The purpose of moral exemplarism is to render moral theory practically functional. It deals with how to make virtue theories about what is good for us work, and with being able to ground one’s account of virtue in a realistic understanding of human nature and of the cognitive mechanisms that govern human action. According to Linda Zagzebski’s conception of moral exemplarism, exemplars are to be understood as ‘supremely admirable persons who show us the upper reaches of human capability, and in doing so, inspire us to expect more from ourselves’ (Zagzebski, 2017, p. 1). From the point of view of Spinoza’s philosophy, the problem with hinging a practical moral theory on the emulation of “supremely admirable persons” is that it becomes an inefficient (perhaps even counter-productive) pedagogical tool insofar as it betrays a false (highly idealized) understanding of human nature. While Spinoza extrapolates on the traits of a supremely admirable person in the propositions on the “free man” in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of practical relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his exemplar on the idea of a supremely admirable person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. The purpose for this seems to be to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people (regardless of societal context and level of understanding) in ethical self-transformation.