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Europe's Bogeyman: Europeanization of Nationalism

People have always moved back and forth over continents, in and between countries. Attitudes towards migration have increasingly divided the populations, though (Pecoraro & Ruedin 2014). In the recent elections to the European Parliament (May 2014), in France and in Denmark Front National and the Danish People's Party became the largest parties in their countries. Apart from being against further supra-nationalization of the EU, these parties are also against (too much) immigration. The seemingly less extreme party, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was the largest party in Great Britain. In Greece and in Hungary, the hard core anti immigration parties, the Golden Dawn and Jobbik, gained electoral fortunes. The list could be made longer.¹

The current economic crisis amplifies differences of attitude towards migration into Europe, both within the nation states and at the European level. While some welcome ethnic and demographic diversification, there is a growing concern about the effects of immigration on the labour market and on the national welfare state institutions, in general.

The encapsulation of Europe's borders inside the national states and current demands to limit migration into the EU lie at the core of this study; more specifically I will discuss how feelings of anxiety towards growing diversity in the population transmute into party political preferences. I argue that the current attractiveness of populist parties is due to their occupying a niche in the electoral market, pleading for less diversity and more homogeneity inside the nation's protective shell against the external threats of e.g. Islam.

¹ Angela Andersen helped me proof-reading of this chapter. Her assistance is very much appreciated.

I am not looking for context-independent knowledge, in this regard, but use *the power of example* (Flyvbjerg 2001:6) to illustrate how resistance towards increased levels of diversity is articulated in the space of party political dynamics in one member state. I will show how the nationalist-populist party² the Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden mobilize voters from both the left and the right, using the national myth of *the People's Home* to distinguish between the fearful outside and the authenticity of the inside. Before I engage with the Swedish case more specifically, I will begin with discussing, in more general terms, the relation between migration and national identity.

Migration and national identity

The anxieties of the growing diversification of European societies relate to the cultural impact of migration on national identity. These positions often translate into demands for curbing and controlling migration flows and in requests for political action directed against refugees, asylum-seekers and labour migrants.

While visions of Europe without frontiers connote the free movement inside the union; the dreams of borderlessness co-exist with the building of a Fortress Europe. This is not an obvious contradiction, while the former is associated with the internal sphere the latter image connotes the external dimension (Kunz & Leinonen 2007: 137).

The freedom to move has grown to become a contemporary class marker, where a privileged few are increasingly benefiting from education exchange and business programs. The creation of the single market in the 1980s certainly opened up for such possibilities (ibid: 139; Huysmans 2000). The great majority remains isolated at their localities however (Bauman 1998). The gap between individuals belonging to either position widens as a consequence. Migration as such is increasingly being controlled and street-level bureaucrats are acting as border guards on the inside (Taras 2012). Europe's borders are simultaneously vanishing and constantly rebuilt.

The debate on the freedom to move, following the four fundamental freedoms of movement for capital, goods, services and people, according to the single Europe Act from 1986, still stirs up emotions.

² In the literature there are plenty of labels used to depict to the party family that the SD belongs to. By nationalist-populist parties I refer to parties that, more or less frequently, pursue politics and rhetoric around the populist divide between *the people* and *the elite* centred on the nation – or rather the national state – as an exclusive category of reference (Hellström et. al 2012).

It did not appear from nowhere, the issue of migration to and within the EU countries remains sensitive and has been constitutive for the formation of belonging to national, local and the European communities ever since.

The EU has through various initiatives, successfully, facilitated the movement of labour in the Union. However geographical mobility between the countries remains rather low (Kunz & Leinonen 2007: 143). The process of fear-making from the top down in the EU is intimately linked to the construction of community of belonging inside the borders of the union, the coming to the fore of a European identity, distinguishable from the outside (Hellström 2008; Bauman 2004). Migration and security issues are intrinsically linked in western politics (see e.g. Huysmans 2000; Kunz & Leinonen 2007; Hellström 2008; Schierup et al. 2006). The *social state*, Bauman (2004) notes, with its ambitions to safeguard employment and equal opportunities for all has by now been replaced by a *security state*.

‘It appears unlikely that Europe will overcome the fears connected to Europe in the near future’ (Kunz & Leinonen 2007: 156). Cosmopolitan ideals, eligible to the European elites co-exist with the preservation of nationalist sentiments (Hellström 2006). Cosmopolitanism and nationalism are, in Craig Calhoun’s words, ‘mutually constitutive’ (2004: 233). The delicate balancing act between, on the one hand, a strong attachment to universalist accounts of human rights and, on the other, the particularistic demands of securing belonging to national communities provokes different reactions. The parallel ambitions within the EU implies, if we listen to migration researcher Christian Joppke (2008; see also Modood & Meer 2013: 29), that there is a preference today for universal human rights attributed to liberalism as against priorities of democracy and national citizenship, centered on the nation state.

There is no easy way out of this dilemma; the basic contention is that Europe straddles between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, between ideals of universalism and priorities of particularism. Europe is simultaneously a borderless utopia and a Fortress Europe.

The strong nationalist sentiments are not isolated to the periphery of the political spectrum, rather the ‘extreme right is mainstreamed’ (Calhoun 2009). The populist radical right is not an anomaly, but rather in Cas Mudde’s words a ‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde 2010) that has grown to become mainstream in Western European societies.

Steve Gramer (2005) therefore suggests a change of focus, to the mainstream activities, and thus not the radical right, to come to terms with the current *racialisaton of the nation* and thus the pathological normalcy of mainstream discourse. The consolidated efforts of the EU, in his view, to manage migration flows in the EU means that a 'new set of immigration norms are being superimposed on the older ones' (ibid, 130).

In recent years we have heard mainstream politicians such as Angela Merkel in Germany, David Cameron in Great Britain or Nicolas Sarkozy in France warn about the dangers of multiculturalism in their countries (Modood & Meer 2013). Even if resistance towards multiculturalism does not necessarily imply calls for restrictions in immigration policy, immigration and integration are closely related. Recently, in February 2014, Switzerland voted yes with a tiny majority, in a public referendum, to re-negotiate the treaty with the EU that otherwise would have facilitated labour migration into the country. Less surprisingly, the right-wing extremists welcomed this result while others strongly opposed it. Europe is divided on these issues, not only Switzerland.

Michael Minkenberg and Pascal Perrineau (2007) analysed the European Parliament (EP) elections in 2004, distinguishing between the radical right and the extreme right wing. To the former category belongs those parties who are not opposed to democracy *per se*, yet cherish national homogeneity and argue against pluralist democracy and claim to protect the native population against, in their view, too much foreign influence. I think this distinction is relevant and bring some nuances to e. g. understanding the most recent election results to the European Parliament. All these parties, however, mobilise voters in a particular discursive context; a common European grammar of nationalism to which we now will turn.

A European grammar of nationalism

The europeanization of nationalism refers to the convergence between the EU countries towards renationalization (Modood & Meer 2013), to acknowledge the salience of national identity inside the protective shell of the nationstate. Claims for social cohesion might seem incongruent with increased levels of diversity, however, the nation emphasizes community belonging also in secular, enlightened, diverse European societies (Calhoun 2009).

Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2004) suggest that we need to consider the cultural foundations of politics and the historical processes of modernity in order to understand the complex dynamics of the European integration process. Most scholars of European integration (cf. Radaelli 2006) tend to analyse processes of Europeanization as the interaction of EU and national policy procedures in terms of institutional and constitutional changes, focusing on how national regimes adapt to common norms and legislation. The contribution of Delanty and Rumford, in this regard, is that they look beyond a narrow focus on EU politics and bring forth an understanding of Europeanization that focuses on the cognitive and discursive structures of European societies. They suggest for instance, that a common European commemoration of the Holocaust may bring European people together in a common European public sphere, surpass narrow national affiliations and increasingly adjust to a common European grammar. I would suggest that the Europeanization of nationalism shows proof of how also xenophobic nationalist movements have benefited or at least profited, from the European integration process. Coming to terms with the intrinsic ambivalences involved in the making of Europe, the concept of Europeanization of nationalism is helpful to understand the crucial interplay between Europe and the nation. Trends towards de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation are not dichotomous opposites, but immanent features of European politics.

This perspective allows us to move from a simple mapping of so-called radical right wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe to a wider understanding of a common European grammar of nationalism that, is based, as I would call it, on a *politics of fear*; i.e. a perception of the outside world as increasingly threatening and difficult to comprehend. In this discourse, both internal labour migrants in the union and third country nationals endanger social cohesion.

There are many studies from various angles focusing on this party family, comparing e.g. Europe with Latin America (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2011) or differences and similarities between the west and the east in European nation states (see e.g. Langenbascher & Schellenberg 2011; Minkenberg & Perrineau 2007; Mudde 2007). This is not the route taken by this author, though. Rather, I suggest that each particular nation state displays a particular balance between the nation, the state and the people. The layered discursive

approach, introduced by Ole Wæver (2001), suggests that the debate on Europe in the Nordic countries plays out differently (Hansen & Wæver 2001), which can be explained by different national traditions of combining the three entities of the nation, state and the people.

According to the scholar of populism, Paul Taggart (2000: 76), in the Scandinavian welfare states the nationalist populist parties are likely to rally against high taxes and state intervention in the economy. In countries such as Belgium, Italy and Switzerland with dense regional divisions and ethnic tensions the populist resistance is more likely to emphasize regional independence, Taggart continues. In other countries, such as France and Germany, the immigrants risk becoming scapegoats and being framed by the general public as the direct cause for relative economic deprivation and cultural alienation. To continue Taggart's argumentation, in Greece, the resistance to immigration risks becoming more closely related to extremist activities and extremist ideologies, since the country has suffered so much from the current economic crisis.

Taggart is easy to agree with that more in-depth analyses of the political environment are needed. The basic lesson to be learned here is that the study of the Europeanization of nationalism requires a careful consideration of the different domestic structures of partisan competition. The myth of the nation differs, depending on which nation we refer to.

Economy AND culture

The boundaries between cultural and economic issues are blurred, Häusermann and Kriesi (2011). If traditionally in post World War II politics, the socio-economic cleavage structure between welfare and capital structured political competition the situation looks very different today. To put it simply, political conflict today involves both economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition. The sometimes unequal effects of the welfare states in Western Europe bear cultural connotations. At the core of these structural changes is the question of borders, and the issues of national identity and migration. The popular sentiments related to the complex mechanisms of modernization polarize the population in relation to winners and losers (Kitschelt & McGann 1997). This is increasingly the case with natives who share feelings of deprivation, and fear losing out in cultural status due to higher levels of competition following increased

ethnic diversity (Betz 1994; Häusermann & Kriesi 2011; Bornschier 2011; Ellinas 2010).

Swank and Betz (2003: 219), in a study about the electoral impacts of globalization and the rise of the RPP, says about the support of the latter:

[It] comes disproportionately from those groups that potentially lose from contemporary socio-economic change, fear a deterioration of economic fortunes and possess values that support dramatic reforms of the political economy.

There is a 'socio-cultural shift' (Ellinas 2010) in European politics today; a new cleavage structure based not on the economy, but on cultural goods (Bornschier 2011). The structure of political competition has changed. The parties have not necessarily demised, but they compete on a shifting terrain, the dividing lines are based on economy *and* culture. Along the latter conflict line, the political struggle centers not only on authoritarian versus liberal values, but more recently around resistance towards vs. appreciation of increased ethnic diversity and the abolishing of borders.

The complex interaction between economy and culture can be studied in many ways. I here focus on one single case, how the SD makes use of myths of the nation to justify further encapsulation.

The case

Sweden has been a member of the EU since 1995 and yet stands outside the Eurozone. Traditionally, Sweden has pledged neutrality and, for a long time deliberately stayed out of deeper commitment to supra-national co-operation. But soon after the tumbling down of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sweden handed in an application for Swedish membership in the European Union, and following a public referendum in 1994 the Swedish electorate with a narrow margin voted yes to become member.

After the Second World War Sweden was dominated by a five-party model and the building up of universal welfare systems by technocratic means. The socio-economic cleavage structure dominated the political debate, mainly Social Democratic governments ran the country and voting behaviour was clearly class-driven. From the late 1930s on the Social Democratic party made use of the previously conservative metaphor of the People's Home to embody their political programme and to implement social reforms (Hellström &

Wennerhag 2013). Instead of being a party for the working class only, it aimed to become a party for everyone.

As in other European countries, however, the party political stability was eventually broken down by e.g. the green party and in the 2010 national elections, the nationalist-populist party, the SD gained 20 seats in the national parliament. The electoral fortunes of the new parties that broke the party consensus also implied a stronger focus on new issues such as the environment and immigration, splitting the voters along value politics between the liberals and authoritarians. The attractiveness of the latter position is referred to by Ignazi (1992), as 'the silent counter revolution'.

The SD has a background in the neo-Nazi milieus in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but has since then transformed, trying to become a normal party, appealing to the common man. Not everyone is equally convinced that they have succeeded, though (Hellström & Nilsson 2010). Despite its shady legacy, it now presents itself as a radical party, siding with the people against the elite, debarring any accusations of extremism (ibid). Its arch-enemies are Muslim migrants from far away countries but also the political, economic and cultural elites in Swedish society, including the mainstream media.

Together with the Left party in Sweden, the SD is the only parliamentary party that openly demands an end to of Swedish membership in the EU. In a comparative perspective this is not unusual in European politics where both the traditional left and the radical right tend to argue against national membership in the union (see further Kriesi 2007).

The rise of the nationalist populist parties in Europe is not merely based on a contagion from the right. According to Bale et. al (2010) it is worthwhile to look deeper into the strategic responses of the Social Democrats to the populist challenge for three obvious reasons: they increase the salience of issues, which traditionally have been owned by 'the right'; they appeal to authoritarian working class voters, who perhaps have traditionally voted for the Social Democrats and though they might also facilitate the formation of mainstream right governments. Focusing on the Swedish case, I would like to add that the Social Democratic dominance in post World War II politics in Sweden provides the context in which the SD (and other political actors in Swedish politics today) operates.

In the current political debate, the Social Democrats, no longer

enjoy a monopoly on the People's Home metaphor. Apart from the Social Democrats, also the former mainstream-right coalition government and the SD try to appropriate the metaphor. The People's home is more than a rhetorical ornament; it also provides a dominant narrative about Sweden's post-World War socio-political development.

I do not suggest that the Swedish example is the only possible to illustrate the ambivalent nature of Europe's attitudes to borders, but it is a *critical case* for two obvious reasons. Firstly, Sweden has for long been a reluctant member of the European Union and was before its accession committed to ideals of neutrality (Trägårdh 2001). Secondly, the SD has only been in the Swedish parliament since 2010 and is, in a European perspective, a latecomer in national politics. In sum, Sweden seems to be a critical case to analyse how new parties in the national parliaments in the EU mobilize voters that feel less convinced of the virtues of the border-transgressing ambitions of the EU. This is what I refer to as Europe's bogeyman; i. e. the xenophobic reactions to demographic changes in the society towards increased levels of diversity. This bogeyman pervades our thinking of Europe. It reminds us of Europe's ambivalent relation to borders, and is as such an object of passionate compulsion, generating fear and moral indignation.

The public debate in Sweden is divided between, on the one hand, those parts of the electorate who wish for a more solid glue between the people and the nation; a nostalgic restoration of the Swedish society the way it was in the 1950s and, on the other hand, the greater majority of the Swedish electorate, including both the political and the media elite, who unanimously embrace diversity (Mazzoleni 2003). While the SD tends to attract voters from the first category, their antagonists instead draw voters from the opposite camp. The role of the SD in the Swedish public debate is akin to a yes- or no question, either you are with the SD or against them. SD thus epitomizes Europe's ambivalent attitudes towards borders, of both opening them up and closing them inside particular national states.

Next, I turn to the intrinsic ambivalence of the myths of Europe. The subsequent analysis focuses specifically on the SD's uses of the People's Home metaphor [*Folkhemmet*] as exemplified in their party programmes. This is not to offer a completely "new" history of the Swedish socio-political development, but it offers an alternative nar-

ration and provides a different perspective on diversity than is heard from the established parties and the mainstream media.

Understanding myth

Myths are powerful rhetorical instruments which provide substance to political claims for national cohesion (Bottici 2007). A myth, in this view, is not the opposite of *truth* or a deliberate distortion of reality. Rather, myths constitute the plot in which communal identity is being formed (Stråth 2000: 20).

In this context, it is natural to turn to the semiologist Roland Barthes who some decades ago discussed the relation between myths, language and reality. It is apparent in his works that myths are not about fabrication of reality; rather, myth is a type of speech and provides a system of communication (Barthes 2000). Myths are regularly experienced as naturalized speech. History is turned into destiny.

According to Barthes, the myth, then is a 'second-order semiological system' (Barthes 2000: 99). Myths are depoliticised speech acts in the sense that they are used to 'empty reality' (ibid: 131) of its everyday ambiguities and abolish the complexity of human activities.

I understand myth as a dominant narrative that attributes a set of meanings to both Europe and the nation. I begin with the myth of Europe.

The myth of Europe

Europa, according to dominant narratology, was a princess from present day Lebanon. She was seduced by Zeus, who disguised himself as a bull and ran away with Europa on his back, to the island of Crete (Fornäs 2012). On the shore, she gave birth to three sons and was later married to King Asterius and became queen. From this myth, we learn that Europe is the land of the West. Indeed, Europa was abducted and left her family behind, but the offspring of her encounter with Zeus was not merely a result of brute violence, but reciprocal passion. Out of love, Europe began to materialize as a new social community.

Since then Europe has given rise to a series of expansionistic ventures. In the words of Johan Fornäs (2012: 16): '... after thousands of years of European empire-building efforts, culminating in colonialism and world domination, Europe can hardly be identified as a homeless stranger'. The myth of Europe carries an ambivalent

meaning. Fornäs returns to the mythical figure of the bird Phoenix to describe the significance of this myth: ‘The phoenix is understood as a metaphor for vital resurrection through destruction’ (ibid: 21).

Another mythical figure used to describe Europe is Prometheus, a metaphor for western modernisation as such. Prometheus stole the fire of life, his evil sibling is repeatedly referred to as Frankenstein. What this myth foretells is that the EU was not simply born out of the horrors of the Second World War, it has from the start been both a peace project, based on the logic of irrevocability (Hellström 2006), and ready to conquer the world.

According to the Polish sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, the myth of Europe has turned inwards; failing to live up to its initial expansionist, yet ambivalent, logic. Following Bauman, if once Europe was a ‘site of adventure’ (2004: 3), Europe is now getting ‘grey haired in a world that gets younger by the year’ (ibid: 16).

What Bauman is hinting at is the possibility to yet again encourage Europe to carry on its adventure in the name of humanity, to ‘play first violin and refusing to accept second fiddle’ (2004: 46).

National myth-making

By national myths I refer to particular narratives that aim to glue a distinct people to a particular national community. Following the layered discursive approach, the combination of the state, the nation and the people (the first tier) works constitutively for the domestic debates of European affairs (the second tier).

National myths represent distinct claims on national cohesion, which allegedly gain in salience as a consequence of demographic changes in society. Through political myths different actors give significance to certain narratives of the past (Bottici 2007: 14). However, political myths do not merely tell and re-tell narratives – ultimately they enjoy a moralizing capacity and, potentially, legitimize political action.

Common symbols such as the national flag and the celebration of national holidays are used to ‘authenticate the boundaries between those who belong and those who do not’ (Elgenius 2011: 3). Most modern nation-states are founded on such myths of national belonging. Taggart (2000: 95) refers to the concept of the heartland to signify ‘the positive aspects of everyday life’ and this is a vision derived from the past and projected onto the present (ibid.: 95–8). The heartland

constitutes a claim to a common spiritual foundation that creates a sense of belonging to a culturally homogenous population.

Ideas and stories of what makes our nations distinct from others are told on a daily basis as seemingly banal and innocent. It needs to be kept in mind, however, as put by the scholar of nationalism, Michael Billig (2001 [1995]:7), here referring to Hannah Arendt that 'banality is not synonymous with harmlessness'. These stories can be about articulating certain civic virtues of nationhood, (such as tolerance, gender-equality, social cohesion and human rights) that are demarcated from other nationalities or religions. The particularity of the nation state is further motivated by references to universalist ideals.

National myth-making refers to the ways in which national communities are being reproduced as distinctively exclusive and different from other nations. In this imagination of the home territory, the national people has a dominant position. There is a certain mythology involved here: there can be no community without the imagination of the national people and thus a distinction between inside and outside is made (see further Canovan 2004).

Traditionally, the Social Democrats emphasised socio-economic issues. This policy-making was tied to egalitarian myths of *the common people*. Given these structural circumstances, and the fact that the Social Democratic parties have been accused of abandoning their traditional welfare-statist egalitarian agenda, it could be expected that such well-established interpretations of the common people would provide opportunities for e.g. the SD to broaden their electoral agenda.

In the annual survey from the SOM Institute in Gothenburg, the share of the population that wants to reduce immigration to Sweden has continuously decreased over the years in all population layers, both from rural and urban areas, among elderly and young and both men and women – even if there are evident differences between these categories (Demker 2014). At the same time, the experiences of daily discrimination and the cleavages in public opinion are rampant. The demand for a more restrictive immigration policy (which persists, even if it is not a “wave”) is articulated by but one parliamentary party, the SD. In the struggle about national identity and migration related issues, the political debate is polarised between the SD and the rest.

The People's Home as national myth

After the Second World War, Swedish national identity was tightly linked to the welfare state. Furthermore, according to Trägårdh (2002: 80), the Social Democrats from the 1930s on used a national narrative in which '[t]he 'national' and 'democracy' imperatives were inextricably fused, and with this followed the idea that the state and the people were joined in a common endeavour to safeguard the two freedoms, that of the nation and that of the individual'.

What is worth noting in this respect is that the Swedish national identity was formed as an alliance between promises of individual emancipation and of the caring state, referred to as *statist-individualism* (Berggren & Trägårdh 2009). In the political construction of the modern welfare state, then, interpersonal relations such as the family and the church had a less dominant role in Sweden compared to countries in continental Europe. Today, the People's Home metaphor is a nostalgic vision of the Swedish society.

The SD uses the People's Home metaphor as a powerful rhetorical instrument to attach its nationalist political agenda to a greater Swedish tradition of protecting *our* people against (too much) foreign involvement.

The SD thus positively presents itself as the new People's Home party, invoking memories of the popularly held metaphor of the People's Home that nurtures a vision that look backwards rather than forward. The SD usage of the People's Home metaphor epitomizes its ambition to radicalize popularly held sentiments about national cohesion, and the metaphor as such also brings gendered connotations (see further Norocel 2013).

In the party documents, the SD longingly refers to the days of Social Democracy under the Prime Minister Tage Erlander, who was in office 1946–1969. According to the SD perceptions this period was the People's Home at its best and is therefore the society that the party wishes to restore. The SD configures the People's Home as a mobilizing metaphor for its appeals to a particular national community with references to past experiences of a culturally conformist Swedish national community with limited immigration to the country. The idea is basically that the universal, and comparatively generous, welfare state demands a sense of basic solidarity between the inhabitants.

³ The analysis was, although in a different form, published in Hellström & Wennerhag (2013).

The SD appeals to the people are tied to the moral opposition between the common man and the mediated elites. The references to the people specifically refer to the broad masses of the heartland, those sharing the particular values necessary to obtain community solidarity. Lars Trägårdh (2003: 77) argues that ‘the concepts of *folk*, *folklighet* and *folkhem* are part and parcel of a national narrative that has cast the Swedes as intrinsically democratic and freedom-loving, as having “democracy in the blood”’.

The SD appeals to the Swedish national society as *the heartland* in need of restoration. This is not based on ideals of racial or ethnical superiority, rather these appeals rest on the significance of incommensurable cultural differences, which in the literature has been labelled *ethno-pluralism* (Rydgren 2007). The Swedish national identity, in this rhetoric, is *different* from other identities and thus has a particular quality.

This approach conveys efforts to satisfy demands for more restrictive politics on immigration compared to the official policy – yet rooted in a long tradition of securing the interest of our people at the expense of the Others. The SD is careful to balance the tightrope, between radicalism and extremism – to avoid accusations of the latter.

The re-reproduction of nationalist ideologies in established nation-states refers to claims of community cohesion centred on the nation as a common frame of reference. The SD raises claims of increased community cohesion, protecting the universal welfare state against (too much) immigration from culturally remote countries. The uses of the People’s Home, then, bring attention to particular roots in the Swedish society which, according to the SD, the current official immigration politics contradicts. To this official Swedish line the SD tries to be a counterweight.

The SD articulates a vision of Sweden that is embedded in its uses of the People’s Home metaphor as a mobilizing metaphor for social cohesion and cultural conformism. This is what brings the nationals together. This is the basis for basic solidarity between the natives that the party asks for as a contrast to multicultural experiments of the elites. This is important, since an active welfare state, following this interpretation, presupposes a sense of basic solidarity between the nationals, based on cultural conformism, in order to operate well.

The SD seeks to capitalize on a common heritage to, on the one hand, appreciate the old Social Democracy and, on the other hand,

to criticize the new Social Democrats for having let the native population down in their embracement of multiculturalism. This logic entails that the old Social Democrats are heroes of the nation, but the new Social Democrats have betrayed the natives.

Especially in turbulent times, stable national identities might appeal to those parts of the electorate that believe they were better off before, as these voters resist changes associated with e.g. globalization; hence,

[T]he populist right's nativist conception of the welfare state serves as yet another means to undermine the established political and cultural elites and their multicultural agenda, which, for the populist right, represents a Trojan horse of globalization since it must invariably lead to the destruction of national communities and identities (Betz & Meret 2013: 116).

The use of the particular metaphor of the People's Home does not necessarily show that the SD is more closely attached to the Social Democratic camp compared to the bourgeois camp. Rather while in parliament the SD has more often than not voted with the former mainstream right coalition government and thus against the Social Democratic led opposition. The mainstream right coalition government also capitalised on the work ethic, associated with the metaphor "The People's Home" to rhetorically underpin its ambitions to implement their ideas of the "work path" in the Swedish public sector (Hellström & Persson 2014). Even if the criticism from the bourgeoisie side of the political spectrum, sometimes, has been harsh against the Social Democratic People's Home, which in this criticism is associated with social conformism and lack of entrepreneurship, it is obvious that also the "other" side endorses selected aspects of the metaphor in its political rhetoric.

The metaphor of the People's Home is employed to satisfy a demand among the native Swedes who might be positive to economic redistribution and, at the same time, express the opinion that the welfare state should be reserved for the natives. This message might appeal to sections of the electorate that feel threatened by a seemingly intense and fierce economic competition over scarce resources. The appeals to the People's Home have both economic and cultural connotations.

The People's Home is both a rhetorical means to pursue democratic reforms and the founding myth of Sweden from the 1930s onwards.

It is this seamless fusion between *demos* and *ethnos* (Trägårdh 2002: 83) that, arguably, appeals to the SD:

Sweden is the land of the Swedes. By this, the Sweden Democrats does not imply that we, the Swedes, are better than others, rather Sweden is the only place on earth where we have an absolute right to act and develop our special character and identity (Sverigedemokraterna 2003).

As the SD conceives it –as previously mentioned – the Social Democratic governments of later decades have deserted the idea of the People's Home. In its election manifesto from 2010, the SD makes it explicit why this, according to the party, is the case:

Our country has let too many people in too quickly [...]. The irresponsible and non-demanding Swedish integration and immigration politics has also caused segregation, rootlessness, criminality and increased tensions. The multicultural societal order today is a serious threat to the internal cohesion and stability that conditions the whole solidarity of the Swedish welfare model.

Sweden as the People's Home is a counterweight to the ruptures in the society, according to the SD. Multi-culturalism impinges on the natives' possibilities to do well in society. This development is driven by an allegedly irresponsible immigration policy, appreciated by all the other parliamentary parties in Sweden. In the SD rhetoric, the Peoples Home vision is a counterweight to challenges of ethnic diversity.

Concluding reflections

More than twenty years ago Manuel Castells (1993: 480) argued that European societies face a crisis of cultural identity since supranationality blurs national identities. In the age of information, following Castells, people who feel insecure about who they are may turn to nationalist ideologies as a collectivist response to the neo-liberalization of the world. This is not less the case today.

While globalisation represents a window of opportunities for a privileged few yet others fear, or at least hesitate faced with the same processes. While some political strategies may embrace border-transgressing ventures, others resist such adaptation and instead suggest measures to safeguard the presumed interests of the domestic populations. Nationalist-populist parties offer the citizens a promise of protection against foreign elements that may jeopardize the sacra-

lised link between the national demos and the national territory and yet embracing, at least rhetorically, universalist ideals of e. g. human rights and gender equality. In terms of solidarity, they claim to stand up for the little man in a complex world, and thus argue that the national society cannot withstand much cultural pluralism.

The SD feeds on processes of globalisation and also on the current supra-nationalisation of the EU. The Europeanization of nationalism bears evidence of how xenophobic nationalist movements have profited on the European integration process. The blending of cultures in general, be it further European integration beyond the national state or the flow of (too) many immigrants from (too) far away locations in the country challenge the glue between the national people and the nationstate according to this logic. There is a demand among the population for encapsulating the nationals in particular national states, for resisting diversity and the closing down of the borders. The SD, as the only party in the Swedish parliament, offers a supply to meet that demand.

There are fissures in public opinion, between those who favour more multiculturalism and embrace diversity and those who resist such claims; basically it is about whether the redistributive goals of the Nordic welfare states might square with the ideals of multiculturalism. The SD provides an answer to how to arrange the balance between welfare and multiculturalism. In doing so, they represent Europe's bogeyman and thrive on the European integration process in the sense that they channel the demands of people who are reluctant to the embracing of diversity.

The SD endeavours to act at the margins of the European grammar and thus be considered radical enough to challenge the agenda of the political elite and yet avoid accusations of racism and extremism. When the SD makes references to the People's Home this is not to address concerns for an anti-statist vision of the Swedish nation. Rather it is about restoring the Swedish state to accommodate a stronger feeling of community among the nationals and to breed popular solidarity against (too) much diversity. In this manoeuvre, they seek to justify their politics and appear as legitimate representatives of the people; heirs of a long tradition of mobilizing popular democracy.

The public debate that concerns the SD in Sweden is a source of identification, either you are with or against the SD. The proper balance between the discursive layers of the nation, the state, the nation

and the people are also brought to bear on discussions over Europe. The polarised debate creates a struggle, about what the 'common man' really is and wants in relation to the question of welfare and/or multiculturalism. It is thus not only about the basic (populist) distinction between 'the people' and 'the elite', but deals horizontally with what constitutes the common man in this equation and thus concerns the future of national identity construction in Sweden.

Perhaps it is not now that the European project has turned inwards, to refer back to Baumann's view. It has always been simultaneously outwards- and inwards looking. We have always been afraid, prone to protect ourselves from unwanted visits. Also today.

The SD radicalises mainstream worries about threats to the domestic welfare state, both economically and culturally. However they are exploiting it to safeguard the interests of the nationals residing inside finite state borders. In this way the party mobilizes voters that feel left behind in the on-going processes of modernization, from both the traditional "right" side and the traditional "left" side of the political spectrum.

Garner (2005, 133) argues that 'asylum seekers have become "folk devils"', an enemy within, seeking to sap Europe of its resources and culture'. To halt this development, it is necessary to recognise the ambivalent nature of the European project as simultaneously opening and closing borders. Europe's bogeyman cannot easily be dismissed as merely a fantasy creature, but it taps into the realities of European societies today. The bogeyman takes the front door, whether we like it or not. Also in Sweden.

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