The Shifting Power Dynamics Between Indonesia and West Papua in Global Discourse.

Narratives in the 50s versus Now.

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Abstract

This Study is concerned with the WP-Indonesia conflict and the development of its narrative since 1949 as well as the shifting in power dynamics. It reveals that the past decades have not changed the essential power dynamic of Indonesia holding the main power by portraying itself as the “protector,” while WP describes them as a “colonising power”. Nevertheless, a slow trend has been detected as the Papuan narrative shifts towards WP presenting independent ways of governing to the global community, portraying itself as being on the same level as other sovereign states. Further research could investigate the differences in national versus international narratives and their influence on public opinion. The narratives are being traced using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and framing theory by Robert Entman. Combining these frameworks, the narratives are analysed by focusing on the presented issue, cause, moral judgement, suggested resolutions and portrayed power imbalances. Moreover, the data that are being used involve public statements by the political elite of each party.

Keywords: West Papua conflict, Power Relations, Narratives, Political Discourse

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List of abbreviations:

AFC Act of Free Choice
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
ID Indonesia
OPM Operasi Merdeka Papua (Free West Papua Movement)
PMRI Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia
PNC Papuan National Committee
TPNPB Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (West Papua National Liberation Army)
ULMWP United Liberation Movement West Papua
WP West Papua

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“Any political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language.”

- Schäffner, 1996

1. Introduction

West Papua\(^1\) has been part of Indonesia since 1969 (Saltford, 2000). However, there have been independence movements and conflicts since the 1960s (Gietzelt, 1989). Indonesia argues that Indonesians and Papuans are one people, who suffered the same oppressor and therefore belong together. The Papuan people, on the other hand, claim to belong to a different ethnicity (Melanesians), have a different culture, and even speak a different language (Braithwaite et al., 2010). WP makes up more than 20% of Indonesia’s land mass and is rich in resources: the world’s largest gold mine is located there, as well as the third-largest copper mine (Kusumaryati, 2021). Research states that rebels, fighting for independence, have been violently suppressed and transmigration was supposed to overflow the Island and overtake influential positions (Gietzelt, 1989). The influence that Indonesia has on the education system is vital.

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\(^1\) This study will refer to the whole area of the western part of New Guinea island by using the term West Papua and call the people Papuans referring to a manifesto published in 1961 by the Papuan People congress. The name of this territory has changed several times during the past century. Irian Jaya has been firstly presented by the papuan nationalist Marcus Kaisiepo in 1945, including its etymology based on a Biak phrase: Irian = “it is hot” “it is rising”. As research shows (Jon and Herman, 1984), the term has been introduced to Marcus Kaisiepo in a class by Indonesians and has been the term Indonesia used after the AFC until the end of Suharto’s reign. Also, this territory has been called different versions of Western New Guinea referring to the eastern half of the island, Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, in 2003 President Megawati Sukarnoputri separated the western territory into two provinces, Papua and West Papua (Blades, 2020). There have been more versions during the years and it also depends on the political sentiments of the people which term is used which are not relevant to this research.
The subject of a region fighting for independence is not new and historically the UN was involved as a diplomatic and independent power in the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969, and the Netherlands as the past colonizer (Giezelt, 1989). Also, US companies are part of this since they have contracts with the Indonesian government regarding mining in WP.

The Indonesian narrative communicates to the world that the independence fight of the West Papuan population is illegitimate. In contrast the West Papuan movement’s narrative delegitimizes the position Indonesia takes and its use of violence on the island. For example, about two years ago, the Indonesian government officially declared the “WP National Army - Free Papua Organization” a terrorist organisation (Permana, 2021). The narrative of that group is that they are acting in self-defence (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Also, there have been reports of a general racist sentiment in Indonesia (C.N.N. Indonesia, 2021) regarding Papuans. This shows how and why it is difficult for the global community to manage this sort of conflict, as the narratives differ, and hard facts are hard to find. Especially since the human rights examiners are not allowed into WP by Indonesian rule. The course of conflicts is majorly determined by the narratives that are communicated to important actors; frames are political power. This research addresses the narrative that has been communicated by the Indonesian elite about WP and vice versa, how the West Papuan elite narrated Indonesia’s role during the past 78 years. The way these two parties frame each other will be compared and analysed. The aim is to identify the narratives and the presented Power imbalances and analyse them by using a combination of Robert Entman’s framing method and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Looking at the way these narratives are presented, this research will search for similarities and differences that have been portrayed over the years. Further, it will examine if the main messages sent by Indonesia and WP today differ from those in the 1950s. Entman focuses on the main issue/problem at hand, the presented causes for them, how the narrator morally judges involved parties and the suggested resolutions for the conflict (1993). Further, CDA is used to identify power imbalances, concluding the analysis there will be comparison of the findings and the research question regarding a possible development will be answered. This study is based on thirty-six different public statements over the past 73 years. There have been studies focusing on the rhetoric used by both actors, but, as research showed, there has not been a comparative study of this communication on the global level. The aim of this research is to analyse global communication of WP and Indonesia since the independence of Indonesia to find out whether there is a shift in the portrayed power dynamics. This is relevant because it shows the difficulties of the global community managing this conflict, as the narratives differ, and hard facts are hard to come by. Therefore,
this research will focus on global communication and power dynamics. It will be guided by the following two questions:

1. How have the narratives developed?
2. How have the portrayed power dynamics developed?

In order to analyse the development of the narratives over time, this research looks at three time periods: 1945 until 1966, 1966 until 1998 and 1998 until 2023.

1. 2. Global Politics relevance

The understanding of global politics involves global processes studied through local examples and the other way around. This field is concerned with power relations on a political, social, economic, or cultural on a global level. Additionally, Global Politics examine hierarchies and seek to understand the historical and modern affairs that result in the way politics is displayed at a national and international level (Heywood, 2014). As Huntington states, conflicts usually occur between nations and groups of different civilizations and global politics would be overrun by the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1993). Therefore, this issue regarding WP is relevant to this field as it crosses international borders, as it concerns international organizations such as the UN, which also took over administrative power in the 60s (Webster, 2013). Further, it addresses hierarchies, regarding race and citizenship in WP. On the one hand, the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences between Indonesians and Papuans are denied. On the other hand, racism is occurring regularly as Papuans have a darker skin color, culture, and language. WP is still fighting for its independence, even after the Westminster declaration in 2016 got signed and therefore stated that they have the right to self-determination (ULMWP, 2016). Thus, government, power, and justice are the key topics of this study.

1. 3. Delimitations

Research concerning the conflict about WP has the potential to develop in several different ways. As this study is focused on global communication, a different analyses could concentrate on the development of the narratives of Indonesia and WP on a national level which has great potential as well. As the general public is often under-represented it offers a different perspective on the conflict and it is possible to either compare the narratives of the general public with the narratives of the political elite on a national level, or focus on the international level, by including social media. Further, framing theory offers a framework to
analyse the same event but on both sides, meaning the framing of the same event can differ greatly depending on the political narrative concerning the topic. This can also lead to an analysis of propaganda itself, the intentions of those communicating it and its effect on the general public. Thus, it becomes clear that there are different ways to approach this topic and what to focus on. This research has decided to concentrate on the development of global communication regarding the conflict about WP.
2. Background

This chapter is concerned with the background of the conflict, historical and political. To give the reader an overview of the issues regarding Indonesia’s and West Papua’s relations, the chapter will describe the different times, starting with the discussions of the President Sukarno and WP rose in the 1950s and ending in the modern day of 2023 with the kidnapping issue of a New Zealand Pilot by West Papuan independence fighters as leverage in the fight for independence (Wirawan, Ng and Armstrong, 2023). As the crisis concerning WP has been going on for over 70 years, there have been countless reported violent conflicts. Therefore, not all can be discussed here, and, in the thesis, it will concentrate on the broad political development during this time. Additional to the general context this chapter includes a brief introduction to the “special autonomy law” which was implemented first in 2001 as a compromise in the independence fight. This is essential for understanding the development of WP and its relationship with Indonesia in the past 25 years.

2.1. Political development 1945-2023

This topic will be divided into three time periods here. The first one starts with the independence of Indonesia and its first president Sukarno (original name: Kusno Sosrodihardjo). Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 but was recognized as an independent state in 1949 (Gouda and Zaalberg, 2002). In this research, Indonesia's independence will refer to 1949.

During colonial times, the Papuan island had been divided into two different colonies, the west as part of the Netherlands and the east as part of Australia. When the Netherlands left administrative power in Indonesia, they did not do the same in the Papuan colony. They stated that the Indonesian people do not share anything with the West Papuan people, not their ethnicity, language, or culture. Indonesia on the other hand claimed that they were one people and that they had suffered the same colonial oppressor, the Netherlands, which was supposed to unite them (Kirsch, 2010). Throughout Sukarno’s reign, the Dutch prepared WP for self-determination and independence. The main Papuan opinion today is that Papua's independence was declared on December 1, 1961, when the Morning Star flag was first raised (Webster, 2013). Thus, the Morning Star flag became the symbol of the West Papuan nation,
but, a month later, Sukarno ordered the destruction of the Dutch “puppet state” (Musgrave, 2015). One year later, in 1962, the New York agreement was applied and transferred the administrative authority of WP to the UN for a limited time period (Webster, 2013).

It is possible to determine the end of the first period when the “Act of Free Choice” (AFC) took place in 1969 (Saltford, 2000) and WP officially became part of Indonesia. Nevertheless, in this paper, the first period ends at the same time as the presidency of Sukarno, in 1966 when Suharto (original name: Kemusu Argamulja), became president. The time between 1966 and 1969 was crucial for West Papua’s destiny, as Suharto had a meaningful influence on the development of WP.

Therefore, in this study, it has been decided to start the second time period with President Suharto, which lasts until his government was overthrown in 1998 (Leith, 2002). In the year before Suharto gained presidential power, the anti-communist mass murder occurred under his leadership, as he was head of the Indonesian military (Zurbuchen, 2002). It paved the way for the coup d’état and therefore for the fall of President Sukarno. This massacre has only recently been acknowledged and apologised for by current president Joko Widodo (called: Jokowi) (Ng, 2023). Only one year after Suharto became president, negotiations with the mining company “Freeport” started, and until now Freeport owns the world's biggest gold mine, which is in WP (Leith, 2002). The AFC also found application during Suharto’s regiment, shortly after that, in 1969. It included several representatives of WP and the vote to be part of Indonesia was unilateral, however, this vote is commonly known as corrupt, as the Papuan representatives were pressured, bribed, etc. to vote to be part of the Indonesian state (Musgrave, 2015). Following that, all Papuan political movements were immediately banned, and the Indonesian military brutally eliminated all acts of protest (Kirsch, 2010). Nevertheless, the West Papuan independence movement grew, and Indonesia relentlessly used its military force to keep them as quiet as possible without any regard for human rights (Tasevski, 2021). Moreover, the Indonesian government has tried to force an Indonesian identity on the Melanesian people of WP. Researcher Gietzelt calls this the ‘Indonesianization’ of WP (Gietzelt, 1989). In this process, it is assumed that the West Papuan population is less advanced and not as civilised as the Javanese people of Indonesia and would only benefit from their influence. Since many Indonesians have migrated to WP and work in administrative and industrial areas there, it has separated Indigenous Papuans from (economic) development, which Giezelt sees as one of the reasons for them to develop a stronger sense of their own cultural identity and desire for self-determination (Gietzelt, 1989).
The last time period started with the age of ‘Reformasi’ in the early 2000s (Van Den Broek and Szalay, 2001) when there were new votes and efforts for non-violent resolutions such as the “special autonomy law” (BPK RI, 2001). The time period between 1999 and 2000 was called the Papuan Spring. During that time, the TNI (Indonesian army) remained influential, even though the military presence was reduced during the early post-Suharto period (1998 - 2004). They still had territorial command and participated in a substantial number of businesses in WP (Macleod, 2015). This was also the time when Benny Wenda emerged as the political leader of Demmak (Dewan Musyawarah Masyarakat Koteka), the Koteka Tribal Assembly. The goal of this assembly was to gain more recognition and protection from Indonesia in WP. The Papuan Spring ended when a compromised version of the special autonomy law was issued under the presidency of Megawati in 2001, which was followed by military actions against the so-called separatists. Shortly after that Theys Eluay, leader of the PDP, was murdered (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

There have been countless violent incidents in WP, even in the short amount of time between 1998 and 2023. Starting with the Biak massacre in 1998 that was triggered by Papuans raising their national flag and left more than 100 people dead and tortured but is still denied by the Indonesian government and several similar events in Abepura (2000), Wamena (2000; 2008), Waisor (2001), and Enarotali (2014) (Macleod, 2015). In 2014 the current president of Indonesia was elected, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), he has a liberal reputation and appears regularly in WP. Two years later the Westminster declaration stated that WP has the right to self-determination (ULMWP, 2016). Following this, the ULMWP states that they have smuggled a petition for independence over the border that included signatures of over 1,804,421 people. There have been different statements that the UN had never received such a petition (Hawley, 2017) while others state that it exists and has been rejected (Doherty and Lamb, 2017). In 2019 racism-related protests were taking place in WP and resulted in an Internet blackout that lasted several days. The Indonesian government argued that this was necessary to reduce the risk of further escalation (Kishi, Pavlik, and Jones, 2020). Following this in 2020, protests took place again, connecting to the racism issue from the year before and the sentencing of students that were charged with treason for taking part in the protests in 2019. A year later WP declared a provisional government, once more addressing Indonesia to leave their country. A recent development is the hostage-taking of the New Zealand Pilot P. Mehrten by the West Papuan separatists who demand independence under the threat of killing the hostage. Indonesia has unequivocally stated that there will be no negotiations and that WP will always belong to Indonesia (NBC, 2023). Benny Wenda, the leader, and founder of the
Free WP Campaign (2004), Chairman of the United Liberation Movement for WP (ULMWP), and long-term independence fighter has released a statement calling for the release of the hostage. He criticises Indonesia and blames the government for the fact that the UN Human Rights Commissioner was not allowed to enter the country for three years. (Bohane, 2023).

2. 2. Special Autonomy Law

The law of special autonomy has to be mentioned here, as WP has come closer to independence again here. This law had immense potential to turn the relationship between Indonesia and WP around after the violence that Suharto brought into the province. Bearing in mind that the special autonomy law is complex, this chapter will provide merely a brief overview of its development.

In 2021 the special autonomy law that was issued in 2001 came to the end of its planned time period and had to be revised. Reflecting on the first 20 years under special autonomy researchers such as J. McLoed (2015) and R. J. May (2021) have found it unsuccessful. May states that WP still is underdeveloped, and Papuans are disillusioned. The law is not seen as successful, since it was not negotiated upon, but solely developed by the government and the Papuans did not come to a consensus about it, therefore they did not accept this possibility. Also, the central government lost its credibility since it tried to bypass the withdrawal of its troops (Bertrand, 2014). The former Governor of Papua, Lukas Enembe (2020), stated that special autonomy has not provided the Papuan people with meaningful power, that the law does not get followed through and that national laws are still overpowering.

Moreover, he claims that the large funds have created a dependency on the Indonesian government, and it gave room for corruption. The plan was to work against these issues with a revised special autonomy in 2021, the corruption is supposed to be reduced by implementing more of a welfare system that is not controlled by the provincial capitals. Also, funds can be distributed without going through the provincial government and the creation of new provinces is possible by the national government. Thus, the Indonesian government has more control over what happens with the funding in WP (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2020). This has broadly not been accepted by Papuans as they understand it as Indonesia is trying to divide the Papuans people and their spirit. But there have been movements that promote the special autonomy law by stating that independence and special autonomy do not have to be seen as exclusionary. Credibility is still the biggest issue here.
2. 3. Actors

2. 3. 1. OPM - Free Papua Movement (Operasi Papua Merdeka)

The relevant actors that constitute the elite of the WP conflict involve the Indonesian government, the Free Papua Movement (OPM - Operasi Papua Merdeka), the United Liberation Movement WP (ULMWP), and the Guerilla forces fighting for West Papuan freedom (TPNPB). The OPM represents the beginning of the (organised) independence movement of WP. It emerged during the annexation process of WP by Indonesia, when the Netherlands were preparing WP for independence. The sources differ on when exactly the OPM was founded, it ranges from 1963 (Premdas, 1985) to 1970 (Free WP Campaign, 2012). However, the goal remains the same - fighting the colonisation by Indonesia which has since been presented as the armed military or guerilla force of WP. As Henk Joku from the OPM has stated in 1985, the OPM’s essential argument on why WP deserves independence is that it is the “birthright” (Joku, 1985) of the Melanesian people. They refer to the New Guinea Council resolution of 31 October 1961 (Gault-Williams, 1987). The OPM is described as a decentralised movement that involves subgroups that occasionally work together, but at times can act against each other in competition. There appears to be no single chain of command since the OPM includes different clan and ethnic loyalties, class differences, personal resentment, and rural areas that have different agendas. Factions of the OPM have different names, but it usually is a version of the National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) or TPN/OPM (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2015).

2. 3. 2. ULMWP - United Liberation Movement West Papua

The ULMWP was founded in 2014 by West Papuan leaders during a meeting in Vanuatu. Before there was the Federal Republic of WP (NRFPB), National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), and WP National Parliament (PNWP). They came together under the ULMWP which announced to work through the rules of “green democracy” and since 2021 there has been a cabinet involving twelve departments. Benny Wenda founded the Free WP Campaign and acts as president of the provisional government of WP, as announced by the ULMWP. Moreover, he has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and received the “Freedom of Oxford” (Office of Benny Wenda, n.d.). He is being criticised heavily by the TPNPB which split in 2017 the TPNPB from the ULMWP (C.N.N. Indonesia, 2020). This group does not
see their agenda represented in Benny Wenda and the ULMWP. There have been accusations of Wenda not fighting for WP but being a pawn in the hands of the European, American, and Australian capitalists, underlining that his politics is leading to the opposite of the principles of the Papuan nation (Hariyadi, 2020). As the TPNPB does not provide statements that are on the same level regarding the usage and involvement in global discourse as the ones by Indonesian officials or ULMWP officials, it has been decided to not include them as representatives of the West Papuan voice.

2. 3. 3. PMRI - Permanent Mission of the Republic Indonesia

The Permanent Mission to the European Headquarters of the United Nations and other international organisations in Geneva, Switzerland was founded in 1967 and its purpose was to take over the course of the Indonesian Ambassadors from Bern and Bonn in Geneva, as Indonesia’s involvement in international affairs grew (mission-indonesia.org, n.d.).
3. Previous research and theories

The purpose of the following chapter is to discuss previous research regarding war rhetoric and narratives that have been analysed or mentioned during research on this conflict. Also, studies that have followed a similar approach concerning different political issues will be discussed. As framing theory has been used by several scholars to analyse narratives there is mentionable research to go through. Moreover, this will show in detail where the research gap lies that this study attempts to fill.

Even though most research did not mention narratives explicitly in their research question, it still occurs regularly as part of other research regarding Indonesia and WP. A lot of research is concerned with the historic corruption and wrongdoings during this conflict, for instance the AFC in 1969. For example, Alison Bevege’s work concentrates on the “Blood politics of West Papua” and describes it as a “slow genocide” (2014), as well as Johnny Blades’ research regarding security concerns in WP (Blades, 2020).

3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis-(CDA) is a framework that includes different disciplines such as political sciences, cultural studies, or linguistics. CDA has been described as a broad topic over the years, so there are many different definitions. Fairclough (1995) defines CDA as an approach that comes from discourse analysis and concentrates on how language and discourse work together regarding power dynamics and social imbalances while including social and political structures. A similar definition is given by van Dijk (1993) who stresses the analytical part of working with language and discourse to understand power dynamics. Both researchers have had a significant impact on the development of this approach. In his collection of work regarding CDA, Fairclough includes different perspectives and categories in this kind of analysis, he connects language with ideology and power, and looks at discourse in societal and cultural change, linguistic analysis, and awareness in the educational context (Fairclough, 1995). Later, he specifically adds political discourse analysis and the context of globalisation. This shows that CDA is modifiable and adapts to current developments (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). CDA is based on Critical Linguistics (Rogers, 2004) that
was developed in the 1970s in the UK and Australia (Fowler et al, 1979). Halliday’s research brought up “Patterns of Experience” and “Patterns of ideologies” in the context of formal grammar. Thus, Critical linguistics started to evolve and described language as having ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions at the same time (Halliday, 1978). The definition of languages as a “social act” (Fowler, 1991) and the involvement of ideologies in grammatical structures has been taken up by CDA researchers such as Fairclough and Fowler and led to the emergence of CDA. This enabled researchers to realise that language is a tool to describe something but as a tool that can evaluate social context (Halliday, 1973, 1978). This led to the development of more approaches that focus on various kinds of discourse. Nevertheless, they all share the same assumption that any form of communication needs to be analysed in regard to its context (Fowler 1991). The approach has faced several critiques, Schegloff states that researchers bring their biases into the analysis (Schegloff, 1999). Fairclough’s research suggests applying CDA by using a three-dimensional model that is concerned with descriptive analysis of textual presentation on the micro level, discursive practice analysis on the meso level and socio-cultural structures on the macro level (Fairclough, 1995). Van Dijk’s CDA approach is widely known and has also been found in research regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict (Qawariq, 2020; Amer, 2017). Also, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model has been used in the context of this conflict (Shaban and Al-Thalab, 2021). The authors have taken political speeches and analysed them looking at the development of the way ideologies have been presented. As there is little research that explicitly uses CDA in the same manner in the WP-Indonesia, the topic of the Israeli-Palestine conflict draws significant parallels in the dynamics. Nevertheless, explicitly mentioning CDA, Warami et al (2014) discuss the politics of language regarding power relations in the conflict of WP. They focus on the form of the politics of language and their political function. Their research on the WP-Indonesia is directed at national discourse and therefore analyses primary sources that are written in Indonesian and translates them into English. The study concentrates on the role that language plays or can play in the political context of this conflict.

However, there is research focusing on CDA by specifically analysing the framing of narratives in the WP-Indonesia conflict which will be discussed in the following chapter.
3. 2. Framing theory

When addressing CDA, framing is also part of it (Delon, 2018). Scholars like Goffman (1974) have emerged from sociology and psychology (Scheufele and Tewsbury, 2007) and specialised themselves in research regarding framing. Goffman stated that frames are the layout that categorises human experience. He defines human experience here as “Definitions of a situation built up in accordance with the principles of organisation which govern events - at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such as these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of a frame” (Goffman, 1974). The part of critical discourse analysis becomes clear as frames can be seen as “mechanisms of hegemonic control employed by the powerful” (Delon, 2018). Previous research shows that CDA has been combined with framing theory before (Kanwal and García, 2019). As CDA is concerned with the way language influences social and political realities, framing theory highlights the way public communication shapes people's perceptions through strategies. The discourse about a topic is heavily influenced by the way it is framed. Foucault stated that “what we think we ‘know’ in a particular period” about a specific topic influences how we regulate, control, and punish that issue (Hall, 1997).

Robert Entman is known for his work on political communication, his most influential works are “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm", published in 1993, and "Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy" (2004). Here, he places framing in the context of political communication and presents it as central to it. Furthermore, he argues that framing exists in several different disciplines, which he describes as “scattered” (Entman, 1993, p.1), and requires a more universal understanding. His definition of framing is that one can choose certain aspects of perceived reality and highlight those to fit a specific problem definition, depending on what one seeks to achieve. Entman’s research focuses on media communication but is not restricted to it. His theory is concerned with the way actors use language to influence how situations and topics are perceived by others. A central part of his research was a comparative study of two seemingly similar incidents: a Korean military jet which was shot down by the Soviet military in 1983 as it crossed Soviet airspace on the one hand, and an Iranian passenger jet which was shot by the US military in the Persian Gulf in 1991 (Entman, 1991). Comparing how these incidents were reported on, the study showed that, despite the factual similarity, media coverage was clearly different depending on the objective of the framing. Entman's findings were that a narrative is created by distinct factors such as keywords, metaphors, symbols, visual images, and
name-giving for people or ideas. Entman identified four main locations of communication processes, the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. To operationalize framing theory the analysis can focus on how frames are communicated, reviewed, strengthened, or weakened (Garvin & Eyles 2001). Further, Entman (1993) provides four framing functions: the framed problem, the framed cause, moral judgments, and suggested resolutions which can also be described as a four-dimensional model.

According to Gamson (1989), framing theory is concerned with how messages are made and distributed as well as how they influence the way the other understands and judges. This has been present especially in media studies since the media frames their news to communicate a certain message. Gamson and Modigliani explain that a media frame is the “central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning” (1987, p.143). Entman (1993) also states that events are designed to follow a certain frame to control how people perceive them and talk about them from a specific social perspective. Moreover, Entman (1993) describes framing as a way to develop certain definitions, reasons, morals, and solutions for a problem in the audience by reformulating reality, taking only some parts of it and making them essential to the message. Framing does not necessarily have to happen consciously as it can be the case in advocacy journalism, but also if a complex message is not assessed well enough and some aspects of it get lost and some are emphasised it is a frame. Therefore, the same event can be presented in different ways.

Research suggests that there are two types of framing, episodic and thematic. The first one is supposed to focus on single examples of big events and the second type concentrates on the topic itself (Iyengar, 1991). There are different approaches on the research of framing, either media framing in general and how these frames are used by the receivers to make sense of events as an independent variable, or as a dependent one by looking at how and why specific frames are constructed and adopted (Tewskbury and Scheufele, 2009). Moreover, previous research has concluded that framing can significantly influence the opinion of the receivers on main topics (Dell'Orto et al., 2004; Scheufele, 2000). However, as studies differ majorly, it makes it hard to apply a previously used framework. Further, frames can overlap or the opposite, not cover everything (Tankard, 2001). As Chyi and McCombs (2004) have pointed out, some events get framed over and over again, for the audience to stay attentive. As framing is used to influence public opinion, framing theory can be used to analyse if or how this is happening. However, this is beyond the scope of this research and, thus, will be neglected in this paper. Framing theory has been repeatedly applied to the communication of opposing countries or sides. The cases of Israel and Palestine, as well as the US and Iraq, have
been researched frequently. In both cases, the narratives about each other have been carefully constructed to fit their creator's agenda. Also, the conflict in WP has been analysed by using framing theory. Justito Adiprasetio (2020) writes about the way the media, especially Indonesian online media, has presented the attacks on Papuan students and how it influences public opinion. Often framing theory is used regarding news coverage, this study focuses on direct statements by the political elites of relevant and representable parties. Thus, for this study, framing theory is adapted to fit the aim and the available sources.

In an international context, using the theoretical framework of framing helps understanding conflicts and relations since political manipulation can have a major impact on the decision-making of political leaders (Mintz and Redd, 2003).

3.3. Narratives

There are multiple definitions for narratives. David Herman and Jared Gardner (2011), linguists, explain narratives as “world imagination”. Argyros (1992) defined it as an information processing strategy that is framed causally and is “composed of a frequently tangled hierarchy of nested plots and subplots”. Kenneth Burke (1969) stressed that narratives require essential components: a protagonist (actor), a series of events (action), a purpose or objective (goal or intention), a specific setting (scene), and a tool (instrument). Narratives operate as structural frameworks enabling individuals to discern causality and establish links between seemingly unrelated circumstances, even when such connections may not appear evident initially (Burke, 1969).

As Freedman (2006) states, powerful people influence national and international opinions through purposeful communication, by using convincing storytelling that explains events in a certain way to reach a certain view.

Anne Marie Slaughter (2011) came up with the concept of strategic narratives. Those are described as shaping the identity and making images. Regarding competitive US interests, Slaughter depicts a strategic narrative as a story that everyone, in this case, all Americans, can understand and they can identify with (Slaughter, 2011). Miskimmon et al. (2014) define strategic narratives as an instrument for a political persona to manufacture a shared definition of the past, present and future regarding international politics in order to control the behaviour of national or international parties. So, political actors use strategic narratives to influence and change the discourse about issues that concern them. Strategic narratives describe the state,
the system the state operates in, who the affected people are as a people, and what kind of system they want to live in.

Every research on the WP conflict and Indonesia's role in it includes different ways of communication that the involved parties presented and, thus, it includes different narratives. As narratives are omnipresent (Forchtner, 2021), using this framework in an analysis can add valuable insights into the conflict. Moreover, the use of Indonesian police and military force has been discussed, and the way the Indonesian government legitimised and defended it by stating that they have to protect themselves and civilians against insurgents (Syailendra, 2016). Even though this work has not focused on international communication, Syailendra has found that the narratives of Indonesia and WP present themselves as contradictory. The Narrative of the OPM is described as anti-governmental and promotes an image that is loaded with negative views, especially concerning police/military power. The Indonesian government, on the other hand, is presented as communicating a narrative of positive development. The author calls it a “war of narratives” (Syailendra, 2016).

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict calls the narrative of the pro-independence movement a narrative of oppression (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2015). Another paper that is concerned with narratives is called “The Limit of Narratives”, once more it is not directed at international communication. Nevertheless, the author describes the narrative of Indonesian nationalists about Papuans as portraying them as 100 percent Indonesian. Also, in their view, the AFC in 1969 was legitimate and decided by the Papuans themselves. Another point of their narrative is that separating one part of Indonesia would risk others following that and lead to instability in Indonesia (Hadiprayitno, 2017).

Scholar Richard Chauvel (2005) focuses his research on the West Papuan identity and explains their narrative as being based on the events in the late 60s. As economic development was central to Suharto's government and its political legitimacy, West Papuan nationalists only saw suffering as a result of it (Chauvel, 2005).

There has been research that used Edward Said's (1978) postcolonial theory here. It has been discussed how far the Western, colonial rhetoric can be transferred to Indonesia’s narrative. The findings suggest that Indonesia, being an ex-colony, imitates the ways of its previous oppressor and adds its own strategies. Said defines this as postcolonial colonialism. By using a dominant narrative, supported by market interests and planned transmigration, Indonesia's annexation of WP shows similarities with the time of the Dutch colonial power (Down, 2015). One of the narratives presented in Chauvel's research compares the Indonesian annexation of WP to a forced marriage, meaning that in the beginning, it was against the will
of the people, but after decades of living together, they have got used to each other and even belong together. This metaphor was presented by former West Papuan governor Barnabas Suebu (Chauvel, 2005). Chauvel’s research has contributed immensely to this field. His work with Ikrar Nusa Bhakti about Jakarta’s perceptions and policies has focused on the changes in Indonesia’s perspective regarding West Papua’s position in Indonesia. Moreover, they concentrated on the way Jakarta’s policies changed through the years, starting from the independence of Indonesia with the first president Sukarno until the presidency of his daughter from 2001 to 2004 (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004). Viartasiwi’s (2018) work explicitly concentrates on the narratives of WP and Indonesia about the conflict. His objective is to understand the role history, and the way it is narrated to legitimise one’s actions, play in the conflict. Viartasiwi finds that Indonesia’s and WP’s perspective on the same historical differ in the way they narrate it, Indonesia uses “careful” terms such as “restoration” referring to the AFC, while WP describes the same act as “colonization”. His research focuses on the framing of the same historical events on an intra-national level.

The research gap here appears to be in the topic of global communication. It has not been discussed how state representatives communicate on a global basis, for example addressing the UN. As stated above, there have been studies analyzing the language used by both Indonesian representatives and West Papuan’s independence fighters. However, there has not been a comparative study of this communication on the international level. Overall, it becomes clear that research regarding the Topic of West Papua’s independence movement is limited. Also, the quality is lacking due to strict regulations in Indonesia and WP, but the rise of the internet age has led to more information that cannot be controlled as before. Furthermore, the research is mostly causal or normative, focused on the reasons for this conflict and how to resolve it. Nevertheless, this is useful for my research, since I will compare these reasons with the narrative that Indonesia has facing WP.

The research gap can be seen as it lacks empirical research here and global communication can differ greatly from national communication as the addressed parties have different influence and power dynamics. Especially regarding communication at the UN is supposed to be on the same level as other sovereign states, on a national level there can be more of a hierarchical structure.
4. Method

In order to answer the two research questions, this analysis is divided into two parts. Firstly, the narratives of WP and Indonesia and how they use framing in the WP-Indonesia conflict are analysed. Secondly, this analysis is used to unpack the underlying power relations in the WP-Indonesia conflict.

This study is investigating how narratives of Indonesia and WP are presented to the global community and have developed over the decades-long crisis in WP. To understand how framing is used in this conflict, a descriptive study and an in-depth analysis of global communication will be conducted by looking at speeches, public discussions, and official statements by the political elites of both parties. Therefore, this research will not only focus on the content of these documents but also on their rhetoric.

4. 1. Research design

This study is a comparative analysis of Indonesia’ and West Papua’s global communication (narratives). The framework of critical discourse analyses will be used to focus on portrayed power imbalances. For this qualitative analysis, primary sources, such as speeches and official statements that can be found on the official web pages of the involved parties or in the UN archive will be compared.

As mentioned before, Edward Said provides an analytical approach regarding postcolonialism and narratives, as he calls it: Orientalism. This can also be used in the example of Indonesia and WP, Indonesia acting as the coloniser. Here, it is possible to analyse similarities to identified characteristics of Western postcolonial narratives. Edward Said has used this specifically regarding the conflict between Israel and Palestine and the Great Britain-India relationship. The dynamics could, to a certain degree, be compared to Indonesia and WP. His theory of Orientalism could be applied to this conflict regarding the way Western discourse creates and depicts non-Western cultures. Therefore, it is possible to compare this with how the elite in Indonesia presents WP in their narrative. Power dynamics, stereotypes, and cultural essentialism can be factors that need to be filtered out when analysing the narrative. Regarding power relations Edward Said’s theory can be used to analyse how Indonesia expresses its power about its framing of WP and how WP answers to it, possibly
destabilising these power dynamics. Further, essentialism has been mentioned by Said referring to non-Western cultures being generalised. Regarding the global context, power dynamics hold influence over the way narratives are formed and communicated, so it can be analysed how WP and Indonesia adapt to this. Overall, Said’s research is aimed at comprehending how power, representation, and knowledge production play a role in the emergence of narratives. Said's theories, particularly his concept of Orientalism, shed light on the underlying power structures and cultural biases that influence the construction and portrayal of narratives. By applying Said's insights, one can critically analyse the discourses, stereotypes, and ideological frameworks employed by both parties, highlighting how dominant narratives may perpetuate unequal power relations and reinforce colonial legacies.

Nevertheless, this approach has to be used carefully, as the name Orientalism suggests it has been used to analyse Middle Eastern and North African cultures and how the West has depicted them specifically. Thus, the question arises if this is transferable to the southeast Asian and Pacific contexts. There might be aspects specific to these cultures that cannot be considered in this analysis. Overall, the concept of Orientalism is widely used in postcolonial studies and discourse analysis and concentrates on the way Western narratives refer to the Middle eastern states. Still, his work was also concerned the British-Indian relationship, which is closer to the southeast Asian topic here. Nevertheless, the relationships that have been analysed here exclusively focus on the global north colonising the global south. The relationship between Indonesia, a former colony, and WP, also a former colony is not completely comparable, as they both have been colonised before. Since this research is focused on the analysis of southeast Asia and both regions have a colonial background, Said is not the best approach as it is specified in a slightly different context.

Further, constructivism can be vital to narrative analysis, since it looks at them from an inner perspective, meaning that norms, social constructs, and identities are considered. Since constructivism concentrates more on internal structures and, hence, is more applicable to international communication, it will not be considered in this study as it does not support the aim of analysing the narratives.

CDA can be described as an overarching term for framing theory since it involves the interpretation of political language and puts it in the political context. This study focuses on CDA according to Fairclough in order to specifically focus on portrayed power imbalances in the narratives that are on display. To follow the aim of this study we can see the possible development starting with the basic question regarding the actors that are presenting these narratives and going deeper by concentrating on the moral judgement and presented solutions
to the conflict at hand. Additionally, the international context is included in Entman’s framing theory, as the different actors are focused upon and how they shape public opinion and policies. Thus, the theory also includes suggestions for international comprehension and reactions which will not be included in this theory as it focuses on the political elite of the two parties in the conflict and how they present themselves and each other in front of global actors. Including the (possible) reactions of the global community would not fit in this study. Framing theory, as presented by Robert Entman, explores the process by which individuals or groups choose specific facets of an issue and pay attention to them, intending to shape public sentiment and influence policy decisions (Chong and Druckman, 2007). This theory proves especially useful when applied to the examination of how narratives are constructed on a global scale. It can focus on the various tactics employed by diverse actors in framing discussions related to the WP conflict and reveal the far-reaching consequences these framing strategies can have on international comprehension of the issue and the subsequent responses it triggers. Entman’s four-dimensional Model of framing analysis is combined with CDA regarding power relation analysis. By combining these two models, it is possible to conduct a more nuanced analysis that considers both the framing dimensions and critical perspectives. This approach explores the power dynamics, ideological biases, and historical influences within the narratives about WP and Indonesia in international communication. While Entman’s four-dimensional analysis provides a first structured overview of the discourse, CDA is used for a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of the linguistic characteristics, ideological foundation, rhetorical tactics and contextual features that add to the portrayal of power relations.

4. 2. Data selection

Typical data for analysing international narratives would include media releases, such as newspaper articles and press statements that cover the three time periods. Official documents directly communicate the narrative of governments, organisations or the political elite. Moreover, social media provides a platform for numerous narratives, also regarding international issues and therefore presents narratives that have been communicated by the general public. Since this study is focused on the sources that represent the narratives from the political elite, social media posts are not used.

The data to analyse the narratives of WP and Indonesia on the international level by using Entman’s and Miskimmon’s models should include direct and indirect statements about each
other. Also, the sources need to be directed at a comparable audience, for example, the UN, or ASEAN, or other influential global actors in general. The data needs to be in the same language, English, and communicated by relevant actors, the elite of both parties. Additionally, it needs to be unedited and if, only by the narrative-producing elite, which could be interpreted as part of the narrative. As R. J. May already stated during his work about the development after the AFC (2021), retrieving reliable data regarding WP, in general, appears to be problematic. Some of the reasons for this are that scholars, journalists, and civil society organisations have limited access to WP. On the other hand, globalisation and digitalization have developed new sources of information from the inside. Unfortunately, these sources do not provide reliable data in general as they are often biassed, but since this study is focused on the narrative, biassed global communication is exactly what we need.

4. 3. Primary sources

The primary sources representing Indonesia's position include statements by the Indonesian foreign ministry, the UN, and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia. Concerning international communication of WP, this study chose to focus on the ULMWP (United Liberation Movement WP) and its leader Benny Wenda.

Overall, this study investigates 36 primary sources, 14 represent the Indonesian narrative and 22 the Papuan narrative, bearing in mind that the four of these Papuan narratives have been the same source, but different speakers, all from the Papuan political elite (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010). During the first time period, there are three relevant primary sources from WP that address the conflict globally and four on Indonesian primary sources. For the second time period, there are two primary sources, both by President Suharto, one at the beginning (1969) and one closer to the end of his reign (1991). The nearly 40 years of dictatorship under Suharto’s rule appears to be a major factor here. Nevertheless, the OPM still grew, and they found ways to articulate their resistance. Four relevant sources were found for this. The third time period of this conflict has been significantly more publicly discussed, which explains why this time period involves more primary sources. Globalisation and the end of the dictatorship under Suharto, therefore the beginning of democracy, is the reason here. There are seven primary sources for the Indonesian narrative and 15 primary sources for the Papuan one including one hearing that comprises four separate perspectives. Moreover, during the second time period only two primary sources can be found that address the global community regarding this conflict, one directly after the AFC and the second one in the form
of the autobiography by Suharto close to the end of his reign which also marks the end of the second time period. Between the years of 1969 and 2013, the Indonesian government rarely gave a statement, this can be due to the nature of the 40 years of dictatorship and the following political imbalances while shifting to democracy. Therefore the sources during the years under Suharto are also scarce regarding Papuan international communication, nevertheless, a development is seen as their public statements become more and more. This development does not stop in the third time period as there is a strong global presence of the ULMWP while Indonesia mostly does not address the conflict by itself, only when targeted by other parties. Additionally, the sources rarely actually refer to the same topic, especially on the Indonesian side.

4. 4. Limitations

The data that is mainly going to be discussed here is supposed to focus on statements by (state/elite) representatives. Accessing these sources appeared to be obstructive since the foreign ministry of Indonesia does not appear to promote the topic of WP by itself. Several statements occurred as an answer to human rights violation accusations by the UN, HRW, or other state representatives, such as Vanuatu. There has been communication inside of Indonesia, on the national level, but the language used there is Indonesian, and the focus is on global communication and framing, so these sources will not be included. The question comes up if this restricted access to historical material by the Indonesian government is intentional. Although the amount of accessible primary resources that could be used in this study was limited, it can be assumed that other primary sources that are not online available would broadly support the narratives that are analysed here. The scope of this research did not allow for the geopolitical situation to be taken into account when analysing historical sources which could have added to the insights gained through these sources.
5. Analytical framework

This study analyses the different primary sources to identify patterns, themes, and relationships within the narratives.

As the Indonesian policies regarding WP have not reduced the conflict in an accepted manner it becomes clear that there is the necessity of change in some way. Policies such as the special autonomy had great potential but are overall seen as failed. There does not seem to be a new approach to the issue, and this is the reason why this study is outlining the narratives of both parties.

The problem here is the amount of violence that has been going on for decades and decades. The framing of both parties strongly influences how they feel and act toward each other. It is known that frames and narratives describe reality in a certain way and therefore aspire to justify certain policies and actions. This analysis draws on these concepts to clarify where the differences and similarities lie in the narratives that are being produced about each other. Taking these narratives out of the emotional and subjective context is supposed to give the reader the possibility to understand and judge the actions of both parties on a meta-level. The only way to reach a peaceful outcome is to understand for all parties involved, not only WP and Indonesia, but the international community as well, where both sides are coming from and find a common, neutral ground to have negotiations. It is not possible in this study to provide facts, since WP and Indonesia say different things about the same situation and independent researchers or journalists did not and do not have enough access to assess the situations by themselves. Therefore, the only things that can be analysed are the statements, and the communication about each other, not so much the actual actions. The analysis starts by doing a detailed textual analysis of the selected modes of communication, focusing on linguistic features and recurring topics.

Moreover, Entman’s four framing functions have been explained before, this analysis is going to start by focusing on the problem at hand to understand the context of the statements and speeches regarding the general political discourse. The next step would be to identify the causal explanations that the frames offer. These can be actors that are ascribed a certain responsibility for the conflict. Further, the moral judgement can be presented through the narratives, and the consequences that result from that as well as subjective judgments.
regarding how actors or actions are described need to be analysed. Thus, this research will concentrate on how the parties involved in this conflict are explicitly judged. The fourth framing function is concerned with evaluating proposed solutions and reactions, such as policy suggestions, or certain tactics to manage the conflict in this narrative. Thus, this part will point out the solutions that the narratives formulate to resolve this conflict.

To give this a more critical understanding, a fifth analytical focus coming from CDA has been added. Thus, there will be an analysis of presented power imbalances that become apparent in the way both parties communicate globally.

The importance of this is significant since power is a well-known indicator of the way conflicts are going and will go. Moreover, it shows in which roles the parties see each other which can also explain their past, current, and future actions. CDA provides this analysis with a framework that leads to understanding the diverse ways power relations are portrayed in discourse. Language is the main factor, nuances in the terms that are used can indicate a power shift. As mentioned before, CDA draws from several disciplines which makes it suitable for the multidimensional power relations in international communication. Discovering communicated ideologies is part of CDA and even though they might not be clear at first, this is the purpose of this depth discourse analysis. The category of the analysis that is concerned with the portrayed power imbalances draws from Fairclough’s three-dimensional model and analyses the narratives by looking at the micro, meso, and macro levels.

Thus, the following analysis consists of three smaller analyses that investigate the presentation of the Papuan and Indonesian narrative in each time period. Every time period begins with a broad presentation of Entman’s four dimensions, gives a summary of these and ends with an analysis of the power relations. After the three time periods have been analysed the findings of the four dimensions over the years are presented in a table, one for WP and one for Indonesia. To conclude, there is a comparison of the results regarding if there has been a shift in the narratives and in the power dynamics. Through this combined analytical framework this study aims to offer a clear understanding of the portrayed power relations and how they have shifted over the years.
6. Analysis

This chapter first gives an overview of each narrative in each time period and does a content analysis by using Entman's four-dimensional model, looking at the raised issue or problem, the given causes, moral judgement and suggested resolutions. The purpose of this is to give a general outline of framing by both parties, so the investigation of power imbalances will be clearer. Based on that, there will be an analysis of presented power imbalances for each time period and it will conclude by tracking the development of both narratives through the past 78 years.

6. 1. First Time Period (1949-1966)

Starting with the first time period, it is noticeable that the Indonesian government began to take an international stand at about the end of the fifties and reduced its global communication shortly after the first international statements of WP had been published. The OPM was founded and the people from WP published their manifesto. Thus, statements by the Indonesian government blamed the Netherlands for breaking the connection between WP and Indonesia and turning Papuans against them. They also stated that the colonial and imperialist sentiment of the Netherlands is at fault here. It has been shown that even though WP was still a colony of the Netherlands. They rightfully belong to the Republic of Indonesia and the Indonesian protestant church (United Nations, 1957). The vice president, Mohammat Hatta, argued in the beginning of the sixties that including Papuans in the discussion about their territory is not an option and would compromise Indonesian idealism as national independence cannot exist through compromises (1961). Moreover, WP has been presented as the victim of Imperialism and the Indonesian military was being prepared to fight this. President Sukarno states that “West Irian is a colonial sword posed over Indonesia. It points at our heart, but it also threatens world peace” (United Nations, 1960: 283). Once more it has been mentioned that Indonesia does not carry the blame for the dangerous situation in WP, only imperialism and colonialism. Also, Papuans who were fighting against Indonesia have been manipulated to do so. After the manifesto was published by the First Papuan People’s Congress, Indonesia's foreign minister Subandrio (1961) wrote a
lengthy letter to US President John F. Kennedy regarding the Dutch colonial presence in WP. There he blames the Netherlands for influencing WP into a sentiment against Indonesia. This letter states that Papuans are seeking refuge from the Dutch coloniser in Indonesia and that Papuans that publicly speak about their wish to be part of Indonesia are being suppressed. Furthermore, Subandrio claims that the national anthem and flag of WP are not real but made up by the Netherlands for them to pursue their own interests. Also, it has been pointed out that “Indonesia is not claiming any other people’s territory. The Indonesian people, as a whole, would feel ashamed if our anti-colonial struggle would degenerate into expansionism and result in colonising other people” (Subandrio, 1961: 14)

Another statement from this letter clearly argues against the claim that Papuans ethnically belong to the African black community but claims that their ethnicity is found in the whole eastern part of Indonesia. Also, the foreign minister states that WP is already independent as it has been part of Indonesia since 1945 and that Papuans have been part of the Indonesian fight for independence. Additionally, Subandrio refers to a statement by the Papuan people addressing the Netherlands in 1946. There, he quotes, Papuans have explicitly stated that they do not want to be left behind in the Indonesian independence process.

In 1957, during a general assembly, Indonesian representatives called upon the Western world to eliminate any colonial sentiment, which would be the only way to solve this conflict. The president also argued that Indonesia has tried to find a peaceful solution for years, but it has not led to anything, so the military solution appears to be the only one to end this conflict that endangers the whole world. He describes this process as taking “surgical efforts to remove the cancer of imperialism” (General Assembly United Nations, 1960: 283). Additionally, Hatta mentions that the right of independence needs to be followed without any exception or restriction and that every involved party needs to support this. He actively addresses the US to take a stand against colonialism and work together with the Indonesian government to eliminate this “symbol of injustice” (Hatta, 1961: 14). After the Papuan Manifesto, the foreign minister suggested that a solution can only be found by compromising on the side of Indonesia just like on the side of the Netherlands.

The first voices from WP presented themselves to the world in 1961 through the publication of the manifesto for the independence of WP (Papuan People’s Congress, 1961). Here, they explicitly state that their wish for independence lies in them coming together as a nation and declaring their national flag, which is supposed to fly next to the Dutch one. Also, they give a clear manual on what they want their nation to be called (WP/Papua Barat), as well as their people (Papuans). Following this Manifesto, the Papuan people have repeatedly
addressed the global community regarding their right to self-determination and refer to the
decolonization resolution as the Papuan people are an ethnological community that falls under
this resolution (New Guinea Council, 1962). A year after the Manifesto, the Papuan National
Committee (PNC) stressed its position against being ruled by the Indonesian government and
called it Indonesian Imperialism. It is noticeable that the Manifesto, on the other hand, does
not mention Indonesia at all. The other Papuan statements agree that they do not belong to
Indonesia, but that they are part of the African Black community. The PNC describes
themselves in 1962 as an independent people that does not want to live as “slaves” (p. 26)
under Indonesian rule and that it would be a “devious way to kill a people spiritually” (p. 5)
since they always have been governed by a second party. They pose several questions
addressing the issue of self-determination:

Why do we Papuans have to become victims of the battle for prestige between certain nations which feel
powerful? Why does our small nation have to be inferior to the millions of Indonesia? We ask you: is this
democracy? (p. 5).

Additionally, Indonesia is described as a stranger to the Papuan nation, which has not been
invited and is expected to suppress the democratic/ political development. Furthermore, the
Papuan elite refers to Sukarno’s concept of “guided democracy” (p. 12) calling it a
dictatorship. Some of the words referring to Indonesia were “enemy,” and “imperialism” (p. 26).
Also, they accuse Indonesia of abusing human values such as freedom and
anti-colonialism to legitimise their own colonial goals in WP. The solution suggested by
Papuan officials involves their demand to be treated on the same level as other “free nations”
(Papuan People’s Congress, 1961). Additionally, it has been stressed that the Papuan people
need to come together in order to support its demands. Also, the international community is
required to take a stand in favour of WP and supervise the independence process.

6. 1. 1. Summary

Thus, the discussed problem or issue at hand from the Indonesian perspective is the
Dutch colonising WP, even though it belongs to Indonesia, and the broken connection
between Indonesia and WP. As a cause for this problem, the Indonesian government sees the
possible involvement of WP in the discussion and the influence of the Dutch on the Papuan
people, severing their connection to Indonesia.

Regarding the moral judgement here, Indonesian elites explicitly describe WP as a victim
of imperialism and stress their statement repeatedly that WP is part of Indonesia. It is clear
that they blame the conflict not on themselves but on the Netherlands. Specifically, they do
not blame Papuans, as those voices claiming they do not want to be part of Indonesia have been manipulated and Papuans are seeking refuge in Indonesia. They do recognize the danger this conflict poses and argue that it not only endangers Indonesia but the entire world. The Indonesian government's suggested resolutions for this discussion are non-conclusive, as most sources’ solutions do not involve specific action but the general elimination of colonial sentiment and positioning of the Western world in the support of justice. Also, before the 1960s, Indonesia had positioned itself clearly in support of a military solution. Nevertheless, in 1961, the government claimed that they wanted to find a compromise with the Netherlands.

On the side of WP, the main issue is presented to be their right to self-determination and the possible rule of Indonesia over them. The reason for this problem is described as Indonesian Imperialism. WP is supposed to have the right to self-determination because they are its own ethnological community that falls under the decolonization resolution. Entman’s third category of moral judgement involves here the clear rejection of Indonesia’s claim on the territory of WP and the Papuan statements describe them as politically motivated. Indonesia is framed as a spiritual and political threat. They portray the conflict as a struggle for prestige among nations, with them as the victims. Indonesia is seen as an outsider suppressing democracy. Moreover, Sukarno's "guided democracy" (Papuan National Committee, 1962, p. 12) has been criticised as a dictatorship and WP accuses Indonesia of imperialism. The solution involves demands of equal treatment the same as other free nations, unity among the Papuan people, and international intervention in the independence process.

6. 1. 2. Power Relations

Regarding the power relations that have been portrayed in this time period, it has become apparent that the language used here gives significant insight. The discourse during the first time period strongly suggests power imbalances.

Looking at the Micro level, introduced by Fairclough, the researcher focuses on linguistic details to understand how they create influence and present power dynamics. Thus, it became clear that Indonesia presents itself as the saviour of the world by depicting the conflict as a danger to the world and presenting the only solution to be their rulership over WP. Continuing on the Meso level, which is concerned with the role of language within organisations and communities, the foreign minister claims that Papuans are seeking refuge in Indonesia; it presents again the role of Indonesia as West Papua's saviour and the lack of control on the side of WP. Further, WP is not seen as a party to this conflict and as weaker than Indonesia as they
are depicted to be unable to free themselves from Dutch imperialism. Papuans were barely mentioned before the Papuan Manifesto was published. Furthermore, on the macro level which seeks to analyse the influence of discourse on global structure, they involve the global community in the decision about to which party WP belongs but do not involve its own people. The president positions himself and Indonesia as responsible actors in this conflict by claiming that they have been trying to find a peaceful solution for years, but the other actors have not been open enough to the discussion. As Subandrio (1961) writes about the way Indonesia sees the Papuan national anthem and flag as fake, conveying that Indonesia does not treat WP as a party that has agency. This can be interpreted in the way that Indonesia asserts its power by doubting the legitimacy of West Papuan symbols and their connection to the Papuan Identity. By highlighting that WP rightfully belongs to Indonesia, Indonesia is declaring its authority over that territory which can be understood as an assertion of power and legitimacy. The claim that the Dutch physically shut down Papuan voices that are in favour of joining Indonesia illustrates a power imbalance as WP is not free and does not have autonomy.

They dismiss Papuan statements and claim other facts to be true, as well as the Indonesian government claims that the Papuan people are being manipulated. Nevertheless, the president has called WP a “colonial sword” (United Nations, 1960, p.283) that is directed at Indonesia, which implies that WP has the potential to harm Indonesia, therefore having power and control over Indonesia. Also, they present themselves as victims of historical powers by blaming colonialism and imperialism for the conflict.

West Papua’s perspective on the power dynamics is different as they do not even mention Indonesia in their Manifesto declaring their independence, as Indonesia does not play a role here. After that Indonesia has been involved in the topic. As the Papuan party “rejects the claim of Indonesia” it suggests that WP is challenging Indonesia’s assertion of authority here which is seen on the macro level. But since it is presented as the “claiming party” (New Guinea Council, 1962), it also implies that Indonesia is seen in a dominant position. This becomes apparent as well in their statement that Indonesia cannot be neutral and would undermine the self-determination process, which assumes that Indonesia has the power to strongly influence and overpower the Papuan independence process. This has also been implied by the Papuan National Committee when they stated that Indonesian rule would suppress democratic political development.

When the Papuan National Committee claims to “take the floor” (1962, p. 5), referring to Indonesia, they present their effort to take back their power from Indonesia which indicates a
power struggle as Indonesia seems to hold the power for the moment. While they write about their desire for independence it implies that, as they are not independent yet, it portrays an imbalance in power, because they need autonomy granted by an external party. Referring to West Papua's choice of words that they do not want to be “slaves” (1962, p. 26) anymore, it indicates a form of resistance against the perceived domination. It also emphasises that Papuans view themselves as oppressed by other nations. Here, they present themselves as resisting this kind of oppression. Also, the phrase “devious way to kill a people spiritually” implies that other forces, in this case, Indonesia, are mistreating the Papuans' spirit. Thus, it suggests that as they are facing some kind of control/ oppression that has a strong impact on their people's spirit and psyche, there is a strong power imbalance threatening the people of WP. They also imply historical power imbalances by stating they were always governed by another country. This shows an absence of self-determination and autonomy. Furthermore, the “battle for Prestige between nations which feel powerful” and Papuans being the “victims” (Papuan National Committee, 1962, p. 5) of it suggests power imbalances exist because of geopolitical affairs. Powerful nations might be able to have a negative influence on the self-determination and democracy of WP. As they mention Sukarno’s “guided democracy” and claim that he does not “recognize democracy” (Papuan National Committee, 1962, p. 26) but leads a dictatorship, it shows the perceived power imbalance regarding the way the government of Indonesia acts. This indicates that under Indonesia rule, there would not be democratic governing in WP. By stating that Papuans do not want to become “second-rate citizens of Indonesia”(Papuan National Committee, 1962, p. 13), it becomes clear that they are rejecting being denounced to a lower status. By using words such as “enemy” and “imperialism” (Papuan National Committee, 1962, p. 5) in reference to Indonesia, they show how Indonesia is perceived as a threat and indicate a strong power imbalance. Lastly, the Papuan elite suggests, through the use of the term “propaganda” (Papuan National Committee, 1962, p. 28) and through claiming that Indonesia would use human values to legitimise its own colonial and imperialist objective, that Indonesia is using manipulation to get its way.


In the second time period, which took place when Suharto became president of Indonesia, he took a public stand on the situation in WP in 1969 addressing the controversial AFC (General Assembly United Nations, 1969). More than 30 years later, when he published his
Autobiography in 1991, was the next time he publicly spoke about WP. The conflict surrounding WP existed, because the Dutch were trying to “set up the state of Papua as a trust territory of the Netherlands” (Soeharto, 1991, p. 85). Suharto claims that Indonesians and Papuans have been fighting the implementation of the AFC as it goes against the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the outcome confirmed that WP wants to be part of Indonesia. Suharto describes this as a positive result. Also, he describes this referendum as “legally final and irrevocable and cannot be made void by whomsoever or whatever” (General Assembly United Nations, 1969, p. 13). In his autobiography, the president states repeatedly in 1991 that Indonesia was prepared to free WP until the Dutch agreed to release WP through the Bunker proposal. Because of the New York Agreement WP was “returned” to the “protection” (p. 91) of Indonesia. At that time, he described WP as less developed than the rest of Indonesia, said it was 17 years behind and called WP “a truly backward region” (p. 91). Additionally, the AFC is depicted as presenting a peaceful end to the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands and the government is focused on supporting the development of WP. Therefore, his new government concentrated on reducing this difference in development. He also states that WP still lags behind after 30 years of the Indonesian government and gets “special treatment” (p. 92) and gets prioritised funds, as he declares that WP has to be able to “taste the fruits of its freedom in the shortest possible time” (p. 92). Furthermore, the president opposes separatist movements (Free Papua Movement) that have developed in WP and his way to contain them shall be by “approaching them and providing Information” (p. 320).

During this time period, the OPM raised its voice in the late seventies and contributed extensively to the discussion. The statements agree on what the main issue is, describing Indonesia’s presence in WP as “unjust” (Jouwe, 1978), as well as oppression by the Indonesian government through intimidation and human rights violations. They call Indonesia’s rule in WP (neo-)colonial. One of the reasons given for these issues is that Indonesia succeeded in 1963 through the UN temporary executive authority, as this “crushed the hopes” (Jouwe, 1978, p. 12) of Papuans and their independence process as well as the manipulation of the AFC (Korwa, 1983). Also, the extensive military force used by Indonesia, the colonial legacy, and exploitation, but most of all, the rejection of WP’s right of self-determination is seen as a reason for this conflict (Joku, 1985; Free Papua Movement - Organisasi Papua Merdeka, 1987).

The sources claim that Indonesian propaganda discredits the people of WP and presents them as “primitive” and “backward” (Jouwe, 1978, p.12). Also, Nicolaas Jouwe acuuses
Indonesia of employing political intimidation to convince other Melanesian countries to accept WP as a part of Indonesia/Asia. It is repeatedly mentioned that Indonesia uses “brutal” (1978, p. 12) means to keep WP separated from the Melanesians. Therefore, it has been stressed that WP should remain part of Melanesia or Oceania, as they naturally belong there and the Papuan people are committed to their development and fight for independence, even though Indonesia tried to put a halt to the educational and political development process of WP. Also, Nicolaas Jouwe, a well-known Papuan independence fighter, points out that the intellectual elite of WP is still growing, hence WP can govern its own country. Furthermore, the exploitation of natural resources has been emphasised, not only blaming Indonesia but also the US and other Western countries. International organisations are blamed for only using workers from other Indonesian islands, which results in a lack of job opportunities for Papuans as well as educational troubles, as school taxes are deemed too high for locals. This has led to the “most brutal, unjust, and inhuman” (Jouwe, 1978, p.12) situation. The global community is accused by Jouwe, in 1978, of giving Indonesia the freedom to suppress and “eliminate the original inhabitants” (p. 12) of WP. Additionally, Jouwe posed the question of why Papuans have to “be on their knees and beg” (p.13) to become associate members of the European economic community to aid their conflict. Indonesia is depicted as violating human rights using colonial ways, even though they had previously condemned such ways. Another point raised by Jouwe is the rising number of mosques being built in WP, as they “sprung out like mushrooms” (p.13). He claims that mosques are an Indonesian status symbol that is supposed to project the image of an Islamic power in Indonesia, including WP. Also, Indonesia's state philosophy is questioned as it may appear “attractive” (p.13), but in reality, it suppresses indigenous people and makes them feel “like strangers in their own homeland” (p.13). Following this, the government is accused of conducting “wipe-out-the-natives” operations. Moreover, President Suharto was accused of suppressing freedom of speech already in 1965 which led to the resistance of the Papuan people who formed the OPM. The OPM states that Indonesia increased its military power significantly to fight this resistance, killing indigenous Melanesians in WP. They also claim that the AFC was a:

barbarian form of consultation [which] made sure that 1024 representatives, appointed by the Indonesian authorities were convinced that their lives would be in danger if they did not choose in favour of the continuation of Indonesian neo-colonialism in West Papua. [...] The General Assembly of the UN in 1969 voted with a great majority to support of the Act of Free Choice giving the Indonesians a carte blanche to continue their atrocities in West Papua (Korwa, 1983: 194)
Further, the OPM accused Indonesia of denying that 150,000 Papuans are missing or dead, but at the same time not allowing foreign investigators to enter WP. Another issue raised by Hank Joku (OPM) concerns the healthcare troubles in WP, people are often left to die “like animals.” Additionally, the Indonesian government is accused of addressing their own issue of overpopulation by transmigration to WP which leads to the Indigenous people becoming a minority. Here, as well, the necessity of international involvement is pointed out and certain concepts to realise them have been introduced, such as holding a round table conference to start a dialogue. Moreover, the OPM stressed the essential need for further resistance against Indonesia (1987).

6. 2. 1. Summary
To summarise, Indonesia’s perspective describes the main issue at hand as referring to the Netherlands and its attempt to make WP a territory that was influenced by the Dutch in the past. As a cause for this Suharto saw the disagreements with the Netherlands which led to the AFC and therefore the Papuan people choosing to be part of Indonesia. The aspect of moral judgement can be seen here in the way Indonesia describes the result of the AFC as legally binding and in the way WP is depicted as less developed, therefore needing Indonesia's support to bring them to the same level as the rest of Indonesia. As a solution to this issue, Indonesia states that WP needs to stay part of Indonesia and development is in focus.

On the other hand, Papuan voices depict the main issue as Indonesia’s presence in WP being oppressive, unjust, and involving human rights violations. They see the cause for this in Indonesia's dominant behaviour, exploitation, the AFC, strong military presence, and their rejection of WP’s self-determination. The moral judgement is overall that WP views itself as oppressed, fighting for human rights, cultural identity, and self-determination. Simultaneously the OPM accuses the Indonesian government of being brutal in their ways. As a solution for this, they suggest that their independence needs to be internationally recognized, regain control over their resources, and an end to human rights violations through international investigations.

6. 2. 2. Power Relations
The power relations presented in the Indonesian narrative begin with the president portraying a distinct narrative of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. During his statement, he points out that Indonesians as well as Papuans have been criticising the
implementation of the AFC, claiming that it was seen as a threat to Indonesia’s values and sovereignty. The statements by Suharto illustrate a power imbalance on the micro level, by looking at the specifics of language use, where Indonesia is seen as more powerful and it portrays the nation as the rightful leader of WP. By mentioning the so-called positive results of the AFC Suharto states that this outcome is “legally final and irrevocable” (1969). Due to this declaration, he reinforces the image of Indonesia as the superior authority and suggests that West Papua's Interests were in line with Indonesia's interests which happens on the meso level, the discursive practice level. As Suharto depicts WP in his autobiography as a “truly backward region” (p. 91) in 1991, and that the rest of Indonesia is further developed, he implies that WP needs Indonesia's guidance and support. Thus, Indonesia is portrayed as the powerful party here since they are described as more advanced and capable. When the president talks about the “special treatment” (p.92) that WP has received he implies a power imbalance as Indonesia has the authority to distribute resources and lead the further development of WP. Lastly, the president's position against the separatist movements and Indonesia’s tactic of handling this by “approaching them and providing information” (p.320), portrays Indonesia here as well as the entity that holds control and authority over this situation. Indonesia is presented as a benign party that works to maintain the unity of the people.

The previously presented Papuan narrative describes the power relations between WP and Indonesia as Indonesia has been presented as the “unjust” (Jouwe, 1978, p. 12) ruler of WP. Indonesia has been described as an oppressive and intimidating power that violates human rights. Thus, the power imbalances are clear as Indonesia is portrayed as an oppressive and dominant force governing WP. Another word used to describe Indonesia is “(neo-)colonialism” (Korwa, 1983, p.194) which supports this narrative of power imbalance as this implies that Indonesia dominates and exploits WP. Additionally, WP frames Indonesia’s success in 1963 and later the AFC as it “crushed the hopes of Pauans for independence” (Jouwe, 1978, p. 12) and was manipulated. This portrays the suppressing power of Indonesia again. The OPM accused Indonesia of implementing propaganda to discredit Pauans since Indonesia depicts Pauans as “primitive” and “backward” (Jouwe, 1978, p. 12).

The power imbalance here becomes obvious through the portrayal of Indonesia’s attempt to influence the narrative about WP in its favour. Moreover, WP calls Indonesia’s ways of separating Pauans from Melanesia “brutal,” which indicates the power lying on Indonesia as the aggressor. The description of Indonesia and other Western countries exploiting WP’s
natural resources while not using local workers thus creating a lack of job opportunities leads to the image of Indonesia being supported by the global community in its powerful position on the macro level, looking at the socio-cultural structures. Additionally, Papuans feel disempowered as an Indigenous population by referring to Indonesia’s state philosophy that suppresses their culture and makes them “feel like strangers in their own homeland” (Jouwe, 1978, p.13). While criticising President Suharto for suppressing freedom of speech and the strong use of military presence to eliminate resistance, Indonesia is, once more, presented as the powerful entity that holds control over the Papuan people. This power imbalance is reinforced as well through the OPM pointing out problems regarding health care and results from transmigration in WP, which is illustrated as Indonesia's tactic to solve overpopulation in Indonesia.

6. 3. Third Time Period (1998-2023)

The narrative presented by the Indonesian political elite addresses repeatedly the issue of Indonesia being accused of violating human rights in WP, such as the freedom of speech and as a reason for this the Indonesian elite blames Papuan separatists, including their own and their supporters' agenda (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013). Further, Indonesia defends itself against these allegations by stating that they only diverge to violent means where it is necessary as in regions of WP that have been attacked by criminal armed groups, and the allegations are claimed to be biassed (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016; United Nations, 2017). Another issue Indonesia blames separatists for is the “issue of displaced people in the Nduga regency” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021). The PMRI states that the people have been fleeing as the separatists make the area too dangerous. Moreover, the problem of deficiency in physical and human development in WP has been discussed by the PMRI in 2022 which is also blamed on the separatists explaining that not many people are willing to work in WP as they are afraid for their lives. Thus, the increasing number of attacks by separatists “continue to undermine development” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022b).

The PMRI stated in 2013 that Papuans have freedom of speech, as there are independent mechanisms at work that guarantee this in a “responsible way” and an “independent commission” on information is in place. Further, they point out that Papuans do not need a permit to hold protests, even though this is the rule for the rest of Indonesia. Referring to the
human rights violation allegations, made by several parties and repeatedly by Vanuatu, the PMRI denies those and answers that the accusing parties do not understand the way Indonesia works, they are politically motivated and support separatism. It becomes clear that Indonesia’s reaction to these accusations is to question the claiming party’s motivation:

“It is shameful that this single country continues to have an excessive and unhealthy obsession about how Indonesia should act or govern itself. [...] it prefers to instil enmity and sow division by guising their advocacy for separatism with flowery human rights concerns. [...] How could one talk about promoting the rights of indigenous people when it does not even sign the International Covenant on Economic, social, and Cultural Rights, the core human rights instrument? This actually raises the question: do they really care about indigenous concerns?” (United Nations, 2020)

Additionally, they refer to the UN Charta and demand for the non-interference principle of the domestic affairs of sovereign countries to be respected. Indonesian government representatives claim that these allegations have been made to divide the Indonesian people by pretending to care for human rights and to disseminate “public distrust towards security personnel.” However, Indonesia calls these allegations “baseless attacks” as verifiable data has been ignored. It has been stated that this claim not only is incorrect and “one-sided” but ignores the progress that has been made regarding the human rights protection in WP (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022a).

Indonesia highlights that WP will always be an “integral part of Indonesia” and that it has belonged to Indonesia since 1945 which is “final, irreversible, and permanent” (United Nations, 2020). Papuans are called Indonesians. The Indonesian government states that they do not have a policy of reprisal and that there is no judicial harassment. The separatists, on the other hand, are described as violent and having no ”regard for human life”. Therefore, the Indonesian government states that violence has only been used when “armed criminal groups” have attacked civilians. They call the allegation of “humanitarian aid to displaced Papuans being obstructed by authorities” a “bold faced lie” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022a) by declaring that travels have only been restricted to areas where it is too dangerous to enter. The PMRI uses the terms “open-door communication” and “dialogue” to describe the essential way of governing in Indonesia, as they firmly highlight that they cooperate with the civil society in order for human rights protection. Following this, the PMRI explains that separatist attacks on civilians and Papuan infrastructure have intensified which led to people having to flee from their villages. Despite this dangerous situation, the Indonesian government states that it is still present and committed to supporting the people in their basic needs and development. Indonesia is depicted as being strongly committed to human rights and plans through the implementations of certain institutions to continue to
uphold this standard by protecting, respecting, and fulfilling the democratic laws and human rights of “our people”.

In the upcoming time, the Indonesian political elite aspires to further improve democratic means for people to want to be part of the political process and to experience equal possibilities and access to it. Also, they want to support free and independent media and as well institutions that offer the possibility of discussing previously mentioned issues. Additionally, an “early warning system” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013) has been suggested that also includes measurements to be taken during or after a conflict. In 2014 the PMRI claimed that the president has already initiated policies to manage past and future human rights issues such as an “integrated team that involves the National Human Rights Commission” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016). In the following years, the statements regarding possible solutions to this conflict became less, but in 2020 the Indonesian representative at the UN did not explicitly give a solution but stated that the president supports a “positive approach for all states, which benefits all” (United Nations, 2020). In 2021 the PMRI focuses on the separatists and declares that they attack essential workers, thus violating human rights and to resolve this conflict they need to be “perpetuated”. In the future, the Indonesian government is focused on continuing to rebuild what has been destroyed in the dangerous areas of WP and on reinstating public services. They describe it as implementing an “inclusive approach” that supports the respect for human rights and “environmentally friendly development”. Additionally, the government wants to educate itself further on human rights and use a national and sub-national human rights system to address human rights issues. Lastly, the PMRI declares that they plan “concrete action” (2021) referring to the raised issue of internally displaced Papuans.

In the 2000s resolution of the second Papuan People’s Congress (2000), the issue was raised that the WP is already sovereign based on several historical documents during the past 50 years, such as the Manifesto published in 1961. 10 years later during a hearing before the subcommittee of Asia, the Pacific, and the global environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives 111 Congress, 2. session, Indonesia was once again accused of crimes against humanity by F.H. Faleomavaega and other speakers (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010). Here, the question was raised when Indonesia’s military would be held accountable for “deliberate and systematic abuse” in WP. Faleomavaega, Octavius Mote, and Salomon Maurits Yumame, and other members of the OPM claim that special autonomy has failed, that the military presence in WP is still growing and blame the ongoing control Indonesia has over WP. The reasons Mote presents refer to the funding that is going to the
government for salaries etc. to maintain the recently built regencies by 80 percent. Also, he claims Papuans reject special autonomy not only because they do not see any positive results coming from it but see a development for the worse and see themselves becoming a minority in WP. Yumame states that another reason for failed special autonomy is that the leaders are indirectly still Indonesians whom Papuans do not trust or accept.

Only One Voice, Nicholas Simeone Misset, saw potential in the concept of special autonomy in 2010. He sees it as a fresh start for both parties and puts the responsibility on the Papuan people for it to succeed, as he requires them to take initiative here. Moreover, he claims that independence is not necessarily the solution to this conflict. 3 years after this discussion, Mote addressed the issue of human rights violations worsening (Mote, 2013). In 2014 the FRWP discussed the restriction of freedom of speech in addition to other political rights through the Indonesian government, as an outcome of Indonesia's policies silencing the democracy in WP. In 2017 Benny Wenda raised the issue of the alleged Petition for Papuan Independence, seeing the reason for it in the referendum of ‘69 that was not just and Papuans rejected the Indonesian government. Wenda discusses the topic of potential talks with the Indonesian government in 2019. The cause for this topic is that the Indonesian government has not reached out to talk and WP does not trust Indonesia due to its violent history. Another topic discussed by Benny Wenda in 2020 is that WP does not have a future in Indonesia, as Papuans are still fighting for decolonization and freedom due to racism. Additionally, the ULMWP discussed the accusation from Indonesia that OPM is a terrorist organisation (Rumbiak, 2020). Shortly after this, President Jokowi visited WP which was discussed by Theo Hesegem, the president of WP and Justice Integrity Foundation. He accuses the visit of having no outcome and sees the reason for this as the lack of interest from the Indonesian government (Hesegem, 2021). Another issue raised here is the topic of climate justice and ecocide, connecting it with colonialism for which the causes are presented to lie in the displacement of Papuans which is controlled by the Indonesian military and Indonesian projects such as mining and racism.

Indonesia is described as a perpetrator, alongside the Netherlands and the US, who have committed crimes against humanity in WP and have suffered through 40 years of oppression and violence. In 2010 Faleomavaega described the Indonesian military as committing a “slow genocide” in WP and Wenda called it a “systematic genocide” (2017) and a “colonial genocide” (2020). He calls Indonesia's presence in WP “illegal” as Indonesia “stole” (United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), 2022) the Papuan right to self-determination in 1963. Also, he mentioned in 2022 that the “colonial developments” are
destroying nature in WP. Wenda states that Indonesia depicts Papuans as people who are not capable of “managing their own land” (Wenda, 2022). The AFC is repeatedly being criticised claiming it was manipulated by Indonesia through military intimidation, a common term used here is “act of no choice” (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010). Thus, Faleomavaega claims that WP had to become part of Indonesia “at the barrel of a gun” and that it is an “indisputable fact that Indonesia has deliberately and systematically committed crimes against humanity and has yet to be held accountable”. Jakob Rumbiak accuses Indonesia in 2020 that they tried to convince the Papuan people that the AFC was just and legal, but this was not successful. Further, several discussants state that Papuans have been prevented by military force from being part of a meaningful dialogue which has been described as a “discrimination policy” (2010) by Mote, as there is a dialogue with the Aceh territory.

Further, Wenda accuses Indonesia of not showing any interest in resolving the conflict by ignoring the “begging for freedom, justice and a referendum” (2019) and that Indonesia’s single response is more violence and propaganda. Additionally, the failed implementation of special autonomy is seen as a reason for growing frustration among the Papuan people. Indonesia is presented as a force that is not managing WP right, describing Indonesia as having done “such a lousy job,” thus they request independence. Yumame highlights that as special autonomy has failed to bring positive development to WP which makes the people call for a change and reject this policy. He also points out that WP has suffered 41 years under the Indonesian authoritarian rule which involved human rights abuses and that the current leaders are controlled remotely by the Indonesian government. Also, Jakob Rumbiak stated in 2020 that the reason for special autonomy was a cover-up of the “militarised governance” by Indonesia. Additionally, Mote depicts Indonesia as an “autocratic” (2010) ruler who uses distant representatives that are based in Jakarta which leads to the security forces not facing any consequences for their actions. This he repeats in another statement in 2013, stating the use of torture could easily be stopped if the Indonesian government would implement appropriate actions. As this has been going on for such a long time, Mote states that state brutality “constitutes a state-sponsored crime and has become a mode of governance” (2013). State brutality and lack of public services put Papuans at risk of extinction. Also, the current Indonesian laws reduce essential political and religious freedom, and he sees the military presence in WP growing.

Moreover, the Papuan governor is depicted as “powerless” (Mote, 2010) as the Indonesian government does not listen to him, and Indonesia wants a “slave” (Mote, 2010) that follows the orders of the Indonesian government. Messet depicts WP as the “most
beautiful place on the planet” (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010) that had to suffer through injustices such as colonialism and Indonesian authoritarianism. Rumbiak describes Papuans as “god-fearing and god-loving” (2020). Papuan interests have also been described by using the words “self-esteem” and “dignity” (Hesegem, 2021). Referring to the Indonesian government depicting the OPM as a terrorist group, the ULMWP reacts by stating that

“This is a disgraceful attack on the people of West Papua, all of whom are in support of the OPM struggle for a free and independent West Papua. In reality, Indonesia is a terrorist state that has used mass violence against my people for nearly six decades.” (ULMWP, 2021)

Further, the OPM claims that they only act in self-defence. Here the ULMWP defines Terrorism as “the use of violence against civilians to intimidate a population for political aims” (2021) and accuses the Indonesian government of doing exactly that for decades to WP. Also, it is seen as a tactic to divide Papuans through this narrative of terrorism. Furthermore, Misset states that WP has suffered through the Injustices, just like the rest of Indonesia. The military has been restrained by now and human rights violations have stopped as well. Further, he claims several OPM members have changed their position regarding Indonesia to be part of the “new Papuan Democracy” and President SBY is called an “honest man.” In 2013, Mote depicted Indonesia as being responsible for protecting WP. Also, he sees a “policy of isolation” (Mote, 2013) in WP as no international actors are allowed to enter the territory, which is a problem raised continuously by the Papuan elite. Further, it has been mentioned that President Dr. Yudhoyono has suggested that he is open to a dialogue, but never followed up on this. WP is used to “fake promises” (Mote, 2013), but this deepens the lack of trust further. Additionally, Papuans have been depicted as only acting peacefully and a peaceful solution is essential for WP’s belief system and that the Indonesian government does not sufficiently react to the suggested solutions to this conflict and the Indonesian government repeatedly gets accused of not being interested in solving this issue. Benny Wenda describes Indonesia by using the term “occupier” or simply “coloniser” (Wenda, 2017). He mentions that Indonesia has imprisoned and tortured Papuans that supported the Petition for independence and Indonesia denies that this petition exists. Further, the Indonesian police are depicted as racist. Rumbiak states that Indonesia cannot defend its human rights abuses and exploitation in WP anymore as the global community’s perspective has shifted, thus it gets more difficult for Indonesia to legitimise their actions. Therefore, he is confident in his statement that since Indonesia is not a government of justice, it will fail eventually. Moreover, he points out the Papuan demands regarding negotiations monitored by an independent
Indonesian institution supported by a third party. Jokowi’s visit in 2021 was described as a show, comparing the situation to a father who comes to visit the child that is happy about it either way. Papuans do not feel taken seriously and accuse Indonesia of being malintended and not capable of resolving the human rights abuse cases. Moreover, the president is portrayed as “always” (Hesegem, 2021) prioritising the infrastructure, the people of Indonesia, and the strength of the military which leads to the assumption that he is not interested in humanity's causes. Additionally, it has been stated that the growing military presence will “increase the conflict greatly” (Hesegem, 2021). Therefore, Jokowi is described as being incapable as he does not implement any new policies or initiatives to fight the violence in WP which has a tremendous impact on the civil society. Additionally, Hesegem accuses Jokowi of not respecting Papuan citizens and blames the international community for not intervening. Another point here is that it appears as if the president thinks the “humanitarian crisis in WP is ordinary” (Hesegem, 2021). The Indonesian military (TNI) and the police (POLRI) are presented as occupiers of WP. Further, the law enforcement process is described as rigged and the officials are too scared, so there are no fair investigations in the violent incidents in WP. Indonesia is portrayed as the destroyer of WP’s nature and as only being interested in the natural resources but not their people.

Looking at the future of WP and Indonesia, it has been demanded that Indonesia, the Netherlands, the US, and the UN recognize the political rights and sovereignty of WP as a nation. Also, the crimes against humanity committed during the years need to be investigated as well as an international tribunal. The political negotiations have to be honest, peaceful, and democratic for a solution here. Additionally, congress demands an independent team that needs to be part of a referendum regarding the recognition of the sovereignty of WP. Dialogue between Indonesia and WP with the supervision of a neutral party from the global community has been requested, but would only be possible if WP’s culture and traditions are included. Further, Yumame states the importance of Papuans who are not controlled by the Indonesian government as leaders. Thus, Indonesia needs to change its focus from special autonomy and open the dialogue to start a referendum as the last possible solution for Papuans to achieve self-determination while protecting the human rights of the Papuan people.

Additionally, the US government is called upon to pressure Indonesia to let independent actors enter WP and stop supporting Indonesia’s military as human rights are usually violated by them. Yumame also mentions that a permanent consulate needs to be established in WP or, in general, through the years of this time period it has been stressed that government representatives should be in WP to investigate and observe human rights abuses. Messet
portrayed special autonomy in 2010 as the solution for the political, economic, and social empowerment of WP, describing it as “fair” and “just”. Also, he states that the global community supports this approach, but it can only work if human rights are respected, using the term “essential.” This international positioning and involvement of the global community, and especially the UN have been mentioned repeatedly, as a third party to mediate between the two parties. Misset recommended in 2010 that the US House of Representatives and the US administration validate and support this agreement as soon as possible. Issues regarding West Papua's politics, society, and economy shall only be discussed between Indonesia and WP under special autonomy. Thus, he highlights that both parties must work in favour of the “well-being” of the other, and special autonomy needs to be “revised and work properly to empower the Papuan people”.

In 2014 the FRWP stated through Edison Waromi that in order to find a solution to this conflict all political prisoners that Indonesia took needed to be freed, unconditionally, which was demanded again by the ULMWP in 2020. Also, Indonesia was called upon to be open to a dialogue regarding negotiations. Wenda stated that the ULMWP would be open to talking with the Indonesian government under certain conditions and the president needs to express “serious interest” (2017) in finding a solution. Also, the military needs to be reduced and in general, the only solution is to grant WP independence. Further, Wenda stated in 2020 that WP is ready to enter international affairs with other countries and that Indonesia follows the Papuan provisional government vision of creating a “green state”, as a “promise to the world” (ULMWP, 2022). He states that “there can be no climate justice without West Papuan freedom” (2022) and that the green state vision is the solution to the global climate crisis. They want to make ecocide a criminal offence that would be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court. Thus, the corporations working in WP need to have their licence revoked if they do not stop destroying nature. Wenda states that the president knows that the only possible peaceful solution to this conflict involves freedom for WP. A “free West Papua” would place “the rights of all beings(…) above the rights of private corporations” (Wenda, 2022).

6.3.1. Summary

To summarise WP’s narrative, Entman’s questions can be answered as follows: the main issue here is that WP is advocating for self-determination, it addresses human rights abuses, as well as accusations of Indonesia committing crimes against humanity in WP, which led to decades of violent oppression and discrimination. The causes of these problems include the
statement that historical documents from the past indicate that WP should be recognized as independent and that the failed concept of special autonomy has strengthened the distrust and frustration among Papuans. It has been mentioned several times that the growing military presence is seen as problematic, and Papuans do not trust leaders who are under the control of Indonesia. Also, racism and the “Act of No Choice” (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010) contribute to the Issues raised before. Regarding the aspect of moral judgement, this narrative has portrayed Papuans as victims of colonialism, Indonesian authoritarianism, and exploitation. The AFC is criticised for not providing Papuans with self-determination. Further, Indonesia’s actions in WP are described as resulting in a “systematic genocide” (Wenda, 2017) while preventing a meaningful dialogue through discrimination policies. Lastly, the Indonesian government is described as an interested party that does not focus on resolving the conflict, but on the military, Infrastructure, and Indonesians. The suggested resolutions here involve global recognition of WP’s sovereignty and independent investigations into the alleged crimes against humanity and neutral actors that monitor the situation in WP. Moreover, it has been stressed that negotiations have to be peaceful, honest, democratic, and under the supervision of a neutral third party. The importance of Papuan leaders who are not controlled by the Indonesian government has been stated several times. Indonesia is called upon to concentrate less on special autonomy but on dialogue and a possible new referendum to gain independence. Nevertheless, one OPM official states that special autonomy could be successful if both parties focus on the well-being of each other as it bears the potential for political, economic, and social empowerment. Another point that was mentioned is the demand for the unconditional release of all political prisoners and the reduction of military presence. Wenda has introduced the concept of making WP a “green state” (2022) which would concentrate on climate justice, making ecocide a criminal offence. He also suggests that a free WP would prioritise human rights over the interest of private corporations.

On the other hand, the Indonesian narrative regarding the conflict primarily focuses on addressing human rights abuse allegations regarding their actions in WP. Further, the Indonesian government discusses the accusations referring to displaced people in the Nduga regency and blames the separatists for blocking physical and human development in the region. One of the causes for the allegations is claimed to be the separatist agenda as their supporters made these accusations. Also, Indonesia defends itself against its actions by stating that violence is only used if immediate threats are coming from “criminal armed groups” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022a) in specific regions of WP. Regarding the issue of displacement, the government accuses separatists of being a danger to
civilians as the people have to flee their homes which is also described as undermining Papuan development. The moral judgement here presents itself by denying the allegations of human rights abuses and claims that there are procedures in place that guarantee freedom of speech in a “responsible” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013) way. While addressing the allegations, Indonesia discredits the accusers, calls them politically motivated, and accuses them of trying to divide Indonesians. The narrative states clearly that Indonesia and WP belong together and will always belong together. It declares that Indonesia is strongly committed to the protection of human rights and supports Papuans despite the danger posed by the separatists. Suggested resolutions include further education regarding human rights protection, the continuance of development work in WP, and support of free and independent media. Additionally, the government has suggested creating an early warning system that not only detects conflicts but also gives a sort of protocol on how to manage them. Moreover, it has been mentioned that the armed separatists need to be stopped.

6.3.2. Power Relations

The power relations in the Papuan narrative are presented to be unequal starting with the argument that historical documents prove that WP is sovereign. As this has been denied by the Indonesian government it shows on the micro level that Indonesia is presented to have historically established its dominance and power by ruling over WP. Indonesia has also been accused of committing crimes against humanity through its military which creates a significant imbalance regarding power relations between the two parties. On the meso level, the terms “slow genocide” (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010), “systematic genocide” (Wenda, 2017), and “colonial genocide” (Wenda, 2020) highlight this relationship. Thus, the growing military presence in WP is portrayed as authoritarian and as a form of control and intimidation which leads to the assumption that WP is powerless. Further, the special autonomy policy that is widely perceived as unsuccessful in bringing real development or self-determination to the Papuans highlights the power imbalances here as well. It has been mentioned that WP’s leaders are seen as being indirectly controlled by the Indonesian government which leads to further distrust in the Papuan society. This imbalance portrays the control Indonesia has and obstructs Papuans from advocating for their rights and
goals as well as the perception that freedom of speech is restricted. The Papuan elite describes the actions of the global community as insufficient as they would have the power to change the power imbalances between Indonesia and WP. The repeatedly stated issue of the Indonesian elite about not being interested in a dialogue with WP stresses the presented power imbalances since Papuans feel that their peaceful attempts to resolve this conflict have not been addressed adequately by Indonesia, instead Propaganda and violence have been Indonesia’s perceived focus. More disparities regarding the power relations of WP and Indonesia become clear through the implication that WP is being exploited and their people marginalised.

The power relations from the Indonesian perspective are also portrayed as unequal. This becomes clear by looking at how the Indonesian government shifts the blame for violence and human rights abuses from themselves to Papuan separatists. Further, as they repeatedly faced human rights allegations, they replied by discrediting the accusers. They state that the allegations were politically motivated which depicts Indonesia as the target of “baseless attacks” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022a). By dismissing the criticism, they attempt to keep their power position and legitimise their actions. The government clearly states that WP historically is an “integral part” (United Nations, 2017) of Indonesia by using the words “final, irreversible, and permanent” (United Nations, 2020). Here, Indonesia implies that Indonesia has ownership over WP and is not open to negotiating. Additionally, the Indonesian narrative presents their own use of violence and the separatists' use of violence in a unique way. On the macro level, Indonesia is portrayed as only using violent means as a reaction to attacks by “armed criminal groups” (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022a). At the same time, separatists are framed as aggressors with “no regard to human life”. Indonesia frames itself as the responsible authority that addresses security threats to civilians. Regarding the issue of internally displaced Papuans, the Indonesian narrative suggests that this is not a result of their actions, but an outcome of the danger separatists pose which supports their position of being innocent in this conflict.
6. 4. Comparison

In this subchapter the findings of the three time periods are being compared and put into context. This is illustrated by two tables showing the main findings of each party using Entman’s four-dimensional model. Following this, there is a comparative analysis specifically focusing on the development of the power relations portrayed in the narratives during the past centuries by operationalizing the overview given before. This seeks to answer the research question of the shifting power dynamics between Indonesia and West Papua in global discourse.

**Indonesian narrative:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>1. Time Period</th>
<th>2. Time Period</th>
<th>3. Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch colonisation</td>
<td>Past disagreements with the Netherlands</td>
<td>Allegations of human rights abuses in WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broken connection between WP &amp; Indonesia</td>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Displacement of Papuans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Dutch influence on Papuans</td>
<td>Developmental needs in WP</td>
<td>Papuan separatist agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia: protector of WP</td>
<td>WP: less developed + needs Indonesian support</td>
<td>Indonesia: Protector of civilians + committed to human rights protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>军事</td>
<td>Further development</td>
<td>WP belongs to Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested resolutions</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>human rights education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>development work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support of free &amp; independent media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>early warning system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
### Papuan narrative:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>1. Time Period</th>
<th>2. Time Period</th>
<th>3. Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right to self-determination</td>
<td>Indonesian oppression</td>
<td>Right to self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of Indonesian rulership</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights violations</td>
<td>Human rights abuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Right to self-determination</td>
<td>Crimes Against Humanity in WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Indonesian imperialism</td>
<td>Indonesian dominance + exploitation</td>
<td>Historical documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Failed special autonomy → distrust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong military presence</td>
<td>Growing military presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rejection of self-determination</td>
<td>Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia: brutal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggested resolutions</td>
<td>Global recognition of Papuan</td>
<td>Global recognition of Papuan</td>
<td>Global recognition of Papuan independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>independence</td>
<td>independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal treatment compared to other</td>
<td>Control over resources</td>
<td>Independent investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>free nations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International intervention</td>
<td>International investigations</td>
<td>Peaceful negotiations → Neutral supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Release of political prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Climate justice → Green State Vision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2
As has been visualised in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 the differences and similarities of the narratives and their development become clear. During the three analysed time periods significant power imbalances have been communicated on both sides. While the Indonesian narrative portrays WP as an integral part of Indonesian territory it points out the importance of historical relations. WP is depicted as in need of protection from the colonial presence of the Netherlands, and it implies that Indonesia is supposed to be that protector. Here, the power lies strongly on the side of Indonesia, which implies that Indonesia holds authority over WP. During the same time, WP declares independence which counteracts the Indonesian narrative. This suggests that WP is in a power struggle with Indonesia by resisting their authority. As has been mentioned several times before, Indonesia is portrayed as the oppressor, dominant, and unjust. As Papuans address the global community for support it highlights the framing of Indonesia holding most of the power in this relationship. In the second time period, Indonesia continues to present itself as the protector/saviour and developer of WP. Here, their presence has been framed in a way that implies that Indonesia is responsible for development and order in WP. Thus, in this time period Indonesia is also portrayed as the dominant and controlling force. In the Papuan narrative, Indonesia is depicted once more as the oppressor that intimidates and holds (neo-)colonial power even though Papuans explicitly accuse Indonesia of violating human rights, propaganda, and exploitation. So, the power balance stays in favour of Indonesia. During the last time period, Indonesia's perspective points out that it is committed to human rights protection and development in WP. Allegations of human rights violations are being dismissed which keeps Indonesia in the position of power. Lastly, the Papuan narrative during this time argues by referring to historical documents that are supposed to prove their sovereignty and accuse Indonesia of committing crimes against humanity. It highlights the distrust Papuans bring against their leaders who are described as being controlled by Indonesia and stress a lack of freedom of speech and exploitation. Thus, the portrayed power imbalance here is also in favour of Indonesia as the dominant and controlling force.

Overall, it becomes clear that both narratives present Indonesia as the powerful party, but the way that this is framed is different. WP’s narrative describes Indonesia as the powerful oppressor or colonial power while the Papuans are resisting and are asking for global support. Indonesia on the other hand describes itself as the powerful protector of the weaker, less developed Papuans. Nevertheless, looking at the last time period, Papuan statements show a trend in re-claiming their power. WP’s narrative shifts slowly away from the presentation of themselves as victims and started in the past years to address the global community by not
only asking for help but also by introducing their potential way of governing if granted independence. Through their statement that they are ready to enter international affairs, they present themselves as being on the same level as the other sovereign states. Nevertheless, this shift in power dynamics does not (yet) overshadow the general narrative of being oppressed by Indonesia and them overpowering WP.
7. Conclusion

This study's aim was to investigate the shift in the Indonesian and Papuan narrative regarding their conflict over the past 78 years and their portrayed power dynamics on a global level. The Analysis consisted of CDA and framing theory using Entman’s four-dimensional model, resulting in five comprehensive categories: issue, cause, moral judgement, suggested resolutions, and portrayed power imbalances. It is also evident that the Indonesian narrative does not address the Papuans' role in this conflict until WP mentions itself, by publishing its Manifest in 1961 which declares its independence. After that, Indonesia started to involve Papuans in its narrative, not as another party of the conflict but as victims of Dutch colonialism and propaganda. Even after the Netherlands had already left WP for decades, they were often mentioned and blamed. In the middle of the second time period, this blame shifted slowly towards the Papuan separatist movement which is upheld until now. Overall, the results of this study are that even though the framing has shown some changes over the years, mostly on the Indonesian side, the power dynamics stayed similar. Both narratives describe Indonesia as the powerful entity in this conflict, even though Papuan voices have become more confident in the last time period. While Indonesia presents itself as the powerful protector of the less developed Papuans, WP calls Indonesia the oppressor, or colonial power.

During the analysis, it became clear that some of Entman’s categories overlap, as the causal explanation of the frames can also be the moral judgement of the narrative regarding subjective judgments of actors or actions. Nevertheless, this does not change the outcome of the analysis. The limitations regarding this analytical framework include that the researcher is interpreting the sources by including the linguistic factors and political context which means that CDA and framing theory cannot be fully accurate and someone using the same method could produce a slightly different analysis. However, based on the extensive data collection and findings of this study, the assumption that other studies would come to similar conclusions can be made.

The findings of this study provide a basis for further research, to comprehend this complex conflict in its nuances further research could compare the narratives presented to the global community to the narratives that have been communicated on a national level. Additionally, it provides the potential to deepen the use of framing theory here as it can be used to understand
if and how public opinion is influenced by this. Especially in the context of Global Politics, this could lead to a better understanding of the reactions and decision-making of global actors, which could influence more than just one Island in Indonesia. As mentioned before, the Israel-Palestine conflict shows some similarities to this conflict and these dynamics are not rare in the modern world. How political actors manage every one of these situations can influence the way the others are perceived and reacted to.
Reference list


ULMWP (2022). *Interim President Benny Wenda's December 9th Speech at Queen Mary University of London*. [online] Available at:


Appendix

Table - Entman’s four-dimensional model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Problem / Issue</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Moral judgment</th>
<th>Suggested resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ID</strong></td>
<td><strong>1957 - UN</strong></td>
<td>WP connection to Indonesia: broken</td>
<td>the Dutch deliberately broke the connection</td>
<td>WP belongs to the Indonesian protestant church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ID</strong></td>
<td><strong>1960 - President Sukarno</strong></td>
<td>Indonesian and Dutch military: standing in front of each other at the borders of WP → explosive situation</td>
<td>WP: victim of imperialism</td>
<td>The military fighting for WP is misled who defends an “outmoded conception“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ID</strong></td>
<td><strong>1961 - Vice president</strong></td>
<td>Including the Papuan people in this</td>
<td>Including the Papuan people in this discussion → compromising Indonesia’s idealism regarding the</td>
<td>WP: belongs to the Indonesian territory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Time Period (1949-1966)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Problem / Issue</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Moral judgment</th>
<th>Suggested resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammat Hatta</td>
<td>Netherland s, but truthfully belongs to Indonesia</td>
<td>discussion → compromising Indonesia’s idealism regarding independence of Indonesia as a whole</td>
<td>independence of Indonesia as a whole → historically speaking “national independence cannot exist through compromises”</td>
<td>to form their societies following their own ideals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• US: needs to position itself against colonialism &amp; work actively to eliminate this “symbol of injustice” (p.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>1961 - First Papuan People's Congress</td>
<td>Manifesto: Independence of WP • Papuan people→ come together as a people &amp; as a nation→ declaration of national flag waving next to the dutch flag • Papuan national anthem &amp; dutch national anthem together • country is called Papua Barat (West Papua) + locals: Papuan people</td>
<td></td>
<td>• demand own position, equally to other “free nations”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• want to live peacefully among them and contribute to world peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• call upon all Papuian people to support this manifesto→ seen as main ground for a free WP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Problem / Issue</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1961 | Foreign Minister, Subandrio | Colonialis m | Netherlands influence WP: sentiment against Indonesia | • WP: least explored & least exploited area of Indonesia
• Indonesia's claims on WP: rightful
• Papuans: seeking refuge from the Dutch in Indonesia
• Papuans that speak up about wanting to join Indonesia → physically shut down
• National anthem + flag of WP: not real, made up by the Netherlands
• “Indonesia is not claiming any other people's territory. the Indonesian people, as a whole, would feel ashamed if our anti-colonial struggle would degenerate into expansionism and result in colonizing other people” (p.14)
• WP: always part of Indonesia: historical fact
• Indonesian people, including the eastern: disregarding interracial differences→ formed Indonesian nationality
• Papuans do not belong to the African black community→ their type of ethnicity: found all over the eastern part of Indonesia
• Papuans: already independent→ as part of Indonesia, since 1945
• Many Indonesian freedom fighters died in WP → “the people in West Irian knew full well what the fight for Indonesian independence meant and they were closely associated with this fight” (p.18)
• After Indonesia's freedom proclamation (1945): political parties led by Papuans emerged→ support of the independence of Indonesia, including themselves, but the Netherlands reoccupied WP & started pushing for Papuan independence
• “the people in West Irian never wanted to be separated from Indonesia” (p.19)
• 1946→ West Irian sent a message to the Netherlands: not to be excluded from the Indonesian independence process | Compromise between Indonesia & Netherlands |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Problem / Issue</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Moral judgment</th>
<th>Suggested resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| WP       | 1962 - New Guinea Council | Right of self determinati on                                        | Papuan people: ethnological unit has the right to decide its own fate → decolonization resolution | • Rejecting claim of Indonesia that they were included in their proclamation of the Indonesian republic in 1945  
  • Indonesia: “claiming party” of the territory → not able to be neutral → Indonesia will not support Papuans in their right to self determination freely | • International acknowledgement: helpful  
  • Administration: under the Netherlands or the UN  
  • UN: send a commission to learn about the Papuan people's desires and perspective |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Problem / Issue</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Moral judgment</th>
<th>Suggested resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>1962 - PNC</td>
<td>Possible Indonesian rule over WP</td>
<td>Political sentiment → Indonesian imperialism</td>
<td>• Papuans know: they are independent + do not want to be “slaves” anymore → “devious way to kill a people spiritually” (p.5); always governed by another country • WP: “victim of the battle for prestige between certain nations which feel powerful” (p.5) → no democracy • Indonesia: as strange to WP as the Netherlands (difference: Dutch were asked to assist in independence process and stay in WP during that time) • Indonesia will suppress the democratic/political development • “Soekarno does not recognize democracy” → “guided democracy” (p.12) = dictatorship • Papuans do not want to become “second rate citizens of Indonesia, not even citizens of Indonesia with a special status” (p.13) • Papuans belong to the black community • Country and people: endangered to be handed over to the enemy → Indonesia (different race) → this would make Papuans “slaves” (p.26) of the Indonesians • Indonesia → imperialism • Indonesian “propaganda” (p.28): uses human values (freedom &amp; anticolonialism) to legitimize their colonial and imperialist goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Problem / Issue</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Moral judgment</td>
<td>Suggested resolution</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ID         | 1969 - President Suharto | Controversy → AFC Even though AFC contrary to national sovereignty & territorial integrity of Indonesia has been implemented | • Opposition throughout Indonesia & WP  
• this referendum→ people of WP confirmed themselves that they want to be part of the republic of Indonesia → positive result  
• AFC: “legally final and irrevocable and cannot be made void by whomssoever or whatever”  
• AFC→ peaceful end of the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia | • Indonesian Government: now focused on supporting development of WP  
• separatists will be contained by providing them with information and |
| WP         | 1978 - Nicolaas Jouwe | Indonesia's unjust rule in WP Indonesia's success following 1963 (UN temporary executive authority) → “crushed the hopes of Papuans and their Independence process” (p.12) | • Indonesian propaganda: discredit Papuan people  
• WP = “primitive”, “backward” (p.12)  
• Indonesia uses political intimidation: to convince other melanesian countries to accept WP as part of Indonesia + Asia  
• “the whole world knows that (...) WP is different than Indonesia and Asia” (p.12)  
• WP: not to be separated from its natural environment → Melanesia/Oceania  
• Papuans: not worried about Indonesian propaganda, they will continue to grow & learn to pursue the independence process  
• Indonesia is forcefully separating Papuans from melaneans→ harsh & brutal  
• Papuan intellectual elite has been growing→ melanesian Papuans are able to govern their country on their own  
• Papuans have been robbed of their wealth and natural resources, also by western countries→ ”most brutal, unjust and inhuman [that] Indonesia was given the freedom to suppress and eliminate the original inhabitants” (p.12) | • Indonesian: grant WP independence, without any violence,  
→ best interest of everybody involved (like Australian government in Papua New Guinea)  
→ Indonesia: acting in line with its constitution;“above all it would create worldwide confidence and credibility in relation to the Indonesian state philosophies and constitution” (p.13) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Problem / Issue</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Moral judgment</th>
<th>Suggested resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| WP    | 1983 - Fred Korwa - Free Papua Movement | Repression, intimidation & human rights violations by Indonesia | • Why do the Pапuans + Melanesians have to go on their “knees and beg to become associate members of the European economic community, and have access to aid” (p.13)  
• Indonesia: against the universal declaration of human rights  
• Indonesia is using colonial means for which they” condemned” (p.13) the earlier colonial governments  
• Mosques “sprung out like mushrooms” → Indonesian ”status symbol” + “help project the image of the greatness of an Islamic power in the Indonesian archipelago” (p.13)  
• on paper Indonesians state philosophy: “attractive”, but reality: different → Indonesian majority rules → everywhere indigenous people are suppressed, “made to feel strangers in their own homeland” (p.13)  
• Government: “wipe-out-the natives” (p.13) operations in WP  
• Indonesia: WP = backward people  
• WP have been educated and prepared to govern themselves for years before Indonesia took over, but Indonesia suppressed this development | • Only way to solve this conflict: learn something from history to stop the pain of the Papuan people  
• president: oppressed freedom of speech in 1965 → no gathering in public places + no expression of opinion → resistance in Papuan people: OPM → Indonesia increased military power to 30 000 people to fight this resistance movement  
• oppression + intimidation by Indonesia until today  
• Act of free choice: “barbarian form of consultation”, manipulated, “farce” (p.194)  
• Indonesia’s rule: “neo-colonialism” (p.194)  
• UN vote in favor of the act of free choice → Indonesia: “carte blanche to continue their atrocities” (p.194) in WP  
• last 20 years→ Indonesian military & police continued to kill indigenous melanesian people of WP  
• Indonesia: denies that 150 000 people are missing/dead, but... |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Problem / Issue</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Moral judgment</th>
<th>Suggested resolution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>1985 - Hank Joku-OPM representative</td>
<td>Colonial presence of Indonesia • Historical colonial legacy • different values • exploitation, lack of international action</td>
<td>never allow foreign investigators into WP to check health care for WP → people are left to die “like animals” (p.195) • because of Indonesia → international organizations exploit WP’s resources + no use of local workers → cheap workers from the other islands • Economic exclusion → most Papuans: less educated, high school taxes → cannot compete with Indonesian transmigrants • Transmigration: problem of overpopulation in Indonesia → people from java migrate to WP → indigenous people of WP are becoming a minority, compared with the Maoris of New Zealand</td>
<td>Issue: brought back on the agenda of the United Nations Decolonisation Committee → revisited + United Nations General Assembly should debate about it • International, independent visitors: come to WP for an investigation &amp; see the will of the people first hand (UN states + members of the south pacific forum) • International Red Cross and Amnesty International: send help • Indonesia: hold round-table conference → start a dialogue with the OPM Government within the next 12 months → independence &amp; full sovereignty of the Papuan people can become reality and the violence can stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>1987 - OPM</td>
<td>Neo-colonialis in WP Denial of the Right of Self-Determinati</td>
<td>Papuans: “discriminated minority under Indonesian […] colonial rule” • Resistance against Indonesia’s rule will not stop, otherwise</td>
<td>Resistance against Indonesia • Demand: WP to be accepted as neo-colony → should make a case in the Trusteeship and in the...</td>
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| ID 1991 - President Suharto | Colonization of WP by the Dutch | Dutch goal: “set up the state of Papua as a trust territory of the Netherlands” | • Indonesia prepared to liberate WP  
• Bunker proposal: the dutch agreed to release WP  
• Mandala command: for the deliberation of WP → assigned to suharto  
• New york agreement: returned WP to the protection of the | “to this day” WP gets “special treatment” (p.92) + prioritized regarding funds → “West Irian must be able to taste the fruits of its freedom in the shortest possible time” (p.92)  
• Separatist movements are not welcome (Free Papua |
### 3. Time Period (1999-2023)

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<tr>
<td>WP 2000 - Second Papuan People’s Congress</td>
<td>Results → WP is already sovereign</td>
<td>historical documents, e.g. Manifesto (1961)</td>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong> = perpetrator (+ Netherlands and US) has committed crimes against humanity in <strong>WP</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>WP</strong> has suffered from nearly 40 years of oppression and violence through <strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong> (+ Netherlands, US and UN): recognise the political rights and sovereignty of the <strong>WP</strong>&lt;br&gt;The crimes against humanity by <strong>Indonesia</strong> (+ Netherlands and US) need to be investigated and an international tribunal is necessary&lt;br&gt;Political negotiations: honestly, peacefully + democratically → based on the principles of justice and truth.&lt;br&gt;Independent team: involved in a referendum on recognition of the sovereignty of the <strong>Papuan</strong> people and Nation&lt;br&gt;Negotiations regarding the political status of <strong>WP</strong>: just and democratic → between the lawful representatives of the <strong>Papuan</strong> Nation and <strong>Indonesia</strong>, the Netherlands, the United States &amp; the United Nations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP 2010 - F.H. Faleomavaega</td>
<td>Crimes against humanity&lt;br&gt;Failed Special Autonom</td>
<td>Control over <strong>WP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indonesian</strong> military: intentional harm against the people of <strong>WP</strong> → causing a &quot;slow genocide&quot;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Indonesia</strong>: this is an issue of internal affairs + the U.S. believes and respects <strong>Indonesia</strong>’s territorial integrity, but this concerns more than borders or internal matters.&lt;br&gt;“Act of No Choice”: heavy military</td>
<td>Call for dialogue between the Republic of <strong>Indonesia</strong> and the <strong>Papuan</strong> people → only possible if <strong>WP</strong>’s tradition and culture is included → international community: neutral third party</td>
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<td>Security → more military</td>
<td>• surveillance to control how Papuans would vote concerning the territory's political status → serious violations of the U.N. charter and no broad-</td>
<td>• surveillance to control how Papuans would vote concerning the territory's political status → serious violations of the U.N. charter and no broad- biased referendum → WP had to become part of Indonesia “at the barrel of a gun”</td>
<td>• “indisputable fact that Indonesia has deliberately and systematically committed crimes against humanity and has yet to be held accountable”</td>
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<td>WP 2010 - Octovian us Mote - pro independence movement</td>
<td>Special autonomy has failed</td>
<td>● Funding→ 80 % → government: salaries etc. → maintain new regencies ● Rejection of special autonomy: not only because they do not get anything from it (no education and economic and welfare are problematic)</td>
<td>• Papuans do not believe in the interest of the Indonesian Government to resolve the deep-rooted differences • Indonesia: autocratic rule through a distant representative in Jakarta → security forces act without consequences → laws limit basic political and religious freedoms. • The military will extend more and more troops under Indonesian law • The president: rejects any form of dialogue → discrimination policy (as there is dialogue with Aceh) • Governor in WP: powerless → Jakarta does not listen to him → Indonesia wants a Papuan, acting like a “slave”, following Indonesia’s orders</td>
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| WP 2010 - Nicholas Simeone Messet-OPM | Special autonomy is a chance | • WP and Indonesia can start new → potential  
• Responsibility is by the Papuan people, they need to take initiative, not Indonesia + independence might not be the answer | • WP: “most beautiful place on the planet”, but had to endure Dutch colonialism and Indonesian authoritarianism  
• WP has suffered from injustices, just like the rest of Indonesia  
• military: finally restrained + no major human right violations recently  
• more and more OPM members have changed their position to be part of the “new Papuan democracy”  
• President SBY: honest man | • Special autonomy: solution  
→ political, economic and social empowerment WP  
→ “just” and “fair” solution  
→ world community accepts it  
• Respect for human rights is essential  
• Recommendations: the United States House of Representatives and the United States administration reaffirm and strengthen this agreement immediately + issues regarding politics, society and economy for WP need to be discussed solely in line with this agreement and only between Indonesia and WP + both parties should work in favor of the well being of the other  
• Special autonomy needs to be “revised and work properly to empower the Papuan people” |
| WP 2010 - Salamon Maurits Yumame, head of fordem (the democrat ic forum) | Special autonomy has failed | Leaders are still Indonesian → WP does not trust / accept them | • special autonomy: failed to bring welfare to WP  
→ Papuan people do not want to continue under this policy  
• WP: needs their own leaders, because the leaders now are remotely controlled by the Indonesian government  
• 41 years under Indonesian authoritarian rule → human right abuses | • Human rights, especially of the Papuan people need to be protected + Indonesian government has to open a “humane and acceptable” dialogue for a new referendum instead of special autonomy → last resort  
• US government has to stop military support for Indonesia → human right abuses are often committed by the military  
• Pressure Indonesia to let independent international actors enter WP  
• Permanent consulate / U.S. government representatives |
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| WP           | 2013 - Octavianus Mote - pro independance Papuan                            | deteriorating human rights situation in WP                            | • Indonesia does not follow legal framework for human rights protection  
• Overlapping & conflicting policies → lack of clarity regarding who holds authority  
• Slow development of possible peace negotiations  
• Indonesia: responsible to protect Papuans  
• Indonesia: policy of isolation → no international scholars/journalists/NGO’s allowed to enter WP  
→ sensitivity of Indonesian authorities towards WP  
• Papuans: feel alienated and discriminated against  
• Indonesian administration: feel necessity to invest many resources to maintain that policy  
• Policy: “sweeps the burning issues under the carpet”  
• “Papuan rights remain fragile and unprotected”  
• Indonesia: state brutality against civilian Papuans (comparison to habeas corpus) → state officials still use torture regularly, even though it could easily be stopped if the right measure were taken → barely consequences to state brutality, → continues and has continued for so long that it is embedded in Indonesian judicial system  
• “torture in Papua constitutes a state-sponsored crime and has become a mode of governance” → Papuans are at risk of extinction (Juan Mendez): combination of state-sponsored violence and minimal public services available for Papuans  
• Indonesian government: still holds the essential power → local government in WP cannot work properly  
• WP: used to fake promises, but still deepens the distrust in the Indonesian government  
• President Dr Yudhoyono: spoke of dialogue repeatedly, but military continues to “conduct intensive and destructive operations in WP”  
• Papuans only use peaceful means in this conflict  
• Peaceful solution: deeply based in Papua’s belief system  
• Government reacts to suggestions from the public to resolve | should be in WP → monitor human right abuses  
• Papuans need the possibility to determine their own destiny  
• International involvement → pass a U.S. Congress resolution pressuring the U.S. government to act protective against crimes against humanity against Papuan people  
→ negotiations with the Papua peace team mediated by an international party  
• Support for the Papuan peace team: logistics and research → U.S based research/think tank institutes → develop the possibility to represent Papuans at peace negotiations  
• U.S. administration: moral, political and necessary logistical support to the Indonesian administration regarding peace negotiations with the Papuan peace team  
• U.S. security: assisting Indonesia in ending human rights violations in WP |
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<td>2013 - PMRI</td>
<td>Papuan people do not need a permit, as it is in other regions of Indonesia, to hold protests</td>
<td>this conflict “limited and far from enthusiastic”</td>
<td>any democratic means will be further improved</td>
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<td>Independent mechanisms: ensure freedom of speech in a “responsible” way + independent commission on information</td>
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<td>so people want to participate in politics and are provided with equal possibilities and access to politics</td>
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<td>more creation of conditions that support free and independent media</td>
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<td>strengthening of institutional capacities, so these issues can be discussed</td>
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<td>implementation: “early warning system” + possible steps during/after conflicts</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>2014 - Edison Waromi - FRWP</td>
<td>Indonesia is a colonizer</td>
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<td>International support</td>
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<td>Indonesia silenced democracy</td>
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<td>Political prisoners in Indonesia need to be set free, unconditionally</td>
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<td>UN needs to focus on WP + act as mediator between Indonesia and WP</td>
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<td>Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and TAPOL → independent investigations into human rights violations</td>
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<td>Indonesia needs to be open for talks and negotiations → international solidarity and intervention over the humanitarian crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>2016 - PMRI</td>
<td>Vanuatu does not understand how Indonesia functions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Measures have been instructed by the president to handle past + future human rights issues</td>
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<td>Vanuatu is politically motivated</td>
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<td>Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs → “integrated team that involves the National Human Rights Commission”</td>
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<td>Their support goes against the purposes and objectives of the UN Charter + principles of international law on friendly relations between states + violates sovereignty and territorial integrity</td>
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<td>They abused the council and the rules of human rights protection because they support separatism</td>
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| WP    | 2017 - Benny Wenda | Petition → independence | Referendum in ’69 Petition rejects the Indonesian Government | • Referendum was illigal and criminal  
• **Indonesia** arrested and tortured petition supporters + deny the existence of the Petition  
• **Indonesia’s** justification for its illegal annexation of WP is called unjust  
• Act of free choice = Act of no choice  
• systematic genocide | • Australian support |
| ID    | 2017 - Indonesian representative at UN General Assembl y | Vanuatu’s allegations : human rights abuses | Economic agenda of separatists and supporters | • Vanuatu exploit human rights issues for their own purpose  
• Vanuatu does not understand **Indonesia**  
• Hide own human rights problems  
• Vanuatu’s motivation: to disrupt **Indonesia’s** territorial integrity → illegal, violation of UN Charta  
• WP will always remain an “integral part of **Indonesia”” | |
| WP    | 2019 - Benny Wenda - ULMWP | Possible talks with **Indonesian** government did not reach out  
• Mistrust of Papuans due to violent history of **Indonesia** | **Indonesia**: occupier of Papuan land + killed and still kills indigenous people  
**Indonesian** representatives tend to deceive Papuans  
**Indonesia** does not show any motivation to resolve the cause of the conflict→ the only reaction from **Indonesia** to the conflict is violence and propaganda  
**Indonesia** ignores the “begging for freedom, justice and a referendum” | • President needs to show serious interest in resolving the conflict  
• ULMWP is only open to talk, if certain pre conditions will be accepted by the **Indonesian** government |
<p>| ID    | 2020 - Indonesian | Vanuatu’s accusation agenda | <strong>Vanuatu</strong>: unhealthy obsession about how <strong>Indonesia</strong> government should act/ govern itself | • The president states to support a “positive approach for all states, that benefits all” |</p>
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| an representative at UN general assembly | s | • UN charta→ respect non-interference principle of the domestic affairs of other countries  
• Ignorant country: seeks to divide Indonesians by presenting their advocacy for separatism and pretend to be concerned about human rights  
• Vanuatu does not represent Papuan people  
• The representative says WP belongs to Indonesia since 1945 “final, irreversible, and permanent”  
• Papuans ≠ Indonesians | | |
| WP | 2020 - Benny Wenda | • Indonesia: colonizer  
• Indonesian police→ racist  
• Indonesia: no interest in resolving the conflict  
• Indonesia: blocked the UN from entering WP | • Only international actions have the potential to end this “colonial genocide”  
• ULMWP is ready to enter international affairs with other countries  
• Newly deployed military forces need to be withdrawn  
• Political prisoners need to be set free  
• UN High commissioner + special rapporteur need access to WP  
• Indonesia must allow Papuans the right to self-determination and independence | |
| WP | 2020 - Jakob Rumbiak - ULMWP | • People of WP: “God-fearing and God-loving”.  
• Indonesia: tried to convince Papuans that the AFC was legal→ failed  
• Indonesia: cannot defend human rights abuses + WP’s ressource-exploitation anymore  
• International understanding has changed→ it gets harder for Indonesia to justify its actions  
• Indonesia: not a government of justice→ will fail  
• Even Indonesian institutions support WP’s notion for negotiations between ULMWP and Indonesia with a third international party overlooking it | • WP national army will continue to fight  
• Australia needs to reject the special autonomy law  
• 1. Program: Australia’s representative at the UN needs to actively support and vote for Vanuatu’s motion to list WP on the UN Decolonisation List.  
• 2. Program: Australia’s Ambassador needs to communicate with Jakarta that WP’s freedom gets acknowledged through an international third party acting as a mediator | |
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| ID            | 2021 - PMRI                                                                     | “Issue of displaced persons in the Nduga regency”                     | - Government of **Indonesia**: no policy of reprisals or judicial harassment  
- Armed separatist groups: violent, “no regard for human life”  
- In spite of these dangers **Indonesia** is still present and committed to provide basic services  
- **Indonesia**: strong human rights commitment + will continue to protect, respect and fulfill the human rights of our people | - The armed separatists attacks on essentials workers: violating human rights → need to be “perpetuated” |
| WP            | 2021 - ULMWP                                                                    | OPM: not a terrorist group                                              | - This accusation: “disgraceful attack on the people of WP”  
- **Indonesia**: terrorist state that has used mass violence against the Papuan people for six decades  
- WPs sovereignty was stolen by **Indonesia**: they invaded and colonized  
- OPM only acts in self defense  
- “Terrorism is the use of violence against civilians to intimidate a population for political aims. This is exactly what **Indonesia** has been doing against my people for 60 years”  | - Pursue an international solution through peaceful means. |
| WP            | 2021 - Theo Hesegem - President of Papua Justice and Human Integrity Foundation | Visit of President jokowi→ no results                                | - Visit: only a show “It is as if the father comes and the child is happy;” → not taken seriously + not good intentions + unable to resolve human rights violation cases  
- President: “always” prioritizes infrastructure + interests of **Indonesia**, not interests of “humanity”  
- Real Papuans interests: self-esteem and dignity  
- **Indonesia’s** focus: “always” on the strength of the military presence → “always” send non-organic troops for military actions  
- President: sending troops resolves the issues of human rights violations, but “I believe the conflict will increase greatly”  
- President: incapable + no new policies, no initiatives to fight violence → extreme impact on civil society  
- **Indonesian** Military (TNI) + Police (POLRI): occupying WP  
“law enforcement process”  |                                                                                                                                 |
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<td>→ Civilians: arrested + shot, “then the authorities put the gun on their chest or body to show it as having belonged to them, then the TNI apparatus handed over only the evidence – pistol – to the law enforcement apparatus”</td>
<td>Rebuilding efforts in the dangerous regions will be continued</td>
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<td>• Law enforcement officials: scared→ no fair investigation</td>
<td>Public services will be reinstated</td>
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<td>• “President does not respect citizens” + international community→ they do not follow their request of acces to WP</td>
<td>Inclusive approach: strengthening human rights respect + environmentally friendly development</td>
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<td>• President: might think that humanitarian crisis in WP is ordinary</td>
<td>Update the governance knowledge about human rights Ongoing training</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>2022 - PMRI</td>
<td>Human right violation accusation by UN human rights experts</td>
<td>• Violence: only used in regions that have been attacked by criminal armed groups • Biased allegations</td>
<td>National and sub national human rights system: address human rights issues</td>
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<td>• Allegations: support the narrative of criminal armed groups that disseminate “public distrust towards security personnel”.</td>
<td>Concrete action regarding the issue of internally displaced individuals</td>
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<td>• Unconstructive and baseless media attacks</td>
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| WP 2022 - Benny Wenda - ULMWP | Struggle for self-determination | Violent oppression since the morningstar flag was raised in 1961 | • Indonesia's presence in WP is illegal  
• Indonesia stole WP's right to self-determination in 1963  
• Continued resistance to colonialism  
• Freedom was stolen from WP  
• The nature gets destroyed because of Indonesian colonial developments  
• ULMWP mission is peaceful → demanding peacefully for their national rights | • All Papuans need to unite behind the ULMWP Provisional Government  
• ready to engage with the international community  
• Green State Vision: “promise to the world”  
• International leaders need to recognise the provisional government → only solution  
• “There can be no climate justice without Papuan freedom” |
| WP 2022 - Benny Wenda - ULMWP | Struggle for independence + climate justice  
Colonization + genocide + ecocide | Indigenous Papuans are getting displaced → control by Indonesian military  
Trans Papua highway and wabu block gold mine  
“climate change and colonialism is connected”  
Racism | • Indonesia: force that endangers Papuans people especially those connected with the provisional government  
• Indonesia tries to frame Papuans as people who cannot manage their own land  
• Indonesia's role in WP: 60 years of “genocidal, colonial, military occupation”  
• Indonesia: efforts to divide Papuans by creating the narrative that the ULMWP is an association of terrorists.  
• President knows: freedom for WP is the only peaceful solution  
• Indonesia: destroys the forests, mountains and poisons the rivers  
• Indonesia: doesn’t want the Papuan people - only the resources | • WP will be the first green state if the government is accepted  
• “There can be no climate justice without Papuan freedom”  
• Green state vision: solution to the global climate crisis.  
• First country to make ecocide a criminal offence  
• → fight for it to be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court  
• Corporations working in WP → destruction of nature needs to stop or their license will be revoked  
• Free WP: “the rights of all beings will be placed above the rights of private corporations” |