This book examines the role of ethics and philosophy in biodiversity conservation.

The objective of this book is two-fold: on the one hand it offers a detailed and systematic account of central normative concepts often used, but rarely explicated nor justified, within conservation biology. Such concepts include ‘values’ (both intrinsic, instrumental, and, more recently, relational), ‘rights’, and ‘duties’. The second objective is to emphasize to environmental philosophers and applied ethicists the many interesting decision-making challenges of biodiversity conservation. The book argues that a nuanced account of instrumental values provides a powerful tool for reasoning about the values of biodiversity. It also scrutinizes relational values, the concept of rights of nature, and risk, and show how moral philosophy proves indispensable for these concepts. Consequently, it engages with recent suggestions on normative aspects of biodiversity conservation, and show the need for moral philosophy in biodiversity conservation. The overriding aim of this book is to provide conservation biologists and policy-makers with a systematic overview of concepts and assessments of the reasons for reaching prescriptive conclusions about biodiversity conservation. This will prove instrumental in clarifying the role of applied ethics and a refined understanding of the tools it can provide.

This title will be of interest to students and scholars of conservation biology, conservation policy, environmental ethics and environmental philosophy.

In recent years many actors have investigated the possibilities of strengthening legal environmental protection by making appeals to the rights of nature. Such rights have also been legally encoded in some countries. This chapter will critically investigate whether it is reasonable to ascribe moral or legal rights to nature. With support from moral and legal philosophy, different propositions in support of rights of nature will be tested to see if reasonable responses can be formulated against objections. If not, the position that nature has rights may ultimately have to be rejected, or at the very least become questionable. It will be suggested that all the investigated propositions require one to commit to one or several of the following shortcomings: rejecting conventional properties of rights-holders; accepting conventional properties but suggesting that natural objects and processes have those properties; accepting conflicting claims between rights of natural entities and human rights; or trivializing the notion of rights. Committing to any of these has significant intellectual and practical costs, and ultimately it will be proposed that the view that nature has rights ought to be rejected.

Constructing energy scenarios is traditionally an endeavour driven by experts. I suggest that an outcome of relying solely on expertise is incompleteness. Moreover, expertise, while being a necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition for epistemic quality and normative legitimacy of energy scenarios given the scope of transitions that energy scenarios entail, which includes substantial societal repercussions. Four reasons will be provided for wide participation when constructing energy scenarios. First, there are several forecasting shortcomings of top-down approaches. Second, to rely solely on expertise provides incomplete conceptualizations of energy and central concepts such as ‘smartness’, in addition to neglecting normative views. Third, increased epistemic quality is an outcome of wide participation. A fourth reason is derived from the argument of inductive risks, stating that thresholds of evidence should reflect the potential outcomes if erroneously corroborating or rejecting a hypothesis. As energy scenarios provide input to decision-making having potentially large societal impact, they ought to be both normatively legitimate as well as of sufficient epistemic quality, components provided by wide participation.

Citizen science (CS) has been presented as a novel form of research relevant for social concerns and global challenges. CS transforms the roles of participants to being actively involved at various stages of research processes, CS projects are dynamic, and pluralism arises when many non-professional researchers take an active involvement in research. Some argue that these elements all make existing research ethical principles and regulations ill-suited for guiding responsible CS conduct. However, while many have sought to highlight such challenges from CS, few have discussed principles per se providing the foundation for regulations. In this article we will investigate the possibilities of midlevel principlism in guiding responsible CS conduct. Principlism has the potential of accommodating many of the concerns taken to reduce the relevance of existing principles.

This master thesis is inspired by St. Pierre’s post qualitative inquiry and the philosophy of immanence, which support the creation of concepts through immersion in theory, philosophy, and practice. This serves as a guide of thought for the inquirer´s journey of exploration and creativity. This research departures in Latour´s concept of the Terrestrial, enriched by Haraway´s addition to the concept; and in Haraway´s theory of string figures, which is the foundation for exploring how to enact the change that is needed to survive in a world of climate destruction and business as usual. Haraway says that not all humans observe the Terrestrial from above (as Latour suggests) and invites us to go out there and find the people that never took off. For this purpose, I went to Costa Rica and had non-structured conversations with six Costa Rican leaders, who have been working for and with social and environmental causes for years. This inquiry aims to get a deeper understanding of how these stories, combined with the concept of the Terrestrial and SF theory, may help us create new concepts and develop a philosophy of Terrestrial Leadership. From a magic island to banana women, these stories tell us about how these leaders have gone through constant metamorphic processes of inner development, the discovery of their response-ability, the enactment of collaborations, and the politics of staying with the trouble in a chaotic world; in the Chthulucene. Finally, with the help of storytelling, I attempt to offer a first ontological and epistemological perspective on the concept of Terrestrial leadership and how we might benefit from it.

Many contemporary defenders of paternalist interventions favor a version of paternalism focused on how people often choose the wrong means given their own ends. This idea is typically justified by empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics. To the extent that paternalist interventions can then target the promotion of goals that can be said to be our own, such interventions are prima facie less problematic. One version of this argument starts from the idea that it is meaningful to ascribe to us preferences that we would have if were fully rational, informed and in control over our actions. It is argued here, however, that the very body of empirical results that means paternalists typically rely on also undermines this idea as a robust enough notion. A more modest approach to paternalist interventions, on which such policies are understood as enmeshed with welfare-state policies promoting certain primary goods, is then proposed instead.

In considering patriarchy as potentially institutional and as a characteristic also of contemporary Western societies, a fundamental issue concerns how to make sense of largely informal institutions to begin with. Traditional accounts of institutions have often focused on formalized ones. It is argued here, however, that the principal idea behind one commonly accepted conception of institutions can be developed in a way that better facilitates an explication of informal institutions. When applied to the phenomenon of patriarchy, such an approach can then also allow us to ontologically make sense of gray areas and hierarchies of authority, as well as the intersectionality of social positions.

Many normative theorists want to contribute to making the world a better place. In recent years, it has been suggested that to realise this ambition one must start with an adequate description of real-life practices. To determine what should be done, however, one must also fundamentally criticise existing moral beliefs. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of doing both. Yet, its practical usefulness has been doubted and it has been largely ignored in the recent practical turn of normative theorising. This paper offers a complementary methodology to the method of reflective equilibrium, referred to as Rawlsian constructivism, which brings forth its practical merits. With the support of Rawlsian constructivism, the method of reflective equilibrium becomes a tool for public reasoning about practical problems which aims to facilitate shared solutions. The process of reflective scrutiny is used, not in the search of moral truth, but rather to highlight what stands in the way of solutions to problems agents face in different domains of social life. The practical value lies in scrutinising reasons for action that are taken for granted, explicating new rationales for action and highlighting neglected points of agreement. The paper exemplifies this approach with a process of justifying individual obligations to combat climate change. Normative theorists who share the practical agenda have correctly noted the importance of bottom-up investigations of subject domains. This paper argues that the next step should be to utilise this version of the method of reflective equilibrium to explore the potential for morally progressive solutions to these problems.

This essay is a phenomenological study that explores how the visualisation of hands affects the viewer’s perception of the world in the movie Avatar. The essay analyses three scenes from Avatar, consisting of hands that interact with objects that are unknown to both the movie character and the viewer. The analysis applies theories within phenomenology, perception, cognition, and science fiction as a narrative form, as it aims to explore how viewers perceive the interaction of hands in the context of watching a movie.

The results suggest that the visualisation of hands can have several outcomes, regarding how the viewer reacts while watching the scenes that were involved in this study. The interactions serve a narrative function, as they convey information about the construction of the fictional film world. This in turn, engages the viewer’s interest and creates anticipation. Theories within phenomenology support that viewers can experience sensory perceptions, such as tactile sensations, while watching the scenes. The analysis also concludes that viewers may wish to interact with the film world by using their own hands, as cognition theories support that the presence of hands in our field of vision, prompts us to interpret our surroundings as being interactive.

The findings in this study also conclude that experiences are difficult to measure and interpret, since our perceptions are shaped by our previous experiences and interests. The essay closes with a critical reflection on the results and elaborates on how the findings can be applied to different research fields, such as film narration, medicine, interaction design, UX design, and visual communication, followed by how the analysis in this essay could be expanded into a larger study.

The purpose of this essay is to capture the significance of norms and virtues in computer games, with a major focus on digital sports, in relation to the traditional representations of sports in novels. The socio-legal design tells us that popular culture, as a discursive and normative agenda, has a vital moral impact on individuals in relation to virtues and values, an influence that is as good as the authority of formal law. By comparing the representation of sports in novels and digital sports, the essay discusses the transition of virtues

As a departure from sport ethics and sociology of law this article deals with norms, rules, ethical principles and legal instruments that have an influence on the development of sport. The subject is connected to the Nordic regulation of sport, with a tradition of self-regulation and internal dispute resolutions; recently this 'autonomy' has been challenged by the interests of the market, different political pressures and by ethical discourses in the civil society. This is conceptualized as a state of normative tension and a 'sport model' in transition. The ethical departure focuses on the phenomenology of sport, illuminating internal values important to sport and the development of different conflict resolutions within sport organisations. The socio-legal perspective places sport in a social and normative context, focussing on various normative sources exterior to sport that will have an impact on the development of sport.

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, the book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. This author-meets-critics includes scholars in philosophy, education and Spinoza studies.

This paper addresses the rift between the teacher’s sense of self as a causal agent and the experience of being in lack of control in the classroom, by way of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ It is argued that understanding agential control in terms of a valuable fiction—a practical (ethical) fiction in Vaihinger’s vocabulary—can offer a way of bridging this rift and can help teachers make sense of the tension between their felt need to strive for control and their experience of suffering from lack of control. A fiction, it is argued, is different from an illusion in that fictions can be affirmed without being believed. Unlike illusions, valuable fictions can be recognized as fictions and still retain some of their affective power over us, thereby allowing us to act ‘as if.’ In education, this is helpful as it means that we can make use of valuable fictions without assuming that these have to be protected from the critical gaze of non-believers. In fact, we can openly acknowledge that we rely on fictions as this is part and parcel of being a human being with a limited cognitive ability. 

Min fråga är: Vad innebär det att arbeta med högre värden som utgångspunkt för den pedagogiska praktiken? För att försöka förstå dessa högre värden ska jag skissera en tankelinje som löper från 1600-talsfilosofen Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) via 1800-talsfilosofen Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) och efterkrigsfilosofen Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Denna tankelinje är tänkt att fungera som ett slags teoretiskt ramverk för en tänkbar tolkning av dessa moraliska utsagor utifrån en filosofisk diskussion om ontologi. Denna diskussion är både intressant och viktig, menar jag, eftersom vi ytterst sällan diskuterar – och ännu mindre problematiserar – de ontologiska och epistemologiska utgångspunkterna för den pedagogiska praktiken. Jag gör inga anspråk på att komma med några färdiga svar på dessa frågor här men ser ett behov av att lyfta diskussionen.

Fictionalism confronts the dual epistemological nature of education. In this book, Johan Dahlbeck argues that all education, at bottom, concerns a striving for truth initiated through fictions. This foundational aporia is then interrogated and made sense of via Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if’ and Spinoza’s peculiar form of exemplarism. Using a variety of fictional examples, Dahlbeck investigates the different dimensions of educational fictionalism, from teacher exemplarism to the basic educational fictions necessary for getting started in education in the first place. Fictionalism will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of education.

Utbildning handlar i stor utsträckning om att förmedla kollektiva berättelser som å ena sidan är engagerande och intresseväckande och å andra sidan skildrar världen vi lever i på ett relevant sätt. Här kan den tidiga moderna politiska filosofins insikter kring indoktrinering som politiskt styrmedel vara något att dra lärdomar av, menar utbildningsforskaren Johan Dahlbeck.

This article argues that universal documents on children's rights can provide illustrative examples as to how childhood is identified as a unity using difference as an instrument. Using Gille Deleuze's theorising on difference and sameness as a framework, the article seeks to relate the children's rights project with a critique of representation. It seeks to illustrate how the children's rights project seems to be promoting an image of childhood that is sharply contrasted by adulthood in a dichotomised sense, as well as how, in these documents, the fate of the child is being intertwined with the fate of the state.

To what extent should teachers promote the view from nowhere as an ideal to strive for in education? To address this question, I will use Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger as an example, illustrating the stakes involved when the view from nowhere is taken to be an attainable educational ideal. I will begin this essay by offering a description of Thomas Nagel’s view from nowhere. Having done this, I will return to Twain’s story, providing some further examples of how access to the view from nowhere comes to influence the educational process in different ways. I will then connect the educational question raised by Twain’s story to two radically different versions of the exemplar found in the works of Benedict de Spinoza: the philosopher and the prophet. These figures will help illustrate how the striving for philosophical truth can sometimes be educationally inapt, as education always needs to account for humans being human, all too human.

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, this book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. Readers will benefit from a succinct introduction to Spinoza’s political philosophy and from an account of civic education that is based on careful exegetical work. It draws conclusions only hinted at in Spinoza’s own writings.

This article turns to the neglected pedagogical concept of ingenium in order to address some shortcomings of the admiration-emulation model of Linda Zabzebski’s influential exemplarist moral theory. I will start by introducing the problem of the admiration-emulation model by way of a fictional example. I will then briefly outline the concept of ingenium such as it appears in a Renaissance context, looking particularly at the pedagogical writings of Juan Luis Vives (1492/3–1540). This will set the stage for the next part, look- ing at how early modern philosopher Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) adopts a Vivesian notion of ingenium, adjusting it so as to fit into the setting of his political theory. Next, I will turn to Spinoza’s use of the concept of ingenium in relation to his portrayal of exemplary persons, offering a pedagogical model of moral exemplarism that can counter same of the perceived problems of the admiration-emulation model as it highlights the necessary fallibility of efficient exemplars as well as acknowledges the socio-political dimension of emotions. Finally, I will lay out some preliminary consequences for educational theory, hoping to offer a way of reconciling moral exemplarism with a more realistic pedagogical and psychological framework.

This paper addresses the rift between the teacher’s sense of self as a causal agent and the experience of being in lack of control in the classroom, by way of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ It is argued that understanding agential control in terms of a valuable educational fiction—a practical (ethical) fiction in Vaihinger’s vocabulary—can offer a way of bridging this rift and can help teachers make sense of the tension between their felt need to strive for control and their experience of suffering from lack of control. A fiction, it is argued, is different from an illusion in that fictions can be affirmed without being believed. Unlike illusions, valuable fictions can be recognized as fictions and still retain some of their affective power over us, thereby allowing us to act ‘as if.’ In education, this is helpful as it means that we can make use of valuable fictions without assuming that these have to be protected from the critical gaze of non-believers. In fact, we can openly acknowledge that we rely on fictions as this is part and parcel of being a human being with a limited cognitive ability.

Douglas Yacek’s recent book The Transformative Classroom proposes a useful aspirational model of transformative education. In this critical commentary, I review this model and suggest that while it succeeds in overcoming some ethical shortcomings of other dominant models of transformative education, I would like to suggest that focusing on more subtle transformative gestures could have the benefit of being less dependent of the teacher’s intention to transform and of being less constrained by the expectation that transformation should take place primarily in the classroom. When transformation is conceived as an educational fiction, it may be conceived as a retroactive experience constructed around memories of the teacher’s transformative gestures, thereby adding to Yacek’s aspirational model by allowing for transformation to continue beyond the walls of the classroom.

In this essay, we argue that Rousseau’s lawgiver is best thought of as a pedagogical fiction. It is fictional as it reflects an idea that is entertained despite its contradictory nature, and it is contradictory in the sense that it describes “an undertaking beyond human strength and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing” (II.7; 192). Rousseau conceives of the social contract as a necessary device for enabling the transferal of individual power to the body politic, for subsuming individual wills under the general will, and for aligning the good of the individual with the common good. For the social contract to be valid, however, it needs to be preceded by a desire to belong to a moral community that can induce people to join willingly, and that will grant legitimacy to the laws established. If the social contract is the machinery that makes the body politic function, the lawgiver is “the mechanic who invents the machine” (II.7; 191). In this paper we will look closer at the pedagogical functions of Rousseau’s mythical lawgiver by first examining the relationship between the social contract, the general will and the lawgiver. Then, we aim to flesh out a pedagogical understanding of the figure of the lawgiver by way of the two educational dimensions of accommodation and transformation. Finally, we will argue for the importance of understanding Rousseau’s lawgiver as a fictional device allowing for the fundamental and enduring educational task of balancing between the preservation and renewal of society. 

Epitomized in the bodily exhibitions of ‘fitspiration’, photo-based social media is biased toward self-beautification and glorification of reality. Meanwhile, evidence is growing of psychological side effects connected to this ‘pictorial turn’ in our communication. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche poses the question how ugliness and discord can produce aesthetic pleasure. This paper proceeds from an inverse relationship and examines why glorification of appear- ances and conspicuous beauty fails to do the same, and even compounds suffering. Drawing on the Apollo-Dionysus dualism undergirding Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy, I posit a deeper relation between the saturation of visual self-exhibitionism typified in fitspiration and its empirical effects. Concentrating on the med- ium and self-representational photograph, I argue that Instagram is primarily an instrument of Apolline artifice and that the pictorial turn which defines the present centers Apolline mediation to the detrimental exclusion of meaningful communion with its Dionysiac antithesis. For users immersed in this Apolline sphere of visual self- representation, a fractured existence beholden to conditions of the image ensues—comprising surface-level appearances, deification of the moment, and loss of existential sustenance through myth. By positioning fitspiration not as an aberration but as the logical conclusion of the medium’s intrinsic Apolline property, it becomes a litmus test of the entire visual landscape and illustrative of the implications that uncritical participation in it may bring. 

Though the rise of social media has provided countless advantages and possibilities, both within and without the domain of sports, recent years have also seen some more detrimental aspects of these technologies come to light. In particular, the widespread social media culture surrounding fitness – ‘fitspiration’ – warrants attention for the way it encourages self-sexualization and -objectification, thereby epitomizing a wider issue with photo-based social media in general. Though the negative impact of fitspiration has been well documented, what is less understood are the ways it potentially impacts and molds moral psychology, and how these same aspects may come to influence digital sports subcultures more broadly. In this theoretical paper, I rely on the insights of Friedrich Nietzsche to analyze the moral significance of a culture like fitspiration becoming normalized and influential in structuring and informing self-understanding, notions of value, and how to flourish in life. Using two doctrines central to Nietzsche’s philosophy—The Last Man and his conception of the ’higher self’ – I argue that fitspiration involves a form of hedonism that is potentially harmful to the pursuit and achievement of human flourishing. Through fitspiration, desire is elevated to a central moral principle, underlying the way users both consume and produce its content, catering simultaneously to their desires for external validation and instant gratification. It thereby creates conditions which foster a culture in adherence to the ethos of The Last Man. In doing so, I argue it impedes the cultivation of the virtues and higher values which define the higher individual, regarded by Nietzsche as essential for human flourishing. However, drawing on the ethical framework of the higher individual provides the philosophical and psychological resources with which resisting and overcoming the more harmful temptations of these trends may be possible. 

This article is a philosophical examination of the social media culture of fitness and the behavior which most distinctly characterizes it. Of the numerous and varied digital subcultures emerging with the rise of photo-based social media during the 2010s, the culture surrounding fitness, or "fitspiration," stands out as one of the more notable. Research has identified the phenomenon as consisting to a large extent of users engaging in behaviors of self-sexualization and self-objectification, following, not unexpectedly, the inherent focus within fitness on the body, its maintenance and ultimately its appearance. Research also demonstrates that, for many, viewing and engaging in this behavior is linked to a deterioration of body-image, general self-perception and mental well-being. In this article, I analyze the phenomenon within a philosophical framework in which I combine the philosophical theory of Jean Baudrillard on media and the consumption of signs and the psychoanalytic perspective of Jacques Lacan on subjectivity, narcissism and desire. Using this framework, I discuss the body assuming the properties of a commodified object deriving its cultural value and meaning from the signs which adorn it, resulting in the "fitspiration" user imperative becoming the identification with an artificial object alien to the self, necessitating a narcissistically oriented, yet pernicious self-objectification. I argue that "fitspiration," as well as the photo-based social media which both enables and defines it, indulges narcissism, detrimentally exaggerating the narcissistic inclinations lying at the center of subjectivity.

This article is a philosophical examination of the six-part documentary series, Cheer, which debuted on Netflix on the 8th of January 2020 to widespread enthusiasm. It centres around a dedicated young cheerleading squad at Navarro College in Corsicana, Texas, and their celebrated coach who rulesthe team with an iron fist, as they prepare forthe annual college cheerleading championship. Part of the attention garnered by the documentary series was directed towards the coach and her unconventional, stern methods of leadership, which, to some, seemed to forego the best interests of the cheerleaders in favour of the pursuit of results. In applying the philosophy of Nietzsche, notably his perhaps most famed work, the enigmatic Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I present an alternate interpretation of the events. Through concepts like the overman, self-overcoming and the will to power, I discuss the possibility of attaining meaning, purpose, self-satisfaction and happiness through suffering. I then conclude by letting the argument propagate into and include the field of sports in general, likening the arduous training and attainment of mastery in sports to what I call the Nietzschean transcendence.

Female empowerment has long been a prominent social concern in Western culture. With the rise of social media, the quest for female empowerment has become embodied in self-presentational practices, occurring conspicuously throughout the Instagram fitness subculture: ‘fitspiration’. Here, female empowerment is merged with the body-centrality inherent to fitness, and the self-sexualization that has become characteristic of both photo-based social media in general, and fitspiration in particular. Meanwhile, an extensive body of research highlights numerous detrimental effects of self-sexualization on women. Evidently, something seems awry with the implied proposition ‘sexualization as empowerment’. Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of power and its relationship to human flourishing, this article aims to critically examine the conception of female empowerment expressed in fitspiration and to conceptualize a philosophically compelling reformulation of universal human empowerment. I argue that what is commonly conceived of as female empowerment in trends like fitspiration—delineated in its explicit relationship to sexualization—may be seriously flawed. Rejecting this understanding in favor of a Nietzschean universal alternative may prove beneficial to individuals both within and without the contemporary fitness culture. 

Science centres aim to present science in ways that will attract visitors and enhance public interest in, and knowledge of, science. But what images and different aspects of science are visitors confronted with at Nordic science centres? This study aims to explore the different aspects of science that are displayed and the ways in which these aspects constitute different images of science. In this study, staff members who work with the planning and creation of new exhibitions were asked to answer a web-based questionnaire, identifying the extent to which different aspects of science were displayed in their latest exhibition. They were also asked to voice their opinions on what, and to what extent, they would like to display different aspects in future exhibitions. This study shows that exhibitions today, in particular, choose to display the wonders of science, presenting science in a product-oriented and unproblematic way. The study also reveals a great discrepancy between what staff members display at their latest exhibitions and what they want to display in future exhibitions. They express a will to emphasise aspects of science on the basis of a societal and cultural perspective. This means that controversial issues, values in society, non-western science, and scientific processes constitute important components for future exhibitions.

This paper invites us to reconsider our usual understanding of infancy, no longer as something that passes but as infantia. The Latin word infantia, which is not easy to translate, means a lack of speech, a lack of eloquence, and also infancy, babyhood, and dumbness. Drawing on Barbara Cassin’s works on the untranslatables, I propose to translate infantia, starting by not-understanding, and then by taking detours by different texts, in-between languages. Exercising translation allows us to expose ourselves to the differences between languages. The exercise in translation that unfolds will help to challenge some familiar distinctions such as infant/adult and uneducated/educated.

This book represents a unique indispensable reflection on the interconnection between empathy and ethics. To what extent is it right to be empathetic? Can empathy be unethical? Or is there an ethical obligation to be empathetic? Do we educate our citizens and train our professionals to use the right form of empathy?

Phenomenological ethics is a relatively new approach to ethics whose emphasis is put on the description of the lived-experience and the ethical phenomenon. The essays offer phenomenological descriptions of the thorny problem pertaining to the interconnection of empathy and ethics essential for professionals and scholars of different fields, such as philosophy, psychiatry, health science, psychology, and sociology.

Contributors: Michael Agostinelli Jr., Elodie Boublil, Francesca Brencio, Manuel Camassa, Scott D. Churchill, Nicolas de Warren, Craig Derksen, John J. Drummond, Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, Jannik M. Hansen, Simon Høffding, Joel Krueger, Carlos Lobo, Esteban Marín-Ávila, Alexander Montes, Dermot Moran, Henning Nörenberg, Tone Roald, Eva Schwarz, Andrea Staiti, Joona Taipale, Stefano Vincini, Maren Wehrle, Dan Zahavi

Development is the intentional, multidimensional process concerned with using resources to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities and countries (Girvan, 1993, p. 30). The discourse surrounding the decolonisation of Development continues its critique of Development's colonial ideologies rather than uplifting proposed alternatives and solutions. This mixed-method study used qualitative and quantitative data to examine and determine what, if anything, Afro-Caribbean Philosophy can contribute to Development in the context of Jamaica. Data sources included eight (8) Afro-Caribbean texts—including a speech, a song, four (4) poems, two (2) books—and 77 responses to an online questionnaire geared towards Jamaicans in the diaspora. Data analysis of the Afro-Caribbean texts revealed that the primary function of Afro-Caribbean philosophy is liberation—that is, the “significance of human freedom and agency” (Henry, 2000, p.168) and the struggles for independent nation-state construction and decolonisation. Under this primary function of liberation are five identified sub-themes of sensitisation, history, collectivism, self-production, and Spirit. By uplifting these findings, and deploying Afro-Caribbean philosophy as a viable alternative to the Western philosophy of modernity, this study will indicate that there are several ways Afro-Caribbean philosophy can contribute to effective Development in Jamaica.

This thesis in Educational Theory explores how teachers in Denmark reconfigured their practices of teaching to be conducted via digital means during the COVID-19 pandemic. In a time where people were locked away in isolation from the world they knew due to the threat of a of the deadly virus, I show the reconfiguration of teaching practices that subsequently impacted educational relations situated in, out and alongside the classroom. Accordingly, I draw from interviews I conducted with teachers, reflecting on their lived experiences during this period, that gives insight into how they responded to the sudden and forced shift of the (digital) classroom. Drawing on Paulo Freire’s concepts of ‘banking education’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘alienation’ with Nel Noddings’ notion of ‘care’, I argue for an approach oriented towards care and attention to the ways in which teachers are both limited in their efforts of caring but also find new ways of doing so within the changed, digital classroom. The teachers reconfiguring interventions certainly give hope for the future in which digitalization is expected to increasingly transform classrooms but nonetheless also show a limit to how much hardship the teaching professional ideal of care can endure in educational relations. 

Book review of Alison Stone's Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference, published by Cambridge UP, 2006. ISBN 978-0-521-86270-7

A structural affinity between republican freedom as non-domination and human rights claims accounts for the relevance of republicanism for cosmopolitan concerns. Central features of republican freedom is its institution dependence and the modal aspect it adds to being free. Its chief concern is not constraint, but the way in which an agent is constrained or not. To the extent I am vulnerable to someone’s dispositional power over me I am not free, even if I am not in fact constrained. Republican freedom adds a substantial element to a justification of human rights in terms of entitlement, rather than mere satisfaction of interests. A satisfied interest is not a satisfied right if the satisfaction is dependent on personal good-will and can be withdrawn at any time. Like republican freedom, human rights claims add a modal aspect to enjoyment. Both can be violated by institutional arrangement alone and can be secured only within accountable institutions. National borders may well be irrelevant to the dispositional powers to which people are vulnerable. An international set of institutions globalizes those circumstances in which republican liberty arises as a concern.

In this essay I seek to find a balance between a respect for the enduring force of a philosophical idea and for the sensitivity to contextual understanding of what philosophical ideas are.

In this article I discuss and analyse what is referred to as the standard account of discrimination as measured against a number of requirements any viable account of discrimination should satisfy. I also discuss how the standard account fails to explain how differential treatment based on genetic factors can be regarded as discriminatory.

On a functional approach to a concept one aims to address the question of why we use it at all. What is the work we want the concept to do? There can be nothing neutral about the answer to that question and the answer will not be found by merely looking at the world. The answer will be part of an elaboration of our moral and political commitments. It will be functional to the overall theory within which we use it. My aim in this article is to explore the multifaceted character of freedom, encouraged by a functional approach. Mainly, I wish to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between two questions, one concerning the meaning of liberty—What is liberty understood to be? What does it mean?—and another concerning the circumstances under which issues of liberty arise—What has to be the case for a state of affairs to be appropriately described as one of freedom or unfreedom? A number of mistakes and confusions can be cleared up if we appreciate that a factor can be an element of liberty without being included in the meaning of it, but instead in the circumstances that have to obtain for liberty to be a concern. This requires that the two questions, although related, are kept analytically distinct.

In this article I discuss different ways of conceptualising the relation between liberty and law. By ‘law’ I refer throughout to law in the sense of civil law: rules with accompanying sanctions, promulgated by a legislator for the regulation of action in political society. I do not intend to say anything about ‘natural law’, unless I explicitly state otherwise. For the purposes of my argument I will loosely group the positions I discuss under different labels: ‘liberty from the law’, ‘liberty by the law’, and ‘liberty under law’. There is nothing self-serving about these labels; indeed, they may appear simplistic and historically inept. I use them to direct our attention and in order to illustrate a general point that I wish to make, a point that seems to me to fall out of the preceeding discussion. That point is that concepts like liberty are institution dependent and that we cannot hope to understand or even talk about what they mean without adhering to that fact. To anticipate, I will argue that even when liberty is understood in terms of the absence of law, the presence of law or the possibility of its presence will have to be assumed in principle in order for its absence to make sense.

In this article Hobbes’s view of the commonwealth, and of law and liberty within it, is discussed from the point of view of social ontology. The artificial character of the commonwealth and the constitutive function of the covenant is put in terms of the institutional world being constructed through collective intentionality, which is performative, self-referential, and collective, and which serves as truth-maker. Hobbes is used here to make the point that it is a mistake to argue, as for example Tuomela has done, that the construction of institutions require a joint commitment: we-attitudes held in the we-mode. Instead, institutions on a ‘Hobbesian’ model are constructed by we-attitudes held in the I-mode. This analysis is used in a discussion of law as an institution and law serving as a constraint on freedom. The constructive character of law means that the idea of law can serve as a constraint even in an area of life where in actual fact is unregulated. In order to assess whether liberty can be said to be infringed when that happens we need to go back to the notion of an external constraint, appreciating that what agents there are, what they can do and the powers they possess are functions of collective attitudes conveying meaning and status.

Review of Catherine Villanueva Gardner Historical Dictionary of Feminist Philosophy. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2006.

Review of Quentin Skinner's Hobbes and Republican Liberty, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

I denna artikel diskuteras lagstiftning som metod för att motverka diskriminering och den form som svensk diskrimineringslag har med avsikt att utvärdera diskrimineringslagens potential att fungera som det instrument för rättvisa det avses vara. Som illustration tjänar ett rättfall från Arbetsdomstolen, det så kallade Barnmorskemålet.