Spinoza’s claim that self-preservation is the foundation of virtue makes for the point of departure of this philosophical investigation into what a Spinozistic model of moral education might look like. It is argued that Spinoza’s metaphysics places constraints on moral education insofar as an educational account would be affected by Spinoza’s denial of the objectivity of moral knowledge, his denial of the existence of free will, and of moral responsibility. This article discusses these challenges in some detail, seeking to construe a credible account of moral education based on the insight that self-preservation is not at odds with benevolence, but that the self-preservation of the teacher is instead conditioned by the intellectual deliberation of the students. However, it is also concluded that while benevolence retains an important place in Spinoza’s ethics, his causal determinism poses a severe threat to a convincing account of moral education insofar as moral education is commonly understood to involve an effort to influence the actions of students relative to some desirable goal.

First off I would like to thank the editors of this journal for allowing me this space to respond to Jim Mackenzie’s ‘Dahlbeck and pure ontology’ (written in reply to my ‘Towards a pure ontology’). I would also like to thank Mackenzie for taking the time to read and to respond at length to my article. I’m pleased Mackenzie engaged with my article so intensely. In response, I will not quibble—word by word—with Mackenzie’s vigorous attack upon my work. I think curious readers should read it for themselves. Here, I would like to focus upon the larger issues and assumptions at play in our debate.

We have all been told of the death of grand narratives. We have been told that the days of asking eternal metaphysical questions in philosophy are long since over. When Wittgenstein’s (1953/2009) famous spade hit bedrock it reminded us that we had better stop wasting our time on lofty questions without answers. Foucault (1970) prompted us to recall Borges’ story of a certain Chinese encyclopedia showing us that there are many ways of ordering the world and that each way changes the rules of the game a little bit. We found that history was contingent and that hierarchies, however firmly built, would all crumble in the end. In its place were the slightly disorienting feeling following the postmodernist’s proclamation of ‘the elusiveness of meaning and knowledge’ (Kirby, 2017). It turned out that the metaphysical questions of old were not so easily abandoned after all. While we might turn a blind eye to them we are still bound to them by our tacit presuppositions and they still tend to lurk in the shadow of our every endeavor to rethink the old. Educational philosophy is in need of a direction as it is always aimed at some kind of change. Metaphysical assumptions can provide us with a direction. If we assume a capacity of free will, education can achieve certain ends, and if we assume that free will is a myth then education needs to abandon certain claims and stake out new paths. Both assumptions may be valid but they will result in very different understandings of what education is and what it can achieve. While the door opened by the postmodern skepticism of eternal truths cannot be closed, it may be that we can benefit from acknowledging our need for addressing our most basic metaphysical assumptions without unlearning the lesson of postmodernism. Like Foucault’s encounter with the Chinese encyclopedia, we might find joy in revisiting the lost traditions of the past without assuming that they can salvage us from the perils of our future. The postmodern doubt not only shook things up, but it helped us see that we always rely on something, whether we know it or not. Rather than tear down the great structure of metaphysics once and for all, it helped reveal that the questions we ask always betray some kind of metaphysical assumption. Seeing this, we can return to the great metaphysical questions a little less innocent than before.

We have all been told of the death of grand narratives. We have been told that the days of asking eternal metaphysical questions in philosophy are long since over. When Wittgenstein’s (1953/2009, p. 174) famous spade hit bedrock it reminded us that we had better stop wasting our time on lofty questions without answers. Foucault (1970) prompted us to recall Borges’story of a certain Chinese encyclopedia showing us that there are many ways of ordering the world and that each way changes the rules of the game a little bit. We found that history was contingent and that hierarchies, however firmly built, would all crumble in the end. In its place were the slightly disorienting feeling following the postmodernist’s proclamation of ‘the elusiveness of meaning and knowledge’ (Kirby, 2017, p. 5).

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, the book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. This author-meets-critics includes scholars in philosophy, education and Spinoza studies.

How can we reconcile the fact that in order to act virtuously we appear to need to refer to the concept of a free will, while, at the same time, there are convincing philosophical arguments (aligned with a contemporary scientific understanding of natural causation) discrediting any viable notion of an unconstrained or uncaused will? Taking its cue from this important question, this chapter will proceed along the following lines. First, I aim to substantiate the link between contemporary character education and the concept of the free will so as to illustrate the interdependency between the two. Next, I will scrutinize the concept of a free will, raising some philosophical concerns about its validity in a contemporary educational context. This involves looking at the philosophical stakes involved in proposing a unique capacity to intervene with the causal order of nature. At this point, I will suggest that there is a way out of this conundrum, and I will continue by proposing a radically different understanding of the will, offered by the seventeenth century rationalist Spinoza. The chapter will close by looking at some of the practical consequences of grounding contemporary character education in a Spinozistic conception of the will.

Denna essä är en pedagogisk-filosofisk betraktelse över hur berättelser kan användas för att initiera etiska samtal i utbildning. Den tar spjärn emot idéer om att etisk kunskap bäst grundas hos barn och unga genom undervisning av etiska principer eller genom att träna etiskt beteende och framhåller istället styrkan i att tillsammans med barn och unga utforska berättelser som engagerar känslor och fantasi men som samtidigt kan leda in i ett djupare etiskt samtal utan på förhand givna svar.

In recent years, character education and virtue ethics have undergone a form of renaissance in the philosophy of education (Sanderse, 2015). Virtue and character are Aristotelian notions that amount to key components of an ethical life. The Aristotelian conception of the highest good to strive toward (in life as well as in education) is expressed through the notion of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is commonly taken to denote a form of happiness in the sense of a life well lived or a flourishing life. This form of happiness is construed as an end in itself and it is therefore also reasonable to posit eudaimonia as the end-goal of character education. Consequently, character education may be said to aim at ‘the formation of somebody’s character, which accommodates a whole range of virtues and in which cognition and emotion ideally form a unity’ (p. 383). Early modern rationalist Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1670) is a largely neglected philosopher in the context of the philosophy of education. In part, this can be explained by the fact that Spinoza never wrote any texts addressing education explicitly. This neglect is regrettable, however, since Spinoza offers a profound ethical theory – firmly grounded in his metaphysical system – raising important questions relevant for contemporary moral education. In his posthumously published magnum opus, the Ethics (first published in 1677), Spinoza writes that ‘[t]he striving to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue’ (4p22c). This conception of virtue has led Spinoza scholars to conclude that Spinoza is best read as an ethical and psychological egoist (e.g. Nadler, 2013). As Genevieve Lloyd points out, this means that for Spinoza ‘[s]elf-seeking – traditionally opposed to rational virtue – now becomes its foundation’ (1996, p. 9). At the same time, Spinoza’s ethical theory is often described in terms of a form of eudaimonistic ethics, highlighting the importance of developing a virtuous character for reaching a state of happiness or human flourishing (Kisner, 2011). This paper proposes an outline of a form of character education based on Spinoza’s ethical egoism, arguing that the self-preservation of the teacher is the main motivation for the Spinozistic teacher. Since the self-preservation of the teacher is conditioned by the moral development of the students – by virtue of Spinoza’s doctrine of the imitation of the affects – this, however, requires a reciprocal set-up, where the student is emulating the teacher (as role model) so that the teacher, in turn, may emulate his or her students. The paper closes by considering how a Spinozistic character education can facilitate the escape from bondage – for teacher and students alike. Method This paper makes for a philosophical discussion engaging with relevant parts of Spinoza's moral theory. It also draws from recent contributions discussing the pros and cons of Aristotelian character education so as to be able to investigate how a Spinozistically conceived model of character education could serve to address some perceived shortcomings of an Aristotelian model. Expected Outcomes A Spinozistic model of character education is centered on furthering the self-preservation of the teacher and students alike. Since the self-preservation of one is conditioned by the self-preservation of the other, this egoistic striving is greatly benefited by benevolence and friendship. Successful self-preservation is the foundation of virtue and the means to this end are construed as anything that empowers us. What empowers us most, however, is an adequate understanding of ourselves and our marginal place in the world which is why this kind of knowledge is the object of a Spinozistic character education. To gain this kind of knowledge requires practical experimentation, as we need to find out individually how different things affect us so as to get more information about our affective capabilities. It is greatly benefited, however, by being guided by general dictates of reason making sure that we strive for things that really do empower us rather than things that are only seemingly good for us. Moreover, a Spinozistic character education is guided by a strong sense of community insofar as the things that benefit our striving to persevere the most are available to all and can be enjoyed by all equally. This means that there is no reason to compete over the good, but instead, all the more reason to help others strive for it since the striving of others like me will benefit me in my own striving (4p18s). This amounts to a model of character education that is unhampered by the problematic notion of a free will and that can combine a strong sense of eudaimonism with a constructivist understanding of moral values.

This paper addresses the rift between the teacher’s sense of self as a causal agent and the experience of being in lack of control in the classroom, by way of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ It is argued that understanding agential control in terms of a valuable fiction—a practical (ethical) fiction in Vaihinger’s vocabulary—can offer a way of bridging this rift and can help teachers make sense of the tension between their felt need to strive for control and their experience of suffering from lack of control. A fiction, it is argued, is different from an illusion in that fictions can be affirmed without being believed. Unlike illusions, valuable fictions can be recognized as fictions and still retain some of their affective power over us, thereby allowing us to act ‘as if.’ In education, this is helpful as it means that we can make use of valuable fictions without assuming that these have to be protected from the critical gaze of non-believers. In fact, we can openly acknowledge that we rely on fictions as this is part and parcel of being a human being with a limited cognitive ability. 

Min fråga är: Vad innebär det att arbeta med högre värden som utgångspunkt för den pedagogiska praktiken? För att försöka förstå dessa högre värden ska jag skissera en tankelinje som löper från 1600-talsfilosofen Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) via 1800-talsfilosofen Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) och efterkrigsfilosofen Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Denna tankelinje är tänkt att fungera som ett slags teoretiskt ramverk för en tänkbar tolkning av dessa moraliska utsagor utifrån en filosofisk diskussion om ontologi. Denna diskussion är både intressant och viktig, menar jag, eftersom vi ytterst sällan diskuterar – och ännu mindre problematiserar – de ontologiska och epistemologiska utgångspunkterna för den pedagogiska praktiken. Jag gör inga anspråk på att komma med några färdiga svar på dessa frågor här men ser ett behov av att lyfta diskussionen.

In this paper it is argued that, from a Spinozan perspective, to live is not an either/or kind of business. Rather, it is something that inevitably comes in degrees. The idea is that through good education and proper training a person can learn to increase his or her degree of existence by acquiring more adequate (as opposed to confused) ideas about his or her body. This gradual qualitative enhancement of existence is an operationalization of Spinoza’s quest for immortality of the mind. While Spinoza’s idea of immortality differs from the traditional Christian account of the immortality of the soul in some key respects it nevertheless concerns a form of immortality of the mind albeit grasped from a strictly naturalistic standpoint. And as such it is clear that we are faced with not only a philosophical and metaphysical problem of some magnitude but that we have come up against an educational problem that is rarely being addressed. The educational problem, emanating from this, concerns the tension between Spinoza’s necessitarianism and the overall goal of education. Why educate people at all if their lives are already predetermined? In addressing these problems, this essay marks an attempt to present a pedagogization of the degrees of existence in Spinoza. To this end, it is argued that (1) the imitation of affects is key for understanding Spinoza in an educational setting and; (2) that teaching, in a Spinozistic context, hinges on the act of offering the right amount of resistance.

This article begins with the question: What is it to live? It is argued that, from a Spinozistic perspective, to live is not an either/or kind of matter. The educational problem, emanating from this, concerns the tension between Spinoza's necessitarianism and the overall goal of education. In addressing these problems, this paper marks an attempt to present a pedagogization of the degrees of existence in Spinoza.

This article begins with the question: What is it to live? It is argued that, from a Spinozistic perspective, to live is not an either/or kind of matter. Rather, it is something that inevitably comes in degrees. The idea is that through good education and proper training a person can learn to increase his or her degree of existence by acquiring more adequate (as opposed to confused) ideas. This gradual qualitative enhancement of existence is an operationalisation of Spinoza’s quest for immortality of the mind. While Spinoza’s idea of immortality differs from the traditional Christian account of the immortality of the soul in some key respects, it nevertheless concerns a form of immortality of the mind albeit grasped from a strictly naturalistic standpoint. And as such it is clear that we are faced with not only a philosophical and metaphysical problem of some magnitude but that we have come up against an educational problem that is rarely addressed. The educational problem, emanating from this, concerns the tension between Spinoza’s necessitarianism and the overall goal of education. Why educate people at all if their lives are already predetermined? In addressing these problems, this article marks an attempt to present a pedagogization of the degrees of existence in Spinoza. To this end, it is argued that (1) the imitation of affects is key to understanding Spinoza in an educational setting and; (2) that teaching, in a Spinozistic context, involves the act of offering the right amount of resistance.

There is a social and political dimension to Spinoza’s theory of affects that is important to highlight for educational purposes. Because all people are always in part passionate (i.e., determined to act by causes that are external to them), it makes no sense to assume that empowerment is ever an entirely individual affair. On the contrary, Spinoza contends that if people want to become more active and more empowered, they need to join with others who are striving for the same thing. Accordingly, ‘the good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men’ (E4p27d). There are two upshots to this idea that can be addressed in terms of practical (educational) questions. First, it demands that we find out more about how people can be influenced to want the same thing. Second, it means that we need to look closer at how passivity can help bring about activity. Because different people have different ingenium (i.e., affective constitution) it is not a straightforward thing to assume that we would all naturally strive for something similar. At bottom, we all want to become more empowered, but what we take to be empowering may differ widely depending on our past experiences and our culturally encoded patterns of association. The educational concern at the heart of this matter is therefore bound up with the question of how different people can be made to strive for the same thing so as to help them flourish, individually as well as collectively. 

This essay (written in response to Steven Nadler’s article in this issue) seeks to interrogate the promise of Spinoza’s perfectionism for education. It does so by first establishing Spinoza’s perfectionism as a striving toward the intellectual love of God, occasioning an investigation of the relation Nadler sets up between Spinoza’s and Maimonides’ perfectionist schemes, and then evaluating the educational currency of such a striving. It is argued that while Spinoza’s highest good is difficult to construe as a widely attainable educational aim, it allows for two different educational pathways, where one focuses on the reeducation of passions via narratives adjusted to the ingenia of students and the other on attaining the highest good. At a glance, these two pathways come across as radically different in their setup, but they are aligned insofar as the stability of the community (agreeability) is a precondition for the striving for intellectual perfection. In parallel, this tracks how a pedagogical relation – being necessarily asymmetrical from the outset – can evolve into a relation of mutual friendship once the striving for perfection is identified and accepted as a common goal.

Education and Free Will critically assesses and makes use of Spinoza’s insights on human freedom to construe an account of education that is compatible with causal determinism without sacrificing the educational goal of increasing students’ autonomy and self-determination. Offering a thorough investigation into the philosophical position of causal determinism, Dahlbeck discusses Spinoza’s view of self-determination and presents his own suggestions for an education for autonomy from a causal determinist point of view. The book begins by outlining the free will problem in education, before expanding on a philosophical understanding of autonomy and how it is seen as an educational ideal. It considers Spinoza’s determinism and discusses his denial of moral responsibility. Later chapters consider the relationship between causal determinism and autonomy, the educational implications of understanding free will and how free will can be utilised as a valuable fiction in education. This book will be of great interest to academics and postgraduate students in the field of education, especially those with an interest in moral education and philosophy of education. It will also be of interest to those in the fields of philosophy and psychology and specifically those focusing on the free will problem, on Spinoza studies, and on the relation between moral psychology and external influence.

In this Spinozist defence of the educational promotion of students’ autonomy I argue for a deterministic position where freedom of will is deemed unrealistic in the metaphysical sense, but important in the sense that it is an undeniable psychological fact. The paper is structured in three parts. The first part investigates the concept of autonomy from different philosophical points of view, looking especially at how education and autonomy intersect. The second part focuses on explicating the philosophical position of causal determinism and it seeks to open up a way to conceive of education for autonomy without relying on the notion of free will in a metaphysical sense. The concluding part attempts to outline a Spinozistic understanding of education for autonomy where autonomy is grounded in the student's acceptance and understanding of the necessary constraints of natural causation rather than processes of self-causation.

In this paper I argue that there are some telling examples from the discourse of education for sustainable development (ESD) that hint at a reliance on a reversed sense of causality, manifesting itself in a teleological and anthropomorphic understanding of nature. In order to substantiate this claim, I will consider some of Spinoza’s arguments concerning the limitations of human imagination -- and the prejudices that tend to arise from this -- and I will also link this with some of Freud’s claims with regards to the human tendency to deify the forces of nature as a kind of psychological response to the inherent remoteness of said forces. The relation between Spinoza and Freud has been discussed in terms of a mostly implicit affinity grounded in a common metaphysical starting-point that may be labeled a philosophy of immanence. This affinity is most evident, however, with regards to both Spinoza's and Freud’s reliance on a rationalist framework and on their insistence that the human psychological constitution is geared so that when humans are governed by their imagination, and are being confronted with the unexplained, they tend to automatically protect themselves by seeking comfort in the already known, regardless of the unlikeliness of the arrived at explanation. Hence, this paper aims to employ some of Spinoza’s and Freud’s arguments in order to formulate a critique of the anthropomorphic motifs displayed in contemporary educational materials produced within the discourse of ESD.

Saul Smilansky’s Illusionism suggests that some false beliefs are important enough to warrant the indefinite perpetuation of illusions in order to protect the larger moral community from breaking down. In this article I suggest that this position actualises an old educational paradox where education is expected to protect the common moral community (even if this means maintaining some illusions), and at the same time promote the pursuit of truth. Taking Smilansky’s position of Illusionism as a starting point, I argue that while Illusionism highlights and addresses an important problem—that sometimes false beliefs can function to maintain social stability where the truth threatens to unsettle it—relying on indefinite illusions is problematic from an educational point of view. It is difficult to justify that education, being at least in part motivated by truth-seeking, should (or even could) be grounded in illusion. Taking seriously the fact that a dimension of education concerns maintaining social stability, I suggest that Spinoza’s notion of fiction can complement Smilansky’s view in that it can be conceived in terms of an instrument for maintaining social stability and promoting truth-seeking without assuming that one end is pursued at the expense of the other.

Fictionalism confronts the dual epistemological nature of education. In this book, Johan Dahlbeck argues that all education, at bottom, concerns a striving for truth initiated through fictions. This foundational aporia is then interrogated and made sense of via Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if’ and Spinoza’s peculiar form of exemplarism. Using a variety of fictional examples, Dahlbeck investigates the different dimensions of educational fictionalism, from teacher exemplarism to the basic educational fictions necessary for getting started in education in the first place. Fictionalism will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of education.

In this keynote presentation I will offer some thoughts on the implications of different theories of free will and agency for educational research. In addition, I will draw on my own recent work in order to offer a Spinozistic understanding of autonomy that I believe holds some promise for investigations into the relationship between agency and education.

The focus of this paper is on enquiring after the functions and the effects of hope and fear in teaching materials produced for and used within the discourse of education for sustainable development in Sweden. Drawing on the ethical writings of Seneca, Spinoza and Nietzsche, I aim to investigate hope and fear as tools for governing the behavior of students in a contemporary setting. Understanding hope and fear, not as opposites, but as mutually constitutive and as interdependent emotions directed at past and future events, I look into some of the philosophical problems with attempting to gain control over external things rather than striving to control the evaluations and responses to these. I focus especially on understanding education for sustainable development as conditioned by possible rewards and punishments, making it genealogically linked to organised, sectarian religion in that the hopes and fears of people are being manipulated for the purpose of governing the way they live their everyday lives. The Swedish examples looked at in this paper are part of a global trend of strengthening the work with sustainable development in schools and preschools, making them of interest not only locally but on an international level as well. Method: Looking at a selection of discursive statements such as teaching materials, national and international documents referred to within these teaching materials and related projects such as peace education and cosmopolitan education, this paper is based on a form of discourse analysis looking to identify some notable genealogical continuities and discontinuities. I approach these statements in terms of what Agamben labels 'paradigmatic examples' as they serve to reveal some of the conditions of the discourse, indicating the rules and conceptual boundaries of the discourse of education for sustainable development. It also presents a brief review of some of the key texts of Seneca, Spinoza and Nietzsche with regards to the functions and effects of hope and fear as passive affects and tools for governing people's lives. Expected Outcomes: As the notion of sustainable development is directed at anticipating and predicting future events I conclude that the functions of hope and fear in the examples looked at can be somewhat paradoxically understood to be hindering action on the part of the student as focus is placed on controlling external events that may be claimed to be beyond the control of the individual. This risks leading to the construction of a docile rather than an active student, which is contrary to the aspirations expressed within the discourse of education for sustainable development. References: Dahlbeck, J. & De Lucia Dahlbeck, M. (2012). "'Needle and Stick' Save the World: Sustainable Development and the Universal Child", Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 33(2), pp. 267-281. De Lucia Dahlbeck, M. & Dahlbeck, J. (2011). "Evaluating Life: Working With Ethical Dilemmas in Education for Sustainable Development", Law, Culture and the Humanities, Available as early-view online. Nietzsche, F. (1996). Human, All Too Human. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seneca (1969). Letters from a Stoic. London: Penguin Classics. Spinoza, B. (1996). Ethics. London: Penguin Classics. Spinoza, B. (2007). Theological–Political Treatise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Education for sustainable development represents a politically prioritized area of knowledge in contemporary Swedish education and as such it has acquired a prominent position among the governing values of educational policy. Insofar as education for sustainable development is directed at securing the future of human well-being, this article suggests that it concerns a moral discourse where notions about what may or may not happen in the future plays an important role in the governance of practices and behaviors in the present. Since the future is shrouded in uncertainty, it is suggested that the emotions of hope and fear may be understood in terms of tools for governing the everyday lives of children, invoking alluring and deterrent images that influence their decision-making. Besides seeking to gain a better understanding of some of the preconditions of education for sustainable development, the aim of this article concerns an investigation into some of the effects that education for sustainable development may have on the lives of children. To this end, it looks at how hope and fear are being put into play within the discourse as strategies for governing individuals in relation to the uncertainty of the future.

Utbildning handlar i stor utsträckning om att förmedla kollektiva berättelser som å ena sidan är engagerande och intresseväckande och å andra sidan skildrar världen vi lever i på ett relevant sätt. Här kan den tidiga moderna politiska filosofins insikter kring indoktrinering som politiskt styrmedel vara något att dra lärdomar av, menar utbildningsforskaren Johan Dahlbeck.

Redan i den kittlande undertiteln Unexamined life antyds den un-derliggande spänning mellan barndomen och det etiska livet som Lisa Sainsbury både tar avstamp i och undersöker i sin bok om etik i brittisk barnlitteratur från efterkrigstiden och framåt. Begreppet ”unexamined life” anspelar naturligtvis på Sokrates berömda fras ur Platons Sokrates försvarstal som säger att ”the unexamined life is not worth living”. Barndomen är ju till sin natur mer eller mindre ”unex-amined”, så till vida att filosofisk självreflektion i regel betraktas som ett livslångt projekt. Snarast tänker vi kanske att det är i barndomen som vi bör få de förutsättningar vi behöver, för att så småningom be-driva den typen av kritisk självreflektion som vi först som rationella vuxna (i bästa fall) behärskar.

This paper explores the moral underpinnings of education for sustainable development by studying the humanization of nature in contemporary teaching materials. To this end, Spinoza’s and Freud’s naturalistic psychological accounts – suggesting, among other things, that the human psychological constitution tends to further a reversed sense of causality – are invoked as resources for explaining the image of nature as portrayed in education for sustainable development. It is argued that the examples looked at rely on two problematic assumptions: (1) that there exists a metaphysical gulf between humanity and nature, and (2) that natural forces, like humans, act intentionally and therefore appear to be motivated by an underlying, albeit seemingly unexplainable, sense of teleology. To conclude, the humanization of nature in education for sustainable development is taken to make for a potential democratic problem insofar as the image of nature may be conceived as a powerful instrument for governing the everyday lives of people. That is, being able to influence the humanized image of nature also implies having a degree of influence over the ways that people live.

Med utgångspunkt i några aktuella exempel från undervisningsmaterial framställt för användning inom utbildning för hållbar utveckling syftar föreliggande presentation till att diskutera och problematisera bilden av naturen i relation till rationalisten och upplysningsfilosofen Spinozas tankar om den mänskliga fantasins tendens att upprätta en omvänd kausalitet. Presentationen argumenterar för att centrala element av Spinozas bibelkritik kan tjäna som modell vid analysen av materialet eftersom naturen i materialet delar gemensamma drag med den antropomorfiska gudsbild som Spinoza identifierar i profeternas texter. Mot bakgrund av detta framträder bilden av en natur iklädd synbart mänskliga drag, med igenkännbart känsloregister och tydligt teleologiskt driven motivation. En tentativ slutsats är att utbildningsmaterialet i fråga är mindre intressant att studera som källa till kunskap om naturen och människans relation till naturen och mer intressant att studera som källa till kunskap om mänsklig psykologi.

The aim of this thesis is to critically examine how ethical principles are conceptualized and applied in educational contexts, focusing on the intersection of early childhood education and education for sustainable development. Its contribution to educational research in general, and to philosophy of education in particular, is to; first, discuss the presumed relation between ethical principles and individual actions and events, and to illustrate how this connection frames the understanding and application of ethics in educational situations. Second, it is to problematize the conditions for how the ethical framework is understood and applied by examining disturbances in the relation between ethical principles and its individualizations using a philosophy of immanent ethics as a conceptual framework. Education for sustainable development is targeted specifically as it offers some interesting examples of educational situations where children are working with ethical decision making and where ethical principles – manifested in the form of universal human rights – are commonly invoked. These examples are analyzed in terms of paradigmatic examples as they are taken to say something about the conditions for conceptualizing ethics in contemporary education. Looking at texts produced or commonly referred to within the discourse of education for sustainable development, the four articles of this thesis are looking to make visible some basic assumptions necessary for understanding and making sense of the examples looked at. The paradigmatic examples range from official documents on children’s rights to various forms of teaching materials produced within the discourse of education for sustainable development. The Kantian concept of the good will is identified as a useful way of describing the imagined link between principles and actions, facilitating the general understanding of the process whereby children are anticipated to make good ethical decisions in educational situations. The concept of the good will is, in turn, dependent on some form of transcendent ethics where ethical principles are presumed to exist independent of historical and social changes. Through the concept of immanent ethics, the presumed stability of the relation between principles and actions is scrutinized and destabilized. This is so as it introduces intrinsic dimensions of change and particularity into the overarching ethical scheme. Without the seemingly stable guarantors of universally valid ethical principles, the educational aspects of ethics appear to take on new characteristics, demanding the construction of new problems and the formulation of new questions regarding the relation between ethics and education.

This article argues that universal documents on children's rights can provide illustrative examples as to how childhood is identified as a unity using difference as an instrument. Using Gille Deleuze's theorising on difference and sameness as a framework, the article seeks to relate the children's rights project with a critique of representation. It seeks to illustrate how the children's rights project seems to be promoting an image of childhood that is sharply contrasted by adulthood in a dichotomised sense, as well as how, in these documents, the fate of the child is being intertwined with the fate of the state.

In this article I will investigate a perceived tension in Swedish early childhood education (ECE) policy between reevaluating certain foundational claims on the one hand and following universal moral commands on the other. I ask the question; how is it that certain commonly held assumptions are being debunked and others left undisturbed in this particular context? To this end, I look at some of the preconditions of framing the edu- cational practice by universal moral commands so as to make visible some of its under- lying ontological assumptions. Correspondingly, I look at some necessary epistemological and ontological prerequisites for understanding knowledge formation as essentially rela- tional, such as it is construed in the policy documents concerned. I connect this with a broader trend in educational philosophy and theory, one where the destabilizing of a Cartesian notion of subjectivity has opened up for more relational conceptions of sub- jectivity. Next, I will take a closer look at some key passages from the policy documents where the appeal to moral universalism runs parallel with an appeal to a relational ontology. Having done so, I point to some epistemological problems with combining these two conflicting approaches on a policy level. To conclude, I formulate some final thoughts regarding how one might begin to resolve this tension within the discourse of Swedish ECE by coming to terms with what kind of ontological and epistemological foundation to rely upon. I do this by trying out the notion of a pedagogy of dosage.

Research aims: In this study I investigate a perceived tension between reevaluating certain foundational claims on the one hand and following universal moral commands on the other. I ask the question, how is it that certain commonly held assumptions (about the nature of knowledge and knowledge formation) are being debunked and others (about ethics and the good life) left undisturbed in the context of contemporary Swedish early childhood education? Relationship to previous research works: this is original research unrelated to previous studies. Theoretical and conceptual framework: I study the conceptual preconditions necessary for making sense of the studied policy documents. Paradigm, methodology and methods: content analysis of Swedish ECE policy documents. Ethical considerations: none applicable. Main finding or discussion: the main findings include a detected incommensurability in the ontological and epistemological conditions of the studied policy documents. Implications, practice or policy: I suggest further discussions concerning the theoretical basis of Swedish ECE policy so as reconcile this perceived incommensurability. Keywords: relational pedagogy; moral universalism; Swedish ECE policy; foundational values; epistemology.

While it is well known that Plato’s Republic contains arguments both for and against the use of fictions in education (376e–398b), it is less widely recognized (at least in an educational context) that the entire premise of the Republic is a fictional endeavor set up to arrive at the truth of justice in itself. This, in fact, corresponds well with Hans Vaihinger’s conception of the purpose of an expedient fiction, being a fiction that is specifically geared at facilitating the process of truth-striving. As such, this paper argues that the Republic is best read as an expedient fiction, constructed so as to render the truth of justice within grasp of the understanding of the less-than-fully rational (i.e., ordinary) reader.

To what extent should teachers promote the view from nowhere as an ideal to strive for in education? To address this question, I will use Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger as an example, illustrating the stakes involved when the view from nowhere is taken to be an attainable educational ideal. I will begin this essay by offering a description of Thomas Nagel’s view from nowhere. Having done this, I will return to Twain’s story, providing some further examples of how access to the view from nowhere comes to influence the educational process in different ways. I will then connect the educational question raised by Twain’s story to two radically different versions of the exemplar found in the works of Benedict de Spinoza: the philosopher and the prophet. These figures will help illustrate how the striving for philosophical truth can sometimes be educationally inapt, as education always needs to account for humans being human, all too human.

Spinoza and Education offers a comprehensive investigation into the educational implications of Spinoza’s moral theory. Taking Spinoza’s naturalism as its point of departure, it constructs a considered account of education, taking special care to investigate the educational implications of Spinoza’s psychological egoism. What emerges is a counterintuitive form of education grounded in the egoistic striving of the teacher to persevere and to flourish in existence while still catering to the ethical demands of the students and the greater community. In providing an educational reading of Spinoza’s moral theory, this book sets up a critical dialogue between educational theory and recent studies which highlight the centrality of ethics in Spinoza’s overall philosophy. By placing his work in a contemporary educational context, chapters explore a counterintuitive conception of education as an ethical project, aimed at overcoming the desire to seek short-term satisfaction and troubling the influential concept of the student as consumer. This book also considers how education, from a Spinozistic point of view, may be approached in terms of a kind of cognitive therapy serving to further a more scientifically adequate understanding of the world and aimed at combating prejudices and superstition. Spinoza and Education demonstrates that Spinoza’s moral theory can further an educational ideal, where notions of freedom and self-preservation provide the conceptual core of a coherent philosophy of education. As such, it will appeal to researchers, academics and postgraduate students in the fields of philosophy of education, theory of education, critical thinking, philosophy, ethics, and Spinoza studies.

On trouve chez Spinoza deux types de modèles (peut-être s’agit-il d’ailleurs de deux interprétations différentes de ce qui correspondrait le mieux à l’idée que Spinoza se fait d’un modèle). En observant et en comparant ces deux types de modèles, on pourrait conclure que l’un est pertinent d’un point de vue pédagogique, et que l’autre ne l’est pas (ou bien moins). Curieusement, celui qui n’est pas pertinent d’un point de vue pédagogique ressemble beaucoup au modèle promu par la tradition néo-aristotélicienne, à savoir une personne digne d’admiration. Dans cette tradition, l’admiration est censée être déclenchée par des individus au comportement vertueux. Ces modèles sont perçus comme suprêmement admirablesparce que moralement infaillibles. Chez Spinoza, ce premier type de modèle est introduit sous la forme de « modèle de la nature humaine » (à savoir, de l’homme libre / homo liber) dans la Quatrième Partie de l’Éthique (de la proposition 66 à la proposition 72). L’autre type de modèle est faillible mais applicable en pratique en ce qu’il est affectivement en phase avec l’imagination des personnes auxquelles il s’adresse. Ce deuxième type apparaît dans le Traité Théologico-Politique, sous la forme de la dualité des« Prophètes » et des « Docteurs ». Dans cet exposé, mon objectif sera cependant de laisser de côté cettedeuxième conception du modèle pour tenter d’étudier ce qui est pédagogiquement intéressant dans les modèles et dans l’exemplarité elle-même, pour ce qui concerne l’adaptation des récits collectifs, la dynamique entre l’imagination et la raison, et l’importance pédagogique d’être en phase avec les dispositions affectives, c’est-à-dire avec l’ingenium de celui à qui l’on s’adresse.

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, this book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. Readers will benefit from a succinct introduction to Spinoza’s political philosophy and from an account of civic education that is based on careful exegetical work. It draws conclusions only hinted at in Spinoza’s own writings.

This article turns to the neglected pedagogical concept of ingenium in order to address some shortcomings of the admiration-emulation model of Linda Zabzebski’s influential exemplarist moral theory. I will start by introducing the problem of the admiration-emulation model by way of a fictional example. I will then briefly outline the concept of ingenium such as it appears in a Renaissance context, looking particularly at the pedagogical writings of Juan Luis Vives (1492/3–1540). This will set the stage for the next part, look- ing at how early modern philosopher Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) adopts a Vivesian notion of ingenium, adjusting it so as to fit into the setting of his political theory. Next, I will turn to Spinoza’s use of the concept of ingenium in relation to his portrayal of exemplary persons, offering a pedagogical model of moral exemplarism that can counter same of the perceived problems of the admiration-emulation model as it highlights the necessary fallibility of efficient exemplars as well as acknowledges the socio-political dimension of emotions. Finally, I will lay out some preliminary consequences for educational theory, hoping to offer a way of reconciling moral exemplarism with a more realistic pedagogical and psychological framework.

Self-causation, for Spinoza, is reserved for God (E1D3). Spinoza’s is a kind of self-causation that differs in some key regards from the standard interpretation of causa sui. For something to be self-caused for Spinoza does not mean that it may somehow contradict the law-like regularities of nature. It simply means that it encompasses the full causal explanation necessary for understanding and explaining why it is determined to act the way it does. God, Spinoza asserts, ’acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one’ (E1p17). Because Spinoza’s God is equivalent to Nature as substance (the immanent cause of all things), the laws of God’s nature are the same as the law-like regularities of nature. To act freely, then, is to act from the necessity of one’s own nature. It is not to act contrary to one’s nature as this would violate Spinoza’s definition of freedom as that ’which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone’ (E1D7). The only thing that qualifies for this kind of freedom is God (E1p17c2). Everything else, whether human or otherwise, is causally determined and that ’which has been determined by God to produce an effect, cannot render itself undetermined’ (E1p27). Spinoza’s metaphysics allows for no exceptions here. Accordingly: ’In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way’ (E1p29). This means that singular things in nature ’can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause […] and so on, to infinity’ (E1p28). Self-causation, then, is out of the picture for humans. For someone to be the cause of him- or herself would mean acting contrary to the regularities of nature. With regards to this Spinoza concludes: ’It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause’ (E4p4). As humans we are part of nature and being part of nature means being dependent upon antecedent causes for our existence.

Is the education of citizens a private matter or is it primarily a concern for the state? Throughout the history of political and educational philosophy, this question has remained central. Different philosophers have answered the question in different ways and different periods have witnessed different ways of organizing public education in response to it. At the root of this question is another question. This question concerns how we understand the state and how we construe the relation between the state and the well-being of its citizens. How we understand the state, in turn, depends on if we consider it the natural extension of the will and striving of its individual citizens or if we consider its main purpose to be to protect its citizens from each other and from external threats.

The purpose of this article is to add to the debate on the normative status and legitimacy of indoctrination in education by drawing on the political philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677). More specifically, I will argue that Spinoza’s relational approach to knowledge formation and autonomy, in light of his understanding of the natural limitations of human cognition, provides us with valuable hints for staking out a more productive path ahead for the debate on indoctrination. This article combines an investigation into the early modern history of political ideas with a philosophical inquiry into a persistent conceptual problem residing at the heart of education. As such, the aim of the article is ultimately to offer an account of indoctrination less fraught with the dangers of epistemological and political idealism that often haunt rival conceptions.