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Sweden *Inside-Out*:

Suffering, Everyday Peace and Violence in Deliberation

Abstract

This thesis critically examines the role of suffering in violence, by applying a postmodern perspective to empirical examples gathered during fieldwork in the Malmö in 2011. Combining Bourdieu's perspectives on practice with Turner's concepts of space and liminality, Malmö takes on a new light. Through the criminalization of rejected asylum seekers, Malmö — otherwise a location of everyday peace — becomes an *inside-out* space defined by suffering where the clandestine asylum seekers are physically located within Swedish society, yet legally, culturally and socially located outside. Within this space bought into existence through the creation of clandestine asylum seekers new social relationships are formed — new ways of 'being in the world'. In this thesis the clandestine asylum seekers are facilitating the altruistic and philanthropic practices of volunteers, whilst simultaneously becoming a utility for personal gain through exploitation. By examining these newly created social relations this thesis explores the experiences of suffering from an *emic* perspective, which provides an alternative and holistic approach to understanding the relationalities of experiences of suffering, personhood and the social field. These relationalities of suffering are exhibited through postulates of identity, performances, ways of doing and being, subjectivities and difference, as tools for viewing the social encounters taking place in a specific field.

Key Words: Suffering, clandestine asylum seeker, everyday peace, violence, Sweden

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1. Introduction

1.1 Problem Statement

In March 2011 I conducted a pilot study in order to determine whether it is feasible to make a study of '*clandestine asylum seekers*' residing in Malmö, a term coined by Maja Sager¹, in her doctoral dissertation about irregular migrants in Sweden (2011:20-24). I determined that it was possible to conduct this study and furthermore I was able to establish a baseline of knowledge pertaining to this specific field (Furlan, 2011). The choice of this topic for research into Peace and Conflict Studies is highlighted by a number of critical areas. Firstly, the migration process itself, which illegalizes migration, and applies the use of violence (police and detention) to protect Swedish citizens from this threat, indeed the same forms of violence are used to control dangerous criminals (Khosravi 2009:48-50). Secondly, formal barriers restrict '*clandestine asylum seekers*' from participating in the welfare state, meaning they occupy a space outside of Swedish society and must deal with uncertainty and risk on an everyday basis, exposing them to exploitation, where existence becomes a state of vulnerability (Sager, 2011:49-52). Thirdly, social activist movements within Swedish civil society have developed as a reaction to the circumstances created by this exclusion.

Finally, embedded within these areas are issues of power; the relationship of illegality to vulnerability creates new sites of power on national and local levels. New types of social relationships emerge that exist outside of the mainstream Swedish society, these are violent relationships created by exclusion, bound in fear and hope. There is a need to understand the social effects of this power and suffering for clandestine asylum seekers, the helpers and those exploiting the clandestine asylum seekers within these social relations. Within this relationship the sufferer becomes bound, through reciprocity, to the actor whom provides recognition. This is explored in further detail in sections 4 and 5.

¹ Maja Sager uses this term in her PhD dissertation, which she completing at Lund University in Sweden, at the Centre for Gender Studies, at the Faculty of Social Sciences.

This thesis is not an assessment of Swedish migration laws or immigration policy, nor is it a study of migration processes; it is an examination of the structure and individual conditions of suffering. However, migration laws and processes do play a significant role here, creating the conditional space of concern, a *liminal third space*, whereby persons exist as physical bodies occupying society whilst simultaneously outside legally, socially and culturally excluded, in limbo, living *inside-out* in Swedish society (Turner 1967 in Baradwaj, 2009:84-86). It is within this space that suffering and violence are located and acted out in the everyday lives of individuals struggling for acceptance, those assisting them, and also those exploiting them.

The relevance of this topic to Peace and Conflict Studies may seem to diminish in some respects, as it does not represent a full blown *protracted social conflict* in the Azarian sense (Azar 1990 in Ramsbotham, 2005:84-90), nor is it possible to read as a *new war* (Kaldor, 2006). However when examined, this topic becomes a strikingly complex field engulfing lived experiences of violence, power and agency, political policies on local, national and global levels and brings into question the foundational understandings of the modern liberal society and its egalitarian principles, not to mention understandings of citizenship and the role of the nation state. To resist deviation, the primary focus of this thesis will be the critical development and examination of ontologies of suffering and violence using anthropological theories and concepts such as social suffering presented by Kleinman, Lock and Das (1996), and present them in a postmodern light through empirical examples, gathered through ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the city of Malmö in 2011.

My own competencies and experiences gathered throughout undergraduate studies have significant influence; this is reflected in the choice of topic and the theories and the methods that have been applied. Half of my studies have been within the discipline of Anthropology, particularly Medical Anthropology, which explores illness, pain and suffering. The name anthropology is a compound of two Greek words, *anthropos* and *logos*, translated as 'human' and 'reason' respectively

and thus is concerned with 'reason of human' or 'knowledge about humans' (Erkisen, 2001:2). Epistemologically, anthropology as a social science moves away from the positivist perspective with its world of facts waiting to be discovered — bolstered by Cartesian dichotomies as modes of thought. Instead it is empirically focused and concerned with ontologies of experience and articulations of perceptions and meanings embedded within the everyday experiences of people (Walliman, 2006:24; Fedorak, 2008:XXV). Anthropology seeks to explain human behaviour and understand the diverse ways people organize their lives, and is holistic in its approach examining culture as a whole and not as discrete parts. Using it to examine suffering and violence will provide contextually grounded insights into its role and practice within contemporary Swedish society (Fedorak, 2008:XXV-XXVII). Thus, suffering and violence is examined as part of the lived experiences of people.

The problem of this thesis is concerned with these experiences, namely why people remain in hiding in Sweden once their asylum applications have been rejected. What is at stake and why they are taking the risks implied in being *inside-out* in Swedish society and how they deal with these risks especially when the Swedish authorities have established that there is no risk for them in returning to their home country. By the means of this thesis I hope to make a contribution to the discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies with an empirically grounded understanding of how suffering constitute everyday experiences and how people react and deal with such situations, such as turning to uses of violence. It is important to keep in mind that suffering is unique with varying degrees of saliency and that not all forms result in or are violent (cf. Galtung, 1969; 1990). It may be the subtler forms of suffering and violence, which can perhaps provide the greatest contribution to understanding some of the social aspects pertaining to the social significance of suffering and violence.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to understandings of violence and social suffering through empirical cases pertinent to the experiences of persons living *inside-out* in Malmö. As research is temporally and physically limited to a

particular context, the knowledge produced here can only have limited application. Yet, with this aim the thesis can contribute to Peace and Conflict Studies by posing an alternative direction in examining suffering and violence as social manifestations embedded within everyday peace in Sweden. The thesis will examine the experiences and persistent suffering in peace². In order to examine suffering the following research questions have been formulated:

- Why do people remain in Sweden once their asylum applications have been rejected — what is at stake?
- Do respondents including the clandestine asylum seekers, the altruistic and philanthropic volunteers, and those who utilize clandestine asylum seekers for personal gain, experience suffering, and if so how?
- What is the socio-cultural significance of suffering?

1.2 Operationalization of the Study

In order to answer these questions the primary method applied in this thesis is in depth interviewing supported by ethnographic fieldwork, providing a descriptive account of the experiences of those living in this *inside-out* liminal space. This method has been chosen as it best suits the diverse and heterogeneous nature of the individual experiences, and also of the clandestine asylum seekers themselves (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Because these migrants constitute part of a difficult to find “group”, the study commenced with purposive sampling techniques to identify this group’s location and access possibilities in Malmö (Bernard, 2006:191). This took the form of a pilot study mentioned above conducted in February-March 2011 (Bernard, 2006:189-191). From here, snowball sampling allowed for greater access to respondents (Chambliss & Schutt 2006:101). For this study, I have conducted a total of seven interviews with two members of activist groups volunteering to support asylum seekers who were interviewed on two separate occasions each and three persons who are or have been residing in Sweden ‘illegally’ who were interviewed once. The volunteers are experts in the

² Peace is referring to the peaceful nation of Sweden, which is the frame of study in this thesis.

field, having knowledge and experience of many different situations and issues. They constitute a link between Swedish society and the clandestine asylum seekers making their perspective unique. Therefore they were interviewed twice each. The interviews conducted have been in-depth with open-ended questioning which allows for the individuals own understandings and experiences to emerge, it also allows for me to ask more explorative questions about specific elements of their answers. Respondent validation³ is achieved through follow up interviews to verify statements and meanings (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007:183). The material gathered through these interviews constitutes the main element of this thesis, and provides the basis for the analysis. For the purpose of this Bachelor Project the 129 pages of interview transcripts have been included as an appendix No 1. Material has also been gathered from other sources, namely peer-reviewed journals. After the initial survey of published texts these sources, through data triangulation methods were compared and contrasted with my original interview data to verify accounts and findings (Furlan, 2011). Theoretical lenses from literature sources are used to frame the problem within Peace and Conflict Studies and are built upon to provide operational definitions for the analysis of data.

1.3 Ethical Considerations

Because this study investigates clandestine asylum seekers, it has the potential to pose a real risk to their security should it reveal information about certain aspects of the respondent's life. Ethical considerations have thus been paramount in all phases. Prior to conducting the interviews, in keeping with an open and honest approach I also informed respondents that they may request and comment on the subsequent transcript (Chambliss & Schutt 2006:40-46). The main considerations adopted in this paper for conducting research amongst clandestine asylum seekers are divided into three parts; firstly anonymity and the protection of identities as these people are living in hiding and there is a real threat of violence and even death should they be detained and deported. Therefore, pseudonyms are used in

³ Respondent Validation is one method of triangulation: through the checking of inferences drawn from one set of data sources by collecting data from others, relating to the same phenomenon but deriving from different phases in the fieldwork. This process is intended to validate the collected data (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007:183).

place of real names and any identifiers or other information which could result in undue harm, have been omitted.

The second ethical issue regards power, respondents who provide economic or other type of help to clandestine asylum seekers. It becomes impossible to know to what extent these people receiving assistance feel obliged to partake in this type of research and how this could effect research results (see Chambliss & Schutt, 2006: 187-188; Bernard, 2006:74-78). As described above, the problem of validation that results from this issue is countered through triangulation and respondent validation techniques (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007:183). Finally, the third issue is in regard to language. In this study I have used a translator for two of the interviews. This person, who wishes to remain anonymous, is qualified and has experience working as a translator amongst refugees and asylum seekers. They offered their service voluntarily and I am fully confident that all conversations have been reliably translated. A Dictaphone was also used in these interviews. This is important with regards to obtaining informed consent and I am positive that respondents gave their full consent and are fully aware of the use of their dialogue in this study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011:175-176; ASA Ethical Guidelines, 1999).

1.4 Delimitations

This study has been limited to clandestine asylum seekers, those helping them and those exploiting them, excluding the voices of the government authorities and police who are directly involved in the handling of clandestine asylum seekers. This is due to the limited scope of this thesis as it is an examination of experiences of suffering from the perspective of living *inside-out*, it is not deemed critically important to conduct interviews with these authorities. Additionally, it should be stated that this research is constrained by its own temporal dimensions and the spaces in which it was conducted. As laws, cultures and societies are in constant change this research can only provide a limited accuracy of the situation experienced in Malmö. Although this study is limited in scale and therefore generalizability, and only representing those who took part, it aims to exemplify

theories of suffering and violence through the use of this empirical data (Chambliss & Schutt, 2006:12-14).

2. Former Research

I commenced the project and my literature search in examining how clandestine asylum seekers access welfare services in the European context, namely healthcare, on the premise that clandestine asylum seekers also require medical assistance from time-to-time. Here I found examples of the difficulties faced on an everyday basis, many of which go beyond medical care. For example Castaneda (2009:1552-1554) highlights how the unauthorized status and constant threat of deportation leads to the exclusion of clandestine asylum seekers from not only from welfare structures including health care, but also access to work permits and the job market. Thomas & Thomas (2004), examine the risks of the migration process itself including displacement and the risks faced by persons in the pre-flight, flight and post-flight stages of migration. Khosravi (2007) examined the deportation and asylum processes in Sweden; his description includes the general structure of the detention system, people's experiences of detention and the ideas of citizenship. These ideas of citizenship are used as the theoretical tool to explain the position of clandestine asylum seekers. A report from *Medicines Sans Frontieres* (2005) directly examines the problems of social security and access to health and welfare services in Sweden for people residing without legal status. This literature is orientated towards migration, and it is useful in providing an image of the types of issues that exist for clandestine asylum seekers and how the migration and welfare systems function. Although this literature provided a basis for conducting interviews, it is lacking in revealing knowledge concerning suffering and violence, central to a thesis in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

A word search in the *Journal of Peace Research*, which is directly relevant to Peace and Conflict Studies revealed little, with the words *asylum seeker* providing only five results. Using *illegal immigrants* as an alternative had a slightly better result with ten articles, however of these 15 articles only two had limited relevance to

this thesis. The first is a normative examination of asylum enforcement in the United States, utilizing statistical data to test hypotheses on changes in policy, finding that asylum enforcement policy changes over time due to normative factors (Rosenblum & Salehyan, 2004). The second concerns demography and how migration results in conflict in the Pacific regions of Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia (Ware, 2005). Being a demographic study, explanations of the outcomes of migration are recorded statistically and these statistical outcomes are then used to give recommendations for regional development programs (ibid).

This search revealed a conspicuous lack of research into violence and suffering within migration caused by wars and a plethora of political issues, especially within the last decade. This is alarming as migration is increasing in importance with growing political implications in policy and the way that war, as a reason for flight is being viewed. More so all of the above mentioned articles emphasise the way in which migration is viewed — from above as a separate field unto itself. This is the view that turns logical terms of analysis into reality overlooking the fact that the lenses from above give a very different picture to the experiences of those on the ground ('from below') (Maton, 2008:55). To overcome this limitation, this thesis empirically examines experiences rather than perspective. In section 3, ways in which the world is experienced and how these experiences manifest into behaviour is discussed theoretically, from a postmodern perspective, utilizing for example Bourdieu's notions of *habitus*, *field* and *illusio* (Grenfell, 2008). Section 4 then conceptually examines the setting (Malmö) and the relationality between the setting and the actors within it. The setting and what people are doing in it must be viewed as one to analyse experiences. Section 5 then brings together the setting and empirical examples and experiences of actors to provide a unique multifaceted bottom-up perspective of the social world surrounding clandestine asylum seekers. Finally the section 6 brings together the issues of experience in violence and suffering posing alternative ways of approaching these social interactions.

3. On Violence and Suffering

Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (2004:1) describe violence as a slippery concept, being non-linear, destructive, productive and reproductive, a mimetic force, like imitative magic or homeopathy, where like-produces-like. They go on to say that violence can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality — force, assault, or the infliction of pain alone (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004:1). It includes assaults on the dignity, personhood, sense of worth or value of the victim. Most importantly, it is the social and cultural dimensions of violence, which give violence its power and meaning (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004:1). This thesis aims to explore this elusive and complex concept from its social and cultural dimensions and it is therefore essential to commence this study with an epistemology of violence through which to frame and ground the empirical findings. To do this I will start with the inverse that is meanings and power, which manifest as suffering.

Johan Galtung's (1969; 1990), concepts of 'structural' and 'cultural' violence can serve as the point of entry into this discussion on violence and suffering. Galtung expanded violence into a social field by including the structures and cultures of the society, viewing violence from a predominately Marxist perspective with focus on victimhood, subjugation and oppression (Galtung, 1969; 1990). Structural violence is described as being inherent to the structure of society, whereby the social structures lead to inequality and forms of abuse and exploitation (Galtung, 1969). Structural violence is the forerunner to cultural violence and is presented along with a brilliant typology of violence embracing manifest and latent forms, physical and psychological forms of violence (Galtung, 1969:173-184). Cultural violence is defined as "aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence — exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) — that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence" (Galtung, 1990:291). The important aspect here is the relation of power that exists, between the person and the larger social structures and forces. These large-scale social forces translate into personal distress and disease; for examples

sexism, racism and poverty are forms of structural violence (Farmer, 2004:281-289).

Although useful, these definitions have some important weaknesses, as they are based on power, limitation and control, rather than 'ways of being in the world'. They apply a systemic way of viewing society and violence, which results in an *etic* perspective in their application to real world phenomenon. *Etic* is one half of the *emic-etic* dichotomy introduced to anthropology by Marvin Harris, but first developed by linguist Kenneth Pike (Eriksen, 2001:36). The natives or local point of view is *emic*, whereas the analytical perspective of the anthropologist or researcher is *etic* (Eriksen, 2001:36). In this thesis I am not doubting or disputing the existence of cultural or structural violence; I am raising awareness of an easy to fall into trap, which occurs when the subjective experience is removed. This may result in unnecessary ascriptions of victimhood to those who perhaps experience these inequalities in other ways. So I stress caution to the application of such wide and encompassing definitions of violence which may contribute to or create unnecessary suffering where it did not exist before, through a reframing of the social world from a primarily *etic* standpoint.

To exemplify the unnecessary suffering created through the *etic* issue described above, one need look no further than feminism and how women's worlds were restructured into fields of oppression by patriarchal systems of culture, science, governance and family values (Harding, 1991:17-29). This persecuted womanhood resulted from 'second wave feminism', which mobilized the Marxist arguments of oppression, subjugation, and patriarchies, casting women as victims. This construction of an entire gender into a specific social status as victims can provide a valuable lesson for studies of violence and suffering by utilizing the contemporary feminist methodologies and perspectives, which emerged out of this black hole of victimhood. Postmodernism challenges the positivist assertion that scientific rationalism leads to a full and accurate knowledge of the world, instead bringing in individual subjectivities to the centre (McGee & Warms, 2008:532). Galtung's (1969:173-184) typology of structural violence presents violence as a

law, which can be categorized into a neat frame and universally applied irrelevant of the context and experience.

Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis a postmodern approach will be applied, derived from postmodern feminist theorists like Haraway (2008), Wajcman (2010), and Helmreich (2009), who break away from the rationality and social structures that cast a category of people — in this case women — as victims. To shift from the *etic* focus within Peace and Conflict Studies means to examine violence through suffering from an *emic* focus. Here suffering is examined as five interrelated and overlapping social spheres: commencing with identities and built upon by, doing/being, performances, subjectivities and difference. These categories allow for violence and suffering to be examined in reference to specific temporal locations in social spaces in Malmö, by focusing on experiences of suffering, through which violence can be understood.

3.1 Identity

In reference to victimhood, suffering can be a source of identity, as in the example of the Lacanian notion of *jouissance*⁴, where the subject enjoys their symptom (victimhood). Their symptom becomes their reality, their character, as it is what distinguishes them from others, it is what gives them consistency in life and they do not know how they would manage without it (Zizek 1995 in Navaro-Yashin, 2002:160). Here, it is not only the power of suffering that is felt, it also comes to constitute part of the individual's existence, one's personhood, and thus suffering is a productive force experienced as identity.

⁴ In psychoanalysis, *Jouissance* (joy) describes how if a patient is made aware of their symptom then the symptom would disappear, the subject would be psychologically cured (Navaro-Yashin, 2002:160-164). The problem is when the symptom persists after the patient is made aware of their symptom. For Lacan the patient derives enjoyment from their symptom it accounts for their existence, this performance is what Zizek calls: *enlightened* false consciousness (ibid).

In order to understand how suffering invokes identity initially we must recognise the importance of personhood⁵. Personhood is to do with the 'self'; within anthropology many writers distinguish between the public and private 'self', the latter being the 'I' as it sees itself from the inside (unobservable)— these two levels are described as 'personhood' (Eriksen, 2001:55). Personhood is threefold; first, the person can be identified as a human being — embodied conscious social being with moral agency; secondly, the person represents a cultural category; and thirdly, the human person as a self, the 'I' as opposed to the others — a construal which exhibits wide cultural variation (Eriksen, 2001:56). The third distinction is followed by this thesis. It refers to what Anthropologist Louise Dumont (in Eriksen 2001:56) calls the '*individual proper*' — the origins of people's agency located within their ego.

Bourdieu (in Hage, 2003:15) argues that everything people do is aimed at perpetuating or augmenting their social being⁶. This '*being*' is not evenly distributed in society and occurs in the form of recognition and consideration manifest in social situations (Bourdieu in Hage, 2003:16). In this light the relationship of *jouissance* and personhood can be seen as an accumulation of *being*, where all individuals aim to accumulate *being* through reproducing the social context which gives them identity — recognition and reasons for their *being*, offering individuals the possibility to make something of their lives (Bourdieu in Hage, 2003:16). Therefore it is society, which generates meaning for life (identity), distributes *being* which in some cases may be victimhood, which can come to form the basis of an individual's way of 'being in the world'. This in turn through interaction with the Other comes to constitute one's personhood (ibid).

Identity can then be read in two ways; the first is that suffering is culturally relative and reflexive, bound to the society, which gives it meaning. For example,

⁵ Personhood: is the social characterization of the individual human being in a society, societies understandings and laws of how an individual will be treated and represented, given autonomy and how life will be defined (Janzen 2002:293).

⁶ Bourdieu is building upon the conception of being offered by seventeenth century Dutch philosopher Spinoza, embodying the ideas of *conatus* (Latin: endeavour) and joy as the augmentation of being — this positions the existential idea that humans aim to accumulate being (Hage 2003:15-16).

suffering in Sweden may not be the same as suffering in China. Secondly, that suffering constitutes identity functioning as a distribution mechanism for '*being*', whereby any attempt to cease the suffering would be an attack on the identities of the persons involved. Suffering is a social activity bound to the Other, a form of *jouissance*. Victimhood can be reproduced as a means of maintaining identity and existence, suffering becomes a reason for being in the world, created through formulations of the 'I' in reaction to the social encounters which give its existence meaning, for victims and philanthropists alike.

3.2 Performance

Performance links into this idea of victimhood within suffering. Beyond providing identity, suffering is also acted out, performed in everyday social encounters by both victims and those they encounter. This can be understood through 'social suffering', which provides a counter perspective to the 'from above' view presented by Galtung (1969; 1990), by seeing the issues 'from below', collapsing the neat paradigms and categories of structural and cultural violence, by reintroducing the individual. The term 'social suffering', was coined by two anthropologists Arthur Kleinman and Robert Desjarlais (Janzen, 2002:105):

Social suffering, brings into a single space an assemblage of human problems that have their origins and consequences in the devastating injuries that social force can inflict on human experience. Social suffering results from what political, economic, and institutional power does to people and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves influence responses to social problems. Included under the category of social suffering are conditions that are usually divided among separate fields, conditions that simultaneously involve health, welfare, legal, moral and religious issues. They destabilize established categories. For example, the trauma, pain, and disorders to which atrocity gives rise are health conditions; yet they are also political and cultural matters. Similarly, poverty is the major risk factor for ill health and death; yet this is only another way of saying that health is a social indicator and indeed a social process (Kleinman et al. 1996:ix).

Here suffering takes on a new dimension. Not only is it experienced socially, it is also a total collective social experience, shared across high-income and low-income societies, primarily affecting, in such different settings, those who are desperately poor and powerless (Kleinman et al. 1996:xi). Social suffering does not separate the individual from social levels of analysis, it accounts for cultural and social responses to suffering, including historically shaped rationalities and technologies and how the transformations they induce to end suffering, may actually contribute to it (Kleinman et al. 1996:x).

Now it can be seen that suffering is not only a personal experience through encounters with the Other, but that the same social situation where this encounter occurs also constitutes part of one's own personal experience in relation to the Other's suffering. This unique social experience is performed as a larger social reaction to the suffering, where societies arrange themselves accordingly by creating institutions to deal with *social suffering* which in turn may result in additional suffering and even violence. In this twist it can now be seen, with regards to identity, that the suffering of the Other may provide meaning to the self in which case there can be no interest in ending such suffering and violence, *jouissance*.

3.3 Suffering: Doing/Being

Here it is necessary to build upon the above-discussed notion of *being* as an inherently social phenomenon, through the introduction of agency. Agency is understood by Anthropologist, Galina Lindquist (2006:7-12) as twofold; one is the desire to act and the other is the capacity to implement this desire or will to act. Although useful, this definition is limited, especially in relation to the intended postmodern perspective, as it is still based on limitation and control, rather than ways of 'being in the world'. Because societies and social spaces vary in terms of their enabling and constraining powers, the social position of an individual in any society is determinant in the possibility to turn their plans into reality and construct life more or less according to his or her wishes (Lindquist, 2006:7). This structuralist perspective resonates similar problems to that of Galtung's (1969) of

violence, returning us to the *etic* perspective and forgetting the subjective reality of the experience.

To address this, inspired by the phenomenological mode of knowledge, which sets out to bring light to the *truth of experience*, Lindquist (2006:5-18) applies Bourdieu's concept of *illusio*. *Illusio* provides the temporal dimension to what people are doing and why. It identifies trajectories in behaviours and cannot be understood without first understanding practice. According to Bourdieu (1990 in Lindquist, 2006:5):

What defines practices as such is the uncertainty and fuzziness resulting from the fact that they have as their principle not a set of conscious, constant rules, but practical schemes, opaque to their processors, varying according to the logic of the situation.

Bourdieu's (ibid), definition highlights an important interplay, which is the relationality of practice, whereby the situation and practicalities of the context form the foundation of possibilities. In order to apply this to social observations, Bourdieu uses the notions of '*habitus*' and the '*social field*' or 'field of a game'; here a *field* is a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power, while *habitus* consists of a set of historical relations 'deposited' within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation and action (Wacquant in Lindquist 2006:6). These two notions are symbiotic, developed to examine the relations between things, a holistic approach where the field and the actors influence each other (Maton, 2008:53-55). Here, the social encounter is called the 'field of a game' and personhood is referred to by the notion of *Habitus*. The combination of the two is what is described as practice, the product of which is purpose, which as stated above is the augmentation of *being*.

To describe the investment, interest or a stake in 'the game' — the temporal dimensions of practice — Bourdieu developed the notion of *illusio*, (Lindquist

2006:6). *Illusio* is always orientated towards the future, to something that is being brought into being, in projects and desires. It is therefore part of the foundational existential condition of being: that of hope (Lindquist 2006:6). Philosopher Ernest Bloch (1986 in Lindquist, 2006:6) proclaims that hope is a way, which people are determined by their future, and Erich Fromm (1968 in Lindquist 2006:6) states that 'hope is vision of present in the state of pregnancy'. In Lindquist's (2006:6) own words "the existential attitude of hope is a state of Being where time dimension is secured; where the present is projected into the future". *Illusio* then explains why people do things, providing purpose to practice, giving meaning and recognition to existence.

Thus if agency is blocked, 'hope' maybe induced as a sign of 'being', a means of recognising one's existence. This can be manifested in *deliberation*, which is understood as the action of the mindful body or an embodied mind, the 'I' (Daniel, 1996:322). In deliberation, human beings experience the exercise of their practice's being subjected to change, the practices of belonging, of being with, rather than merely being in or being as — the actor becomes aware of the *field* (ibid). Deliberation is a moment in which such practices are disturbed and rise to the threshold of practice-change; intentionality becomes involved in deliberation, giving purpose to one's actions as a reaction to the recognition provided through the *social field* (ibid). Doing then, is the augmentation of *being* as a reaction to change, linking the past experiences with the practices of the present and the imagined outcome in the future which is determined by the *field* which provides or limits purpose and possibility.

3.4 Subjectivities

The subjective aspects of suffering describe the way in which it is experienced, translated into *being* — its meaning. It is not possible to say whether subjective experiences are the same. It is reciprocity, which precipitates social trajectories, making agency possible and gives violence and suffering its power. Reciprocity is the mechanism that exists within the relations between people as a form of exchange of cultural attitudes, goods or services whereby obligation is incurred

linking individual experiences together, a mode of recognition, distributing '*being*' amongst members of a society (Eriksen, 2001:182-184). It is this power to incur obligation, which bonds the *self*, one's social location (*field*) and agency together, under the auspices of recognition which is distributed through the very practices which it incurs. In these relations some people will gain more recognition (*being*) than others feel more attached to the reality of the *field*.

If we return to Bourdieu (1977 in Eriksen, 2001:183), such exchange is viewed as a 'total social phenomena' concealing power relations and exploitative practices, therefore the kinds of social integration and mutual obligations created through reciprocity are not necessarily beneficial to everyone involved. Reciprocity and exchange can be seen as surface phenomena that serve as a foil for the ultimate concern of the people concerned, which amount to the protection and preservation of assets that are felt to represent their identity and- what Anthropologist Annette Wiener calls *inalienable possessions* (Eriksen, 2001:184). This accounts for the reproductive nature of reciprocity and its ability to be the driving force in the continuance suffering: the *mimetic* potential of subjectivities, where like-produces-like. A key facet in *illusio* and *deliberation*, reciprocity is the distribution of *being* in a social field through power, its ability to dominate, incur obligation and affect agency.

3.5 Differences

The contemporary global world is a constant flux of people and culture in order to understand suffering at a global level, the Other must be viewed in an alternative phenomenology contrary to that discussed under identity. Here we can no longer talk about anchored local world meanings — a more pragmatic and cosmopolitan worldview is required in grasping the assemblages of practices, which affect the meeting of the self and the Other. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1988 in Lindquist, 2007:309) argues that when one encounters the exotic Other the unknown is cast into the known, by absorbing the Other into the sameness of '*being*' (appropriation of 'being' by knowledge, the lived experience converted into doctrines, teachings, scientific, pronouncements, etc.). Thus the violence of

grasping 'otherness' in terms of the 'self' is extirpated from all its surprise, danger and mystery (Levinas, 1988 in Lindquist, 2007:309). By doing so recognition of *being* is altered, new avenues of behaviour must be developed to interact with the established practices of the *field*, to gain recognition. This poses a difficult question for the global world, marked by spaces of ever increasing social encounters with the exotic and suffering Other, these encounters existing outside the possibilities of 'sameness of *being*', filled with surprise, danger and mystery.

If suffering is a culturally relative, subjective and interpersonal experience, how can the danger of difference be explored? Levinas (1988 in Lindquist, 2007:309), argues that suffering is based on ethics rather than meaning, whereby suffering is meaningless from the start, useless, as it provides no *being*, up until the point of the social encounter with the Other. For Levinas (in Lindquist, 2007) the Other, provides meaning at the point of the social encounter, by giving recognition to one's '*being*'. This presents the social encounter of suffering in a different light, whereby the encounter shapes the Other in culturally meaningful ways, through the power of reciprocity in giving recognition and consideration, outside a specific culture (Lindquist, 2007: 309-318). Accounting for this, the face-to-face encounter creates its own cultural context and provides meaning to the suffering experience so long as the Other gives power to, and submits to the obligations incurred through reciprocity (Lindquist, 2007:312-318).

However, in doing so the sufferer becomes bound, through reciprocity, to the actor providing recognition. Their source of *being* within that particular *field* is limited because of the historical differences located in their personhood (*habitus*) — one cannot provide the context of experiences of suffering to the Other in a *field* outside of that which gave birth to that very experience. It is here that the difference itself becomes a platform for reciprocity and power. The only means to overcome this is to remove the difference by changing one's practices to conform to those of the *field*. Yet, this is not always possible as certain constraints of the *field* (for example asylum application rejection) may not allow for such change and therefore the only source of recognition exists within this exchange with the Other.

Ergo, by viewing suffering as meaningless in the start, it is contextually connected to social encounters with the Other, and the field from which it becomes a source of meaning. Recognition, providing a detached source of augmentation of 'being' and transgressing culturally relative boundaries, difference becomes a new site of reciprocity, power and agency, which gives meaning to people's lives, which can then be analysed.

The complexly transposable and multifaceted aspects of practices of *suffering* can now be explored through postmodern lenses, where sites of suffering overlap, intersecting social fields, simultaneously reproducing ways of 'being in the world' with varying levels of saliency. Temporally bound to specific individuals, agency and the larger social structures, a subjective yet culturally and socially exchangeable way of providing meaning to existence, suffering is an important and essential aspect of 'being' human.

4. Sites of Suffering

When I completed transcribing my interviews, I was overawed by the quantity and depth of the data (see Appendix 1). There are accounts of the administrative processes of the migration and legal systems; accounts of the practicalities of the welfare services such as healthcare, schools, employment; accounts of deportations and of being granted asylum. Additionally I collected life stories; personal stories of violence, suffering and the hardships of having asylum rejected; accounts of living in hope and fear; emotional accounts of the difficulties and hopelessness of helping those in need; and accounts of isolation and exploitation. All of these elements converged into a single setting — Malmö. There is an imbalance between the data collected and that discussed below, the excluded data is a valuable source of information and has provided the contextual location for the data analysed in this thesis. However, I cannot possibly use all the data collected, choosing to utilize only that specifically relevant to the topic of suffering. Therefore, most of the data pertaining to experiences outside of Malmö are excluded. To make sense of suffering experiences in Malmö, my original data can

be separated into three categories: the clandestine asylum seekers, the altruistic and philanthropic volunteers, and those who identify and utilize clandestine asylum seekers for personal gain.

Before applying theories of suffering to the empirical examples a clear conceptualization of Malmö as a setting must be made to understand how the *field* as a limiting or liberating site influencing practices, and ways of 'being in the world'. Malmö like many other cities has become an *ethnoscape*, a landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, guest workers, exiles and other moving groups and individuals who constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree (McGee and Warms, 2008: 588). Malmö then provides the contextual space where, through processes of migration and mobility, new sociocultural encounters occur; these encounters can become sites of suffering. Current migration debates, policy, laws and practices provide conspicuous and salient examples of framing issues of globalization within the Malmö context (Sager, 2011:46-52). However, these debates, policies and laws are not the focus of this thesis; suffering is. This implies caution to the examination of this space in which such social relations are occurring, to avoid becoming entangled in such debates as migration and policy. To emphasise this point, it should be stated that this thesis is only intended to address suffering as a way of 'being in the world', and does not intend to address the secondary meta-purpose of contributing to policy or discussions on migration, or function as academic activism (Schmidt, 2007:83-90). To understand how Malmö appears as a site of suffering, the subjective experience may once again be drawn into focus through understanding the conditional *liminal third space*, which occurs within this *field* (Turner 1967 in Baradwaj, 2009:84-86).

The *liminal third space* can be described as an opportunity that did not previously exist; it is a site of potential, convergence with intersecting pathways (Turner 1967 in Baradwaj, 2009:84-86). This space consists of a limitless composition of life worlds that are radically open and openly radicalized reflecting the move away

from the either/or positivist dichotomies to both/and/also (Soja, 1996 in Baradwaj, 2009:85). The third space is open ended, Baradwaj (1996:85-86), relates this idea of third space to Turner's *anti-structure*, which describes a state of liberation of human capacity for cognition, affect, volition and creativity. This *liminal anti-structural* is a departure from the official structure/norm, which gives the third space its temporal *liminality*, where rules are constantly critiqued, rewritten and articulated (Baradwaj, 2009:86). Unlike the *liminality* of between time and *rite de passage*⁷ where there is a return to the existing social structure, in the *liminal third* there is no such return, it remains open ended (Baradwaj, 2009:86). When describing Malmö as a *third space*, I am describing the new and open scenarios which operate in the social encounters present in Malmö, where both ethnic 'Swedes' and migrants encounter each other to form new sites of opportunity, new ways of 'being in the world'. I should state here that *opportunity* is not always positive and definitely not for all involved.

Applying the *liminal third space* to the notion of '*social field*' or '*field of a game*' provides a more concise way to map the social aspects of suffering. *Field of a game* was touched upon in the previous section, as a set of objective historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power, and is directly associated with *habitus* (Wacquant in Lindquist 2006:6). Bourdieu (2000:151) explains that within the relationship between *habitus* and the *field*, between the feel for the game and the game itself, the stakes of the game are generated and ends are constituted. The game and its stakes are visible to those caught up in it, as an all-encompassing transcendental universe, imposing its own ends and norms unconditionally (ibid). This means that when a *liminal third space* appears as part of the *field*, those it affects will experience this opportunity as a shift in the stakes of the game, a changing of the rules.

⁷ *Rite de passage*: Describes the symbolic removal of for example a child from society as part of a ritual process whereby they complete certain rites to return to society as a man, this consists of 3 stages- detachment from the group, the liminal period of ambiguity and third stage where the neophyte re-enters society changed (cf. Van Gennep 1909 in Turner, 2002:96).

The institutional structures in place in Sweden like the Migration Board, the police and the welfare system constitute part of the *social field*. Not only do institutional structures play a role in the regulation of society, but also their existence and efficacy gives conception to *anti-structure* (Jasanoff, 2003:395-397). The cardinal aspect concerning the ‘field of a game’ is the ‘deportability’ of clandestine asylum seekers; this criminalization of migration precipitates *anti-structure*, birthing the *liminal third space* (Khosravi, 2009:48-54). This criminalization of Khosravi’s (2009:49) ‘anti-citizen’, a term describing migrants as threats to citizenship⁸, is justified through the rejection of the asylum application, whereby the asylum seeker is rendered a ‘bogus refugee’ coming to Sweden to leach off money from the public purse, a ‘risk’ to the welfare system, and therefore Swedish citizens. It is at this point that the game for the rejected asylum seeker collapses in on itself. They enter this *inside-out* space, simultaneously in Sweden as a physical body, yet ostracised, outside of the social norms, institutions and structures, isolated in *liminality*, the future offering nothing but undetermined hope. It is here when nothing seems possible that everything becomes possible, all types of phantasmic discourses about the future have a purpose in filling up the void in what is to come, offering the illusory hope where the real one does not exist (Bourdieu in Lindquist, 2006:10). One respondent who I will call Nadif describes his experience⁹:

Of course, they rejected and said ok we don’t accept your application they told me that I am going to be returned to (*text removed*), where I knew that the risk that I was going to face, wasn’t less than that I am going to be killed or inhumanely tortured. By that time the intuition forced me to stay in Sweden as a hidden refugee or go round to people, live like an unregistered life.

In this instance the ‘field’ changed for Nadif, and when asked how this made him feel he replied:

⁸ Khosravi (2009:49), describes an anti citizen as an individual who is outside the ordinary regulatory system, who violates the established norms and who may constitute a risk to the quality of life and safety of a ‘normal’ citizen.

⁹ A note concerning the quoted material: All names used in this text are pseudonyms. The quote material is taken directly from the interview transcripts (grammatical and language errors have not been corrected), in the instances where there appears ‘(*text removed*)’, certain information has been omitted in order to protect the respondents anonymity.

You can understand how difficult it is when you never know your fate, when you never know what is going to happen to your life, when you never know if you are going to be deported without your consent, or if you are going to stay here in the future, so it is something that is very heart touching, something that is very heavy, something that you can imagine how a human person can feel here when you never know your destiny. So there are things that I cannot explain, there are things that are very, very hard to explain.

The future for Nadif has become one of uncertainty, of fear and hope brought about through his new status, he is now *inside-out*, suspended in the *liminal third space*. Another respondent who I will call Ubah describes her experience of applying for asylum:

Of course it was full of horrible, it was full of nightmare, because all of the papers that I used to get from the Migration Board, every fucking paper that comes from the migration in the post was disappointing, it was full of bad information it was like, I was rejected, I was going to go to the police and so on and so forth. So I reach to an extent that I never liked to open the papers from the Migration Board, I reached to an extent that I disliked getting post from, even if it was the papers that were going to make me happy.

Ubah's experience highlights the central aspect of hope, where refraining from opening the post was one means of maintaining hope, maintaining her imagined future, her *illusio*. Similarly another respondent who I will call Ahmed, describes his interview at the Migration Board as part of his asylum application:

How did you travel from that airport to here? And then I said that I travelled by train. OK how long did this trip take you? I said roughly 30 minutes or plus, yeh 30 min. Ok he said, have you crossed a bridge or did you travel over a bridge? And I said; I don't know, I didn't see it. Then he said did you go through a tunnel? And I said; I don't know, all I said was that I travelled with the train and I was scared, afraid of the police, why are you asking this? He said you're lying! Just in front of me. How am I lying? You're lying because you must have seen a bridge or tunnel, if

you have travelled with a train to this place, and that trip was around 30 minutes. I said that I can't tell you if there was a bridge or there was a tunnel, because I had no intention of checking, I was not a tourist, I was scared and I didn't experience and I wasn't like someone who lived here before, travelled with such a train, so I think it is weird that you are asking me such a thing or that you say to me that I am lying. You must be lying he said, because I travelled to Sweden nine years ago and I travelled with the same train that you travelled with while I was hiding myself under the chairs of the train and I realized that we crossed a bridge and that we went through a tunnel, so you must have understood. I said ok well that's you and this is me. Anyway, I waited for a decision from that guy for six months, and after six months and twenty days I got a negative response from him that my application was rejected.

This dialogue of suspicion from the Case Officer, a former asylum seeker himself, reinforces Khoravi's (2009:49) notion of anti-citizen, the asylum seeker accused of lying, presented and treated as bogus, untrustworthy, a risk from the very start of the process. Swedish volunteers assisting the clandestine asylum seekers also experience this criminalization as part of their everyday lives; the respondent who I will call Birgitte describes some of her experiences:

The police said that they would not deport him without telling him first, so that he could pack up his things and say goodbye to his friends. And then they one Monday when he was at the police station after school, for registration they were, I don't know if they were 6 to 8 to 10 police officers and put him in handcuffs and they put him in detention. This boy was then sixteen, fifteen years old, and unaccompanied and they deported him seven o'clock the morning after.

Two years ago the police were asking for the schedules of the children in the schools, that is; they can't put the children without their parents in detention. But what they did then was they waited outside the school and they followed the children back to their house so they could arrest the parents. So then they asked for the schedules of the children so that they would know when they quit class. In this case the principal, firstly informed the families and the children were taken out of schools for a certain amount of time and the schedule was changed by the

principal. But in another case, which was not me personally involved with but the whole family was deported.

When you go up to the city council, they report people who are going to get married to the police they give out the lists. And we didn't really realize that, so we had some arrests during marriage.

Birgitte provides another perspective on the issue of criminalization, simultaneously highlighting the totality of the *field* and the *liminal third space*:

This family I have contact with there is no violence at all, there is nothing like that, but it is a big issue within the healthcare field because women that are exposed to violence, are living in close relationships or on the streets or whatever, they can't report and get protection of the authorities, because they will report them to the police.

These examples highlight the nature of the '*field of game*' for clandestine asylum seekers, where their existence in Malmö is fraught with risk of incarceration; this risk leads to vulnerability through exposure to exploitation. Criminalization changes the 'stakes' of the game, precipitating a *liminal third space*, a space of existence *inside-out* of mainstream society where new opportunities grow out of the reality of clandestine asylum seekers. The *liminal third space* is only present where the illegalization of migration dissects mainstream Swedish society creating new sites of suffering. The exclusion of clandestine asylum seekers from the welfare system consolidates this *anti-structural* space as a site of suffering; Nadif describes his experience of this specific situation:

Anyone would feel how I feel and this is that everybody lives somewhere and has his food or accommodation somewhere, I don't have anywhere where I live myself, I don't have anywhere where I have my food and go and eat. It could be that I don't get food to eat for three times constantly or for a whole day, this is one of the heart touching problems, it's an issue that touches your bones.

Here the reality of the *field* becomes visible to Nadif, engulfing his existence, leading to new 'ways of being'— *inside-out* without food or somewhere to live like everyone else. It is within this *inside-out* space that my original data can be separated into three categories: the clandestine asylum seekers, the altruistic and philanthropic volunteers, and then those who identify and utilize clandestine asylum seekers for personal gain. Of course these are fuzzy categories, dissecting and interacting with one another, nevertheless they allow for a representative image of the encounters within the social space. The first, are the clandestine asylum seekers, who are the kernel element from which the *liminal third space* can manifest. These people are marginalized, '*marginals*' permanently outside, they will always be asylum seekers members of two groups: their country of origin but also Sweden via ascription (Turner, 2002:97). *Marginals* are betwixt and between with no cultural assurance of final stable resolution of their ambiguity, where they remain (ibid).

The second describes the people offering assistance, the space offering a new way of being in the world. One respondent who I will call Anna describes her experience:

I think that it strengthens me to know that I make a difference. And some things that I do I find more difficult and more strenuous, but some things that I do are quite... it doesn't take much energy to do them and still it takes much energy to do them for other people, and I think that, that makes me grow. And I think that you always develop when you see more in society than just the narrow image that the media or the politicians want to give you. I think to be part of this sort of, it's not a game, it's fighting the system from within and to hear how other people do it and you hear from them and you — yeh that's the way to do it, and then you can kind of fight the system from within and that's kind of cool.

Here Anna, describes how her involvement in assisting clandestine refugees and how this provides her with strength, an opportunity that has come about through someone else's suffering. Anna is also betwixt and between, entering the *liminal*

third space, voluntarily ascribing herself to a position outside the structural arrangements of the Swedish social system, situationally set apart by assigning herself an alternative status of “fighting the system from within” (Turner, 2002:97). However, she is not a *marginal* (clandestine asylum seeker), she is a ‘*liminar*’, being an ethnic Swede she has the cultural assurance of being able to at any time end her ambiguity and return to the structural arrangements of the Swedish social system. This is a clear differentiation from *marginals* who remain betwixt (ibid).

The third category is where people see an alternative opportunity that comes with the criminalization of migrants; Anna describes one of her experiences of this:

I have had an issue with a teacher who was acting in a very unethical way towards a hidden refugee child or adolescent I should say. And that was well it's a delicate situation because the child is here on her own and sometimes, the teachers they want to help, but maybe they also take advantage of the situation, that this person is alone and without any sort of state supported rights, and so, well in this case it was a teacher who offered this young woman to stay in his place and also said that if she would marry him he could help her and this was a person who she had trusted, she found him very supportive and she started to tell him about her situation and as soon as he learnt about her situation he took advantage of that. And because she didn't want to be in a relationship like that with her teacher she said well thankyou for the offer but no thankyou and then she didn't want to go back to school for quite a while and was very scared that he would report her to the police or something. So it's, yeh I think people take advantage and the younger they are the easier it is, or older for that matter and women especially vulnerable when it comes to sexual exploitation.

The actors in this category are also *liminars*, able to return to mainstream society, and end their ambiguity (Turner, 2002:97). All of these categories exist in symbiosis, interrelated and suspended together in this *liminal third space*, a new *field* with its own rules and stakes. Malmö's transposable *inside-out liminal third space* becomes a nexus of human problems, ambiguities and opportunities, defined

by social relations that provide new ways of 'being in the world', a result of clandestine asylum seekers to which it gave birth. This section has shown that clandestine asylum seekers result from social systems and institutional structures that have been developed as a reaction to global processes of mobility and migration. Because the rejected asylum seekers are criminalized, their social interaction with mainstream Swedish society results in changes to the *social field*, manifested as a *liminal third space*. It is within this space that new opportunities materialize and suffering takes on new dimensions, which can now be examined.

5. Experiences of Suffering: *Understanding Violence*

The *field* has now been discussed, providing the contextual reference point from which to examine empirical evidence; these examples can then provide the insights into how suffering and violence affects social relations and explain the significance of suffering in everyday life in Malmö. By returning to the five interrelated and overlapping social spheres discussed in section 3, identities, doing/being, performances, subjectivities and difference suffering will again form the focus, maintaining the *emic* focus of this thesis, remembering that suffering is an experience of violence, an effect that is felt and acted out in people's everyday lives.

5.1 Identity and Suffering

Something that stood out in my original data was the issue of recognition being able to justify suffering during the asylum process. Because suffering is culturally relative and reflexive, bound to the society which gives it meaning, a denial of recognition of that suffering reconstitutes or changes its meaning. Ahmed describes his experience of this:

I just told them that, I just want to get asylum here, to live in a peaceful life where I can study and work freely and safely, where I am safe all the time. But this didn't work well, or this wasn't perfect this hasn't worked perfect. I don't know if it was

because of my formulation of the case, what I said or it was generally the politics of the migration at that time.

Similarly, Nadif has also experienced this situation where his suffering was not given recognition:

I don't know what to consider, more than that someone is tortured, or that someone is killed or that someone faces to be or risked to be killed. But they still say that this is not enough or not relevant for someone to be given asylum in Sweden.

Again Ubah has also been in this situation:

All decisions depended on the individuals who were making the decisions; there has never been a unique decision, the Migration Board was arguing throughout my case. And some of the decision makers argued that I am not from *(text removed)*, some argued that I am not saying something relevant for me to get asylum here, and some were saying that I don't... well it depends on different individuals and different decisions it hasn't had anything to do with the legal system — it was individually based.

Here, Ubah describes her experience as an interaction with individuals not with the system, she recognises that it is the subjective arguments, which impacted the decisions pertaining to having her experiences of suffering recognized. This highlights the first issue of identity, that suffering is culturally relative, which means that its very meaning and saliency can be manipulated and changed, whereby the forces of reciprocity again emerge this power of recognition. Anna provides a different example of the power of recognition within ones identity, whereby being associated or having been through the asylum process and deported changes ones identity:

And then I heard of another case of an Afghan man who was sent back and he said he had documentation that this man was being beaten and he had to be on the

move all the time, he could not stay in one place too long because he had people going after him because they thought that he was connected to Sweden and that he could be pushed to get money from Sweden so that they threatened him with his life and he had to get money from Sweden to pay these people off. He was beaten several times and then he just started to move around and it was harder for them to find him.

Here, the man's identity is changed — in the Afghan context he is a resource, his suffering takes on a new dimension — exemplifying his place as a '*marginal*', where even though he has returned to Afghanistan, he remains suspended in between the two countries, linked by his suffering in a permanent betwixt state. Not only does this affect his suffering and way of 'being in the world' but it also has created a new space of suffering within the Afghanistan context, a new *social field*. Anna gives an example of the mobilization of victimhood as identity, as victims of the volunteers:

I think, well with this young woman she once told me, that she and her mother they were pushing me a bit, they were saying; well you don't help us you don't give us any money or anything, and we know that (*text removed*) they've got money because we know another family and they went to the (*text removed*) and they gave them much more money than we are getting from you! And so in relation to her, I felt that, well, at the moment when it happened I thought that this is what they really believe and maybe they believe that to gain more from the group and to push. But in hind sight, when time had passed I thought maybe it was more a reflection on the despair and the situation that they are in, they are just desperate and they're pushing in all directions.

This mobilization of victimhood, around suffering caused by supposedly unfair allocation of money, highlights its linkage into recognition and *being*. Were Anna to give them more money she would be creating a site of victimhood by giving recognition to the claim, thus bringing it into existence within the *field of game*. However, she identified this situation and is unwittingly confirming Bourdieu (in Hage, 2003:16) that everything people do is aimed at perpetuating or augmenting

their social *being*; victimhood, a possible means to do so, should the social field allow it by providing recognition. In these above examples suffering becomes intertwined with identity, it can change identity if it does not achieve recognition, and it can be used to try and create new spaces within the field — identity becoming suffering.

Not all suffering constitutes the identity of the 'so called sufferer', indeed the volunteers gain at least part of their identity through the work that they do. This is *jouissance* where the Other's suffering becomes a reason for 'being in the world'. Indeed both of the volunteers who I interviewed described themselves as activists. Activism in itself is a performance of identity, and it is this identity that has come about through Malmö's *ethnoscape* and the production of clandestine asylum seekers. Responding to the question of whether activism gives voice to clandestine asylum seekers, Birgitte explains her view:

I have a really problem with the giving voice issue, because I am not sure how to do that in a good way, because it is really important to be representative of all the different experiences that people have living in clandestine because they are so diversified. So in that sense I think it is really difficult, but on the other hand these people they have no possibility or very limited possibility to actually take part in the official debate. So in that sense how to make a bad situation as good as possible I think that our activism and our political ambition are based on really, really solid ground of experience.

Here, Birgitte states that her grounded experiences are central to her activist activities. To further demonstrate how clandestine asylum seekers constitute the identity of the volunteers helping them; Birgitte describes some of these experiences in relation to her way of organizing her life:

When I think about my economic and financial situation I also think about other people, that I need to be able to be there because of crisis. And there was a period when it was like this every month, now it's not like that, because I think I have developed some kind of coping strategies during the years, because the first years

it was crisis every month and when I wasn't able to pay my own rent, I think the situation, it was, you know I realized that this is not something that I can continue with in this how I do it now but, and you know I go on holiday and I think I will live a really luxury life and I have arranged it in that way that I have a minimum expenses every month, so I don't need that much to actually manage.

This economical commitment is one aspect of the role of clandestine asylum seekers in Birgitte's life and she goes on to explain the social aspects of her involvement in the group assisting asylum seekers:

We recruited them and we became friends during working together, but it's both positive and negative, because for me it's really important to have friends, the close friends I have they need to know, otherwise they can't be really close to me because I need them to understand. They don't have to be in the actual group but they have to understand, and to understand, I think, that you have to have a certain view of society, certain values, I don't know, whatever.¹⁰

This statement identifies clandestine asylum seekers as having a significant social role in the way which Birgitte recognises and constructs her friendships. These three extracts from an interview highlight the extent to which Birgitte is engaged in the *field*. This engagement is not only limited to the practical aspects of the *field*, the suffering she witnesses has also had an emotional impact on her:

I don't know some times I feel it's different periods, some period I had felt that my empathy that it was gone, it was finished I didn't have anymore feelings to feel for. But then I sort of recharged, but I can't have the same level of stories or the same intense relationships with people because I think that all of the stories that I have heard and all of the stories I have experienced, now I mean the stories of Sweden because the abuse and the violations are continuing in Sweden since it is a very vulnerable situation and since the system started it. So the stories and the things I experienced I don't know it is kind of like something that is inside me so, I can't

¹⁰ When Birgitte says 'we recruited them' she is referring to other activists within the same organization.

deal with too much at a time because it's added to the old stories and experiences of the system.

When asked how she deals with these stresses she explains:

I exercise a lot I do boxing which is the best thing, I also go on running and many of my friends are involved in this also so we are talking a lot.

In the examples that Birgitte gives, her involvement with clandestine asylum seekers locates her in the *field*, which in turn provides her with meaning in her life. The *field* presenting all-encompassing transcendental universe, imposing its own ends and norms unconditionally on Birgitte (Bourdieu, 2000:151). At stake identity, her *jouissance*, her source of *being* which give her reality — should the laws change eliminating all clandestine asylum seekers, then this source of identity would be lost. So in this sense the suffering made available through the *liminal third space* is functioning to distribute *being*, Birgitte is reacting to this source of being, this site of suffering offering her the possibility to make something of her life (Bourdieu in Hage, 2003:16).

5.2 Collective Suffering — Performance

The previous section examined suffering as a source of identity for the sufferers and the volunteers, the social encounters around the particular source create sites of suffering through everyday performances. *Social suffering* best describes these performances as it brings to light sites of suffering, through the social reaction to it (Kleinman et al. 1996:ix). The Scandinavian model of welfare is intended to reduce the level of inequalities, and improve people's quality of life and the health and the productivity of the population (Tylleskär et al. 2007:277-279). This is a model built around the provision of public social benefits, of free health care, education, old age care *etcetera*. To support this system a large number of public institutions, like hospitals, schools and so forth are required. These are funded through taxes, resulting in very equal income distribution and have directly resulted in a peaceful society, with little conflict (Kærgård, 2006:3). Social suffering accounts for cultural

and social responses to suffering, including historically shaped rationalities and technologies and how the transformations they induce to end suffering, contribute to it (Kleinman et al. 1996:x). The Swedish welfare system is one such example. I will begin with how this system excludes Nadif sharing his experience:

The good part of this life is that you can feel that for a day at least that you are physically safe from torture, from killing, from any harm. But the bad thing of this is, that you are this way now, going nowhere, not working, not going to school, not sharing views with people, because you feel to be like isolated because everybody here has got his own numbers, his or her identification numbers. So everywhere you go, you need to register yourself, to go to school people will immediately find that you are in a different situation than the others. So you have a stamp on the back, showing that you are not a normal person, because the normal people have got ten digit numbers where they write it whenever they register themselves where they set off to, whether that's a school, whether it's buying cards.

This example describes the importance of the civil registration number, which is used to access the welfare system and associated institutions, Nadif further describes how he experiences this:

Of course I am blocked from society because I can't, these papers are the bridge, is the gate line for getting in the society. I can't go in the society, I can't integrate myself. I can't deal with anyone because I don't have the legal status to stay in the country; I am not legally staying in the country.

Although the welfare system provides general equality across Swedish society, there are still those living *inside-out*. Here the well-functioning system actually makes life more difficult for anyone in this *liminal third space*. Here, new opportunities emerge in the form of social reactions to situations which Nadif and others are in. Birgitte describes some difficulties experienced by those she is assisting:

Sweden is very special in that sense, if you actually compare it with the rest of Europe because it's very difficult, the informal structures are not really that developed as it is in other countries, so it's very difficult, it's very difficult to get black work outside the system, [...] and it's also work with very exploitative conditions and many of them who I know, working they get like 20 Crowns an hour, and to compare that is, I don't know if you have white work and pay taxes I think if your cleaning you get at least 90 an hour.

The volunteers provide a parallel welfare service Birgitte explains how she provides assistance:

I do many different things; you can say it is based on two different modes of working, which is one where we are working directly with contact with undocumented migrants, clandestine asylum seekers. We have counselling once a week where people can come and we give contact to lawyers, medical help, or housing, or economic aid or whatever the situation is [...] also it's about the basic needs and basic rights because, as you know, they are not granted for undocumented migrants, so we try to, for example, when it comes to medical care children are allowed to, you know are recognised as the same status as children that has residence permit here. They're allowed to get healthcare as everyone else, to 18 years old, but most of the time it's still that you don't know the system, you don't know the language, you're very frightened. So we also are also, working as a link between the healthcare and this children, or families mostly.

Birgitte, along with other volunteers, responds to suffering on an everyday basis in the way that she arranges her life to deal with these issues, in doing so she is creating specific sites of *social suffering*. The sites are aggregates of suffering, poverty, health, welfare, legal, moralities, globalization and historical contexts and problems. Here they are performed as everyday experiences of survival, collectively bound together in the space of the social encounter. These sites make suffering observable as social encounters inducing reciprocity, contextualized by the *social field*.

5.3 Doing Suffering/ Way of Being

As already discussed, the *liminal third space* may be a space of opportunity, however it is set within and determined by the *field*, the interaction between these two elements can be discussed as agency. Because the *field* precipitates identity and creates sites of recognition agency describes how people maintain their position, or indeed increase their recognition. This can be examined as *illusio*, which cast the present actions and meanings into the future, accounting for changes in the *field*. For example, a rejection in the asylum application will change how one plans for the future and how one views their opportunities. Anna describes her experience discussing the future with a clandestine asylum seeker:

I think that this Christian guy that I am in contact with, I think that he is sometimes, I am just asking him sometimes, well how do you cope, how can you still be, you look so well, what's the trick? And he just says, well, its hope, I can't lose hope and he's got this thing, he is convinced that God has meant for him to be here and that is going to just change somehow, he doesn't know in what way or how, but he just has this feeling that God is not going to send him back to Nigeria, and I think that is reassuring for him.

This exemplifies *illusio*, this man's agency plans have been blocked in the form of a rejection from the Migration Board, and he turns to God. This creates its own reason for being in the world and brings that into the '*field*', his suffering is not his responsibility and thus he is able to project the future in relation to his faith by changing the meaning of his suffering in the present. Another example from Anna concerns a young Kurdish woman:

This young woman from Turkey she has been hiding now for (*text removed*) years and we have been discussing her case, and obviously she is going to apply again, but when I talk to her, and I've asked her, she hasn't yet reapplied and maybe, I don't know, I haven't asked her straight forward, I haven't asked her but maybe that's the situation, where I can imagine that you hope that your next application will be successful and to take that step to go into a new process is, it must be very difficult, because then you have had this situation of living in hiding for (*text*

removed) going to school being educated learnt the language, learnt the customs and traditions and everything and then you hope that your next application will not be rejected, it will be a positive result. But then yeh, it must be very difficult to take that step, and I just get the feeling that she is nervous and she wants to be hopeful and she wants to think that this time it'll work, but...

The woman's reluctance to reapply for asylum is also an example of *illusio* — a possible future with its consequences felt in the present. A negative outcome providing an impossible future, here again the stakes are set by the *field*, linking the past experiences (*habitus*) with the imagined future, resulting in practices of the present — abstaining from reapplying for asylum. Therefore it can be seen that *illusio* is not always positive, hope can also have negative consequences and can explain violence in the form of an imagined victory. Deliberation is a moment of change in practice; intentionality becomes involved giving purpose to one's actions, as a reaction to the recognition provided through the social field (Daniel, 1996:322). *Illusio* provides various ways of conceiving the future; *deliberation* is changes to one's agency by brining in the purpose of identity, resulting from the *field* Ahmed experienced this change:

Of course England was my best preferred country when I came to Denmark, because I saw a dream that I can even travel since I travelled from Switzerland to Denmark. So I thought that this is maybe also possible to travel to England. But this time it wasn't possible because of financial issues, I couldn't manage to travel by myself without getting help from someone and there was no one who could help me go further to England. And I was doing this because I never had any idea of England, I was doing this because I had or was able to speak the language. I had or came to know that people in Sweden, Denmark and Norway speak different languages, I never heard this before. So when I realized that they speak different language and that every country in this region has it's own language this has contributed my ambitions to travel further to England where I could speak English. But this wasn't realized because of this financial problems and then I decided to ask for asylum in Sweden. So this is where I ended up, I asked for asylum.

Here, Ahmed's *illusio* (imagined future) is altered by the *field* he could no longer achieve his ambitions and a new future emerges offering a new identity a new way of 'being in the world', with new purpose. The decision to accept this and reconstruct identity is *deliberation*; this counts equally for any conjuncture emulating such change to *illusio*, for example having one's application for asylum rejected. There are two interlinked ways of *being* and *doing* suffering; one is to continue through an adjustment of *illusio* where no other future seems possible as in the first example, or secondly is to react to changes in the *field* through the reconstruction of identity to create a new way of *being* —*deliberation*.

5.4 Subjectivities and the experiences of Suffering

Building upon the previous sections, subjectivities describe how people experience their worlds. Subjectivity is perhaps the most important aspect of suffering elucidating why not all suffering is experienced as violence. Reciprocity is a form of exchange of cultural attitudes, goods or services whereby obligation is incurred linking individual experiences together, a mode of recognition, distributing '*being*' amongst members of a society (Eriksen, 2001:182-184). This example of reciprocity is from Anna:

Well, it was this guy from Afghanistan, who told me that he didn't want to go back and he couldn't go back because it was a honour related crime that had occurred in his home country, and if he would go back he would always feel threatened by the police, soldiers, military people and things like that. And he would have to live with the situation he had with a woman, who got married to a military person, but he also said that to come to Sweden for him, his relatives had had to put money into his trip here, so he felt that: I can't go back because I don't have anything to give to my relatives, I have nothing and if they send me back I am not only threatened for my life, but I won't get any jobs and I won't be able to pay back the things that people have invested in me, because they think that the situation in Sweden is much more beneficial and earn more money than in any country like Afghanistan where there is war and all this.

This example, describes a two-fold situation where again this '*marginal*' is bound between two cultures, through this subjective understanding of his place in the *field*. Reciprocity has distributed being across societies through suffering. The Afghan man is both a source of identity to Anna who, by helping him, maintains her place in the *field*, yet he is also an *inalienable possession*, the embodiment of his family's hopes, their *illusio*. He becomes a site of suffering, violence felt from every direction — his rejection from the Migration Board, has interacted with the hopes of and obligations to his family which still act upon his agency. This subjective reality gives him no choice but to remain in Sweden. In this sense it is the subjectivities which describe what is at stake, why people do what they do how their *illusio* is constructed, how they are experiencing the *field* seen in this example from Anna:

And I had another situation, a young woman from Turkey, a Kurdish woman and she also had honour related issues, she had married, forced into marriage with a much older man and she refused and she fled and the Migration Board said you can go back to Turkey because there's laws protecting you, because there are. Written in the law that you are supposed to be able to go to the police and tell them what the situation is like. But then you realize that the law is one thing and the culture and the way the actual society is working, does not take the laws into consideration.

The subjective aspects of violence in this case are clear. This woman does not see returning to Turkey as an option, opting to live a clandestine life of poverty in Sweden instead. This threat is related to reciprocity of the marriage obligations from which she is fleeing. She refused to commit to these obligations which, as described come down to honour where she is an *inalienable possession*. The power of reciprocity within the *field* she experiences outweighs the power of the state authorities in Turkey. The Migration Board does not share this subjective reality, her experience is unable to induce a reciprocal obligation *id est* recognition for her *being*; she is unable to justify her reason for existence in this particular *field*, the power of her *being* at stake.

5.5 Differences in Suffering

When talking about suffering in terms of difference, what is being discussed are the ways in which the field is experienced by different actors, in other words how the same site of suffering are experienced differently by various actors according to their positions in the *field*. Difference, by its nature, is a form of recognition and thus a source of *being*. It is the *difference* in the degree of the suffering endured in social encounters which, in a reflexive turn, gives the suffering its meaning or purpose, and in some cases like the criminalization of migrants, manifests as forms of violence (incarceration and forced deportation or exploitation). So when examining violence it is within the difference of suffering that the meaning can be found. Not far from this example is the suffering inside the *liminal third space*, which has come about through difference; this recognition of difference of those occupying this space becomes an available source for the augmentation of *being*. This is clearly outlined using the examples presented throughout this section. Nadif describes his experience of difference when he is on the streets trying to get food and accommodation:

For myself it was myself going around to different people and later on going to travel to Stockholm where I was told the people that I know of who we can recognise each other physically, live in Stockholm more than here. But there are people that have the same situation and the same problem.

Nadif talks about his strategy of trying to recognise physical similarities in people on the street. He is using difference to try and find assistance in his own situation of being different to the rest of the society, but he also remarks that there are others in this same situation and *ipso facto* this sameness of difference forms an identity within the *field* — actors competing for the same recognition. Ahmed describes his experiences and strategy of avoiding deportation:

In those times I lived in three different places, and this chosen without any specific reason. For example if I move from Malmö to Copenhagen I need to move with reasons of course, like I want to work there or I want to study there or I am going

to move with my girlfriend or whatever. This didn't have any good reasons like this, instead, just like, I go to this guy and live with him for some months, ok I am fed up with him I can go to another. You know, you don't have anything to do, the situation was like that.

In this example like Nadif's situation, suffering is rooted in difference; Ahmed's place in the *field* denies him purpose within that context, other than to be a victim, moving from place to place, negotiating assistance. This in itself is a form of violence; victimhood is an oppressive ascription of inactivity. Nadif explains his experience:

I actually manage myself; it is actually me who manages my time and how I live on a day-to-day livelihood. Sometimes I go out and just go around, sometimes I just go out and try to read things, sometimes I go to people and I talk to them. You cannot just sit at home and just sleep all the day.

It is clear that Nadif is not pleased with being a victim, and thus the difference created by his position in the *social field*, his everyday encounters, his experiences of searching for help on the streets and living in fear of deportation reproduce this victimhood as a source of violence, an articulation of the denial of *being*. Therefore victimhood is within itself a vicarious form of suffering manifested as violence to those upon which it is assigned. It is this space that can direct violence and emerges as a counter to victimhood — a reclamation of personhood.

6. Conclusions

This thesis, through a postmodern perspective, has illustrated the complexity of the interrelatedness of suffering and the fact that such suffering reaches beyond those experiencing it as a source of pain. For some, it is a source of opportunity and others a source of meaning. It is a fundamental part of being human and cannot be examined in isolation — to do so is to provide an *etic* perspective, ignoring the views of those on the ground. Bourdieu (in Grenfell, 2008) reacting to the top

down issue, developed his ontology of practice concerning the interdependent notions of *habitus* and *field*, which cannot be viewed as separate elements overcoming the issues of the scholarly lenses. The empirical examples from Malmö reify this interdependence whereby the *field* influences and creates social situations, which existentially speaking creates and influences behaviour and vice versa. The previous sections have shown that within Malmö the same situation created by the *field* (clandestine asylum seekers) results in very different experiences and consequently distinct ways of 'being in the world'.

The social space pertaining to the *field* therefore presents different stakes to those involved in it, for example clandestine asylum seekers might experience themselves as *inalienable possessions* becoming *marginals* — effigies of hope of the embodiment of someone else's *illusio*, with no option but to try and fulfil their obligation — their reason for *being*. In other examples the stakes are quite different, the *field* creating new sources of identity, social encounters providing meaning and purpose to one's life, whereby one can move out of the mainstream structure of society as a *liminal*, with the possibility of ending such ambiguity should this source of *being* cease to exist. The stakes of the game are fluid and transposable due to their interrelatedness with the various actors' experiences (*habitus*) of the *field* and as such they influence the behaviour and conditions of the Other, changing the stakes of the game. The *field* itself is a precipitation of the social encounters defining its parameters and rules — the stakes.

So in this sense, to answer the question of why people remain in Sweden once their asylum applications have been rejected is not so simple. Because the stakes are different depending on how the *field* is experienced, some people will see no option but to remain in a difficult and clandestine life Sweden, perhaps due to opportunities created by the activist groups or by my respondents accepting exploitation. Alternatively some people may experience these stakes as too high, as did Ahmed with regards to travelling to England, with no *illusio*: no future in Sweden choosing to move on, returning to the country of origin or continuing to migrate elsewhere. In both of these situations it is *deliberation*, which is initiated

by the *field* and compounded by *illusio*, which leads to individual perceptions of the stakes and accordingly behaviour. Therefore, it cannot be generalized whether one person's situation is worse or more deserving than another's, as it is the subjective experience which determines the behaviour, and is based on the subjective value and understanding of one's *being* or reason for living which is ultimately at stake.

This in part, answers the second question postulated in this thesis, do respondents including the clandestine asylum seekers, the altruistic and philanthropic volunteers, and then those who utilize clandestine asylum seekers for personal gain, experience suffering, and if so how? Suffering has been explored in detail and like the stakes of the game and the *field*, it too is experienced in very different ways from different locations as both a subjective experience, as identity, and as something being reacted to. If suffering is not taken to be meaningless from the start, it will incur an ascription of victimhood. In this instance the otherness becomes absorbed into sameness of *being*, making the Others suffering meaningful and non-dangerous, integrating it with one's own experiences (Levinas, 1988 in Lindquist, 2007:309). It is here that violence can be firmly brought back into the discussion, as not all violence is experienced as suffering, to say that it is to ascribe victimhood. Victimhood is *disrecognition* of personhood. In the empirical examples in this thesis victimhood constitutes a loss of control over one's life, a loss of *illusio*, of identity, and reason for *being*. It is the most salient form of violence, inconspicuous, illusive and slippery. When the social encounters occur where suffering is involved, if one does not fulfil the victimhood role they are a 'risk', refused asylum and criminalized. If they are identified as victims they are rendered indebted by reciprocity fated to this reason for *being*, permanently a *marginal*.

All of the examples in this thesis show suffering as experienced differently — by rejecting it completely, by partaking in activist and volunteer activities, to try and stop it or by contributing to it by taking advantage of its non-recognition (rejected asylum application), these ways of experiencing suffering are determined by the *field* which gives it meaning. Therefore, to correctly gain an *emic* insight into suffering it must be viewed from the start as meaningless and explored through

the social relations occurring within the *field* which give it meaning this means that in some cases suffering, like that of Ahmed's may not be suffering at all, but an expected part of the process of migration: which includes plans and agency and to some extent the freedom of agency in *deliberation*. To this end, it is suffering which gives violence its meaning and purpose, and if this form of social encounter is not experienced as suffering, then the violence will not, existentially speaking, exist¹¹. It is the ability of the practice of this social encounter to induce meaningful and subjective suffering (a victim), which gives violence its purpose and power, and this, will always be symbiotic with the context of the *field*. Thus, this accounts for the multitude of vague and different definitions and difficulty of explaining violence and why the top down approaches and subsequent policies are limited, resulting in forms of social suffering.

This then directs us into the final question posed by this thesis, what is the socio-cultural significance of suffering? This question is deliberately directed towards the *field*, as it is the *field* in which the social encounters occur shaping the social and cultural experiences of the actors in it. This includes providing identity, agency and reciprocity, all of which lead to the augmentation of *being*, that which gives people meaning in their life (Bourdieu in Hage, 2003:16). It is here that suffering can become a source of *being* and as demonstrated by the examples in section 5, provide opportunity and a source of *being* for actors within the *field*. It is this more subtle aspect which conceals the true power which also hidden beneath violence's shocking *façade*, it is a social relationship giving recognition and *being* in a most salient way, a form of socialization a communication of existence, embedded in the mutual understanding and meaning of the suffering which it creates. In this sense violence can be a source of augmentation of being and more so, become a space of opportunity for individuals to make something of their lives.

¹¹ This is a similar issue to that discovered by anthropologist Talal Asad (1996, 298-308) when examining definitions of torture and dilemma of practices sadomasochism. Sadomasochism fulfils all of the definitions of torture and violence, is cruel and degrading yet is experienced paradoxically as pleasure and liberation and not torture (ibid).

However, as discussed in this thesis the meaning of suffering is malleable, transmuted by the perceptions and practices of identity determined by the *field*, thus violence itself is also subject to the same forces of change and additionally able to induce such changes. Every time the meaning of suffering changes so does the purpose of violence and its practice. This also explains why so many people can experience the same site of suffering so differently. Therefore the sociocultural significance of suffering is that it constitutes part of the repertoire of social behaviour pertaining to identity and personhood. It's meaning is collectively experienced by actors within a particular *field* where it functions to distribute *being* amongst the various actors. The empirical examples collected in Malmö show that because of the threat of violence (although condoned under the auspices of Swedish migration law) a *liminal third space* emerges. As a result clandestine asylum seekers find themselves *inside-out* in Swedish society — their suffering an opportunity for identity (recognition of *being*) and exploitation, whilst reproducing differences and the violence of victimhood and reciprocity. The clandestine asylum seekers are rendered as *inalienable possessions* distributing *being* within the *field* which emerges around these specific sites of suffering within spaces in Malmö.

This research can contribute to the cross-disciplinary field of Peace and Conflict Studies as it shows how an *emic* perspective enables for a more concrete understanding of the relationality of suffering, the *field* and experience. By critically demonstrating the issues of applying an *etic* perspective, to suffering resulting in victimhood, this thesis presents an alternative *emic* approach to these issues. This is based on the *field* and how the actors in the *field* actually experience their social and structural situation, examining the interrelatedness of all the parts giving the most holistic understanding destroying boundaries *id est* the academic lines in the sand that divide and simplify the world as individual segments to be explained. By using the postmodern approach to examine a *field* — combining the examination of identity formation, performances pertaining to specific elements here — suffering, ways of being and doing, subjectivities of experiencing the field, and identifying the function of differences occurring in that field, the sociological

aspects of these elements can explain how violence and suffering constitute ways of 'being in the world.'

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