society based on rationality, rule of law, equality, individual freedom, all of which are liberal principles (McLendon, 2014). Beccaria, like Hobbes, considered loss of one’s possessions a bigger punishment than banishment (Beccaria, 1995, p. 58). Beccaria defended banishment stating “*Anyone who disturbs the public peace, who does not obey the laws which are the conditions under which men abide with each other and defend themselves, must be ejected from society*” (Beccaria, 1995, p. 56). According to Beccaria, banishment and loss of property must be proportional to the crime. If the purpose of banishment is to sever all ties between society and malefactor, all possessions shall be forfeit. In these cases, Beccaria states “*the citizen dies and the man remains*” (Beccaria, 1995, p. 58).

Voltaire was a liberal thinker (Butler, 2005) who argued against banishment, stating a petty thief, a petty forger, an individual guilty of an act of violence, banished would become a big robber, a forger on a bigger scale and a murderer in another jurisdiction. Voltaire wrote about banishment: “*It is as if we threw into our neighbours' fields the stones which incommode us in our own.*” (Voltaire, 1924). The point made by Voltaire is that banishment is irrational, as it merely displaces the problem instead of fixing it, and destructive in the community of nations, as a state should not burden another state with its own criminals.

Hannah Arendt cannot be classified in terms of traditional categories like liberalism, she did, however, defend constitutionalism, the rule of law and individual rights (d'Entreves, Hannah Arendt, 2019). In her book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt writes about the harms of statelessness (Arendt, 1958, pp. 293-296). Arendt argues the stateless typically suffer three losses. First, loss of home including social community. Arendt argues it was almost impossible to find a new home, as immigration at this time was difficult, not due to
overpopulation but political organization. In her book she writes “whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether.” (Arendt, 1958, p. 294). The second loss is loss of government protection, not just in one’s own country but anywhere as stateless people do not belong to any community, and so no law exists for them. Arendt argues this is why the Nazis started of the extermination of Jews by depriving them of all legal status, so they became cut off from the world. Third, the “deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” (Arendt, 1958, p. 296). The experience of statelessness in the Second World War created awareness of the existence of a right to have rights (Arendt, 1958, p. 296), that is citizenship as a meta right to enjoy other rights.

### 2.2 The contemporary denationalization debate

The argumentations in these texts are reviewed in this section, and those arguments deemed relevant for the analysis will be further explored in the results chapter. Though not all of these arguments will be analyzed in the thesis, they are important to get an understanding of the existing debate in which this thesis is situated.

Matthew J. Gibney’s article examines issues associated with state’s withdrawal of citizenships. The aim of his article is to consider whether denationalization, either as a punishment or a means to protect the nation, can be compatible with liberal principles (Gibney, 2013, p. 646). Gibney discusses liberal objections to denationalization power, which include that revocation of citizenship can lead to statelessness, which from a liberal perspective is both unjust and cruel (Gibney, 2013, p. 651), that denationalization is discriminatory when it only applies to naturalized or dual nationals because it violates liberal principles of equal respect by generating a group of second-class citizens (Gibney, 2013, p. 652), that denationalization is arbitrary and an illegitimate exercise of state power, as it, at least in the UK, generally have been subject to little or no judicial supervision and is implemented as administrative work (Gibney, 2013, p. 652). Gibney concludes liberals have good reason to be concerned about proposals to develop denationalization power (Gibney, 2013, p. 657).

In her article *Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization*, Patti Lenard argues democratic states are not permitted to denationalize citizens. Lenard responds to two broad clusters of arguments supporting revocation power: first, arguments that it is justifiable to denationalize individuals who pose a threat to national security, and second, arguments that it is justifiable
to denationalize dual citizens as they will not become stateless. Lenard counter these arguments stating there is insufficient evidence to believe denationalization plays a protective role in democratic states, that revocation is inconsistent with principles of just punishment in democratic states and that a clear understanding of the foundations of the right of citizenship, protection of the individual from harm and protection of residential security, makes denationalization unjustifiable in democratic states (Lenard, 2018, p. 99). In an earlier article, Patti Lenard (2016) brings forward three consequentialist critiques of denationalization: first, existing consensus against endangering statelessness; second, lack of proof denationalization reduces terrorist threats to national security rendering the practice unjustifiable; and third, forced exile is widely considered a violation of human rights, even when it does not result in statelessness, as the consequences are still profoundly disruptive (Lenard, 2016, pp. 73-74). She also argues that states practicing denationalization are effectively off-loading responsibility for individuals they have deemed dangerous onto other states which means they are not upholding their obligations to fight global terrorism (Lenard, 2016, p. 88).

In her essay, Elizabeth Cohen argues Patti Lenard’s three consequentialist arguments against denationalization with an epistemological argument (Cohen, 2016, p. 253). Cohen argues Lenard’s consequentialist critiques, though they are morally weighty, are empirically vulnerable bases on which to reject denationalization. Elizabeth Cohen’s epistemological argument is that denationalization is undemocratic because it is permanent, and democracy is predicated on a belief in a conception of human character as non-static and developmental (Cohen, 2016, p. 256). Democratic theory does not see the state of a person’s character to be permanent and therefore the idea of permanent punishment is undemocratic (Cohen, 2016, p. 257). Cohen concludes internal confinement with opportunities for revisiting the penalty is the most acceptable penalty for violation of national security based on consequentialist, proceduralist and epistemological perspectives (Cohen, 2016, p. 258).

David Miller (2016) also comment on Lenard’s paper (2016) and gives his own arguments. Though he agrees with a lot of Lenard’s points, specifically the argument that states should not burden other states with their own criminals (Miller, 2016, p. 269), Miller challenges the idea that revocation is fundamentally incompatible with liberal democratic states and argues denationalization when incorporating strong human rights safeguards can be justified (Miller, 2016, p. 270).
The following texts are all chapters from *Debating Transformations of National Citizenship* and under the theme of the return of banishment (Bauböck R., 2018). Macklin’s chapter starts up the debate, and the following chapters comment on Macklin and the authors before them and adds their own arguments. Not all chapters were included here, as not all were deemed relevant to this thesis.

Macklin (2018) argues virtually all rights depend on territorial presence within the state and only citizens have an unreserved right to enter and remain in the state. Therefore, if stripped of the right to enter and remain in the state one is essentially stripped from all other rights that depend on territorial presence (Macklin, 2018, p. 166). Macklin also argues the criminal justice systems of modern states obviates the utility of banishment, making denationalization an unnecessary and outdated practice (Macklin, 2018, p. 167). Another critique of denationalization practices Macklin points out is the lack of evidence proving that citizenship revocation will deter a potential terrorist any more than criminal conviction and incarceration and that expelling an individual convicted or suspected of terrorist activities transfers rather than reduces risk, as deportation may make it easier for that individual to engage in terrorist activities posing a threat to global security (Macklin, 2018, p. 171). Macklin’s final objection to denationalization as a response to terrorism is the absurdity of what would happen if all states denationalized, it would become a race between the two nations tied to a dual national to denationalize first. Macklin concludes that banishment needs to be banished, as denationalization does not make a state or the global community any more secure, and instead enhances the discretionary and arbitrary power of the government at the expense of the citizens and citizenship itself (Macklin, 2018, p. 172).

Peter J. Spiro’s chapter on terrorist expatriation argues that denationalization along with expatriation measures are seen as empty gestures, what Spiro calls “a kind of terrorist bravado to make up for the deficiency of more important material responses” (Spiro, 2018, p. 173) and a “security related theatre, a feel good move that will be popular with some voters” (Spiro, 2018, p. 175). He argues that terrorist expatriation does not at all advance counter-terrorist efforts and that the practice is unlikely to have staying power against human rights critique. This failure, he concludes will evidence an emerging norm against involuntary expatriation (Spiro, 2018, p. 175).

Peter H. Schuck argues that grounds for denationalization must be limited to the most extreme attacks on the nation’s security that aims to bring the nation to ruin and revocation
must not result in statelessness and thus a loss of the meta right to have rights. Procedures for citizenship revocation must be robust and the government’s burden of proof must be exceedingly demanding. Schuck sees no reason in logic or justice why a state should not have revocation power when there is a suitably defined threat and a suitably defined and rigorously proved attacker. He bases this argument in utilitarian balancing as well as the deontological principle of the nation’s fundamental duty to protect its people (Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178). Schuck counters Macklin’s arguments on dual and mono-citizens, stating that the inequality that dual citizens risk denationalization when mono-citizens do not is hardly one which should trouble us any more than the fact that dual nationals have additional passports and have the power to vote in multiple countries (Schuck, 2018, pp. 178-179).

Christian Joppke argues in favor of the denationalization of terrorists (Joppke, 2018, p. 181). Joppke argues that the nature of liberal citizenship is changing due to globalization and that citizenship is increasingly a privilege as well as a contract. A privilege considering majority of people in the world are not citizens of OECD states and have to live on less than two dollars a day, and a contract by definition for the growing number of immigrants. Joppke further argues that since most states allow its citizens to renounce their citizenship it is not illiberal that the states have the same right to get rid of those citizens, born or naturalized, who have despised or abused their citizenship (Joppke, 2018, pp. 183-184).

Vesco Paskalev’s chapter argues that the function of constitutional rights is to assure that “the legislator is not driven by the passion of the day” (Joppke, 2018, p. 185). To prove this point the author uses the example of the actions taken by the US president and congress after 9/11, which a decade later see were not at all reasonable. Despite the threat posed by terrorism, Paskalev argues that there is no state of emergency justifying the return of banishment, as violence in the world is declining and the capacity of law enforcement agencies has increased. Another critique of Joppke’s argument brought forward by Paskalev is the unquestioned assumption that banishment will solve the problem. Whilst taking away the passports of terrorists may prevent them from travelling to Syria or back, Paskalev argues that it is better to imprison them than to leave them in a legal limbo in the middle east (Joppke, 2018, p. 186).

In his chapter Whose Bad Guys Are Terrorists? Rainer Bauböck acknowledges that there are good arguments on both sides of the denationalization debate (Bauböck R., 2018, p. 201). Bauböck is, however, opposed to the practice. His main point in this chapter is that states that
denationalize terrorists deny their responsibility for their “home-grown citizen terrorist” (Bauböck R., 2018, pp. 204-205) and shifts the burden onto another state. Bauböck concludes stating that if denationalization was a necessary and effective tool in countering terrorism the practice might be justifiable, but as a symbolic defense of liberal values it is unconvincing (Bauböck R., 2018, p. 205).

2.3 My contribution

My contribution to this research field will complement the growing literature on this subject by compiling and analysing the evidentiary strength of some of the arguments used for and against the practice of denationalization in liberal democracies.

3. Methodology

3.1 Argumentation analysis

The method used in this thesis is argumentation analysis, specifically diagramming the whole arguments by means of pro et contra and pro aut contra notation developed by Arne Næss (Næss, 2003) in 1947 and popularized in e.g. Björnsson, Kihlbom & Ullholm (2009) 4. Argumentation analysis is also sometimes called informal logic (Groarke, 2020) or critical thinking (Hitchcock, 2020). This method is used to display complex argumentations in a structured way to make it possible to comprehend the relationship between arguments. When this structure is established it is then possible to assess the evidentiary strength of the main thesis advocated by judging the validity and relevance of included arguments. In other words, this method is used to analyze the arguments for and against a thesis (T) 5 in order to determine whether it should be accepted or rejected. The overall validity of the thesis is assessed based on the evidentiary strength of the arguments (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 22-23). The first-order arguments for and against a thesis are called pro- and counterarguments, P and C for short. First-order arguments are the main arguments arguing either in support of or against the thesis, but there are also second-order arguments, which are the pro and counter arguments for the first-order arguments, for example P1P1 would be the first second-order pro argument supporting the first first-order argument (P1), C1C1 would be the first second-order counter argument against the first first-order counterargument (C1), C1P1 would be the first second-order counter argument against the first

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3 Own translation Swedish term ‘beviskraft’ (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 22)
4 The book explaining this method is in Swedish and the terms have been translated by myself into English.
5 Own translation Swedish term ‘påstående’ (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 22)
first-order pro argument (P₁), and P₁C₁ would be the first second-order pro argument supporting the first first-order counter argument (C₁). Argumentations can also have third- and fourth order arguments and so on (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 58-62). The evidentiary strength of a pro argument (P) supporting T is a measurement for how good the reasons P gives us are for accepting T. The evidentiary strength of a counter argument (C) against T is a measurement for how good the reasons C gives us are for rejecting T. To give an example:

\[ T \text{ Citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state} \]
\[ P \text{ Citizenship revocation practices violate liberal principles of equality} \]
\[ C \text{ Citizenship revocation protects national security} \]

Evidentiary strength is measured in five degrees ranging from very low – low – moderate – high – very high, where very high is as good as the maximum (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 22-23). The evidentiary strength of an argument relies on its validity⁶ and relevance⁷. The validity of a thesis is a measure for the degree of trust we have reason to give the thesis (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 22). For normative theses like the one discussed in this paper, there is no factual evidence, meaning the thesis cannot be tested in a scientific or uncontroversial way to be ‘proven’ either true or false. We can, however, still look at and analyze the arguments supporting or countering a normative thesis in order to determine how convincing a thesis is, and we can also look at whether the thesis complies with other normative perceptions, for example by asking ourselves the questions: does the thesis go against any general moral norm? Does the thesis get any support from any general moral norm? If the thesis is a norm in itself, we can look at whether there are any real or imagined examples that make the thesis acceptable, or unacceptable? (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 32)

The relevance of an argument is a measure for the degree of relevance that argument has in supporting or countering the thesis. The relevance of a pro argument (P) for T is a measure of how relevant the reasons P gives us are to accept T, assuming P is valid. The relevance of a counter argument (C) for T is a measure of how relevant the reasons C gives us are to reject T, assuming C is valid (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 34-36). Relevance arguments have different acronyms than validity arguments (P and C) and are instead

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⁶ Own translation Swedish term ‘hållbarhet’ (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 22)
⁷ Own translation Swedish term ‘relevans’ (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 34)
shortened F arguments, for those arguing in support of the relevance of an argument, and M for those arguing against the relevance of an argument (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 63). The evidentiary strength of F supporting the relevance of an argument is a measure for how good reasons F gives us to see that argument as relevant. The evidentiary strength of M arguing against the relevance of an argument is a measure for how good reasons M gives us to see that argument as irrelevant (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 73). For example:

\[ T \] Citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state
\[ P_1 \] Liberal states should not render individuals stateless.
\[ P_1 \] is relevant, because citizenship revocation can lead to statelessness.
\[ F_1P_1 \] Citizenship revocation can lead to statelessness

For normative theses, when we analyze whether P is relevant to support T we can see if there are any normative ideas or background understandings which together with P supports T (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 41).

In order to assess the validity of a thesis, two evaluations\(^8\) must be made. First, for each argument we must calculate its evidentiary strength by finding the sum of its validity and relevance. Second, we must weigh the total evidentiary strength of the first-order pro arguments with the total evidentiary strength of the first-order counter arguments (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 44). Four principles must be considered when doing this. First, an argument has the maximum evidentiary strength when both validity and relevance are at their max. Second, if an arguments relevance is not at its max, the evidentiary strength of the argument decreases in equivalence – if the relevance is missing altogether so is the evidentiary strength. Third, the same rules apply to validity. Fourth, if both relevance and validity are not at their max, the evidentiary strength inherits both weaknesses – non maxed relevance decreases the evidentiary strength and non maxed validity decreases it further (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 44-45). The value of validity, relevance and evidentiary strength range from very low – low – moderate – high – very high (max). Based on the four principles, if validity is moderate and relevance is very high the evidentiary strength becomes moderate, and if the validity is very high but relevance is low the evidentiary strength becomes low. If both values are less than very high the evidentiary

\(^8\) Own translation Swedish term ‘sammanvägningar’ (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, p. 44)
strength is pulled down by both, for example, moderate validity and moderate relevance equals low evidentiary strength (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 46-47).

In this thesis argumentation analysis will be deployed to a body of arguments chosen from selected argumentative texts. First, I will use descriptive argumentation analysis to present and describe the arguments. Secondly, I will use evaluative argumentation analysis to assess the validity, relevance and evidentiary strength of each argument. In the conclusion, I will weigh each side of the argumentation, the pro- and counter arguments, against each other in order to determine whether to reject or accept the thesis.

3.2 Material
With the chosen method I have not had to collect any data in an ordinary sense. Instead, the research process consisted in finding and choosing the right arguments for the analysis. Thereby, identified and selected arguments correspond to data in a classical empirical study. Using the library search engine and searching a combination of the key words: denationalization, citizenship revocation, ethics, philosophy, liberalism, and liberal state, I was able to find some relevant argumentative texts. The literature search is not systematic as in systematic reviews (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006), which is exhaustive and carried out by a review team including a librarian as a search expert. My sample is therefore relevant, but probably not representative and not exhaustive, which means some conclusions are uncertain. For a text to be included, argumentation in the text must…

1. …include a position either for or against denationalization
2. …have an ethical, moral or philosophical perspective
3. …have a focus on liberal states

In addition, the included text must be published in scientific journals or in academic textbooks written in English. The process of identifying and selecting texts and arguments includes subjective decision making, but I try to be as explicit as possible. 16 texts were selected, 10 of the texts argue against denationalization and 6 argue for denationalization, these texts are those included in the literature review. The pro unconditional citizenship authors present some good arguments against denationalization before refuting them which will be included. The thesis which I have chosen to analyse is T: citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state. All of the argumentative texts chosen for this analysis either argue for or against this thesis. Due to the delimitations of this thesis, not all arguments will be included in this analysis, instead 8 arguments have been chosen on the basis that they had
a lot of subsequent lower-order arguments and because they were brought up by several of the authors. The arguments included as material in this thesis are therefore not an exhaustive list of arguments in this debate.

4. Analysis

The analysis will proceed with a descriptive analysis of the arguments and an evaluative analysis of the arguments. Appendix 1 shows an argumentation scheme where all mentioned arguments are included along with their evaluated validity, relevance and evidentiary strength. In order to get a better overview, I have condensed the arguments, and in some cases interpreted their meaning. There is a list of quotes in Appendix 2 to make possible for a critical reader to evaluate whether my reformulations are in accordance with the intentions of the authors of the texts. Throughout the analysis footnotes indicate what quotes the arguments have been derived from. Appendix 3 shows a diagram of how all of the arguments are connected.

4.1 Descriptive analysis

In this section I present the chosen arguments. All of the arguments included in this analysis are explicit arguments made by their respective authors, unless otherwise stated.

The chosen thesis is:

\[ T \text{ Citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state} \]

This is a normative thesis statement, as it states how things ought to be.

4.1.1 Pro arguments

\( P_1 \)

The first pro argument for this thesis is an implicit argument identified in Lenard (2018, p. 99)\(^9\) and Gibney’s texts (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)\(^10\) and a normative statement in itself:

\( P_1 \) Liberal states should not render individuals stateless.

The relevance of this argument for the thesis \( T \) is explained by Gibney “denationalization can lead to statelessness” (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)\(^11\).

\( F_1P_1 \) Denationalization can lead to statelessness.

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\(^9\) Quote 2, appendix 2
\(^10\) Quote 1, appendix 2
\(^11\) ibid
For the validity of this argument, Gibney (2013, p. 651)\textsuperscript{12} brings forth two second-order arguments on moral implications of the creation of statelessness:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(P_1\) creation of statelessness is unjust according to liberal values.
  \item \(P_2\) creation of statelessness is cruel according to liberal values.
\end{itemize}

Gibney argues the creation of statelessness is unjust because it violates the right to full membership somewhere and since the world is exhaustively divided between states, individuals have no choice but to live within and under authority of a state (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)\textsuperscript{13}.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(P_1\) Statelessness violates right to full membership
\end{itemize}

Gibney argues the creation of statelessness is cruel because it may be a recipe for exclusion, precariousness, and general disposition (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)\textsuperscript{14}. Here he draws on Arendt’s account of statelessness (Arendt, 1958, pp. 293-296)\textsuperscript{15}. Arendt argues statelessness is cruel because it results in a number of losses: loss of home and social community, loss of government protection and loss of “the right to have rights” (Arendt, 1958, p. 297)\textsuperscript{16}.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(P_1\) Stateless suffer loss of home and social community.
  \item \(P_2\) Stateless suffer loss of government protection.
  \item \(P_3\) Stateless suffer loss of the right to have rights.
\end{itemize}

The latter argument, loss of the right to have rights, which depicts the right to citizenship as a meta right which through the government gives access to other rights, is also made by Lenard (Lenard, 2016, p. 75)\textsuperscript{17} and Macklin (Macklin, 2018, p. 167)\textsuperscript{18}.

Gibney does acknowledge Arendt’s depiction of statelessness may exaggerate contemporary effects, because denationalization doesn’t necessarily result in literal loss of one’s home and human rights law which provides a legal basis for the treatment of non-citizens (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)\textsuperscript{19}. These are included as counter arguments to \(P_1P_2P_1\) and \(P_3P_2P_1\).

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(C_1\) Denationalization need not involve loss of home.
  \item \(C_1\) International human rights provides rights for noncitizens.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{12} ibid
\textsuperscript{13} ibid
\textsuperscript{14} ibid
\textsuperscript{15} Quote 3, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{16} ibid
\textsuperscript{17} Quote 5, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{18} Quote 4, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{19} Quote 1, appendix 2
Gibney himself, however again counters \( C_1P_3P_2P_1 \) arguing that even though international human rights law offers some rights to non-citizens, there are also some rights which are reserved for citizens. For example, only citizens can vote in national elections, hold key government offices, and not be deported (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)\(^{20}\).

\[ C_1C_1P_3P_2P_1 \text{ Some rights are reserved for citizens} \]

Similarly, Macklin argues virtually all rights depend on territorial presence within the state and only citizens have an unreserved right to enter and remain in the state (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)\(^{21}\).

\[ C_2C_1P_3P_2P_1 \text{ Rights depend on territorial presence.} \]

\[ F_1C_2C_1P_3P_2P_1 \text{ Only citizens have an unreserved right to enter and remain in the state.} \]

Another second-order pro argument is the existing consensus amongst nations against creating statelessness, brought forth by Lenard (2016, p. 75)\(^{22}\).

\[ P_3P_1 \text{ There is an existing consensus against endangering statelessness.} \]

\( P_2 \)

The second first-order pro argument for the thesis \( T \) is citizenship should be unconditional, as denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination. \( P_2 \) is a rule argument, as liberal states are expected to follow liberal principles. This argument is implicitly stated in Lenard (2016, p. 88)\(^{23}\) and Gibney’s texts (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)\(^{24}\).

\[ P_2 \text{ Denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination.} \]

The first second-order argument for \( P_2 \) is put forth by Lenard (2016, p. 79)\(^{25}\) who argues liberal democratic states are founded on a commitment to equality and aim to protect and respect the equal moral worth of all their members.

\[ P_1P_2 \text{ Liberal states are committed to protecting the equality of their citizens.} \]

Lenard gives two main reasons for why denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and nondiscrimination: first, denationalization discriminates against individuals on
the basis of their national origin, and second, denationalization subjects individuals guilty of
the same crime to unequal punishment (Lenard, 2016, pp. 78-79).  

\( P_2 \) Denationalization discriminate based on national origin.  
\( P_3 \) Denationalization results in unequal punishment for the same crime.  

\( P_2 P_2 \) is a result of the statelessness constraint discussed in relation to \( P_1 \). Because of the
consensus to avoid statelessness most countries only use denationalization against dual
citizens, as these will not become stateless as a result (Lenard, 2016, p. 80).  

\( P_1 P_2 P_2 \) Denationalization usually only applies to dual nationals.  
In some countries revocation laws only apply to naturalized dual citizens. To back this up,
Lenard refers to a study which shows 8 out of 33 EU countries permit citizenship revocation
only for naturalized citizens (Lenard, 2016, pp. 79-80). Lenard argues this is damaging to
democratic inclusion as it reinforces the idea that naturalized citizens are less loyal (Lenard,
2016, p. 81), which reinforces racist stereotypes. This singling out of naturalized citizens,
Lenard argues is straightforwardly discriminatory (Lenard, 2016, p. 81).  

\( P_2 P_2 P_2 \) Denationalization sometimes only applies to naturalized citizens.  
\( P_3 P_3 P_2 \) 8/33 EU countries allow citizenship revocation only for naturalized citizens
\( F_7 P_2 P_2 P_2 \) Denationalization only applied to naturalized citizens is discriminatory.
\( P_1 F_7 P_2 P_2 P_2 \) Singling out naturalized citizens reinforces the idea of naturalized citizens
being less loyal.  
Most states recognize this is discriminatory, and therefore apply revocation laws to all dual
citizens including those who are born citizens. Lenard argues advocates of this approach
suggest applying revocation laws to all dual nationals, in principle, is not discriminatory, as
any individual could be a dual national either by inheritance or by naturalization (Lenard,
2016, p. 81). Similarly, Gibney argues dual nationality is not an ascribed status like gender
or race, as an individual typically has a choice to acquire a second citizenship (Gibney, 2013,
p. 656). I will include this as an argument against the relevance of \( P_1 P_2 P_2 \).  

\( M_1 P_1 P_2 P_2 \) This practice is non-discriminatory as dual citizenship is a choice.

\( 26 \) Quote 9, appendix 2  
\( 27 \) Quote 10, appendix 2  
\( 28 \) ibid  
\( 29 \) Quote 11, appendix 2  
\( 30 \) ibid  
\( 31 \) Quote 12, appendix 2  
\( 32 \) Quote 13, appendix 2
Lenard further argues advocates of denationalization typically also suggest that since dual citizens are advantaged in relation to mono-nationals revocation laws restore that balance (Lenard, 2016, p. 81)\textsuperscript{33}. Peter Schuck is one of these advocates, as he argues the inequality that dual citizens risk denationalization when mono-citizens do not, is hardly one which should trouble us any more than the fact that dual nationals have additional passports, and have the power to vote in multiple countries (Schuck, 2018, p. 178)\textsuperscript{34}.

\[ M_2P_1P_2 \] Revocation laws restore the balance, as dual citizens are privileged.

Gibney counters this however, stating that conceptualizing a second nationality as a privilege does not mean denationalization of a dual citizen never raises issues of justice.

\[ C_1M_2P_1P_2 \] Dual citizenship seen as privilege does not erase issues of justice.

Returning to Lenard’s second objection \( P_3P_2 \), denationalization results in unequal punishment for people guilty of the same crime, what is meant is that when dual citizens and mono-nationals commit the same crime, only the dual citizens risks having their citizenship revoked. The relevance of this argument is that it goes against liberal values of equality (Lenard, 2016, pp. 82-83)\textsuperscript{35}.

\[ P_1P_3P_2 \] Dual citizens risk revocation for crimes where mono-nationals do not.

\[ F_1P_3P_2 \] Unequal punishments violate liberal commitment to equality.

Lenard herself brings up a possible objection to the relevance of \( P_3P_2 \) when she acknowledges democratic states frequently impose different punishments for the same crime, as mentally ill or developmentally disabled are for example, often subject to less harsh punishments (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)\textsuperscript{36}.

\[ M_1P_3P_2 \] Liberal states often impose different punishments for the same crime.

\[ P_1M_1P_3P_2 \] Mentally ill and developmentally disabled get less harsh punishments.

However, Lenard argues against the relevance of \( M_1P_3P_2 \) stating that in these cases, there are mitigating circumstances justifying distinct punishment and whilst a dual nationality may at first glance seem like a relevant distinguishing feature, as threatening the state may be seen as evidence one no longer wishes to be part of that state, or because it is common to worry dual citizens are more likely to carry out crimes threatening the state, such reasoning is troubling.

\textsuperscript{33} Quote 12, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{34} Quote 14, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{35} Quote 16 and 17, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{36} Quote 18, appendix 2
and should be avoided because it assumes a connection between citizenship status and an alleged tendency to carry out crimes (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)\textsuperscript{37}.

\[ M_1M_1P_3P_2 \] These instances have mitigating circumstances.

\[ M_2P_3P_2 \] Dual nationality is a mitigating circumstance.

\[ P_1M_2P_3P_2 \] Threatening the state proves one no longer wishes to be a citizen.

\[ P_2M_2P_3P_2 \] Dual nationals are more likely to carry out crimes threatening the state.

\[ C_1M_2P_3P_2 \] This reasoning assumes a connection between citizenship and crime.

Peter Schuck argues against Lennard’s objection stating that whilst denationalization as a punishment may make some people more insecure in their citizenship, this insecurity is warranted and can easily be avoided (Schuck, 2018, p. 178)\textsuperscript{38}.

\[ M_3P_3P_2 \] One can easily avoid citizenship revocation.

\textbf{P_3 and P_4}

The third and fourth first-order pro arguments chosen for this analysis are that citizenship should be unconditional because states are responsible for their citizens and denying this responsibility harms the international community. These argument are formulated in a variety of ways by multiple of the authors including Voltaire (1924)\textsuperscript{39}, Lenard (2016, p. 88)\textsuperscript{40} (2018, p. 100)\textsuperscript{41}, Gibney (2013, pp. 650-651)\textsuperscript{42} and Bauböck (2018, pp. 204-205)\textsuperscript{43}, as well as Miller (2016, pp. 269-270)\textsuperscript{44}, though he is against unconditional citizenship.

\[ P_3 \] States are responsible for their citizens.

\[ P_4 \] Denationalization harms the international community.

\[ P_3 \] is a rule argument and \[ P_4 \] a consequence argument\textsuperscript{45}, as harming the international community is seen as a consequence of denationalization.

Miller argues states have opportunity and responsibility to form all future citizens present on the state’s territory for a period of at least several years. He writes “\textit{They can and should provide citizenship education in schools as well as citizenship classes for newly-arrived}

\textsuperscript{37} ibid
\textsuperscript{38} Quote 19, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{39} Quote 22, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{40} Quote 25, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{41} Quote 24, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{42} Quote 21, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{43} Quote 23, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{44} Quote 20, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{45} Own translation Swedish term ‘konsekvensargument’ (Björnsson, Kihlbom, & Ullholm, 2009, pp. 109-110)
immigrants, and enact other policies to encourage social and political integration. For liberal states, this is an opportunity to inculcate democratic values and national loyalty.” (Miller, 2016, p. 270). He further argues if the state fails in forming its citizens the state is responsible for dealing with the problems arising from this. If states instead choose to denationalize their dual national criminals this is an arbitrary imposition on the other state, as this state has an obligation under international law to admit the person being deported (Miller, 2016, pp. 269-270).

\[ P_1 P_3 \text{ States are responsible for their citizens because they have opportunity and responsibility to teach them the right values.} \]

\[ P_1 P_4 \text{ Denationalization of dual nationals is an arbitrary imposition on the admitting state.} \]

Gibney argues the responsibility argument \( P_3 \) is especially valid if one agrees with the view that states are communities of character where members share a common public culture and collective identity because this suggests states may be implicated in the acts of its citizens (Gibney, 2013, p. 650). Gibney makes an analogy argument stating “Just like parents cannot simply turn their back on their children when they do something wrong, so a state cannot simply palm off its own failures onto other states, in part because the state in question is in some measure responsible for the kinds of individuals it has generated.” (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651).

\[ P_2 P_3 \text{ States may be implicated in the acts of its citizens.} \]

\[ P_1 P_2 P_3 \text{ States are communities of character.} \]

\[ P_3 P_3 \text{ Parent-child analogy.} \]

Gibney counters \( P_1 P_2 P_3 \) stating more individualistic accounts of the state may not acknowledge the same responsibility of the state (Gibney, 2013, p. 650). Gibney also acknowledge families sometimes disown members which can be used as an argument against the validity of \( P_2 P_3 \) (Gibney, 2013, p. 651).

\[ C_1 P_1 P_2 P_3 \text{ Another view does not see states as communities of character.} \]

\[ C_1 P_3 P_3 \text{ Families sometimes disown members.} \]
Voltaire (1924)\textsuperscript{51} and Bauböck (2018, pp. 204-205)\textsuperscript{52} have similar arguments and further argue this denial of responsibility harms the international community, which brings us back to $P_4$. Voltaire wrote about banishment stating, “It is as if we threw into our neighbours' fields the stones which incommode us in our own.” (Voltaire, 1924). Voltaire (1924)\textsuperscript{53} implicitly argued banishment is destructive to the community of nations, as a state should not burden another state with its own criminals. Similarly Bauböck argues States that denationalize terrorists deny their responsibility for their “home-grown citizen terrorist” (Bauböck R. , 2018, pp. 204-205) not just for the individual but also their responsibility towards the rest of the world upon whom they now inflict this dangerous individual (Bauböck R. , 2018, pp. 204-205)\textsuperscript{54}.

$P_2P_4$ Denationalization burden other states.

Bauböck gives an interesting example argument, stating if Austria or Germany denationalized Adolf Hitler after 1945 it would have entailed a denial of responsibility for his crimes and their consequences and it would have signalled they merely wanted to pass on the burden to the other state (Bauböck R. , 2018, p. 204)\textsuperscript{55}. Recognising Hitler was ‘their bad guy’ was important for building a liberal democratic consensus in Austria and Germany and good relations with other states that had been victims of Nazi aggression (Bauböck R. , 2018, p. 204)\textsuperscript{56}.

$P_3P_4$ Taking responsibility is important for the international community.

$P_1P_3P_4$ Example of Austria or Germany denationalizing Hitler vs taking responsibility

Lenard also argues denationalizing a dangerous individual from one state simply puts the burden onto another state (Lenard, 2018, p. 100)\textsuperscript{57} and in the context of terrorism Lenard argues this violates states’ shared commitment and responsibility to fight global terrorism (Lenard, 2016, p. 88)\textsuperscript{58}.

$P_4P_4$ Denationalization violates shared responsibility to fight global threats.

\textsuperscript{51} Quote 22, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{52} Quote 23, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{53} Quote 22, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{54} Quote 22, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{55} ibid
\textsuperscript{56} ibid
\textsuperscript{57} Quote 24, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{58} Quote 25, appendix 2
By displacing rather than fixing the problem, there is a risk the threat continues and might even grow bigger. Voltaire (1924)\textsuperscript{59} argues this point stating a petty thief, a petty forger, an individual guilty of an act of violence, banished would become a big robber, a forger on a bigger scale and a murderer in another jurisdiction.

$P_3P_4$ Denationalization may result in a bigger threat in another state.

Similarly, Lenard argues states practicing denationalization are “off-loading responsibility for individuals they have deemed dangerous onto states that are often less able and willing to ensure that they are prevented from committing harm globally” (Lenard, 2016, p. 88). This supports Voltaire’s argument, as the denationalized criminal is more able to cause harm in a state less able to prevent dangerous individuals from posing a threat.

$P_1P_3P_4$ Denationalized individuals usually end up in states less able to prevent threats.

Macklin makes an interesting argument about the absurdity of what would happen if all states practiced citizenship revocation. She argues if all states denationalized, it would become a race between the two nations tied to a dual national posing a threat to strip them of their citizenship first (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)\textsuperscript{60}.

$P_6P_4$ If all states practiced denationalization the outcome would be absurd.

4.1.2 Counter arguments

$C_1$

The first counter argument chosen for this analysis is that citizenship should not be unconditional because states have an inherent right to denationalize citizens. Kant (1887, p. 206)\textsuperscript{61} and Hobbes (1651, p. 137)\textsuperscript{62} implicitly argued this as they believed in the state’s right to banish.

$C_1$ States have an inherent right to denationalize citizens.

Peter Schuck makes a similar argument stating there is no reason in logic or justice why a state should not have revocation power when there is a suitably defined threat and a suitably defined and rigorously proved attacker (Schuck, 2018, p. 177)\textsuperscript{63}. Beccaria similarly argued in

\textsuperscript{59} Quote 22, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{60} Quote 26, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{61} Quote 27, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{62} Quote 28, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{63} Quote 29, appendix 2
favor of this stating anyone who disturbs public peace or does not obey the law must be ejected from society (Beccaria, 1995, p. 56)\textsuperscript{64}.

\(P_1C_1\) No reason why states cannot denationalize a defined and proved attacker. Though she is against the denationalization Lenard argues the long history of acceptance of denationalization in political theory can be used to acknowledge its legitimacy (Lenard, 2018, p. 101)\textsuperscript{65}.

\(P_2C_1\) Banishment has a long history of acceptance in political theory

Another second-order argument for the validity of \(C_1\) chosen for this analysis was identified in Joppke’s article where he argues that since most states allow its citizens to renounce their citizenship it is not illiberal that states have the same right (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)\textsuperscript{66}.

\(P_3C_1\) States’ right to revoke corresponds to citizens’ right to renounce their citizenship.

The final validity argument for \(C_1\) is that the state has a right to denationalize because denationalization is not qualitatively different from other types of punishments that are claimed by the state. This argument is put forth by Gibney, who otherwise argues against denationalization. He argues most liberal states until recently have claimed the right to execute, and if a citizen can be killed by the state it seems odd that they cannot be banished (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)\textsuperscript{67}.

\(P_4C_1\) Denationalization is not qualitatively different than other punishments.

\(P_1P_4C_1\) Most liberal states have until recently claimed a right to execute.

\(F_1P_1P_4C_1\) If a state can kill citizens it seems odd that they cannot banish citizens.

He also argues milder punishments, such as imprisonment, take away some key citizenship rights, like freedom of movement (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)\textsuperscript{68}. Similarly, Elizabeth Cohen argues denationalization may not be any more disruptive than incarceration, which is the most widely accepted form of punishment, as individuals punished with incarceration lose fundamental parts of their citizenship such as freedom of movement, civil rights and political participation rights and are also removed from their social contexts (Cohen, 2016, p. 254)\textsuperscript{69}.

\(P_2P_4C_1\) Denationalization is not more disruptive than incarceration.

\textsuperscript{64} Quote 30, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{65} Quote 31, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{66} Quote 32, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{67} Quote 33, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{68} ibid
\textsuperscript{69} Quote 34, appendix 2
Incarceration limits key citizenship rights.
Incarceration removes individuals from their social contexts.
Incarceration is the most widely accepted form of punishment.

Cohen herself counters this however, stating denationalization as a punishment is undemocratic because it is permanent, and democracy is predicated on a belief in a conception of human character as non-static and developmental (Cohen, 2016, p. 256-258)\textsuperscript{70}.

Denationalization is different because it is permanent.

The second counter argument for the thesis is that citizenship should not be unconditional, as it is a contract. This is an indication argument, as citizenship seen as a contract indicates it is conditional. Joppke (2018, p. 184)\textsuperscript{71} argues for this view and Macklin (2018, p. 166)\textsuperscript{72}.

Citizenship is conditional because it is a contract.

Macklin acknowledge one strand of citizenship theory describes citizenship as a contract between individual and state wherein individual pledges allegiance in exchange for protection. She argues that according to this view acts of disloyalty breach the contract and some proponents of conditional citizenship use this to argue citizenship revocation simply actualizes the already breached relationship between a disloyal citizen and the state (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)\textsuperscript{74}.

One view sees citizenship as a contract between state and individual.
Citizens pledge allegiance in return for protection.
Citizenship revocation actualizes the breach of the citizenship contract.

Joppke argues citizenship is increasingly seen as a contract, as it is a contract by definition for the growing number of immigrants (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)\textsuperscript{75}.

Citizenship is increasingly seen as a contract.
Citizenship is a contract for the growing number of immigrants.

\textsuperscript{70} Quote 35, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{71} Quote 32, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{72} Quote 36, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{73} Quote 37, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{74} Quote 36, appendix 2
\textsuperscript{75} Quote 32, appendix 2
In his paper, Gibney considers the idea of citizenship as a contract. He argues “if one views the state as an association of free, right-bearing individuals who contract with each other to further their common goals, it is plausible to concede to the state the right to withdraw citizenship from those who threaten the common goals” (Gibney, 2013, p. 650). Here, he makes an analogy to other associations such as golf clubs, churches, and universities that can withdraw membership if members do not obey rules. I will include this notion of the state's right to freedom of association as a pro argument for the validity of $C_1$.

$F_2C_2$ If citizenship is a contract, states have a right to freedom of association.

$P_1F_2C_2$ Other associations have a right to freedom of association.

Gibney implicitly argues this analogy between states and other associations is relevant as it is used in defense of the right of states to control immigration, which is a similar issue to denationalization (Gibney, 2013, p. 650).

$F_1P_1F_2C_2$ Same argument used for states right to control immigration.

Gibney acknowledges, however, that the standard for removing citizenship should be higher than for granting it, as it is more serious morally to deprive someone of a good they are enjoying than to prevent them from their initial access to it due to the fact that individuals are likely to have already built their lives and expectations around the continuing enjoyment of that good (Gibney, 2013, p. 656).

$M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2$ Standard for denationalization should be higher than for naturalization.

$P_1M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2$ More serious to deprive a good than to deny access to a good.

$C_3$

The third first-order counterargument for the thesis is that citizenship should not be unconditional, as denationalization protects national security. This argument is brought up by Schuck (2018, pp. 177-178), as well as Lenard (2016, pp. 85-86) who is otherwise opposed to conditional citizenship. This is a consequence argument as it suggests the nation becomes safer as a consequence of denationalization practices.

$C_3$ Denationalization protects national security
Lenard brings up the argument that the contemporary objective of denationalization is fighting terror and the practice will do this by deterring individuals from carrying out terrorist actions in order to avoid citizenship revocation, and by refusing re-entry to individuals who pose a threat or to deport them if they manage to regain access to that territory (Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86).81

$P_1C_3$ Denationalization will deter citizens from committing terrorist acts.

$P_2C_3$ Denationalization removes dangerous individuals from the territory

A counterargument to $P_1C_3$ brought up by Lenard, is that for capital punishment, which is the most analogous to citizenship revocation, evidence suggests that the deterrence effect is minimal (Lenard, 2016, p. 85).82

$C_1P_1C_3$ Capital punishment has minimal deterrence effect.

Lenard also brings up the argument that by deporting or preventing the re-entry of dangerous individuals from their territory, the idea is that other citizens are made more secure (Lenard, 2016, p. 86).83

$P_1P_2C_3$ Deporting or preventing re-entry of dangerous individuals protects citizens.

The relevance of $C_3$ Schuck argues is that states have a fundamental duty to protect its people (Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178).84

$F_1C_3$ States have a fundamental duty to protect their people.

Similarly, Lenard argues a defining feature of a legitimate and sovereign state is its willingness and ability to protect the safety of all citizens (Lenard, 2018, p. 104).85

$P_1F_1C_3$ Willingness and ability to protect citizens is a defining feature of a state.

Shuck argues the state’s duty to protect its citizens and national security is a deontological principle (Schuck, 2018, p. 178).86

$P_2F_1C_3$ It is a deontological principle that states protect citizens.

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81 ibid
82 Quote 48, appendix 2
83 Quote 39, appendix 2
84 Quote 40, appendix 2
85 Quote 41, appendix 2
86 Quote 40, appendix 2
A critique of $C_3$ raised by Lenard (2016, pp. 84-86)$^{87}$, Spiro (2018, p. 175), and Macklin (2018, pp. 167-171)$^{88}$ is that denationalization as a protective measure is ineffective. Their arguments are largely based on contemporary denationalization as a response to the threat of terrorism.

$C_1C_3$ Denationalization as a means to protect the nation is ineffective

Lenard (2016, pp. 84-86)$^{89}$ argues there is insufficient evidence to prove denationalization help protect national security, rendering the practice unjustifiable.

$P_1C_1C_3$ There is insufficient evidence that denationalization protects national security

Similarly, Spiro argues denationalization does not further counter terrorism efforts. Instead, Spiro sees denationalization as a “security-related theatre, a feel-good move that will be popular with some voters” (Spiro, 2018, p. 175)$^{90}$, which is an implicit argument that politicians consider denationalization because it is a popular choice, not an effective one.

$P_2C_1C_3$ Denationalization does not further counter terrorism efforts

Macklin argues denationalizing an individual convicted or suspected of terrorist activities transfers rather than reduces security risks and depending on the destination country may even make it easier for that individual to engage in terrorist activities and pose a threat to global security (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)$^{91}$.

$C_2C_3$ Denationalization transfers the threat rather than reduces it.

$C_3C_3$ Denationalization may increase the threat.

Another second-order counterargument to $C_3$ which is argued by Macklin, is that denationalization is unnecessary and outdated. Macklin argues the criminal justice systems of modern states obviates the utility of banishment, as banishment dates back to a time before penal systems that enabled states to segregate, punish, rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers in the state (Macklin, 2018, p. 167)$^{92}$.

$C_4C_3$ Criminal justice systems of modern states obviates the utility of banishment.

$C_4$

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$^{87}$ Quote 42, appendix 2
$^{88}$ Quote 44 and 45, appendix 2
$^{89}$ Quote 42, appendix 2
$^{90}$ Quote 43, appendix 2
$^{91}$ Quote 44, appendix 2
$^{92}$ Quote 45, appendix 2
The last counterargument to T chosen for this analysis ties in with C₃ but is specific to terrorism. This is the argument that citizenship should not be unconditional because exceptional threat caused by terrorism justifies its use. This argument is brought up by Lenard (2018, p. 104)⁹³, though she does not agree with the argument. Lenard writes many political actors propose terrorism poses unique threats to the physical safety of citizens by stating we are in a state of “exception” or “emergency” where civil rights can be sacrificed in exchange for ensuring security and normally unjust punishments can be justifiably deployed (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)⁹⁴.

C₄ The exceptional threat of terrorism justifies denationalization.

P₁C₄ Political actors say we are in a state of “exception” or “emergency”.

P₂C₄ Exceptional threats allow for unjust punishments to be justifiably deployed

Vesco Paskalev argues against the point that the current threat of terrorism put us in a state of exception or emergency. Paskalev acknowledge that one is easily tempted to believe we are living in extraordinarily dangerous times when watching the daily news, but that violence in the world is in fact declining and at the same time the capacity of law enforcement agencies for surveillance and control has increased (Paskalev, 2018, p. 185).

C₁P₁C₄ Violence in the world is declining.

C₂P₁C₄ Capacity of law enforcement is increasing.

Paskalev further argues the function of constitutional rights is to assure “the legislator is not driven by the passion of the day” (Paskalev, 2018, p. 185), meaning we should not let todays anger change our practices.

C₂C₄ Constitutional rights assure that the passion of the day does not control the law.

4.2 Evaluative analysis

In this section I evaluate the evidentiary strength of each argument based on their validity and relevance on a scale ranging from very low – low – moderate – high – very high. Each first-order argument with its consequent lower-order arguments are analysed, first, by their validity, second, relevance and last, evidentiary strength which is estimated based on validity and relevance. I also contribute with my own critique. Due to the length constraint of the thesis not all arguments are discussed in detail, but all arguments have been taken into account and their evaluated strength can be found in appendix 1.

⁹³ Quote 46, appendix 2
⁹⁴ ibid
4.2.1 Pro arguments

**P₁**

*P₁*, liberal states should not render individuals stateless, is a normative argument, as it expresses a moral claim, and can therefore not be said to be factually true or false. However, we can still assess its validity based on its subsequent arguments. As *P₁P₁* and *P₂P₁* show, the creation of statelessness is cruel and unjust according to liberal values, because it violates the right to full membership and because statelessness has serious consequences including difficulty accessing basic rights, such as healthcare, education, work and freedom of movement (UNHCR, u.d.). It is true the consequences of statelessness are not as profound as when Hannah Arendt wrote the origins of totalitarianism, as human rights frameworks offer some protection for the stateless (*C₁P₃P₂P₁*). Still, only citizens may enjoy all human rights (*C₂C₁P₃P₂P₁, F₁C₂C₁P₃P₂P₁ & C₁C₁P₃P₂P₁*), and whilst denationalization does not necessarily result in the loss of home (*C₁P₁P₂P₁*), in the contemporary context of denationalizing terrorists, denationalization is usually accompanied by deportation. The validity of *P₁* is therefore deemed very high.

The relevance of *P₁* is high, as it is a fact denationalization can lead to statelessness (*F₁P₁*). However, it is not very high, as the existing consensus against endangering statelessness (*P₃P₁*) means most states only practice denationalization when statelessness is not the outcome. *P₃P₁* was stated as a pro argument for *P₁*, but on further inspection it also works as a counter argument against the relevance of *P₁*. The relevance has not been deducted any more than this because some countries, including the United Kingdom, have denationalized individuals with only one citizenship (Pokalova, 2020, p. 128). Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of *P₁* is high.

**P₂**

*P₂*, denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination, is a rule argument, as liberal states are expected to follow liberal principles. The validity of this argument is very high as it is true that liberal states are committed to protecting the equality of their citizens (*P₁P₂*), as accounted for in the theory section on liberalism, denationalization practices discriminate based on national origin (*P₂P₂*), and denationalization results in unequal punishments for the same crime (*P₃P₂*). It is true anyone could have dual citizenship or choose not to (*M₁P₁P₂P₂*), but it does not automatically follow that this justifies the practice as non-discriminatory, and the validity of this argument against the relevance of
that denationalization usually only applies to dual nationals, is therefore moderate. The other relevance objection against \( P_1P_2P_2 \), that revocation laws somehow restore the inequality caused by dual citizens’ privilege \( (M_2P_1P_2P_2) \) is unconvincing, as the privilege and risk of denationalization experiences by dual nationals are not comparable, and as Gibney rightfully argues dual citizenship seen as privilege does not erase issues of justice \( (C_1M_2P_1P_2P_2) \). As for states that exclusively apply denationalization to naturalized citizens, the validity of Lenard’s argument \( (F_1P_2P_2P_2) \) that this is straightforwardly discriminatory is very high, as it builds on a perception of naturalized citizens as less loyal (Lenard, 2016, p. 81). The argument on unequal punishment \( P_3P_2 \) is valid and relevant as dual citizens risk revocation for crimes where mono-nationals do not \( (P_1P_3P_2) \) and unequal punishments violate liberal commitment to equality \( (F_1P_3P_2) \). The objection to this argument that dual nationality is a mitigating circumstance for different punishment \( (M_2P_3P_2) \) is unconvincing and cannot be compared to the mitigating circumstances of mentally ill or developmentally disabled \( (P_1M_1P_3P_2) \).

The relevance of \( P_2 \) is also very high, as the argument that denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination is unquestionably relevant to the thesis T that citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state, as we can assume liberal states aim to follow liberal principles. Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of \( P_2 \) is very high.

\( P_3 \)

\( P_3 \), the argument that states are responsible for their citizens, has high validity, as there are many authors backing this view up including Gibney (2013, pp. 651-652), Lenard (2016, p. 88) and even Miller (2016, pp. 269-270) who argues against unconditional citizenship. Miller’s argument \( P_1P_3 \) that since states have an opportunity and responsibility to educate their citizens on how to behave, they are in part responsible when citizens behave badly has very high validity and relevance, as it is true that states can and should provide citizenship education in schools, citizenship classes for new immigrants, and enact other policies to encourage social and political integration. Gibney makes a similar argument, \( P_2P_3 \) which he grounds in the view of states as communities of characters. However, Gibney acknowledge in \( C_1P_1P_2P_3 \) other more individualistic views on the state may not see the same responsibility. Gibney’s \( P_3P_3 \) analogy between parent-child and state-citizen relationships is interesting, but it only has moderate evidentiary strength as there are vital differences between these two
types of relationships, and as he acknowledges even families sometimes disown members ($C_1P_3P_3$).

The relevance of $P_3$ is very high as citizenship should be unconditional, meaning states should not have the power to denationalize, if we accept states are responsible for their citizens. Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of $P_3$ is high.

$P_4$

The argument $P_4$, denationalization harms the international community ties in with $P_3$, as states practicing denationalization deny their responsibility for their criminal citizens by making them the problem of another state, as argued by Bauböck (2018, pp. 204-205) and Voltaire (1924) ($P_2P_4$). As stated earlier, it is generally only dual citizens that get their citizenship revoked, and when this happens Miller (2016, pp. 269-270), argues it is an arbitrary imposition on the admitting state, the validity of this argument is high, but not very high as both states tied to the dual national arguably carry some responsibility for the individual. Bauböck’s example of Hitler ($P_1P_3P_4$) is interesting, but the relevance is only moderate as Hitler was an elected leader of Germany whereas terrorists, whom are the targets of contemporary denationalization, act independently from the state and often against the state. Still, as determined in $P_3$, states do have some responsibility of their citizens and Bauböck’s $P_3P_4$ argument that taking responsibility is important for the international community is still highly valid and relevant. Lenard’s $P_4P_4$ argument has very high validity and relevance, as it is true states have a shared responsibility to fight global terrorism according to multiple UN security council directives (Lenard, 2016, p. 87) and denationalization arguably violates this shared responsibility, as citizenship revocation largely means giving up responsibility or transferring the responsibility to another state. Voltaire’s argument $P_5P_4$ that denationalization may result in a bigger threat in another state has very high validity and relevance and is backed up by Lenard’s argument $P_1P_3P_4$ that denationalized individuals usually end up in states less able to prevent threats. $P_1P_3P_4$ is very relevant, as the international community becomes less safe if dangerous individuals are transferred to countries unable to prevent them from causing harm, and seems to be valid, though I have not been able to find any figures showing statistics of which countries denationalized individuals end up in. The last second-order argument $P_6P_4$, which is made by Macklin who argues the outcome would be absurd if all states practiced denationalization has very high validity, as it is true it would then become a race between the responsible states of a
dual national who is a suspected or proven terrorist to be the first to denationalize them (Macklin, 2018, p. 171). This argument also has high relevance, as it is likely this would cause international tension, as we saw in the background section denationalization has caused international disputes, for example between Bangladesh and the United Kingdom over the case of Shamima Begum and between Australia and Fiji over the case of Neil Prakash (Pokalova, 2020, p. 130). Based on all of these arguments, the validity of P4 is high. That denationalization harms the international community has very high relevance to the thesis that citizenship should be unconditional, as unconditional citizenship would make it clear that states need to take responsibility of their criminal citizens and this would prevent any disputes between countries over unwanted individuals. Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of P4 is high.

4.2.2 Counter arguments

C1

The validity of argument C1, states have an inherent right to denationalize citizens, is low due its subsequent validity arguments. Schuck’s P1C1 argument that he sees no reason in logic or justice why states should not have denationalization power can be liable to criticism to be a fallacy of the kind Björnsson, Kihlbom and Ullholm (2009, p. 152) in Swedish call bevisbördesflytt, which means he with this argument is transferring the burden of proof onto those arguing against denationalization. Lenard’s P2C1 argument that banishment has a long history of acceptance in political theory has high validity, but not very high as citizenship revocation has largely been in disuse the last several decades until the war on terror (Lenard, 2018, p. 99), and the relevance of this argument is moderate, as having a long history of acceptance does not automatically mean states have a right to denationalize. Jopke’s P3C1 analogy argument, that states’ right to revoke corresponds to citizens’ right to renounce their citizenship is questionable, as giving something up and taking something away from a person are two very different actions. Furthermore, we know from the theoretical framework that liberalism emphasizes individual rights, so whilst there may be a liberal justification for the right to renounce one’s citizenship it does not follow, as Joppke suggests, that state’s should have a right to revoke (Honohan, 2017, p. 87). Gibney’s argument P4C1: Denationalization is not qualitatively different than other punishments has moderate evidentiary strength, as whilst it is true most liberal states until recently claimed the right to execute (P1P4C1) (Gibney, 2013, p. 652), and some states in the United States still do (Death Penalty Information Center, State by State, 2020), capital punishment has been abolished in 170
states (OHCHR, u.d.) indicating there is a norm against the practice. And whilst it is true incarceration limits key citizenship rights \((P_1P_2P_4C_1)\) and removes individuals from their social contexts \((P_2P_2P_2C_1)\), Cohen is partially right that denationalization is different because it is permanent \((C_1P_2P_4C_1)\), and this goes against democratic values (Cohen, 2016, pp. 256-258). The validity of Cohen’s argument is however only moderate, as denationalization does not necessarily need to be permanent. Furthermore, other punishments used in liberal democratic states such as a life-sentence or the death penalty used in some states in the US (Death Penalty Information Center, 2020) are permanent as well.

The relevance of \(C_1\): states have an inherent right to denationalize to T: citizenship should be unconditional, is very high, as if it was true it would give us good reason to reject T. However, since the validity of \(C_1\) is low, its evidentiary strength is also low.

\(C_2\)

The second counter argument \(C_2\), citizenship is conditional because it is a contract, has moderate validity, as it is true one view on citizenship sees citizenship as a contract between the state and individual \((P_1C_2)\) wherein citizens pledge allegiance in return for protection \((P_1P_1C_2)\), this argument is tied to social contract theory, but this is not the only view on citizenship. In fact, liberal theory tends to view citizenship as a body of individual rights as opposed to a contract including loyalty to a state, which is more in line with the republican conception of citizenship (Sykes, 2016, p. 1), as described in the theoretical framework. Joppke’s argument, that citizenship is increasingly seen as a contract \((P_2C_2)\), as it is by definition for the growing number of immigrants \((P_1P_2C_2)\) is low, as he gives no explanation of why citizenship is more a contract for naturalized citizens than born citizens, and citizenship regardless of how it is acquired should be equal according to liberal values, as there is an emphasis on equal civil status (Honohan, 2017, p. 87). Gibney’s argument \(F_2C_2\): states have a right to freedom of association because \(P_1F_2C_2\): other associations have a right to freedom of association has low evidentiary strength, as a state cannot easily be compared to other associations like churches or golf clubs, as many of one’s human rights are not dependent on these associations, and it is arguably easier to find a new church or golf club than it is to find a new country to live in. Whilst it is true \(F_2C_2\) has been used as an argument for states’ right to control immigration \((F_1P_1F_2C_2)\) and the acquisition and revocation of citizenship are similar debates, Gibney’s argument that the standard for denationalization should be higher than for naturalization \((M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2)\), as it is more serious to deprive a good
than to deny access to a good \((P_1M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2)\) has very high validity as this moral principle makes sense logically.

The relevance of \(C_2\), is very high as it would give us good reason to reject the thesis that citizenship should be unconditional, but since the validity of the argument is moderate the evidentiary strength is also moderate.

\[ C_3 \]

Argument \(C_3\), denationalization protects national security, has moderate validity. If denationalization did in fact deter citizens from committing terrorist acts \((P_1C_3)\), this argument would have high evidentiary strength, however, Lenard notes capital punishment, which is the closest analogous punishment to citizenship revocation, has minimal deterrence effect \((C_1P_1C_3)\) the strength of this argument is high, but not very high as the death penalty and denationalization is not a perfect analogy. Argument \(P_2C_3\): denationalization removes dangerous individuals from the territory has high evidentiary strength, as it is likely removing dangerous individuals from the territory of the state will protect national security to a degree \((F_1P_2C_3)\). The validity of \(C_3\) is decreased by \(C_3C_3\), as multiple of the authors make the claim denationalization as a means to protect the nation is ineffective \((\text{Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86})\) \((\text{Spiro, 2018, p. 175})\). Argument \(P_1C_1C_3\) arguing there is insufficient evidence denationalization protects national security has very high validity and high relevance, but not very high as whilst the lack of evidence indicates ineffectiveness, it is not a given. Macklin’s arguments against \(C_3\) denationalization transfers the threat rather than reduces it \((C_2C_3)\) and denationalization may increase the threat \((C_3C_3)\) have high evidentiary strength as whilst denationalization might reduce the domestic national security risk, deportation may make it easier for dangerous individuals to engage in activities threatening global security, which in turn threatens national security. Macklin’s final counter argument \(C_4C_3\), Criminal justice systems of modern states obviates the utility of banishment, also has high evidentiary strength, as there is no apparent justification for why incarceration is insufficient to deal with these dangerous individuals in a controlled way within the borders of the state.

The relevance of \(C_3\) is very high as it is true states have a fundamental duty to protect their people \((F_1C_3)\), which is a deontological principle \((P_2F_1C_3)\) \((\text{Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178})\), and a willingness and ability to protect citizens is a defining feature of a state \((P_1F_1C_3)\) \((\text{Lenard, 2018, p. 104})\). Based on its moderate validity and very high relevance, the combined evidentiary strength of \(C_3\) is moderate.
Argument $C_4$, which suggests the exceptional threat of terrorism justifies denationalization, has low validity, as whilst we might accept certain exceptional threats allow for normally unjust punishments to be justifiably deployed ($P_2C_4$) whether the current threat of terrorism is as exceptional as many political actors suggest ($P_1C_4$) is debatable, as Paskalev points out violence in the world is declining ($C_1P_1C_4$) and the capacity of law enforcement for surveillance and control is increasing ($C_2P_1C_4$), meaning states can handle the threat without moving it abroad. Paskalev makes another important argument with very high evidentiary strength, which is that constitutional rights assure the passion of the day does not control the law ($C_1C_4$). As described in the theoretical framework on liberal citizenship, because the government may itself become oppressive it must be constrained by citizens strong legal rights for individuals including freedom of speech and conscience, equal civil status, and constitutional restraints on any form of government (Honohan, 2017, p. 87).

The relevance of $C_4$ to $T$ is very high as if we were to accept the exceptional threat of terrorism justifies denationalization it would give us good reason to reject unconditional citizenship. However, since the validity of the argument is moderate, the evidentiary strength is pulled down to moderate.

5. Conclusions and discussion

5.1 Descriptive conclusions
The descriptive analysis presented the 8 chosen first-order arguments, and their subsequent lower-order arguments, for the thesis $T$. The denationalization debate is a complex one and more in-depth interpretations might lead to different presentations of the arguments than mine. Furthermore, there is of course the possibility some of my interpretations are misjudged, as some level of fallibility is always expected. Diagram 1 (p. 41) shows the structure of the arguments included in the analysis and how they are connected to support or refute each other and the thesis. Looking at the diagram, both the pro- and counter side have complex arguments with $P_1$ and $C_2$ containing sixth-order arguments. The pro side have more arguments than the counter side. Whilst the amount of arguments supporting or refuting a thesis are an indication of how weak or strong said thesis is, the evidentiary strength of the arguments will give more indication of this.
5.2 Evaluative conclusions

The evidentiary strength for the chosen arguments were evaluated in the evaluative analysis. There are good arguments on both sides, however, the pro arguments have higher combined evidentiary strength than the counter argument indicating we should accept the thesis T that citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal democratic state, according to my evaluations. Of course, these 8 arguments are by no means an exhaustive list of arguments within this debate. Whilst I tried to stay as objective as possible, it is likely someone else would evaluate the arguments differently. Furthermore, since the sample of texts and arguments is neither exhaustive nor representative, my conclusions are merely tentative.

5.3 Further research

This thesis has made a small indent in some of the arguments concerning the denationalization debate. However, more in-depth interpretations based on hermeneutical methods (Bielskis, 2005) of arguments included in texts found using a more exhaustive and systematic review strategy (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006), are needed in order to make more than tentative conclusions.

Diagram 1 Argument structure of arguments used for the analysis. Green are arguments supporting the thesis. Orange are countered the thesis. For a more detailed version see appendix 3.
6. Bibliography


### Appendix 1 – Argument scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Evidentiary strength</th>
<th>Reason for evaluated strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state</td>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This is a normative thesis statement and cannot be proven true or false, still, its subsequent arguments will indicate whether or not it should be accepted or rejected. The validity of the thesis has been evaluated as high based on the evidentiary strength of its subsequent first- and lower-order arguments, which indicates the thesis should be accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Liberal states should not render individuals stateless.</td>
<td>Implicit argument See quote 1 See quote 2 (Lenard, 2018, p. 99) (Gibney, 2013, p 651)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument is a normative statement in itself. It has high evidentiary strength as its validity is very high and its relevance is high, but not very high due to the fact that most countries do not use denationalization against individuals who would become stateless as a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₁</td>
<td>the creation of statelessness is unjust according to liberal values.</td>
<td>Explicit argument by Gibney (2013) p.651</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as it is true the denial of right to membership somewhere is unjust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Validity</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Evidentiary strength</td>
<td>Reason for evaluated strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_1P_1$</td>
<td>violates right to full membership</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 1 (Gibney, 2013, p.651)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is evaluated as very high, as it is relevant and it is true statelessness stops an individual from having full membership somewhere, and there is a human right to nationality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2P_1$</td>
<td>the creation of statelessness is cruel according to liberal values.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 1 (Gibney, 2013, p.651)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as the losses associated with the loss of citizenship are likely to be perceived as cruel according to liberal values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Stateless suffer loss of home and social community.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 3 (Arendt, 1958, pp. 293-297)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is high due to its very high relevance and high validity, as whilst statelessness may not necessarily result in the loss of home, contemporary use of denationalization against terrorists is usually accompanied by deportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1P_1P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Denationalization need not involve the loss of home.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 1 (Gibney, 2013, p.651)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This is true, but in the contemporary context of denationalization against terrorists it is usually followed by deportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Validity</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Evidentiary strength</td>
<td>Reason for evaluated strength</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_2P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Stateless suffer loss of government protection.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 3 (Arendt, 1958, pp. 293-297)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as this is true and very relevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_3P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Stateless suffer loss of the right to have rights.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 3 (Arendt, 1958, pp. 293-297)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is high as stateless do lose many rights, but not very high as there are still some rights provided under international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1P_3P_2P_1$</td>
<td>International human rights provide rights for noncitizens.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 1 (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is moderate as it is true international human rights frameworks offer some protections, however as the subsequent arguments show, some rights are reserved for citizens and furthermore, rights depend on territorial presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1C_1P_3P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Some rights are reserved for citizens</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 1 (Gibney 2013 p. 651)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has both very high validity and relevance as it is true some rights are reserved for citizens, for example the right to vote and the right to hold political office (Song, 2014, p. 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_2C_1P_3P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Rights depend on territorial presence.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 4 (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance as it supports the higher-order argument, and very high validity as it is true rights depend on territorial presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$F_1C_2C_1P_3P_2P_1$</td>
<td>Only citizens have an unreserved right to enter and remain in the state.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 4 (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has both very high relevance, as it supports the higher-order argument, and very high validity, as it is a fact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_3P_1$</td>
<td>There is an existing consensus against endangering statelessness.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 5 (Lenard, 2016, p. 75).</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is high as it is true there is an existing consensus against statelessness, even though the UK have denationalized mono-nationals. The relevance is high but not very high as the same argument can be used to argue that this consensus means the creation of statelessness is not a problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1P_1$</td>
<td>Denationalization can lead to statelessness</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 1 (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is high as it is true denationalization can lead to statelessness even if most liberal countries do not practice denationalization where statelessness is a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_2$</td>
<td>Denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 6 (Gibney, 2013, p. 652) and quote 7 (Lenard, 2016, p. 88)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The validity of this argument is very high as it is both true that liberal states are committed to protecting the equality of their citizens ($P_1P_2$), as accounted for in the theory section on liberalism, that denationalization practices discriminate based on national origin ($P_2P_2$) and that denationalization results in unequal punishments for the same crime for certain people ($P_3P_2$). The relevance of $P_2$ is also very high, as the argument that denationalization violates liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination is unquestionably relevant to the thesis $T$ that citizenship should be unconditional in a liberal state, as we can assume liberal states aim to follow liberal principles. Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of $P_2$ is very high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2$</td>
<td>Liberal states are committed to protecting the equality of their citizens.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 8 (Lenard, 2016, p. 79)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This is true as accounted for in the theoretical section, and it is very relevant to $P_2$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Denationalization discriminate based on national origin.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 9 (Lenard, 2016, p.78-79)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The relevance of this argument is very high and the validity is high, but not very high as it is true dual citizenship is in a way a choice ($M_1P_1P_2P_2$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Denationalization usually only applies to dual nationals.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 10 (Lenard, 2016, p.79-80)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and validity as it is true denationalization in most liberal states only apply to dual nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_1P_1P_2P_2$</td>
<td>This practice is non-discriminatory as dual citizenship is a choice.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 13 (Gibney, 2013, p.656)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and moderate validity and evidentiary strength, as whilst it is true that dual citizenship can be given up it does not automatically follow that it makes it non-discriminatory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$M_2P_1P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Revocation laws restore the balance, as dual citizens are privileged.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 12 (Lenard, 2016, p.81) and quote 13 (Gibney, 2013, p.656) and quote 14 (Schuck, 2018, p. 178).</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>This argument has high relevance but low validity because it is unconvincing, as the perceived privilege of the dual national and the dual national’s risk of denationalization are not comparable and as Gibney rightfully argues dual citizenship seen as privilege does not erase issues of justice ($C_1M_2P_1P_2P_2$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1M_2P_1P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Dual citizenship seen as privilege does not erase issues of justice.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 15 (Gibney, 2013, p.656)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and validity as it is true there can still arise issues of justice even if dual citizenship is in a way a privilege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Denationalization sometimes only applies to naturalized citizens.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 10 (Lenard, 2016, p.79-80)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and validity as it is true some countries, like France and Belgium as accounted for in the background section, only denationalize naturalized citizens, and this is highly relevant as this is discriminatory because it sees non-native citizens as less loyal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2P_2P_2$</td>
<td>8/33 EU countries allow citizenship revocation only for naturalized citizens</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 10 (Lenard, 2016, p.79-80)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and validity as it is a reliable study (de Groot, Vink, &amp; Honohan, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1P_2P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Denationalization only applied to naturalized citizens is discriminatory.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 11 (Lenard, 2016, p. 81)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument’s validity and relevance is very high, as denationalization focused on naturalized citizens builds on a perception of naturalized citizens as less loyal because they were not born in the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1F_3P_2P_2P_2$</td>
<td>Singling out naturalized citizens reinforces the idea of naturalized citizens being less loyal</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 11 (Lenard, 2016, p. 81)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument is very relevant and has high validity as it seems likely that this singling out of naturalized citizens can reinforce the perception of naturalized citizens as less loyal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Denationalization results in unequal punishment for the same crime.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 9 (Lenard, 2016, p.78-79)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has both very high validity and relevance as dual citizens risk revocation for crimes where mono-nationals do not ($P_1P_3P_2$) and unequal punishments violate liberal commitment to equality ($F_1P_3P_2$).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Claim</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Dual citizens risk revocation for crimes where mono-nationals do not.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 16 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This is true in most liberal countries practicing denationalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Unequal punishments violate liberal commitment to equality.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 17 (Lenard, 2016, p. 82)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>As accounted for in the theoretical section, equality is one of the main principles in the liberal tradition, therefore unequal punishment goes against this principle and makes this argument have very high relevance and validity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_1P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Liberal states often impose different punishments for the same crime.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has high validity, as it is true liberal states impose different punishments for the same crime if there are mitigating circumstances, and very high relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1M_1P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Mentally ill and developmentally disabled get less harsh punishments.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity as it is true, however, the relevance is only moderate as this is not easily comparable to dual nationality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_1M_1P_3P_2$</td>
<td>These instances have mitigating circumstances.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This is true and has very high relevance and validity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$M_2P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Dual nationality is a mitigating circumstance.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>This argument relevant but unconvincing and cannot be compared to the mitigating circumstances of mentally ill or developmentally disabled ($P_1M_1P_3P_2$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1M_2P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Threatening the state proves that one no longer wishes to be a citizen.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is low as it does not automatically follow that a citizen threatening the state wishes to give up their citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2M_2P_3P_2$</td>
<td>Dual nationals are more likely to carry out crimes threatening the state.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VL</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very low as I have not been able to find any statistics showing that dual nationals are more likely to carry out crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1M_2P_3P_2$</td>
<td>This reasoning assumes a connection between citizenship and crime.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 18 (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has high evidentiary strength as this does assume a connection, wrongfully so, between citizenship status and crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(M_3P_3P_2)</td>
<td>One can easily avoid citizenship revocation.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 19 (Schuck, 2018, p. 178)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>This argument has high validity as it is true individuals can avoid citizenship revocation, however, not very high since it is not certain that abuses of power could happen. Furthermore, the relevance is low as even though it is easily avoidable, citizenship revocation only focused on one group of people is still discriminatory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P_3)</td>
<td>States are responsible for their citizens.</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 25 (Lenard, 2016, p. 88) Implicit argument see quote 21 (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651). Explicit argument See quote 20 (Miller, 2016, pp. 269-270)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>(P_3), the argument that states are responsible for their citizens, has high validity, as there are many authors backing this view up and there are strong lower-order arguments supporting it. The relevance of (P_3) is very high as citizenship should be unconditional, meaning states should not have the power to denationalize, if we accept that states are responsible for their citizens. Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of (P_3) is high.</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1P_3$</td>
<td>States are responsible for their citizens because they have opportunity and responsibility to teach them the right values.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 20 (Miller, 2016, pp. 269-270)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity and relevance as it is true that states can and should provide citizenship education in schools, citizenship classes for new immigrants, and enact other policies to encourage social and political integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2P_3$</td>
<td>States may be implicated in the acts of its citizens.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 21 (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The relevance of this argument is very high as it supports $P_3$. The validity is high, but not very high as it builds on the view of states as communities of character which is just one view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2P_3$</td>
<td>States are communities of character.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 21 (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The relevance of this argument is very high as it supports $P_2P_3$. The validity of the argument is moderate as whilst it is true that this is one view, there are also other views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1P_1P_2P_3$</td>
<td>Another view does not see states as communities of character.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 21 (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This is relevant as it speaks against $P_1P_2P_3$ and true as there are multiple views within liberalism as accounted for in the theoretical section</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>$P_3P_3$</td>
<td>Parent-child analogy.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 21 (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651).</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has high validity but only moderate relevance and evidentiary strength as there are vital differences between these two types of relationships (parental and state-citizen), and as he acknowledges even families sometimes disown members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1P_3P_3$</td>
<td>Families sometimes disown members.</td>
<td>argument see quote 21 (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651).</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This is true and is relevant to $P_3P_3$</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>( P_4 )</td>
<td>Denationalization harms the international community.</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 25 (Lenard, 2016, p. 88) Implicit argument see quote 24 (Lenard, 2018, p. 100) Implicit Argument see quote 23 (Bauböck, 2018, pp. 204-205) Implicit Argument see Quote 22 Voltaire (1924)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Based on all of its subsequent arguments, the validity of ( P_4 ) is high. That denationalization harms the international community has very high relevance to the thesis that citizenship should be unconditional, as unconditional citizenship would make it clear that states need to take responsibility of their criminal citizens and this would prevent any disputes between countries over unwanted individuals. Based on its validity and relevance, the evidentiary strength of ( P_4 ) is high.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_1P_4 )</td>
<td>Denationalization of dual nationals is an arbitrary imposition on the admitting state.</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 20 (Miller, 2016, pp. 269-270)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The relevance of this argument is very high and the validity and evidentiary strength of this argument is high, but not very high as both states tied to the dual national arguably carry some responsibility for the individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_2P_4$</td>
<td>Denationalization burden other states.</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see quote 23 (Bauböck, 2018, pp. 204-205) Explicit argument see quote 22 Voltaire (1924)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high evidentiary strength as it is true by denationalizing an individual another state is burdened with the responsibility of that individual and this can create international disputes as we have seen between Bangladesh and the United Kingdom over the case of Shamima Begum and between Australia and Fiji over the case of Neil Prakash (Pokalova, 2020, p. 130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_3P_4$</td>
<td>Taking responsibility is important for the international community</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 23 (Bauböck, 2018, pp. 204-205)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument seems logical and highly valid and very highly relevant, as not taking responsibility is likely to create international tension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_3P_4$</td>
<td>Example of Austria or Germany denationalizing Hitler vs taking responsibility</td>
<td>Argument see quote 23 (Bauböck, 2018, pp. 204-205)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The validity of this argument is very high, but the relevance and evidentiary strength is only moderate as Hitler was an elected leader of Germany whereas terrorists, whom are the targets of contemporary denationalization, act independently from the state and often against the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<td>Evidentiary strength</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_4P_4$</td>
<td>Denationalization violates shared responsibility to fight global threats</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 25 (Lenard, 2016, p. 88) Explicit argument see quote 24 (Lenard, 2018, p. 100)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has both very high validity and relevance, as it is true that states have a shared responsibility to fight global terrorism according to multiple UN security council directives (Lenard, 2016, p. 87) and denationalization arguably violates this shared responsibility, as citizenship revocation largely means giving up responsibility or transferring the responsibility to another state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_5P_4$</td>
<td>Denationalization may result in a bigger threat in another state.</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see Quote 22 Voltaire (1924)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity and relevance, as it seems likely that denationalized individuals may end up in states less able to prevent threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_5P_4$</td>
<td>Denationalized individuals usually end up in states less able to prevent threats</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 25 (Lenard, 2016, p. 88)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument is very relevant, as the international community becomes less safe if dangerous individuals are transferred to countries unable to prevent them from causing harm, and seems to be valid, though I have not been able to find any figures showing statistics of which countries denationalized individuals end up in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_6P_4$</td>
<td>If all states practiced denationalization the outcome would be absurd.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 26 (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity, as it is true that it would then become a race between the responsible states of a dual national who is a suspected or proven terrorist to be the first to denationalize them (Macklin, 2018, p. 171). This argument also has high relevance, as it is likely this would cause international tension, as we saw in the background section that denationalization has caused international disputes, for example between Bangladesh and the United Kingdom over the case of Shamima Begum and between Australia and Fiji over the case of Neil Prakash (Pokalova, 2020, p. 130).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1$</td>
<td>States have an inherent right to denationalize citizens.</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 27 (Kant, 1887, p. 206) and quote 28 (Hobbes, 1651, p. 137)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The validity of argument $C_1$, that states have an inherent right to denationalize citizens, is low due its subsequent validity arguments. The relevance of $C_1$: states have an inherent right to denationalize to T: citizenship should be unconditional, is very high, as if it was true it would give us good reason to reject T. However, since the validity of $C_1$ is low, its evidentiary strength is also low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1C_1$</td>
<td>No reason why states cannot denationalize a defined and proved attacker.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 29 (Schuck, 2018, p. 177) and quote 30 (Beccaria, 1995, p. 56).</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is low, as it is liable of criticism to be a fallacy of the kind that Björnsson, Kihlbom and Ullholm (2009, p. 152) in Swedish call bevisbördesflytt, which means he with this argument is transferring the burden of proof onto those arguing that the state should not have the power to revoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2C_1$</td>
<td>Banishment has a long history of acceptance in political theory</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 31 (Lenard, 2018, p. 101)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has high validity, but not very high as citizenship revocation has largely been in disuse the last several decades until the war on terror (Lenard, 2018, p. 99), and the relevance of this argument is moderate, as having a long history of acceptance does not automatically mean that states have a right to denationalize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_3C_1$</td>
<td>States’ right to revoke corresponds to citizens’ right to renounce their citizenship.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 32 (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance, but low validity and evidentiary strength as it is questionable, since giving something up and taking something away from a person are two very different actions. Furthermore, we know from the theoretical framework that liberalism emphasizes individual rights, so whilst there may be a liberal justification for the right to renounce one’s citizenship it does not follow, as Joppke suggests, that state’s should have a right to revoke (Honohan, 2017, p. 87).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>$P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Denationalization is not qualitatively different than other punishments</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 33 (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and moderate validity and evidentiary strength, as whilst it is true that incarceration limits key citizenship rights ($P_1P_2P_4C_1$) and removes individuals from their social contexts ($P_2P_2P_4C_1$), Cohen is right that denationalization is different because it is permanent ($C_1P_2P_4C_1$), and this goes against democratic values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Most liberal states have until recently claimed a right to execute</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 33 (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity as it is true, but moderate relevance and evidentiary strength, as whilst it is true that most liberal states until recently claimed the right to execute ($P_1P_4C_1$) (Gibney, 2013, p. 652), and some states in the United States still do (Death Penalty Information Center, State by State, 2020), capital punishment has been abolished in 170 states (OHCHR, u.d.) indicating that there is a norm against the practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1P_1P_4C_1$</td>
<td>If a state can kill citizens it seems odd that they cannot banish citizens</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 33 (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance, but moderate validity and evidentiary strength, as capital punishment and banishment are not perfect analogies, and this argument neglects the fact that citizenship revocation also transfers responsibility/burden to another state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_2P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Denationalization is not more disruptive than incarceration.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 34 (Cohen, 2016, p. 254)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high evidentiary strength as it is true that incarceration limits key citizenship rights, such as freedom of movement, and it is relevant because citizenship revocation too limits, or removes, key citizenship rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Incarceration limits key citizenship rights.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 33 (Gibney, 2013, p. 652) Explicit argument quote 34 (Cohen, 2016, p. 254)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2P_2P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Incarceration removes individuals from their social contexts.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 34 (Cohen, 2016, p. 254)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and moderate validity and evidentiary strength, as whilst it is true incarceration removes individuals from their social contexts, depending on the length of their sentence, this is temporary, and in the meantime they will likely be allowed to see their families and friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1P_2P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Incarceration is the most widely accepted form of punishment.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 34 (Cohen, 2016, p. 254)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity as it is true that incarceration is the most widely accepted punishment and has high relevance, as it supports $P_2P_4C_1$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_1P_2P_4C_1$</td>
<td>Denationalization is different because it is permanent.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 35 (Cohen, 2016, pp. 256-258)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has very high relevance and moderate validity and evidentiary strength as whilst it is true contemporary denationalization is usually permanent, so are some other punishments such as the death penalty or a life-sentence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_2$</td>
<td>Citizenship is conditional because it is a contract.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 32 (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>This argument has moderate validity, as it is true that one view on citizenship sees citizenship as a contract between the state and individual ($P_1C_2$) wherein citizens pledge allegiance in return for protection ($P_1P_1C_2$), but this is not the only view on citizenship. In fact, liberal theory tends to view citizenship as a body of individual rights as opposed to a contract including loyalty to a state, which is more in line with the republican conception of citizenship as described in the theoretical framework. The relevance of $C_2$ is very high as it would give us good reason to reject the thesis that citizenship should be unconditional, but since the validity of the argument is moderate the evidentiary strength is also moderate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1C_2$</td>
<td>One view sees citizenship as a contract between state and individual.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 36 (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The validity of this argument is very high as it is true that one view sees citizenship as a contract between state and individual, however, since this is just one view out of multiple the relevance and thus the evidentiary strength is moderate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1P_1C_2$</td>
<td>Citizens pledge allegiance in return for protection.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 36 (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument is connected to contract theory and has high evidentiary strength as it is true this theory suggests citizens pledge allegiance in return for protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1C_2$</td>
<td>Citizenship revocation actualizes the breach of the citizenship contract.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 36 (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>If one accepts citizenship is a contract, which we will assume for the purpose of this argument as it is a relevance argument, this argument has high evidentiary strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2C_2$</td>
<td>Citizenship is increasingly seen as a contract.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 32 (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is low, as he gives no explanation of why citizenship is more a contract for naturalized citizens than born citizens, and citizenship regardless of how it is acquired should be equal according to liberal values, as there is an emphasis on equal civil status (Honohan, 2017, p. 87).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1P_2C_2$</td>
<td>Citizenship is a contract for the growing number of immigrants.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 32 (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is low, as he gives no explanation of why citizenship is more a contract for naturalized citizens than born citizens. The relevance is high, but not very high as this would only work as an argument for denationalization of naturalized citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$F_2C_2$</td>
<td>If citizenship is a contract, states have a right to freedom of association.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 37 (Gibney, 2013, p.650)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is moderate, the validity is high but not very high as contract and freedom of association are not necessarily connected. Furthermore the relevance is moderate as citizenship as contract is just one view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1F_2C_2$</td>
<td>Other associations have a right to freedom of association</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 37 (Gibney, 2013, p.650)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity as it is true other associations have a right to decide memberships, but it has low relevance and thus low evidentiary strength, as a state cannot easily be compared to other associations like churches or golf clubs, as many of one’s human rights are not dependent on these associations, and it is arguably easier to find a new church or golf club than it is to find a new country to live in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1P_1F_2C_2$</td>
<td>Same argument used for states’ right to control immigration.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 37 (Gibney, 2013, p.650)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The validity is very high as it is true this argument has been used in immigration control debates. The relevance and evidentiary strength is moderate as immigration control and citizenship revocation are not the same, though they both are related to citizenship. Furthermore, as the subsequent arguments suggest it is morally worse to deprive someone of a good they are enjoying than to deny them access to it in the first place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2$</td>
<td>Standard for denationalization should be higher than for naturalization.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 38 (Gibney, 2013, p.656)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This argument has very high evidentiary strength, as $P_1M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2$ has high validity as this moral principle makes sense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2$</td>
<td>More serious to deprive a good than to deny access to a good.</td>
<td>Explicit argument quote 38 (Gibney, 2013, p.656)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as it makes sense logically that it is more serious to deprive a good someone is enjoying and have expectations to continue to enjoy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization protects national security</td>
<td>Implicit Argument see quote 40 (Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178) see quote 39 (Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Based on its moderate validity and very high relevance, the combined evidentiary strength of $C_3$ is moderate. The validity of $C_3$ is decreased by $C_3C_3$, as multiple of the authors make the claim that denationalization as a means to protect the nation is ineffective. The relevance of $C_3$ is very high as it is true that states have a fundamental duty to protect their people ($F_1C_3$), which is a deontological principle ($P_2F_1C_3$), and that a willingness and ability to protect citizens is a defining feature of a state ($P_1F_1C_3$).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization will deter citizens from committing terrorist acts.</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see quote 39 (Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The relevance of this argument is very high, but it has low validity, as I have not been able to find any proof that denationalization deters citizens from committing terrorist attacks, and $C_1P_1C_3$ which argues against this argument has high evidentiary strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_1P_1C_3$</td>
<td>Capital punishment has minimal deterrence effect</td>
<td>Explicit argument See quote 48 (Lenard, 2016, p. 85)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The strength of this argument is high, but not very high as the death penalty and denationalization is not a perfect analogy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization removes dangerous individuals from the territory</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see quote 39 (Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity as this is true if those denationalized are proven to pose a threat to the state and has high relevance as it is likely that removing dangerous individuals from the territory of the state will protect national security to a degree ($F_1P_2C_3$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$F_1P_2C_3$</td>
<td>Deporting or preventing re-entry of dangerous individuals protects citizens.</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see quote 39 (Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has high validity, as it is likely that removing dangerous individuals from the territory of the state will protect national security to a degree and is very relevant to $C_3$ as it supports the argument that denationalization protects national security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F_1C_3$</td>
<td>States have a fundamental duty to protect their people.</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see quote 40 (Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as it is true states are seen to have a moral obligation to protect its citizens, this is part of the liberal tradition as accounted for in the theoretical section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_1F_1C_3$</td>
<td>Willingness and ability to protect citizens is a defining feature of a state.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 41 (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as it is true that this is part of what makes political legitimacy, it is like the social contract where citizens trade some freedoms for protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2F_1C_3$</td>
<td>It is a deontological principle that states protect citizens.</td>
<td>Explicit Argument see quote 40 (Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is very high as it is true states are seen to have a moral obligation to protect its citizens, this is part of the liberal tradition as accounted for in the theoretical section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Relevance</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_1C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization as a means to protect the nation is ineffective</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 42 (Lenard, 2016, pp. 84-86)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument has been deemed high as the relevance is very high and the validity is high as multiple authors make the same or similar claims, and I was not able to find any sources that proved otherwise.</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1C_1C_3$</td>
<td>There is insufficient evidence that denationalization protects national security</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 42 (Lenard, 2016, pp. 84-86)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity, as multiple of the authors make this claim, and high relevance, but not very high as whilst the lack of evidence indicates ineffectiveness, it is not a given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_2C_1C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization does not further counter terrorism efforts</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 43 (Spiro, 2018, p. 175)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument has been deemed high as the relevance is very high and the validity is high as multiple authors make the same or similar claims, and I was not able to find any sources that proved otherwise.</td>
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<td>$C_2C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization transfers the threat rather than reduces it.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 44 (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has high evidentiary strength as whilst denationalization might reduce the domestic national security risk, deportation may make it easier for dangerous individuals to engage in activities that pose a threat to global security, which in turn threatens national security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_3C_3$</td>
<td>Denationalization may increase the threat.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 44 (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has high evidentiary strength as it is valid that deportation may make it easier for dangerous individuals to engage in activities that pose a threat to global security, depending on the country they end up in, and relevant because this in turn threatens national security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_4C_3$</td>
<td>Criminal justice systems of modern states obviates the utility of banishment.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 45 (Macklin, 2018, p. 167)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has high evidentiary strength, as there is no apparent justification for why incarceration is insufficient to deal with these dangerous individuals in a controlled way within the borders of the state</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_4$.</td>
<td>The exceptional threat of terrorism justifies the use of denationalization</td>
<td>Implicit argument see quote 46 (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>This argument has low validity, due to its low validity, as whilst we might accept that certain exceptional threats allow for normally unjust punishments to be justifiably deployed ($P_2C_4$), whether the current threat of terrorism is as exceptional as many political actors suggest ($P_1C_4$) is debatable, as Paskalev points out violence in the world is declining ($C_1P_1C_4$) and the capacity of law enforcement for surveillance and control is increasing ($C_2P_1C_4$), meaning states can handle the threat without moving it abroad. Paskalev (2018, p. 185) makes another important argument with very high evidentiary strength, which is that constitutional rights assure that the passion of the day does not control the law ($C_1C_4$). The relevance of $C_4$ to T is very high as if we were to accept that the exceptional threat of terrorism justifies the use of denationalization it would give us good reason to reject unconditional citizenship.</td>
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95 Quote 47, appendix 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Validity</th>
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<th>Evidentiary strength</th>
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<tr>
<td>$P_1C_4$</td>
<td>Political actors say we are in a state of “exception” or “emergency”.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 46 (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The evidentiary strength of this argument is low as it is true political actors are calling the threat of terrorism exceptional and an emergency, (Lenard, 2018, p. 104), however, whether the current threat of terrorism is as exceptional as many political actors suggest ($P_1C_4$) is debatable, as Paskalev points out violence in the world is declining ($C_1P_1C_4$) and the capacity of law enforcement for surveillance and control is increasing ($C_2P_1C_4$),</td>
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<tr>
<td>$P_2C_4$</td>
<td>Exceptional threats allow for unjust punishments to be justifiably deployed</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 46 (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The validity of this argument is high as we can accept exceptional threats may allow for unjust punishments to be justifiably deployed, however, the relevance is moderate as whether the current threat of terrorism is as exceptional as many political actors suggest ($P_1C_4$) is debatable, as Paskalev points out violence in the world is declining ($C_1P_1C_4$) and the capacity of law enforcement for surveillance and control is increasing ($C_2P_1C_4$).</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_1P_1C_4$</td>
<td>Violence in the world is declining.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 47 (Paskalev, 2018, p. 185)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument is based on the book The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has declined (Pinker, 2011) which argues that violence in the world is declining, and this is true globally which gives the argument very high validity. The relevance is high as declining violence generally is an indication that we do not live in a state of emergency, even if there are threats of terrorism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_2P_1C_4$</td>
<td>Capacity of law enforcement is increasing.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 47 (Paskalev, 2018, p. 185)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>This argument has very high validity as the it seems likely that the capacity of law enforcement for surveillance and control is increasing due to increased technology and this has high relevance as this means states can handle the threat without moving it abroad, however it is not very high as there are other reasons to use denationalization, such as deterrence.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Claim</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_1C_4$</td>
<td>Constitutional rights assure that the passion of the day does not control the law.</td>
<td>Explicit argument see quote 47 (Paskalev, 2018, p. 185)</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>This is a good argument with very high validity, as it is true one of the functions of constitutional rights is to limit what powers the government have over the people within its jurisdiction (Gardbaum, 2008, p. 750). As described in the theoretical framework on liberal citizenship, because the government may itself become oppressive it must be constrained by citizens strong legal rights for individuals including freedom of speech and conscience, equal civil status, and constitutional restraints on any form of government (Honohan, 2017, p. 87).</td>
</tr>
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Appendix 2 – Argument quotes

Quotes for arguments

Quote 1: “Revocation of citizenship can lead to statelessness, which from a liberal perspective is both unjust and cruel. Statelessness is unjust because it violates the right of each and every individual to claim full membership somewhere. Since the world is exhaustively divided between states, and individuals have no choice to live within and under the authority and power of a state, it is unjust not to grant an individual full membership rights in at least one state. This is particularly the case because, despite the growing reach of international human rights law in providing a legal basis for the treatment of noncitizens in recent decades, all states reserve some important rights, entitlements, and privileges solely for citizens. Typically only citizens can vote in national elections, hold key government offices, and not be deported. Even if it does not condemn one to being completely without rights, statelessness constitutes a significant deprivation. Making someone stateless is cruel because it may be a recipe for exclusion, precariousness, and general dispossession. Loss of membership in a state, as noted above, deprives one of arrange of basic citizen rights. Moreover, as citizenship is in some states the sine qua non of even one’s basic human rights, its impact upon an individual may even be far heavier. Focusing on the circumstances of those, like the German Jews and White Russians stripped of citizenship in the 1920s and 1930s, Arendt famously argued that the stateless typically suffer not one loss but three: the loss of a home, the loss of government protection, and, finally, the loss of “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” (Arendt 1958, 293–96). Arendt’s account may exaggerate the contemporary effects of loss of citizenship. Denationalization, as the U.S. case shows, need not always involve the literal loss of one’s home. Moreover, as noted, the stateless now have some albeit minimal rights under international law.” (Gibney, 2013, p. 651)

Used for: \( P_1, P_1P_1, P_1P_1P_1, P_2P_1, C_1P_1P_2P_1, C_1P_3P_2P_1, C_1C_1P_3P_2P_1, F_1P_1 \)

Quote 2: “The right to citizenship is grounded in the importance of protecting individuals from the harms of statelessness; the international order has an obligation to ensure that each and every person is a citizen of at least one country, which is responsible for protecting their rights.” (Lenard, 2018, p. 99)

Used for: \( P_1 \)
Quote 3: “The first loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of their homes, and this meant the loss of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world. ... The second loss which the rightless suffered was the loss of government protection, and this did not imply just the loss of legal status in their own, but in all countries. Treaties of reciprocity and international agreements have woven a web around the earth that makes it possible for the citizen of every country to take his legal status with him no matter where he goes... Yet, whoever is no longer caught in it finds himself out of legality altogether... We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation. The trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any "uncivilized" spot on earth, because whether we like it or not we have really started to live in One World. Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether.” (Arendt, 1958, pp. 293-297)

Used for: P1P2P1, P2P2P1, P3P2P1

Quote 4: “The exercise of virtually all rights depends on territorial presence within the state, and only citizens have an unqualified right to enter and remain on state territory. So once stripped of the right to enter and remain in the state, enforcement means that one is effectively deprived of all the other rights that depend (de jure or de facto) on territorial presence.” (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)

Used for: C2C1P3P2 P1, F1C2C1P3P2 P1

Quote 5: “the expulsion of Jews from Nazi Germany following their denationalization generated a consensus among democratic states that there is something profoundly objectionable—indeed, profoundly undemocratic—about the power of a state to revoke citizenship unilaterally... Reflecting this consensus, the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was enacted in the early 1960s... acknowledging that revocation is permitted only in cases where statelessness is not the result.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 75)
Quote 6: “These three concerns about denationalization – its violation of the right to citizenship, its invidiousness, and its arbitrariness – appear to make the power difficult to square with liberal principles of justice, equality, and fairness.” (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)

Quote 7: “One of the main arguments of this article has been that recent revocation laws create "second-class citizens" by opening a fundamental inequality between citizens who possess one nationality and those who possess two. In opening this fundamental inequality, and by rendering the citizenship of some citizens less secure, the power to revoke is incompatible with modern democratic citizenship.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 88)

Quote 8: “Democratic states are founded on a commitment to equality. Perhaps the most general way to express this commitment is by acknowledging that democracies aim to protect and respect the equal moral worth of all of their members.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 79)

Quote 9: “Revocation laws often treat citizens unequally, by subjecting only some to the threat of revocation on the basis of national origin or identity... revocation laws treat citizens unequally by issuing different punishments for the same crime, again on the basis of national origin or identity.” (Lenard, 2016, p.78-79)

Quote 10: “Because of the imperative to avoid statelessness, most revocation laws are written so that the only individuals subject to revocation are dual citizens. In some cases, proposed or actual revocation laws target only dual naturalized citizens. According to a recent study of citizenship loss in thirty-three European countries, eight countries permit the revocation of citizenship for “seriously prejudicial behaviour,” but only for naturalized citizens. Restricting revocation laws to dual citizens serves a rhetorical purpose in democratic states,
especially diverse ones, that should be troubling to those concerned with protecting social cohesion, as “the singling out of the naturalized has historically been linked to (often racist) anxiety about the loyalty of citizens born outside the state.”” (Lenard, 2016, p.79-80)

Quote 11: “Revocation laws may therefore serve to “fuel a sense of second class Citizenship among the affected communities and erode their feelings of social solidarity” with the wider political community. In so doing, they permit rather than suppress the view that certain citizens are less likely to be loyal and may prove damaging to democratic inclusion. Where the law draws a distinction between two categories of citizens—those whose status is acquired by birth and those whose status is acquired via naturalization— it is straightforwardly discriminatory.”” (Lenard, 2016, p. 81)

Quote 12: “To address this inequality, revocation laws can be written so as to subject all dual citizens to the risk of revocation, as is the case in Canada. Advocates of this approach suggest that in principle such a law is nondiscriminatory, since any citizen can be a dual citizen—whether because of naturalization or because of inheritance. Such advocates also typically suggest that by keeping dual citizenship individuals are advantaged in relation to those who possess only a single citizenship. It is thereby implied that revocation laws somehow restore the balance between the benefits and burdens shouldered by dual and single nationality citizens. Yet while such a law resolves one inequality— between naturalized and non-naturalized dual citizens—it broadens the inequality between single nationality citizens and all dual citizens.”” (Lenard, 2016, p. 81)

Quote 13: “Dual nationality is not an ascribed status like gender or race; an individual typically has a choice to acquire a second citizenship (or at least to maintain it over time). Moreover, there is a plausible case for seeing the possession of a second nationality as a privilege giving its holders benefits single nationals lack. Unlike single nationals, British dual nationals effectively have an exit option from the United Kingdom should they adjudge the country undesirable or insecure. This makes them less reliant on the political, economic, or social circumstances prevailing in Britain than other citizens and less in need of the same kind of absolute protection for their citizenship. Subjecting dual nationals to
denationalization could thus be defended on the grounds that it equalizes their status to other citizens rather than making it inferior.” (Gibney, 2013, p.656)

Quote 14: “is true that denationalising a dual citizen would still leave him with a state while denationalising a mono citizen would not. But so long as we do not allow revocations that would render one stateless, this particular inequality between categories of citizens is hardly one that should trouble us – any more than we should be troubled that a dual citizen has an additional passport and can vote in an additional polity.” (Schuck, 2018, p. 178).

Quote 15: “To conceptualize a second nationality as a privilege does not, of course, mean that withdrawing citizenship from a dual national never raises issues of justice. One still might want to object to the use of denationalization power when it is revoked arbitrarily or for small crimes or when doing so violates a human right.” (Gibney, 2013, p.656)

Quote 16: “where dual citizens and single nationality citizens commit the same crime, only the former can be subject to citizenship revocation; revocation is imposed on top of a sentence that is, at least ideally, already agreed to be fair.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)

Quote 17: “by subjecting some criminal citizens to harsher penalties than others, revocation ultimately violates the commitment to equality of punishment in democratic states.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 82)

Quote 18: “one might respond that the criminal justice system in democratic states frequently imposes different punishments for the same crime. The mentally ill and the developmentally disabled are often subject to less severe penalties in criminal trials than their co-nationals, but in these cases there are mitigating circumstances that explain the distinct punishment. In cases where only some individuals are subject to revocation laws, the only distinguishing feature such individuals have is the possession of a second nationality. At first glance, the possession of dual citizenship may appear to be a relevant distinguishing feature. One might
believe, for example, that the carrying out of crimes that threaten one’s own state’s national security (or even the intention to carry out such crimes) is adequate evidence that one no longer desires to be part of that national community. Especially in times when fear of national security threats is heightened, it is common to worry that dual citizens (and foreigners) are more likely than single nationality citizens to carry out crimes that threaten the state. In such times, states may allow a population to believe that there is a clear connection between revocation policies and such crimes, justifying their differential treatment of dual citizens. We ought to resist this conclusion, however. Such reasoning is troubling because it assumes a connection between citizenship status and an alleged propensity to carry out crimes, which is then used to justify differential punishment for the same crimes.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 83)

Quote 19: “Am I less secure in my citizenship if I know that the state may execute me or imprison me for life if I murder a fellow citizen? I suppose that I am less secure, but that insecurity is warranted and I can easily avoid it.” (Schuck, 2018, p. 178).

Quote 20: “It should not come as a surprise that security services are keen to shift the burden of combating terrorism elsewhere. But if they do this in cases of dual nationality, the counterpart state has an obligation under international law to admit the person being deported. This seems like an arbitrary imposition by one state on another. How should the burden-shifting conflict be resolved? We should start from the premise that states have both an opportunity and a responsibility to form the political identities of all future citizens who are present on their territories for a period of several years or more, regardless of place of birth. They can and should provide citizenship education in schools as well as citizenship classes for newly-arrived immigrants, and enact other policies to encourage social and political integration. For liberal states, this is an opportunity to inculcate democratic values and national loyalty. If they fail in this task, they should be held responsible for dealing with the problems that may arise from political ignorance or alienation. Applying this principle would mean distinguishing between, say, homegrown terrorists and those arriving from elsewhere: only the latter would be liable to have their citizenship revoked for activities of the kind that Lenard lists” (Miller, 2016, pp. 269-270)
Quote 21: “Liberal nationalists, like Miller (1995), Tamir (1995), and Walzer (1983), conceptualize states as ‘communities of character’ where members share a common public culture and collective identity. This view complicates the question of denationalization because it raises the possibility that the broader community may be implicated in the acts of its members more deeply than more individualistic accounts of the state acknowledge. Just like parents cannot simply turn their back on their children when they do something wrong, so a state cannot simply palm off its own failures onto other states, in part because the state in question is in some measure responsible for the kinds of individuals it has generated (Aleinkoff 1986, 1496). However, this more intimate view of the state hardly delivers a knock-out blow to denationalization in extremis. Even families have from time to time disowned their members” (Gibney, 2013, pp. 650-651).

Quote 22: “Not long ago it was the custom to banish from within the limits of the jurisdiction, for petty thefts, forgeries, and assaults, the result of which was that the offender became a great robber, forger, or murderer in some other jurisdiction. This is like throwing into a neighbor's field the stones that incommode us in our own” (Voltaire, 1924)

Quote 23: “The question is whether Western democracies can shed responsibility for their home-grown citizen terrorists and shoulder it upon other states. This is what the new denationalisation policies are about. Imagine for a moment that after 1945 Germany or Austria had posthumously denationalised Adolf Hitler. Would this symbolic act have strengthened their post-war liberal orders by demonstrating their abhorrence of Hitler’s destruction of their liberal constitutions and his genocidal elimination of Jews and Roma from the political community? The answer is clearly no, because Hitler’s denationalisation would have entailed a denial of responsibility for his crimes and their consequences and would thus have achieved the very opposite of the intended defence of liberal values. Moreover, if either Germany or Austria had taken such a decision, it would have signalled that they merely wanted to pass on the buck to the other state. Recognising that Hitler was ‘our bad guy’ was therefore crucial for building a liberal democratic consensus in both countries and good relations with other states that were the victims of Nazi aggression. Why
should this be different today with the jihadist terrorists? Joppke’s answer involves an attempt to distinguish domestic from global terrorists. This may be often difficult, since Hitler turned out to be a global terrorist too. But the crucial point is that citizenship is by its very nature a domestic relation between an individual and a state. By cutting the bond, states deny their responsibility, including that towards the rest of the world upon whom they inflict the terrorist threat.” (Bauböck, 2018, pp. 204-205)

Used for: P4, P2P4, P3P4, P1P3P4

Quote 24: “states by and large recognize the importance of cooperating to fight global threats; denationalizing a dangerous individual from one state simply foists responsibility for that dangerous individual onto another state.” (Lenard, 2018, p. 100)

Used for: P4, P4P4

Quote 25: “States are generally responsible for issuing punishment to citizens and those on their territory who cause grievous harm of the kind that worries advocates of citizenship revocation. Thus, states that choose to revoke citizenship are effectively offloading responsibility for individuals they have deemed dangerous onto states that are often less able and willing to ensure that they are prevented from committing harm globally. By refusing to punish dangerous individuals, or by permitting them to remain largely unpunished for allegedly grievous crimes, the revoking state is also refusing to uphold its obligations to fight global terrorism.” (Lenard, 2016, p. 88)

Used for: P3, P4, P4P4, P1P5P4

Quote 26: “the sheer absurdity of banishment as a response to the terrorist qua global outlaw is best illustrated by speculating on what would happen if all states behaved like the UK and Canada: Imagine a dual UK-Canada citizen who is convicted of a terrorism offence in the UK. Since terrorism is a global menace, Canada can treat a terrorism conviction in the UK as proof of being a bad Canadian citizen. Both Canada and the UK can lawfully denationalise him. But both states are also somewhat constrained in law not to create statelessness, and both want and need to find another state to admit the expelled person. And the only country that has a legal obligation to do is a state of nationality. So, now it becomes a race between Canada and the UK to see which country can strip citizenship first. To the loser goes the citizen” (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)

Used for: P6P4
Quote 27: “In the case of a Subject who has committed a Crime that renders all society of his fellow-citizens with him prejudicial to the State, the Supreme Power has also the Right of inflicting Banishment to a Country abroad. By such Deportation, he does not acquire any share in the Rights of the Citizens of the territory to which he is banished.” (Kant, 1887, p. 206)
Used for: C1

Quote 28: “If the sovereign banish his subject, during the banishment he is not subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is still subject; but it is by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another’s dominion is subject to all the laws thereof, unless he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns, or by special license.” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 137)
Used for: C1

Quote 29: “I see no reason in logic or justice why a state should be powerless to protect itself and its people from imminent, existential threats (suitably defined) from an individual who has launched a dangerous attack (suitably defined and rigorously proved) on itself and its people, whose interestsm both international law and domestic politics obligates it to promote.” (Schuck, 2018, p. 177)
Used for: P1C1

Quote 30: “Anyone who disturbs the public peace, who does not obey the laws which are the conditions under which men abide with each other and defend themselves, must be ejected from society – in other words, he must be banished.” (Beccaria, 1995, p. 56).
Used for: P1C1

Quote 31: “One possible response to these laws is to acknowledge their legitimacy, either in the face of the exceptional threats posed by terrorism, or as part of the long tradition of political theory that has accepted the right of states to banish citizens who are perceived as threats” (Lenard, 2018, p. 101)

Quote 32: “But most importantly, the formula ‘rights to have rights’ dodges the fact that, indeed, citizenship in a globalising world is increasingly ‘privilege’ and ‘contract’. It is a
privilege if one considers the mentioned exclusion from a lucrative OECD-state citizenship of most of mankind (that has to make do with less than US$ 2 per day). And it is a contract by definition for the ever growing number of immigrants who are not born with it but seek it out for their own benefit. In the post-feudal world, most states allow the possibility to renounce one’s citizenship—this was the point of departure of ‘democratic’ America from ‘monarchical’ Britain. But then it is not outlandish (or illiberal) to concede the converse capacity to states to rid themselves even of born citizens who have despised or patently abused their citizenship through their actions (and why stop at the threshold of statelessness?” (Joppke, 2018, p. 184)

Used for: P3C1, C2, P2C2, P1P2C2

Quote 33: “Most liberal states — from the more individualistic to the more communitarian — have, until very recently, claimed the right to execute (after due process of law) citizens who violate the fundamental rules of social order. If a citizen can be killed by the state as punishment, it seems odd to say that she cannot be banished by the same state. Moreover, liberals have always accepted the conditionality of key citizenship rights on law-abiding behavior. Imprisonment, for example, takes away many important liberties, including freedom of movement. Banishment might thus be seen not as a qualitatively different kind of punishment but simply as one that lies at the extreme end (perhaps along with the death penalty) of a scale of justifiable rights-depriving penalties used by states.” (Gibney, 2013, p. 652)

Used for: P4C1, P1P4C1, F1P1P4C1, P1P2P4C1

Quote 34: “forced exile may not actually be any more disruptive or arbitrary than the most widely accepted forms of modern punishment, namely incarceration. The effects of incarceration have come to be regarded as so isolating that scholars of punishment and sentencing have referred to felony sentences as “internal exile.” People who are punished by incarceration lose fundamental parts of their citizenship, including their right to free movement, important civil rights, and political rights of participation and representation, thus rendering them semicitizens within their own country. They are also removed from their entire social context, severing their most intimate ties.” (Cohen, 2016, p. 254)

Used for: P2P4C1, P1P2P4C1, P2P2P4C1, F1P2P4C1
Quote 35: “The epistemological case against denaturalization is grounded in an often unarticulated and yet pervasively important view that any person living in a democracy is subject to forces that can fundamentally transform their character over time. Democracy is predicated on a belief in a nonstatic, developmental conception of human character, which suggests that political decisions of all sorts need to be periodically revisited... If democratic theory never assumes the current state of a person’s character to be permanent, then the idea of permanent punishment is fundamentally undemocratic... If one accepts the developmental theory of democratic citizenship, then denationalization as a permanent punishment is deeply undemocratic and the practice must be revised.” (Cohen, 2016, pp. 256-258)
Used for: C1P2P4C1

Quote 36: “Another strand of citizenship discourse describes citizenship as a contract in which the citizen pledges allegiance to the sovereign in exchange for the sovereign’s protection. Acts of disloyalty amount to fundamental breach of contract, and so citizenship revocation simply actualises in law the citizen’s voluntary severance of the relationship.” (Macklin, 2018, p. 166)
Used for: C2, P1C2, P1P1C2, F1C2

Quote 37: “If one views the state as an association of free, rights-bearing individuals who contract with each other to further their common goals, it is plausible to concede to the state the right to withdraw citizenship from (and, if appropriate, expel) anyone who seriously or wantonly threatens the achievement of these goals. In this view, the state should be considered analogous to other collective organizations in civil society. Virtually all associations, including golf clubs, churches, and universities, have the right to withdraw membership from those who flagrantly disregard their rules or set themselves at odds with the principles of the association in question: individuals are not uncommonly ‘’expelled,’ ‘’excommunicated,’ ‘’struckofftheregister,’ or ‘’drummedout.’’ The analogy between the state and other associations has recently been drawn by Wellman (2009) in a defense of the right of states to control immigration. Wellman argues that states, like other associations in liberal society, have freedom of association rights (derived from the rights of individuals) that ground a right to exclude nonmembers.” (Gibney, 2013, p.650)
Used for: C2,F2C2,P1F2C2,F1,P1,F2C2
Quote 38: “the standard required for removing citizenship should be higher than that for refusing to grant it originally. No state claims the right to denationalize common murderers or rapists (even when they claim the right to execute them or imprison them), despite the fact that these are widely deemed powerful grounds for rejecting a citizenship application. Loss of citizenship is reserved for crimes (proven or suspected) of a higher order, ones that threaten the public order of the state or involve national security. This higher bar is justified because it is more serious morally to deprive someone of a good they are enjoying than to prevent them from their initial access to it, because individuals are likely to have already built their lives and expectations around the continuing enjoyment of the good.” (Gibney, 2013, p. 656)
Used for: $M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2 \ P_1M_1F_1P_1F_2C_2$

Quote 39: “The broad policy objective vis-à-vis citizenship revocation is, of course, fighting terror, and revocation is presented as contributing to meeting this objective in two ways: it will deter some individuals from carrying out terrorist actions, since losing one’s citizenship will be taken to be too high a price to pay; and it will permit a government to refuse re-entry to individuals with nefarious intent or to deport them if they manage to regain access to that territory ... By deporting or preventing the re-entry of individuals who have become radicalized abroad, and who in so doing have developed or honed the skills necessary to cause widespread damage, governments may thereby exclude dangerous individuals from their territory. Citizens are thus made more secure.” (Lenard, 2016, pp. 85-86)
Used for: $C_3 \ P_1C_3 \ P_2C_3 \ P_3C_3$

Quote 40: “And I see no reason in logic or justice why that state cannot defend itself and its people against such an attack by, among other things, severing the attacker’s connection to a state with which he is manifestly at war, thereby making it much more difficult for him to succeed in that war. Should the individual’s interest in maintaining that connection, which (by my definition, embedded in the preconditions listed above) can only be tactical and cynical, utterly and categorically outweigh the nation’s interest in protecting those for whom it bears a sacred trust? This question, I submit, answers itself – and the answer is grounded not merely in a utilitarian balancing but in a deontological principle: the nation’s fundamental duty to protect its people.” (Schuck, 2018, pp. 177-178)
Used for: $C_3 \ F_1C_3$
Quote 41: “One defense of the right to revoke hooks it to the importance of physical safety in democratic states. A defining feature of a legitimate and sovereign state is its willingness and ability to protect the safety of all citizens” (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)
Used for: P1F1C3

Quote 42: “In democratic theory, citizens are considered entitled to justifications for the policies their leaders intend to pursue, in particular where these laws are likely to have a coercive impact on them...Yet here, as well, to the extent that the state provides evidence in defense of the power to revoke, it does not meet these criteria. It is certainly the case that many democratic states have already suffered acts of terrorism, and many more are certainly at risk of being victimized by terrorist actions. It would be a mistake, however, to presume that what is under discussion is the ability of a state to fight terror at all; nearly all states have tremendous ability to fight terror. The question is whether the ability to revoke citizenship will aid significantly in doing so, since it is a power that burdens some citizens in substantial ways. Thus, where the government demands the right to saddle a small subset of citizens with a substantial burden—the risk of having their citizenship revoked—it must offer reasons to believe that the power is essential to fight terrorism effectively.” (Lenard, 2016, pp. 84-86)
Used for: P1C1C3

Quote 43: “So terrorist expatriation advances counter-terror efforts not at all. It supplies yet another example of security-related theatre, a feel-good move that will be popular with some voters.” (Spiro, 2018, p. 175)
Used for: P2C1C3

Quote 44: “expelling convicted or alleged terrorists is an oddly parochial response that transfers rather than reduces risk. Depending on the destination country, deportation may actually make it easier for the individual to engage in activities that pose a threat to global security.” (Macklin, 2018, p. 171)
Used for: C2C3, C3C3

Quote 45: “Banishment as criminal penalty has a long pedigree, and dates to a time before the rise of penal systems that enabled states to segregate, punish, rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers within the state. In other words, modern states have criminal justice systems and
an infrastructure that obviates the utility of banishment. These systems can, and are, deployed in response to the range of conduct encompassed under the rubric of terrorism. Banishment is both superfluous and anachronistic.” (Macklin, 2018, p. 167)

Used for: C4C3

Quote 46: “Many political actors propose that terrorism poses unique threats to the physical safety of citizens. They tell us, we are in a state of “exception” or “emergency,” where civil rights can be sacrificed in exchange for ensuring security (for a discussion, see the contributions to Ramraj et al. 2005). Or, put differently, under conditions of exceptional risks posed to citizens, states can reasonably claim that their sovereignty rights should trump the rights of citizens … Correspondingly, under these exceptional conditions, it is reasonable to accept that normally unjust punishments can be justifiably deployed.” (Lenard, 2018, p. 104)

Used for: C4, P1C4, F1C4

Quote 47: “I too am outraged by what ISIS fighters are doing, but it is well known that the function of constitutional rights, and of the constitutions themselves, is precisely to assure that the legislator is not driven by the passion of the day. One decade after 9/11 we know that the actions taken both by the President and the Congress of the US, based on the rationale that it is a new world that we have woken up into, were not all reasonable, to put it mildly. So may be today’s rush to strip terrorist suspects of their citizenship. When watching the daily news on TV, one is easily tempted to think that we are living in extraordinarily dangerous times, which warrant a return to what the US Supreme Court considered to be ‘cruel punishment’ half a century ago. Yet as a matter of statistics, and despite our contrary impressions, violence of all kinds in the world is actually declining. On the other hand, the capacity of law enforcement agencies for surveillance and control, especially in the OECD countries, has increased dramatically, so the return to practices which have long been abandoned is difficult to justify” (Paskalev, 2018, p. 185)

Used for: C1P1C4, C2P1C4, C1C4

Quote 48: Revocation laws are sometimes defended for their contribution to deterring terrorist activity. The logic is, roughly, that those who might otherwise consider committing heinous crimes may be dissuaded by the threat of having something valuable taken from them. … In perhaps the only analogous case of as severe a punishment—execution by the state—evidence suggests that it has only a minimal deterrence effect, and the issue is a
matter of ongoing debate. If the power to revoke is not adequately justified for its ability to deter terrorist actions, can it be justified for its contribution to protecting the security of citizens? (Lenard, 2016, p. 85)
Used for: \( C_1P_1C_3 \)
Green are arguments supporting the thesis, orange are arguments against the thesis
For sources see argument scheme in appendix 1