On a functional approach to a concept one aims to address the question of why we use it at all. What is the work we want the concept to do? There can be nothing neutral about the answer to that question and the answer will not be found by merely looking at the world. The answer will be part of an elaboration of our moral and political commitments. It will be functional to the overall theory within which we use it. My aim in this article is to explore the multifaceted character of freedom, encouraged by a functional approach. Mainly, I wish to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between two questions, one concerning the meaning of liberty—What is liberty understood to be? What does it mean?—and another concerning the circumstances under which issues of liberty arise—What has to be the case for a state of affairs to be appropriately described as one of freedom or unfreedom? A number of mistakes and confusions can be cleared up if we appreciate that a factor can be an element of liberty without being included in the meaning of it, but instead in the circumstances that have to obtain for liberty to be a concern. This requires that the two questions, although related, are kept analytically distinct.