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FEAR OF CRIME-

AMONG BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES AND HOW IT IS AFFECTED THROUGH THE SECURITY MEASURES OF THE BUSINESS.

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FEAR OF CRIME AMONG BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES AND HOW IT IS AFFECTED THROUGH THE SECURITY MEASURES OF THE BUSINESS.

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Abstract: This study examines how fear of crime is altered in regards to crime-preventive strategies and programs among individuals within businesses. The study also investigates whether perceived risk, previous victimization, and demographics influence the individuals within the businesses fear of crime against their businesses. Based on a theoretical discussion derived from the *Vulnerability Perspective, Indirect and Direct Experience with Crime, Ecological Perspective*, and the *Situational Crime Prevention perspective*, this study assesses how individuals within businesses fear of crime affects the business crime-preventive strategies and programs, and vice versa. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with high level participants and business owners from different industries. It is concluded that the general fear of crime among the interviewees businesses are considered as none, or very low. Most security measures in regards to these types of crimes are used because of standards, rather than influenced by fear. However, some security measures have had been established and altered because of previous victimization. The most fear inducing crimes among the interviewees were those types of crimes which involved intoxicated offenders, where violent outcomes with regards to the employees were considered to be high. Only the high risk businesses representatives had this type of fear, because of prior direct victimization. In some regards, the security measures used by the businesses provide the business representatives with the feeling of being in control, which causes the levels of fear of crime to be low. Another reason for the low level of fears among the business representatives is that the crimes committed towards their organizations are not seen as a personal victimization; instead it is regarded to be frustrating, as it causes economic damages and more work. It also appears that the more vulnerable the business is to become victimized by crime, the more security measures are applied.

Keywords: Crime against businesses, Fear of Crime, High and low risks businesses, Security Measures, Situational Crime prevention.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Crime against businesses is a major societal problem, which not only affects stores and consumers economically, it also creates discomfort and insecurity among customers and staff. In for example the United States, business establishments are a high target of criminal offenses, with a higher crime rate than residential dwellings, even though the ratio of establishments is fewer. A similar trend can be seen in Europe. In the British context almost one quarter of all commercial establishments have been burglarized, compared to a few percentages of the households.¹ While in Sweden it is estimated that approximately 20 million thefts/shoplifting offenses occur yearly against businesses.²

Nevertheless, the legal actions in regard to crime against businesses involve high costs for society. Usually, crime against businesses can occur internally and externally, which increases the vulnerability of businesses to become victimized by crime. The internal crimes account for employee theft, embezzlement and workplace violence, while the most common external crimes are burglary, robbery, vandalism, and shoplifting/theft. The reasons why businesses fall victim to these types of offenses are numerous. First of all, businesses are a place of commerce; in most cases they contain commodities and money, which attracts offenders from inside and outside the organization. Additionally, many businesses are neither staffed or open all the time, which leaves gaps in surveillance. This creates a situation that facilitates burglary and vandalism. However, some business sectors and locations are more prone to be exposed to crime than others. In general, if the business operates in retail and deals with cash the risk of being victimized by outsider-offenders increases. The same applies for businesses that are located in areas with a high volume of poverty and social disorganization.³

1.1 Aim and research-question

Because of these special circumstances, every business is a potential crime victim. Despite this high risk of victimization, the prevalence of victimization and fear of crime among businesses is nearly unknown. The knowledge and discussions about business victimization is largely limited to preventive measures and estimates of crimes committed, with the purpose to “make the workplace safer”.⁴ Consequently, this study fills a knowledge gap in two ways. Firstly, the subject of the study has not been targeted within any research before. Secondly, the study is conducted in southern Sweden. There have not been a large amount of criminological studies regarding businesses in Europe, and even less in Sweden. Most of these studies derive from the United States.

The purpose of this study is to recognize how individuals within businesses fear of crime is altered in regards to their crime-preventive business strategies and programs, i.e. how business representatives fear of crime affects the business’ crime-preventive strategies and programs, and vice versa. This thesis also investigates whether perceived risk, previous victimization, and demographics influence the business-owners’ fear of crime

¹ Stokes, Robert J. Business Community Crime Prevention. Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention, Bonnie S. Fisher & Steven P. Lab (red.), 50-54. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2010.)

² BROTTSFÖREBYGGANDE RÅDET (2002). Butiksstölder – problembild och åtgärder. ISSN 1100-6676. Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet. Elanders Gotab AB.

³ Stokes, Robert J. Business Community Crime Prevention. Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention, Bonnie S. Fisher & Steven P. Lab (red.), 50-54. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2010.

⁴ Bressler, Martin S. ‘The Impact of Crime on Business: A Model for Prevention, Detection & Remedy’. *Journal of Management and Marketing Research* no. 2 (2009):1-13; BECK, A. and WILLIS, A. (1995) *Crime and Security: Managing the Risk to Safe Shopping*. Leicester: Perpetuity Press

against their businesses. In order to reach the purpose of the study, the following research-questions are explored:

- What effects does victimization and risk-perception have on business representatives' fear of crime?
- What sorts of crime-preventive measures are used within the businesses, and in what ways does it alter the business representative's fear of crime?

1.2 Limitations

This study has some limitations, firstly, it does not evaluate the security measures used by the businesses per se; rather, and it portrays the experiences of them being used within the targeted organization, in relation to the perceived crime-risk/fear of crime. As the business representatives share their experiences and thoughts considering their fear of crime for their organization, semi-structured interviews are conducted to grasp these experiences. As these experiences are solely as subjective understandings and statements of a specific issue, the study does not claim generalizability. Since businesses come in all shapes and forms, this is just an explorative study of a small part of a large industry. Moreover, all of the interviews are conducted in Malmö, Sweden which makes the study limited to this area.

For theoretical limitations, all of the perspectives within fear of crime research were not used, as the respondents answers are through the perspective of their organization, and not themselves. Furthermore, the use of Situational Crime Prevention strategies, to identify and capture the respondents own work, tends to be limited as some of the strategies used by the respondents could not be identified and concluded in the analysis.

Another limitation of this study is that it is based on previous research which could be considered as old and out of date. Most of it also derives from USA, where there are completely other circumstances and principles.

1.3 Disposition

The introductory chapter presents the study's aim and research questions, its limitations and the disposition. The subsequent chapter is the background, and provides the reader with information regarding crime against businesses, and previous research within the area. The third chapter presents the theory of the study, which is based on the *Vulnerability Perspective, Indirect and Direct Experience with Crime*, and the *Ecological Perspective*, all of them deriving from the fear of crime research. The latter part of this chapter establishes the theoretical ground for the Situational Crime Prevention perspective. Thereafter, the methodology chapter provides an overview of how the data was collected and analyzed. The subsequent chapter presents the reader with the results and analysis, covering the findings of the study, based on the theoretical approach. The final chapter consists of a concluding discussion, which summarizes and discusses the main findings of the study.

2 BACKGROUND

This chapter contains an overview of the major themes that are included in this thesis, as well as previous research. First off, an introduction of the internal crimes that businesses are exposed to is explained in detail. This section is followed by a brief presentation that covers the most common preventive strategies and programs that businesses apply. The chapter ends with short review of international studies on external crime against businesses. As mentioned in the introduction, crimes committed against businesses can be

separated into two categories: *those committed by employees* (internal) and *those committed by others* (external).⁵

2.1 Internal crime against businesses

“Employees” are not just lower-level workers; employees are anyone who is getting paid by another individual or business. In fact, higher-level executives and managers are in best position to steal from a company in a larger scale. This category of employees is also responsible for the largest portion of losses businesses suffer because of their employment.⁶ A high position within a business makes it possible for the executives and managers to “award” themselves with illegal bonuses and perks through the business compensation system. Family owned businesses are more prone to this type of “entitlement” by family members who work within the organization.⁷ Even though theft and embezzlement are the most common employee crimes against the employer, there are alternative forms of employee crimes. However, this section starts with a brief literature review on employee theft and embezzlement, before following up on these other forms of internal crimes.

2.1.1 Employee theft and embezzlement

Employee theft is defined as “the unauthorized taking, control or transfer of money and/or property of the formal work organization perpetrated by an employee during the course of occupational activity which is related to his or her employment”.⁸ This definition identifies not only the physical taking of money or merchandise but also embezzlement, frauds and money laundering, which are other types of internal crimes committed within businesses.⁹

Several studies have been made on businesses “shrinkage”, which involves businesses losses due to employee theft, misplacing of goods, shoplifting, and vendor/supplier theft.¹⁰ According to the American report *Uniform Crime Report 1991*, it is estimated that between \$10 billion to \$150 billion a year is lost because of shrinkage.¹¹ On the other hand, it is considered hard to estimate exactly how much of the shrinkage that employees caused. Shrinkage in general is hard to measure because of the different ways business organize their accounting. Furthermore, other difficulties of estimating the shrinkage are partly due to the fact that goods may disappear in many different ways: suppliers can supply the wrong amount or weight of goods, and goods could be destroyed. Losses may also be affected by price changes, and that different businesses use different definitions of the term.¹² Despite these reliability measure problems regarding shrinkage, McCaghy and Capron assume that employee theft is one of the most costly offenses by individuals in the United States.¹³ However, Cullen states that the combined cost of employees committing crime exceeds the amounts of goods stolen, counting false sick leave

⁵ Bressler, Martin S. The Impact of Crime on Business: A Model for Prevention, Detection & Remedy. *Journal of Management and Marketing Research* no. 2 (2009):1-13

⁶ Friedrichs, David O. (2010). *Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society*. Fourth edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth: 114.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Hollinger, Richard C. & Clark, John P. (1982) *Formal and Informal Control of Employee Deviance*. *Sociological Quarterly* 23:333-43.

⁹ Bressler, Martin S. The Impact of Crime on Business: A Model for Prevention, Detection & Remedy. *Journal of Management and Marketing Research* no. 2 (2009):1-13

¹⁰ Traub, Stuart H. (1996). *Battling Employee Crime*. A Review of Corporate Strategies and Programs. *Crime & Delinquency*, Vol 42 No. 2, April. 244-256. Sage Publications, Inc.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² BROTTSFÖREBYGGANDE RÅDET (2002). *Butiksstölder – problembild och åtgärder*. ISSN 1100-6676. Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet. Elanders Gotab AB.

¹³ McGaghy, Charles & Capron, Timothy A. (1994). *Deviant Behavior: Crime, Conflict, and Interest Groups*. New York: Macmillan.

requests, and misuse of company materials, vandalism, sabotage, substance abuse, and theft over time, which all leads to higher prices and capital expenditure.¹⁴

Data on the extent of employee theft vary, but recent research indicates that it could be as much as 2% of net sales for retail stores.¹⁵ ¹⁶In 1992, Ernst & Young conducted a survey on retail stores and found out that 7% of the seized people who committed theft were employees.¹⁷ In another study about supermarkets, the respondents reported an average of 2.9 detected employee thefts per store.¹⁸ Furthermore, Clark and Hollinger report that as many as one third of the employees in their study reported stealing company property. Moreover, more than two thirds of the employees also reported engaging in other types of deviant behaviors, some of them criminal, some not; for instance: abuse of sick leave, drug, and alcohol use at work.¹⁹ As with both internal and external theft, there are a large number of unrecorded offenses. However, employee theft is considered to be more of a hidden crime than customer theft,²⁰ and the actual frequency of employee theft might be up to 10 – 15 times greater, than what is detected.²¹

Even if significant employee thefts are discovered, most employers are unlikely to involve the police. This is, according to Clarke, because of the employers fear of that it might disturb relationships and productive patterns at work, expose illegal practices of the employer him/herself, or just give the organization bad publicity.²² Other employers investigate and punish employee theft vigorously, especially if there is plenty of cheap labor.²³

2.1.2 Alternative forms of employee crime

Although money or/and merchandise may be the most common things an employee steals, the development of the “information revolution” enables theft of ideas, designs, and formulas, i.e. business trade secrets. Such theft could very well cost a business owner far more than the direct theft of money, if it, for example, reaches a competitor.²⁴ However, not all employee crimes take the form of theft. Another form of employee crime is the act of sabotage against the business. Sabotage, as a form of employee crime, is defined as the deliberate destruction of the employer’s product, facilities, machinery, or records.²⁵ There are several reasons why employees commit sabotage; it might be to conceal their own errors, gain time off or for more pay, or to express their contempt and anger with their work and/or employer. The more alienated, exploited and mistreated an employee believes they are, the more likely is it that sabotage will be committed, as well

¹⁴ Cullen, Charles P. (1990). *The specific Incident Exemption of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act: Deceptively Straightforward*. Notre Dame Law Review 65:262-99.

¹⁵ Buss, Dale. (1993). *Ways to Curtail Employee Theft*. “Nation’s Business 81:36-37

¹⁶ Freeman, Laurie. (1992). *Clover: Designed for Security*. Stores 74:42-43.

¹⁷ Ernst & Young’s Survey of Retail Loss Prevention Trends. (1992). *Chain Store Age Executive with Shopping Center Age*, January, vol. 68, pp. 2-58.

¹⁸ Food Marketing Institute. (1993). *Security and Loss Prevention Issues Survey in the Supermarket Industry*. Washington, DC: Author.

¹⁹ Hollinger, Richard C. & Clark, John P. (1982) *Formal and Informal Control of Employee Deviance*. Sociological Quarterly 23:333-43.

²⁰ BROTTSFÖREBYGGANDE RÅDET (2002). *Butiksstölder – problembild och åtgärder*. ISSN 1100-6676. Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet. Elanders Gotab AB.

²¹ Traub, Stuart H. (1996). *Battling Employee Crime*. A Review of Corporate Strategies and Programs. Crime & Delinquency, Vol 42 No. 2, April. 244-256. Sage Publications, Inc.

²² Clarke, M. (1990) *Business crime—Its nature and control*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

²³ Mars, G. (1982) *Cheats at work—An anthology of workplace crime*. London: Unwin.

²⁴ Friedrichs. *Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society*: 118.

²⁵ Holtfreter, K. (2005d) “Employee crime,” pp. 281–288 in L. M. Salinger (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of white-collar and corporate crime*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage., mars 2001b.

as the severity of it.²⁶ Another form of sabotage that may victimize employers is dishonest resumes. Just like employee crimes in general, the actual harm caused by false resumes might not be easily identified. However, at least it is certain that it does cause embarrassment and inconvenience.²⁷

2.1.3 Conditions that generate employee crime

According to Clark and Hollinger, young, (ages 16-25) unmarried males are more likely to commit theft as employees within their workplace.²⁸ The likelihood of employee theft increases if the employee expects to leave their job soon.²⁹ However, the personal attributes of the employees seem to be less important in predicting employee crime, instead, focusing on the situational and structural factors of the workplace, and the employees responses and perception of these factors is shown to be more favorable.³⁰ This is evident in Horning's study of 88 blue-collar employees of an American electronic assembly plant. The employees were strongly distinguished between company property (e.g., bulky components and tools), personal property (e.g., money and clothing), and "property of uncertain ownership" (e.g., lost or misplaced money, and small inexpensive components such as nails and bolts). The results of the study showed that more than 90 per cent of the employees admitted to taking property of uncertain ownership. However, about 80 per cent said that it is wrong to steal company property, while 99 percent claimed that personal property never occurred.³¹ In 1953, Cressey interviewed 133 embezzlers and defrauders and found pattern of personal circumstances and a range of rationalization, which all played a significant role in their involvement in employee theft. For example, secret financial problems as: gambling losses and mistresses increased the likelihood that an employee in a trusted position would embezzle. They also had different grounds of justifying their offences, such as seeing themselves as entitled to the money, or denied being able to help it, as they were in a situation where they did not have any other alternatives.³² Other studies of embezzlers have shined light on other motivators, such as enhancing their lifestyle, making up for childhood deprivations, altruism, fantasies, weak character, simple greed, or a combination of the factors. Some respondents in these studies deliberately seek out positions within a business in order to gain opportunities to embezzle. It found that women are well-represented among those charged with embezzlement from inside a business.³³

Other studies³⁴ have found evidence that the form and level of employee crime are influenced a lot by the specific work-place conditions of the business, such as the size of the business. In general, employees are more prepared to steal from large organizations than from small ones. This is mainly because of the view that larger companies are more exploitative and less likely to suffer measurable harm from e.g. petty theft, but also that the risk of getting caught decreases the larger the business is. Also, employee's perceptions of the quality of the workplace milieu are a significant factor in whether

²⁶ Friedrichs. *Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society*: 118.

²⁷ Ibid: 119.

²⁸ Hollinger. & Clark. *Formal and Informal Control of Employee Deviance*:333-43.

²⁹ Boye, M. W. (1991) Self-reported employee theft and counterproductivity as a function of employee turnover antecedents. Ph.D. Dissertation, DePaul University.

³⁰ Friedrichs. *Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society*: 119.

³¹ Horning, D. (1970) "Blue-collar theft: Conceptions of property, attitudes toward pilfering, and work norms in a modern industrial plant," pp. 46-64 in E. O. Smigel and H. L. Ross (Eds.), *Crimes against bureaucracy*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

³² Cressey, D. R. (1953) *Other people's money*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

³³ Dodge, M. (2009) *Women and white collar crime*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

³⁴ Smigel, E. O. (1970) "Public attitudes toward stealing as related to the size of the victim organization," pp. 15-28 in E. Smigel and H. L. Ross (Eds.), *Crimes against bureaucracy*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

crimes are committed at the workplace, where informal norms affect the type and amount of crimes committed. Evidently, the more alienated employees are, the less likely are they to commit crimes against the business owner.³⁵ In view of these studies, there seems to be a complex interrelationship among opportunistic, situational and personal factors which affect whether an individual commits employee crime or not.

2.2 Preventive measures against employee crime

According to Traub, the major prevention strategies used by businesses are primarily created and used in order to reduce the opportunity for crime, rather than focusing on offender characteristics and motivations to commit crime. Surveillance of any kind is the most common way of doing this, because it reduces the opportunity for criminal activity and increases the risk of detection for those who commit crime. Furthermore, Traub divides the most general crime prevention strategies into three categories. Category I highlight security, Category II emphasize prevention through hiring practices and employee awareness/education programs, and Category III focuses on prevention and deterrence via the reporting of criminal activity. The following paragraphs contain a brief description of the categories combined with some information regarding established hands on methods for preventing employee crime.³⁶

Business projects that emphasize security are the most common and direct means of deterring both internal and external crime. It can involve hiring security personal that do tasks such as being in charge of the surveillance, guard, patrol, and take part in undercover operations against criminal activity. Another strategy of security that businesses can do is to restrict access to the work environment or institute physical controls. This is done in numerous ways, for example, the employees could be required to use badges, passes, key cards, or pass through identification systems or check points. The business owner can also install alarms and implement periodic audits. Other technology measures are also considered as popular security strategies. Especially having cameras up and running, like the CCTV system, where one individual can watch a number of monitors and the cameras can move to target a specific area. EAS (electronic article surveillance) systems are also frequently used as security measures, especially in retail stores, and range from tags on clothing to electronic sleeves on other merchandize.³⁷

An increased number of businesses implement different kinds of screening and education projects regarding their employees. Often, it has to do with pre-employment screening, which can include reviewing references, credit checks, integrity and drug testing, and checking if the applicant has former criminal history. This allows the employer to screen out potentially untrustworthy employees. In addition to this, the business can train the employees; supply them with magazines, newsletter, videos, posters, daily meeting, workshops and such with the message that security is everyone's responsibility.³⁸

The third and last category emphasizes "Whistleblowing" within the organization. This means that the business is keen to involve their employees in their strategy to control crime the workplace. As they do, special telephone hotlines and corporate reward/incentive programs tend to receive a larger role in this strategy. For the hotline to work, they must provide the employees with a guarantee of anonymity and easy access.

³⁵ Mars, G. (2006) "Changes in occupational deviance: Scams, fiddles and sabotage in the twenty-first century." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 45: 285–296.

³⁶ Traub. *Battling Employee Crime. A Review of Corporate Strategies and Programs.*

³⁷ Ibid. & Benny, Daniel J. 1992. *Reducing the Threat of Internal Theft.* *Security Management* 3:40. "The Broadway's System: Deter and Protect. 1986b. *Chain Store Age Executive with Shopping Center Age*, August, vol. 64, p. 86.

³⁸ Hayes, Read. 1992. *Battling Workplace Theft.* *Security Management* 36:150-53.

However, even though the employees often are aware of e.g. co-workers that steal, they might not be happy to “rat” on their co-workers. Therefore, incentive programs are implemented in order to motivate employees to report crime by offering monetary compensation.³⁹

2.3 Business victimization and external crimes

Most previous research on crime against businesses has focused on measuring crime rates and financial losses to crime on a national and local level.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the first international Crimes against Business Survey, conducted by Van Dijk and Terlouw, included nine European countries.⁴¹ The study did address several crime types such as burglary, vandalism and robbery over a 12-month period. In all of the countries involved in the study, crimes against retail business were high of crimes, especially crimes like theft and burglary. For example, Hungary had the highest rate of theft (83 per cent) and Italy the lowest (44.5 per cent). Burglary was considered to be the second most common crime, where the rates ranged from 40 per cent in the Czech Republic to 14.4 per cent in Italy.⁴²

Another, more recent study, conducted within 20 selected Member States of the European Union showed that more than three out of every ten European business suffered at least one crime per year.⁴³ Furthermore, about twelve out of every one hundred European businesses suffered at least one theft by an outsider in the last twelve months. Theft was considered to be the most common crime against European businesses, followed by burglary (10.6 per cent). The authors of the study did also identify patterns regarding that some sectors are more likely to be vulnerable to certain types of offences. For example, the wholesale and retail sectors are most likely to suffer from theft by customers (68.4 per cent), whereas the manufacturing sector has the highest number of known employee theft (15.6 per cent). Theft from vehicles (30.4 per cent), and bribery or corruption (26.9 per cent) most affects the construction sector, whereas vandalism (25.7 per cent) is mostly committed against accommodation and food service providers. Lastly, financial and insurance service providers are most likely to be victimized by employee fraud (5.2 per cent).⁴⁴ In terms of the perception of safety of European businesses, 75.2 per cent considered that crime risk for their firms remained the same in the last twelve month, whereas 19.9 per cent claimed that the crime risk has increased, and 3.8 per cent argued that it had decreased. Only 7.1 per cent of the interviewed businesses claimed that they were located in an area which has a very high or high risk of crime. Besides that, a vast majority of the victimized businesses did not considered themselves affected by the presence of social or physical disorder within the areas surrounding their premises. On the subject of crime prevention measures, 59.9 per cent of the victimized businesses claimed that they have a general insurance that covers crime events. The most common security measures adopted by the businesses were firewall antivirus software (80.7 per cent) against online threats. Followed by alarm systems against physical crime (64.3 per cent) and about 40 per cent of the businesses use closed-circuit TV (CCTV) systems and other types of staff codes. Moreover, a little over on third of the businesses use contingency plans to recover/destroy data or goods after theft. The least used anti-crime

³⁹ Traub. *Battling Employee Crime*. A Review of Corporate Strategies and Programs.

⁴⁰ Hopkins, Matt. (2002). *Crimes Against Businesses: The Way Forward For Future Research*. The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 42, No 4, pp. 782-797.

⁴¹ Van Dijk, J.J. M. and Terlouw, G.J. (1995), 'Fraude en Criminaliteit Tegen het Bedrijfsleven in Internationaal Perspectief, Justitiek Verkenningen, 4.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ . Dugato, Marco *et al.* The crime against businesses in Europe: A pilot survey. Executive Summary, Directorate-General Home Affairs in the European Commission.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

measures were electronic article surveillance tags (7.9 per cent), gatekeepers (8.3 per cent) and security patrols during opening hours (8 per cent).⁴⁵ 18 per cent of the businesses had reported the last incident they suffered was not at all handled by law enforcement agencies in a satisfactory manner. About 28.7 per cent were quite satisfied, whereas only 14.3 per cent considered themselves to be very satisfied. The dissatisfaction was mainly due to the fact that the law enforcement agencies were not able to capture the offender(s) or to recover the stolen property, and that the agencies did not keep the businesses informed about the development of the investigation. Moreover, businesses argued that they were not assured sufficient protection against further victimization.⁴⁶

In an attempt to explain the varying crime patterns against certain business types, Burrows *et al*, conducted a framework that is based on the features of the victim, features of the location and the features of the offender. With this perspective, Burrows *et al* identified two broad categories of businesses:

- Businesses with little customer contact. Mainly in the manufacturing, construction and transport (e.g. freight haulage) sectors. The focus of their crime problems was burglary, vandalism and employee theft.
- Businesses which are dependent on customer contact. Such as the retail, pub/restaurant, and transport (e.g. taxi) sectors. The main crime problems for these sectors are customer theft and dealing with violent and abusive customers.⁴⁷

Table 1: Major factors for promoting and reducing risks in high and low risk businesses⁴⁸

		Features of location	Features of caller/victim	Features of offender/source of problem
Businesses with high customer contact	High risk	Located in town/city centres and on 'problem' estates	Have considerable rewards for shop theft. Late night working is common and these businesses tend not to be able to afford security guards	Contact with drunken youths and determined shoplifters is common
	Low risk	Located in smaller towns and on 'safer' estates	Have considerable rewards for shop theft	Have little contact with potential offenders
Businesses with low customer contact	High risk	Tended to be located on industrial estates next to 'problem estates'	Areas were deserted at weekends and at night. Business often left pallets and rubbish in yards that would be vandalised or burnt	Offenders would have time to enter the premises with little surveillance. Often the industrial estates were used as a playground
	Low risk	Tend to be located in industrial areas in smaller towns	Increased security had reduced incidents in the past, though crime problems were generally rare	Little contact with potential offenders

⁴⁵ Marco *et al*. The crime against businesses in Europe: A pilot survey.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Burrows, J., Anderson, S., Bamfield, J., Hopkins, M. and Ingram, D. (1999), Counting the Cost: Crime Against Business in Scotland. Scottish Executive.

⁴⁸ Burrows *et al*. Counting the Cost: Crime Against Business in Scotland.

3 THEORY

This chapter establishes the theoretical ground for the study. Initially, a brief presentation of fear of crime will be given, followed up by the specific perspectives of fear of crime that will be used in this study. The latter part of this chapter establishes the theoretical ground for the Situational Crime Prevention perspective.

3.1 Fear of crime

Fear of crime has been one of the major growth areas for both academic research and policy initiatives since the 1960s, some criminologists even considered it to be a own sub-category of criminology. There have been debates on defining fear of crime, but the most well-accepted definition was established by Kenneth Ferraro, claiming that fear of crime is an emotional response of anxiety or dread to crime victimization or symbols associated with crime. Therefore, fear of crime is considered to have emotional effect on people, depending on what an individual perceives to be a crime situation, could make them feel more isolated and vulnerable.⁴⁹ However, having awareness about crime is positive, but when taken to the extreme it could be counter-productive. Moore and Trojanowicz describes that larger proportions of fear of crime motivates people to invest time and money in defensive measures to reduce their vulnerability; making them staying indoors more than usual and avoiding certain places, and buying extra locks etc.⁵⁰ Fear does not just affect the individuals quality of life, it can weaken the quality of a whole community. For example, it could increase social divisions between rich and poor, those who can afford security measures and those who cannot. Such side effects will eventually negatively influence the ability of the community to deal with crime. Furthermore, the high defensive measures fear has caused may provoke, which in turn may contribute to increases in crime.⁵¹

There are several theoretical explanations, and empirical evidence for the causes of fear. Previous research has mainly focused on two factors that correlate with fear; the notion of vulnerability (physical, psychological or economic) and crime experience (direct or indirect victimization, friends or neighbors' victimization, and mass media). Even though these factors showed to be of value, many times the fear of crime was more widespread than crime itself. For instance, women and seniors often appeared to have a higher fear of crime, but were also the groups that have the least risk of being victimized. This made some researchers look elsewhere, for other factors that correlate with the fear of crime. In this way, factors deriving from local physical and social environments became targets of studies on fear of crime. Neighborhood incivilities, physical deterioration and social disorder are seen as explanations of fear. However, social cohesion, like community spirit and involvement can majorly decrease the level of fear of crime even within a community with a high level of crime and social disorder. Other studies have found evidence of more basic factors that reduce fear of crime, for example improved street lightning. Additional research added two more factors, an individuals' perception of the personal risk of being a victim and the assessment of how serious the consequences of victimization are likely to be. Even though these factors are psychological in their nature, they are affected by feelings concerning the community which one lives in, and the sense of presence or lack of support.⁵²

⁴⁹ May, David C. Fear of Crime. *Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention*, Bonnie S. Fisher & Steven P. Lab (red.), 391-392. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2010.

⁵⁰ Moore, M & R. Trojanowicz. (1988). *Policing and the Fear of Crime*. Perspectives on policing, 3, (NCJ 111459). Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.

⁵¹ Hale, C. (1996). *Fear of Crime: A Review of the Literature*. International Review of Victimology, Vol. 4 pp. 79-150. Academic Publishers-Printed in Great Britain.

⁵² Hale. *Fear of Crime: A Review of The Literature*.

The previous accumulation of evidence regarding fear of crime, has created a consensus among most researchers that there are three major important theoretical perspectives in understanding fear of crime, and its causes and consequences. Each one of them is presented in detail below.

3.1.1 The Vulnerability Perspective

This theoretical perspective emphasizes vulnerability, which refers to the interaction of three factors: (1) probability of victimization, (2) seriousness of anticipated consequences of crime victimization, and (3) powerlessness to control the previous factors. The higher individuals rates their probability of victimization; are conscious about victimization; believe it will have serious personal, emotional and financial consequences; and realize they have little control over the probability of victimization, the more likely it is that these are fearful of crime. This perspective has often been used to explain gender and age differences in fear of crime. It was through this perspective the “shadow of sexual assault” hypothesis derived, which suggests that women’s vulnerability to sexual assault also foreshadow their fear of other crimes, making them more fearful than men in general. This type of hypothesis, that is, perceived physical vulnerability leads to higher levels of fear, also applies on the elderly.⁵³

3.1.2 Direct and Indirect Experience with Crime

This perspective theoretically explains the fear of crime due to experience, both direct and indirect with criminal victimization. Direct experience is defined as personal encounters with crime. There have been contradicting findings whether those who have been victimized by crime are more fearful of crime. A number of studies have also found a weak or nonexistent relationship between fear of crime and prior victimization experiences. The reasons for this seem to be that few studies considered the number of victimizations and the seriousness of the victimization. Also, some researcher argue that people’s beliefs regarding the reason for the victimization experience matters, e.g. some see the victimization as their own fault, because they did something stupid, or was at the wrong place at the wrong time or just using psychological neutralization strategies. Indirect experience with crime involves all the other methods besides direct experience by which a person develops attitudes and perceptions about crime. It could for example be reading about crime in the newspaper, hearing about crime from family and friends etc. As with direct victimization, the research findings are mixed, whether the level of fear of crime is affected. However, there seems to be an increased level of fear, if an individual hears, or reads about stories about crimes committed in their local area, as well as knows someone who has been victimized by crime, especially locally. Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that, the more similar individuals believe they are to a victim, the more likely they are to be fearful of crime.⁵⁴

3.1.3 Ecological perspective

This perspective focuses on contextual variables in society, related to the individual’s fear of crime. It often includes the place of residence, and the characteristics of the neighborhood/community. Recent studies have shown that urban residents often have higher levels of fear of crime, especially those residents who live in inner-city areas, compared to rural residents. The reason for this diversity of level of fear is explained, through this perspective that the inner-city level of fear is a response to the higher victimization rates of urban and inner-city residents. Another explanation focuses on the community context, on the demographic heterogeneity of a neighborhood, social capital

⁵³ May. Fear of Crime. *Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention*: 394.

⁵⁴ Ibid: 395.

and social climate. This explanation suggests that inner-city and urban neighborhoods are more likely to have a higher transition among residents, and also more anonymity and apathy, which increases the level of fear of crime. Another explanation of the ecological perspective focuses on the design and appearance of an area, hence the relationship between a location and the fear of crime. Some researchers argue that higher visibility and surveillance opportunities decrease the level of fear of crime in a specific area. The final ecological explanation suggests that incivilities within a neighborhood affect the fear of crime. Incivilities in this context are defined as noisy neighbors, graffiti, loitering teenagers, garbage and litter in the streets, abandoned houses and cars etc. There has been a large numbers on studies using this perspective, and supported this argument, that there is a correlation between high levels of incivility and high levels of fear of crime.⁵⁵

3.1.4 Measuring fear of crime

In the early days of the fear of crime research, fear of crime was often measured with a single item indicator. This type of research later receives lot of criticisms, which lead to some commonly accepted reliable measures of fear of criminal victimization. This involves multiple-item scales in order to measure fear of specific crimes, instead of just one. Furthermore, the questions should avoid putting the respondents in a hypothetical situation they rarely encounter, and to include the specific crime combined with the words fear or afraid.⁵⁶

Finally, most research on fear of crime has primarily been quantitative research. Recently some researchers started to use qualitative strategies in order to attempt to understand the causes and consequences of fear of crime. Not only does it help the advancement of better theoretical perspective, it also yields more well-defined theories and neutralizes the methodological shortcomings of the self-report measures normally used when measuring fear of crime.⁵⁷

3.2 Situational Crime Prevention

Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is different strategies put together and directed at specific crimes. It involves manipulations of the environment, and is focused on reducing the opportunities and rewards for crime.⁵⁸ SCP is based on theories of environmental criminology, routine activity theory, rational choice perspective, and crime pattern theory, which all share the assumptions that:

- Opportunity is a cause of crime and is explained as a result of criminal motivation and opportunities for crime. Both motivation and opportunities for crime must exist for a crime to occur.
- Individuals are not more or less likely to commit an offense because of their backgrounds or personalities, the only thing that drives individuals to commit offenses are the perception of future benefit by the committed crime. The benefit itself is not always economical, it could for example be: excitement, sex, power, intoxication, and other things individuals might desire. The decision to actually commit a crime depends on the individual's calculation of the chances of obtaining the reward and the risk of failure.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ May. Fear of Crime. *Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention*: 394.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid: 392.

⁵⁸ Lee, Daniel R. (2010). *Understanding and Applying Situational Crime Prevention*. Criminal Justice Policy Review. 21 (3) 263-268. SAGE Publications.

⁵⁹ Clarke, Ronald V. Situational Crime Prevention. *Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention*, Bonnie S. Fisher & Steven P. Lab (red.), 879-881. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2010.

According to these perspectives, criminally disposed individuals will commit more crime if opportunities for crime increase, and law-abiding people can be tempted into committing crimes if they come across an easy opportunity for a crime.⁶⁰

3.2.1 The components of SCP

In 1992, Clarke identified 12 specific techniques for SCP, categorized into three principal components; each of them contains four categories of actions.

Table 2: *Clarke's twelve techniques of situational prevention.*⁶¹

The Twelve Techniques of Situational Prevention		
Increasing the Effort	Increasing the Risks	Reducing the Reward
1. Target hardening: Steering locks Bandit screens Slug rejector device	5. Entry/exit screening: Baggage screening Automatic ticket gates Merchandise tags	9. Target removal: Removable car radio Exact change fares Phonecard
2. Access control: Fenced yards Entry phones ID badges	6. Formal surveillance: Security guards Burglar alarms Speed cameras	10. Identifying property: Property marking Vehicle licensing Personal identification numbers for car radios
3. Deflecting offenders: Tavern location Street closures Graffiti board	7. Surveillance by employees: Park attendants Pay phone location Closed-circuit television systems	11. Removing inducements: Graffiti cleaning Rapid repair "Bum-proof" bench
4. Controlling facilitators: Gun controls Credit card photo Caller-ID	8. Natural surveillance: Street lighting Defensible space Neighborhood watch	12. Rule setting: Customs declaration Income tax returns Hotel registration

3.2.2 Displacements

The most common criticism against crime reduction caused by SCP measures is due to displacements. The crime reduction might instead be caused by the fact that offenders shift their attention to other places, times, and targets, committing new crimes at other times with other methods. Furthermore, some argue that SCP may result in crime escalation, making the offenders resort to more harmful methods in order to gain their benefit.⁶²

3.2.3 Diffusion of Benefits

Sometimes the SCP measures highlight more crime reductions than estimated; way beyond the focus of SCP. This is called diffusion of benefits and could for example be when a parking lot receives cameras, but car crimes overall is reduced not just in the area of that specific car park, but in the whole city. The reason for this diffusion of benefits seems to be that the potential offenders are aware of new preventive measures, but overestimate their precise reach and scope. This makes them think that the risks and efforts involved in committing the crimes have been increased, which actually is not the case.⁶³

⁶⁰ Clarke, Ronald V. *Situational Crime Prevention*. Crime and Justice, Vol. 19, Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (1995), pp. 91-150. The University of Chicago Press.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Clarke. Situational Crime Prevention. *Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime*: 182.

⁶³ Ibid.

4 METHOD

This thesis focuses on how business representatives fear of crime is altered in regards to their crime-preventive business strategies and programs, i.e. how the business representatives fear of crime affects the business' crime-preventive strategies and programs, and vice versa. The interviews consisted of four interviewees, whom all represent different businesses in different industries, in different locations in Malmö, Sweden. However, all of the interviewees have certain positions within their organization, which means that they are well versed in the organizations security strategies, and possesses vast experience, and a holistic view of their business. Overall, the thesis aims at gaining contextual understanding from the viewpoint of organizations fear of crime in relation to their security measures, and does not wish to generate generalizable results. The experiences that are portrayed of the businesses representatives are only their own subjective experiences. In the following sections, the approached field, the interview procedure and ethical considerations are discussed and explained. Thereafter, a discussion concerning the research encounter is presented. The final section in this chapter describes the coding and analysis process.

4.1 Approaching the Field

Businesses exist and appear in many different forms and industries, and previous research shows that this diversity also applies to the criminal activity they are contending, i.e. different businesses face different types, and frequencies of crimes.⁶⁴ It was a strategic decision to include different businesses in the sample, instead of just focusing on one industry. Doing it this way reduces the one-sidedness of the study, as different business representatives would yield different type of fears, different type of crimes, and different type of security measures. The first step of the process was selecting the different suitable industries, and contacting different businesses within the specific field. The different industries and businesses were mainly selected due to the size, location and goods/services, which are factors that are considered to affect the level of crime victimization of the business.⁶⁵ Handpicking the sample by directly approaching the people who are assumed to have crucial importance for the study offer both economical and informative advantages, in contrast to other approaches.⁶⁶ Some businesses were contacted via phone, some by emails and some through acquaintances. No matter which communication medium were used, it was important to thoroughly state the purpose of the study, and to request an individual within the organization who is well versed in the organizations security strategies, as well as possesses a long experience, and a holistic view of their business. This process often involved communication to the gatekeeper of the organization at first, before getting in touch with the prospective interviewees. This was not problematic, because the gatekeepers, no matter what organization I encountered gave me access to contacts who, according to them, were the best suitable persons for my study. The problem whatsoever is created by the fact that the gatekeepers are now in a position where she can decide what data are going to be collected. However, since I contacted several organizations, and dealt with several gatekeepers, (rejections to gain access and conducting interviews in some organizations were motivated by lack of time, in those cases similar organization within the same industry, location, and size where targeted instead) the study eludes the bias of solely one gatekeeper.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Marco *et al.* The crime against businesses in Europe: A pilot survey.

⁶⁵ Smigel. *Public attitudes toward stealing as related to the size of the victim organization.* pp. 15–28.

⁶⁶ Denscombe, Martyn. (2009). *Forskningshandboken.* Studentlitteratur: Lund. 37-38.

⁶⁷ Eklund, L. (2010). 'Cadres as Gatekeepers: the art of opening the right doors?'. In Gregory S. Szarycz (ed.) (2010). *Research Realities in Social Science: negotiating fieldwork dilemmas.* Amherst: Cambia Press

4.2 The interview procedure

As mention in the section above, the interviewees of interest were individuals within organizations whom possess in-depth knowledge of their organization and the security measures of the organization. Some of the interviewees are the owners of their businesses, while others are high level managers. However, one of the interviewees does not have a high level position, but still “fits” the targeted criteria because of the knowledge and experience this individual possesses. However, questions regarding employee crime and prevention were not asked to this interviewee. On the other hand, including this particular respondent might serve some advantages. To start with, the experiences shared could provide a “closer” picture of the context, since this individual works in close range with customers and uses the organizations security measures daily. This could provide a more detailed picture, from “the ground”, which unlike some of the high level managers or owners are not aware of. Secondly, some researchers suggest that there the higher position an individual possess within an organization, the higher are the chances that the individuals make statements that are embellished in favor for themselves and/or the organization.

An interview guide was conducted and used in all the interviews (see *Appendix II*). The interview guide was divided into four categories, these were: Background, Crimes that the business deals with, Fear of Crime, and Preventive Measures, which were based on the aim and research questions of this study. The questions within each category differ from one another, especially the questions within the category Fear of Crime. The questions here are based on previous research on fear of crime, which mainly have been explored through quantitative questionnaires. However, the fluidity that qualitative interviews offer makes it easier to ask supplementary questions, or ask the respondents to develop their answers.⁶⁸ As for the other questions within the other categorizes, efforts were made in order to enable a storytelling situation which gives the respondents opportunities to speak freely and openly about the topics presented to them. In line with this strategy, as many questions as possible were formulated as open as possible and with introductory words like *how* and *why*, which are considered to make the respondent more comfortable in telling the interviewer how an event has occurred instead of explaining why. In this way, the accusatory ways of the word *why* is avoided, and the chances that the respondents will take on a defensive attitude decreases.⁶⁹

As the interviews started with the background, the interviewees were initially asked to present themselves and their organization. The next category of questions was then processed, which was the category that involved questions about crimes that the organization deals with. This was followed up by questions about fear of crime and finally the security measures of the organization. The specific order of the categories serves a multi-purpose. On the one hand, making the respondent talk about the crimes that the organization is and has been victimized of, makes the respondent to take the organizations perspective first, instead of their own personal one. This helps when the interview moves forwards to the next category, fear of crime. When the respondent answers to this type of questions, is it very important that the respondent is primarily thinking like a business representative, putting the organizations view at first, instead of their own personal. On the other hand, placing the category of security measures as the last category may leave the respondents more open-minded and prone to really evaluate their answers about how the security measures really affect their fear of crime, which is the aim of the study. Moreover, the interview guide was adjusted during the interviews

⁶⁸ Bryman, Alan. (2011). *Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder*. Malmö: Liber. 147.

⁶⁹ Becker, Howard. (1998/2008). *Tricks of the Trade. How to Think About Your Research While You're Doing it*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 69-71.

and not followed strictly to make it more like a conversation. According to Bryman, this is the characterization of semi-structured interviews.⁷⁰

In order to make the respondents comfortable they were asked to choose the site for the interview, as well as the time and date since they all have busy schedules. All but one interview were conducted at the respondent's workplace offices, which was conducted at the home of the respondent. This made the interviewees more relaxed and at ease, since the interviews were conducted in their familiar undisturbed environment, improving the whole interview process.⁷¹ Furthermore, all of the interviews were conducted in Swedish, with all respondents agreeing on tape-recording the interviews. The transcription was done in Swedish. Additionally, it was only the quotes, which are used in the result and analysis part that was translated into English. As a final point, the interviews were about 30 to 45 minutes long each. Many of the discussed categories, answers and themes were repeated during the interviews, which is known as the point of theoretical saturation. Once the statements of the interviewees reached this point, it shows that the number of interviewees fulfilled its purpose and that it was time to use the statements in the analysis.⁷²

4.3 Ethical Considerations

The subject of the study is not considered to be very sensitive; however, while conducting any type of research, it is important to keep the research ethics in mind. By doing so, I followed the ethical guidelines of The Swedish Research Council. These types of guidelines are internationally known standards of what is and is not acceptable practice.⁷³

Before each interview, the respondents were informed about the purpose of the study, they also received the information that their participation is voluntary and that they have the right to, if they wish, not to answer any question, and to cancel the interview at any time. They were also briefed that their statements only were going to be used for this study, i.e. educational purposes. Furthermore, the interviewees were given the opportunity to ask questions before they were asked about their consent for recording, which all of the interviewees agreed upon. Moreover, all of the respondents were given assurances of anonymity; neither the individual nor the organization they are representing will be identifiable from the way in which the findings are presented. In doing so, this process involves keeping the recorded material and the transcripts safe, in order to protect the respondents' additional personal information. Finally, the recorded files were deleted after they were transcribed. By conducting the interviews like this, and treating the recorded interview material as such, the four ethical concepts from The Swedish Research Council are covered.⁷⁴

4.4 The research encounter

Bryman emphasizes that qualitative research is interpretive, which aims to get an understanding of the individual's life-world, how individuals interpret and perceive their social reality. Qualitative research goes toward classifying characteristics; the objective is not to quantify them. The aim is instead to get an understanding of how humans perceive their situation and thus not isolating variables and find the connection between those, like quantitative research.⁷⁵ However, the fact that qualitative methods are further

⁷⁰ Bryman. *Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder*. 412-416

⁷¹ Ibid. 420-422.

⁷² Crang, M, & Cook, I 2007, *Doing Ethnographies*. n.p.: London : SAGE, 2007. 14-15

⁷³ The Swedish Research Council [Vetenskapsrådet] (2011) 'God forskningssed' [*Good research practice*], Bromma: CM-Gruppen AB [ISBN 978-91-7307-189-5]

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Bryman. *Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder*. 340-341.

characterized by closeness to the object under examination creates a direct subject - subject relationship between the researcher and the research object. Because the interview itself is considered to be an interactional event, consequently the interaction process could create problematic factors, which potentially affects the results.⁷⁶ With a point of departure of this interview encounter, there are several key problem areas that the researcher must be aware of, that might affect the outcome of the interview. For example, the different power structures and the social positions between the interviewer and the interviewee. Moreover, the "value" and perception of the information given to the interviewer by the respondent affects the outcome of the interview. Trust could also be seen as a problem, since there are vulnerabilities, and desires by both parts to make good impressions, which can influence the accuracy of the interview. The meaning, interpretation and uncertainty are other concepts that might not be shared by the interviewer and the interviewee.⁷⁷ These concepts may not be the same as intended by the speaker, and must be adjusted as the interview process is ongoing, it puts pressure on the interviewer to become active, and lead and guide the interview in the right path, for the purpose of the study.

In this process I have to be aware of my research role, I have to present myself in ways that are nonthreatening, because of my status as an "outsider". The insider and outsider statuses are frequently defined in terms of class, sex, race or ethnic lines etc.⁷⁸ However, the main problem here as an outsider, is being an outsider of the respondents organization, rather than being the outsider with regards to social means. Some researcher argue that not being a part of the organization where the study is conducted is better than being an insider, since the chance of being caught up in the cross-currents of the targeted organization decreases.⁷⁹

Finally, clearly stating the purpose of the study, and providing the information that I was not a part of any organization might in my opinion have made the interviewees much less suspicious of the study's motives, and perhaps made them feel freer to express their opinions.

4.5 The coding and analysis process

Conducting analysis on qualitative data contains many steps, which are considered hard to establish exactly where and when the beginning and the end are of the analysis process. This is mainly due to the extensive amount of data (transcribed text of the interviews), and the repeating nature of jumping back and forth when coding, interpreting and verifying the data. In this way, my own experiences, intellect, discipline and skills etc. becomes a central tool in the analysis, as the final interpretations and descriptive narratives presented are those of the researcher.⁸⁰ In order to shine some light on the process, I divided it into two phases. In the first one, the transcribed interviews were coded, in terms of identified concept, themes and events which were in connection with the study's research question and purpose. Here the transcribed material was printed out and even further categorized and labeled in relation to the study's aim and research questions. In the second phase, these concepts and themes were compared to each other across the interviews, to then be put in relation to the previous research and the

⁷⁶ Holstein, J.A. & Gubrium, J.F. (1995) *The active interview*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁷⁷ Somekh, Bridget & Lewin, Cathy. (2011). *Theory and Methods in Social Research*. Sage Publications. 61-62.

⁷⁸ Rubin, Herbert J & Rubin, Irene S. (2005). *Qualitative Interviewing – The Art of Hearing Data*. Sage Publications, Inc. 87-88.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Fejes, Andreas & Thornberg, Robert. (red.) (2009). *Handbok i kvalitativ analys*. Stockholm: Liber. 13-14.

theoretical framework. This finalizes the analysis and draws a broader theoretical conclusion in order to answer the study's research question and purpose.⁸¹

One could argue that the coding process already began when I was creating the interview guide: dividing the questions into different categories according to the study's theoretical framework and the research questions. As I completed the interviews one by one, I examined the content of each interview, in order to see patterns and prepare follow-up questions to modify the study guide to the better for the next interview. This approach is in line with what is argued to be the main objective of qualitative analysis, which is to discover variety and examine complexity.⁸²

4.6 Validity and Reliability

Although the overall concept of validity and reliability is not usually applicable to qualitative research,⁸³ a few things could be said about the validity and reliability in this study.

Interview data is difficult to confirm because it involves the interviewees own opinions and perceptions about the subject. To increase the validity, one must instead focus on the suitability of the data in relation to the research question and the aim of the study. In order to achieve this, the interview guide were solely based on questions and categories of questions that would yield answers which could be used in relation to the theoretical framework and also in direct line with the research question. In that way, I do confirm that the data obtained is suitable in relation to the study's aims.⁸⁴

The easier it is to review a study's research process, the higher is the reliability of the study. Therefore, I wanted to describe the processes of the methods, analysis and decisions as clear and open as possible in order for the reader to assess the reputable procedures and reasonable decisions of the study.⁸⁵

Qualitative research based on a small number of interviews like this one cannot, and do not tend to be generalize able. However, some of the information presented in this particular case may be transferable in to other similar cases, or lay the way for other future research.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Rubin & Rubin. *Qualitative Interviewing – The Art of Hearing Data*. 201.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Tracy, Sarah J. (2012). *Qualitative Research Methods – Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact*. Wiley-Blackwell. 237.

⁸⁴ Bryman. *Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder*. 380-382, 425.

⁸⁵ Denscombe, Martyn. (2009). *Forskningshandboken*. 381.

⁸⁶ Bryman. *Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder*.352.; Denscombe, Martyn. (2009). *Forskningshandboken*. 380-382.

5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The collected data from the interviews is reported and analyzed continuously in this section, as a coherent whole based on a logical structure, deriving from the aim of the study. In doing so, the empirical data that constitutes as the results is presented in detail, to shine light on the studied phenomenon where the researcher is considered to have an impersonal role. However, most of the presented empirical data is presented through quotes from the interviewees, which purposefully reinforces the study's credibility and the researcher's interpretations. As for the analysis, the researcher's role is more personal.⁸⁷

In order to answer the research questions of how businesses representatives' fear of crime affects the business' crime-preventive strategies and programs, and vice versa, it is important to first understand how the organizations general relation and vulnerability to crime appears. Moreover, the specific offenses that have been/or are committed against the organizations, and how it is perceived, and the different security measures applied by the organizations. Initially this sort of topics will be presented and analyzed, which is followed up with the interviewee's statements about fear of crime based on the theoretical perspectives. The final section ties these two parts together, by analyzing how fear of crime affects the business' crime-preventive strategies and programs, and vice versa. Since the interview guide was developed based on the theoretical perspectives and recent research, a decision was made to not distinguish the results section and the analysis section, but to allow the continuing use of the analytic tools as the results are presented.

This dispositional decision offers, in my opinion, easier ways for the reader to follow the analysis process, which in that way, also increases the credibility of the study, since it makes it easier to follow my interpretations. Furthermore, the quotations in this section have been edited in the sense of fixing slips of the tongue and incorrect colloquia; this is for the convenience of the reader. The interviewees are referred to as I1- I4 in order to keep them anonymous, but also to identify the different statements between them. Thus, it emphasizes on which interviewee is saying what, and their statements are visualized.

5.1 High contra low risk businesses

As mentioned earlier, the interviewees of the study are individuals within organizations whom possess in-depth knowledge of their organization and the security measures of the organization. Some of the interviewees are the owners of their businesses, while others are high level managers. Between the four business representatives, three types of industries are represented, which are: business within retail and wholesale (one which mainly sells food, and one which sells other products), property rentals, and the service sector. Furthermore, none of the organizations above are family businesses, some of them are included in large chains and others are not. Nonetheless, what they all had in common was that the businesses they represent all have been victimized by some sort of crimes.

It emerged in the interviews that the crimes the different organizations deal with, also differs between the different sectors. For the retailer, shoplifting and theft by customers are considered to be the most common crimes against their organization, and occur on a daily basis, according to the interviewee.(I4) However, the wholesale business placed burglary (and burglary attempts) and different types of economic crimes as the crime types that were most frequent in regards to their business. While for the businesses within property rentals and the service sector, vandalism and burglary (and burglary attempts) were consider as the most repeated crime against, and within their organizations. These

⁸⁷ Nylén, Ulrica. (2005). *Att presentera kvalitativa data*. Malmö: Liber. 95.

findings can be compared to Dugato *et al* European study,⁸⁸ where different types of branches suffer from different type of crime victimization. However, some businesses and industries are more vulnerable to crime victimization than others, not only to one type of crime, but a variety of them, and with a high frequency. This is described by I4, who is in the retail business, in the following quote:

The most common crime is shoplifting, and it appears in various forms, it is most common that someone just takes a product. But one can also steal products through the self-scanning system, scanning stuff for 70sek when you actually have stuff worth of 500sek in the cart. We do also have a post office where people just order stuff in the name of others and are using fake IDs, and burglaries.[...] we deal with all these sorts of “classic crimes”, and then there are all the receipts, drivers and employees that can be a part of the problem. So, there are many angles, then there may also be false invoices, it is a classic. (I4)

The other businesses are not as exposed to crime as I4:s business. In fact, the other business representatives felt that they were relatively spared in terms of crime against their organizations. However, I2 mentions that the frequency of the organizations victimization changes, on a periodic basis and further argues that it mostly depends on the external environment in the area where the organization is situated. This is depicted in the following quote:

I think that it is very calm in the neighborhood now, it was many years ago something like that happened in the area (repeated vandalism and burglar attempts against the organizations house, breaking windows and sabotaging the outside interior), but back then there were many gangs in circulation. [...] It (vandalism and burglar attempts) tends to occur in different cycles, especially right before the summer holidays, it is a worrying period. [...] When that high school disappeared nearby, it has become much calmer in the neighborhood. (I2)

As this statement highlights, at a certain period, the frequency of burglaries and vandalism committed by youths increased, which is both associated with the high school being situated in the neighborhood and the youths being free from school. Thus, as the environment changes so does the frequency in crime. Contrary to the feelings of victimization expressed in the quote above, two of the business representatives from wholesale and property rental businesses did not become victimized as frequent. Applying the framework of Burrows *et al*⁸⁹, it could be argued that the wholesale and property rental businesses are so-called “low risk businesses”, while the retail and service businesses seem to be more “high risk businesses”. Considering the customer contact, only the retailer can be described to have a high direct contact with the customers, which explains the vulnerability of the business, especially through crimes such as shoplifting and theft. However, the retailer organization does not really fulfill Burrows *et al* other criteria of a high risk business⁹⁰, as it also has several features associated with low risk businesses with regards to its location and security measures implemented. Based on location and features of the caller/victim the business is located in the outskirts of the city, not around “problem estates” and is not open during nights. Moreover, the retailer has also a large amount of security measures, including security guards, which lowers the crime victimization risk of the business. In contrary to the retail business, the service business, as a business with low customer contact, fulfills most of the criteria of a high

⁸⁸ Dugato, Marco *et al*. The crime against businesses in Europe.

⁸⁹ Burrows *et al*. Counting the Cost: Crime Against Business in Scotland

⁹⁰ Ibid.

risk business. This is mainly because it is located in what is considered to be “problem estates”, that is, in an area that is deserted at weekends and nights, with none, or very little surveillance. In the words of I2:

Nobody lives there, it is exposed and shielded.

As this statement indicates, the organization was exposed to crime due to its shielded location. Hence, crimes could be committed in solitude without any neighbors noticing. Furthermore, similarly to the wholesale business, it is a business with low direct customer contact, since they do not have a boutique on their premises, just a storeroom. The customers are generally contacted via meetings and phone calls, and almost all of their customers consist of other organizations and businesses. However, the wholesale business is located in an industrial area, which is deserted at weekends and nights. Despite this, their crime problems are generally rarer, as they have had a few burglaries and attempts of burglaries in the past, however, succeeded in reducing these incidents by increasing security. Hence, using Burrows *et al* terminology this business can be defined as a “low risk business”.⁹¹ The potential risk with the location and the security measures taken is highlighted in the subsequent quote:

It is very empty here during evenings and weekends, there are no people in motion, it is easier for burglary attempts. But then again, there are lots of guards patrolling the area all the time, because of all the companies which are situated here. (I3)

The fourth business, the property rental business could also be placed under what Burrows *et al* define as a business with a low customer contact.⁹² The features of the business include both high and low risks. For example, the business is situated quite central in town, near “problem” estates. However, since the office of the business is located in an apartment block, there are people in motion all around the clock, which adds to the surveillance of the employed security guards that do rounds every night in the neighborhood. (I1)

Categorizing crime types by the type of customer contact and frequency of the customer contact shows to be of value when predicting what type of crime problems the different sectors have. As Burrows *et al* suggest, the retail business, which is dependent on a high customer contact is faced with customer shoplifting and theft.⁹³ I4 considered the high volume of customers as one of the main reasons for the victimization, and highlighted this in the following way:

We are exposed and have extreme amounts of customers here, and because of that we are more affected of course. (I4)

Although this retail business does not have all the features of a high risk business, such as high risk location, lots of security and so on, it was still a frequent target for criminal activity, in particular shoplifting, theft and burglary. This could perhaps be explained by the commodities and the supply of money that are within the retail business. Even though, this business could be considered to be a high risk target based on Burrows *et al* framework,⁹⁴ it can be argued that these kinds of assets will always attract offenders. I3 comments to the role of goods in wholesale and argues that wholesale businesses in

⁹¹ Burrows *et al*. Counting the Cost: Crime Against Business in Scotland

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

general are vulnerable to criminal acts, such as theft and burglary, as long as there is a market for the products to be handled by fences.

Burrows *et al* framework suggests that the businesses with low customer contact do not have shoplifting and theft as their main concern.⁹⁵ They are instead exposed to different kinds of vandalism and burglary during the hours the business is closed and empty of people. Although the businesses within this category are significantly different, the risk features derived from Burrows framework are quite accurate here with regards to the criminal victimization of the organizations. With the exception of the wholesale business, the aforementioned organizations do not hold any specific theft-prone products and none of the organizations hold money. These are presumably the reasons for why these businesses only have had a few theft and burglary incidents, which have often resulted in petty theft, some of which were personal belongings have been left behind at the offices. The main exception has been the wholesale business where stored goods have been stolen (I1, I2, I3). Although three of the businesses' locations can be characterized and considered to be high risk locations, the service business is the only one that suffers from vandalism and burglary attempts (not often the burglars get hold of something). The reason for this is the low surveillance within the premises, combined with the low insight to the area where the organization is situated, which allows the offenders to commit crimes undisturbed. Moreover, it could also be concluded, that the level of the problems within the "problem" estates around the service business are higher than the "problem" estates around the property rental businesses. As the other organizations (property rental business and the wholesale business) have security guards patrolling periodically within the areas of the businesses, and that the property rental business gain extra surveillance through the residents within the same building block.

5.2 Security and Crime Prevention

All of the businesses in this study apply some kind of security and crime prevention work. In order to gain an understanding about this, the Situational Crime Prevention framework (hereinafter SCP) was used to pinpoint the different measures. This is needed for the later analysis of how the security measures are affected and affects the fear of crime. This section is divided into the three main strategies of SCP: *Increasing the Effort*, *Increasing the Risks*, and *Reducing the Reward*.

5.2.1 Increasing the Effort

The most obvious way of reducing criminal opportunities is to obstruct physical barriers through the use of for example locks, safes and reinforced materials, but also creating access control units, such as ID badges and fences (situational crime prevention). These types of measures are known as *Target hardening* and *Access control* and are the most used strategies by the businesses in this study. Here are a few examples:

We do have electronic tags for residents, locked entrance doors, and tags for the elevator. So there are quite a lot of obstacles ... (I1)

We lock all the valuables in the safe [...] I mean that you have to lock your stuff, you cannot leave personal belongings [...] and to always lock the door to your room, it lies with us to do that. (I2)

We have new windows, which are supposed to be unbreakable [...] but we also put up fences at the loading ramp, and it will be stronger fences instead, which cannot be cut up like that.(referring to a burglar attempt) (I3)

⁹⁵ Burrows *et al*. Counting the Cost: Crime Against Business in Scotland.

We have systems that makes is difficult to perform robberies, cash handling systems for example. (I4)

The list of the businesses *target hardening* and *access controls* can be made infinitely long. However, the remaining two strategies for *increasing the efforts*, that is, *Deflecting offenders* and *Controlling facilitators*, were harder to identify. However, all of the businesses do perform some sort of ID-check or company-check when going into business with another venture or person, in order to prevent being scammed and fall victim to fraud. This kind of preventive measure is often used within the retail and wholesale business when they suspect false invoices, or when a customer behaves shady by for example wanting the payment to be done on their specific conditions; thereby, causing the businesses to be cautious of any types of attempts of economic crimes. The business representatives explain:

When we talk purely economic crime, people may order goods and want us to rewrite it as something else, for tax reasons. There is also money laundering processes, when they ordered very, expensive fine goods and then just washes around money. It is probably what it is most common in such cases..... (I3)

Then there may also be false invoices, it is a classic. It has calmed down a bit, but in the summer there will always come false invoices. There are often in the shape of telephone directories, or web subscriptions.....very diffused in that way. (I4)

5.2.2 Increasing the Risks

This category of strategic measures involves *entry and exist screening*, *formal surveillance*, *surveillance by employees* and *natural surveillance*. These types of preventive measures are well used within the retail and wholesale businesses. Mostly it involves merchandise tagging, but also procedures such as to ask the customers to show the content of their bag when exiting the store. (I3, I4). Furthermore, all of the businesses use some sort of *Formal Surveillance*, which typically involves electronic hardware such as: burglar alarms and cameras, but also the use of security guards. All of the organizations in the study use different types of alarms, connected to security companies. However, only the retail business used advanced camera and cash handling systems, and also alone to have in-house security guards, both in uniforms and undercover. (I4) According to Clarke, some employees, especially those dealing with the public, indirectly perform a surveillance role and passively increases the risk for the potential offender.⁹⁶ It can be assumed that this do apply to all the organizations in the study, but the two high risk businesses are very aware of this, and considered the training and experiences of the employees as an asset in their crime prevention work, which the following statements stresses:

It is really important that the staff never work alone, as I said; they are always two or more, especially in the evenings during the weekends. [...] The staff must at all the time know how to act, to remain cooperative, experience is a big part of this. (I2)

When a crime is committed or someone is suspicious, we have internal codes, which we can call in via the speaker. [...] We work a lot on ensuring that everyone passed all the training courses they should, e.g.

⁹⁶ Clarke, Ronald V. *Situational Crime Prevention*. Crime and Justice

safety training. [...] This is how we catch the big cluster, ranging from technical means to that the employees have the right conditions to perform their jobs in these issues, so that they have enough knowledge about what they should and are allow to do. (I4)

Natural surveillance was not mention by any of the business representatives as an active strategy.

5.2.3 Reducing the Reward

Target removal was not identified as a strategy used by any of the business, however, the strategy of *Identifying Property* is a well-used strategy at the wholesale business, which I3 claims:

The stocktaking is done twice a year, where everything is ID labeled, even though the main reason for this is not in to reduce or prevent theft, but it still works in that way, making it to have a multiple purpose.

Moreover, *Removing inducements* were considered as an important measure, especially when victimized by vandalism according to the organizations. Exemplified by a quote:

I came to think about a fire in the yard, it is important, when something like that happens that it is repaired as quickly as possible, and that everyone has that spirit. (I2)

Furthermore, *Rule setting* is another kind of preventive strategies that businesses can apply to their organization. The retail business representative described that this sort of strategy was the best way of preventing, in particular, employee crime, which will be discussed in the next section. I4 highlights the *Rule setting* in the following way:

To have clear procedures, in order to remove as many gray areas as possible. It may seem that you are overambitious or penny-pinching, but it is like this: we have 100 chocolate bars, and they all expired. I would love to give it to the staff when they go home. But that is a typical gray area.... Because it was standing right there and I thought.....The next time something else is following in that box, and then the next thing, and then someone puts something that they like in the box... eventually it becomes a gray area. Then it is better to state clear rules, saying NO, everything goes in the garbage bin. [...] So rules and procedures are the most important of all, and removing the gray areas. (I4)

The different SCP strategies are quite easy to spot among the different organizations, and some strategies are more favored in some sectors that in others. Some strategies are quite general, and broadly used, especially the strategies that involve increasing the efforts for the offenders. However, it seems like the high risk businesses are using a broader and more intense scope of the strategies of SCP. For example, the retail business is largely dependent on increasing the risk strategies, such as *formal surveillance*, but also *rules settings*. Whereas the service business is most prone to engage in reducing the reward type of strategies, removing valuable things into locks during closed hours and doing rapid repairs on property that got vandalized. The low risk businesses do not tend to “specialize” or focus on one certain strategy, yet do they neither adapt a large number of them. Concluding that, in this context among these businesses, limited crime victimization equals limited security measures.

However, I1 and I2 businesses did also apply a different kind of preventive strategy, which are not really related to SCP. Instead, they tend to focus more on building community connections, and branding their organization as open and complaisant. Here are some examples:

We have been working with involving the residents much more, keeping our doors open, so people are able to come in here and visits us (in the office). Before, it was closed, and no one had any direct contact with us, but now it is much better. We have also improved lots of the interior and exterior of the apartments, and involved the residents in the process. [...] In that way we do create a commitment among the residents, establishing awareness about the apartment and the things. It is a matter of give and take, but much is to the open office, allowing the residents to drop in. (I1)

For our purpose of preventing crime, it is very important that we have direct contacts with other organizations and authorities which can help... it is all about prevention, and to make us (the organization) be considered as good (by the neighborhood). Most of the stuff that happens here, I am fully convinced is drug related, so lots of the preventive work involves doing activities with the children and the youths, and cooperating with the property owners in the areas. (I2)

5.2.4 Employee crime and prevention strategies

As internal crimes often are hard to spot and record, the chances are high that the business owner also tries to avoid the subject, especially when speaking to outsiders.⁹⁷ Moreover, the low risk businesses did not consider themselves at risk for this type of crime at all, and the both representatives did not recall any incidents in this area. However, I3 mentions that the organization may very well suffer from internal crime, but at such a small level, it does not hurt the organization in any way. I3 also states why their business does not have any screening process when they are hiring new employees:

Companies are more often exposed to crime, especially small type of crimes, stuff like employees who take pens and notebooks home with them will always happen. This is not really stuff that one can count as a crime, in that way it is rather arbitrarily. [...] We do use extracts from criminal records, and there are some interviews before employment..... but nothing that illustrates precisely if you have done something earlier or so. I think it is the chemistry that matters there. (I3)

Different conditions and experiences with internal crimes are told from the high risk businesses. In this quote, I2 accounts for some thoughts on internal crimes, and preventive measures within their organization:

Of course it is not good (employees committing crime), it is terrible if it is like that. [...] We do have check-ups on new employees; especially if their work involves tasks together with children. However, we do not do that on the existing staff, it would be humiliating to ask for police records or drug tests. [...] Then we do have lots of people who are employed by the hour on different projects, we do also take in interns, and we cannot control all of them. (I2)

⁹⁷ Clarke, M. (1990) Business crime—It's nature and control. New York: St. Martin's Press.

The other high risk business, the retailer, uses recruitment companies in the hiring process, which performs the background checks on the employees. The business has also implemented automated internal systems, which looks at strange behaviors in the cashiers, flagging strange behaviors. (I4) Based on these results, it could be concluded that the crime prevention measures used to tackle external crime, match the business crime prevention measures in tackling the internal crimes. The retailer, who puts lots of investments and efforts in the SCP strategies like *formal surveillance* and *rule setting* when contending external crimes, are also highlighting the direct security when facing internal crime. Highlighting direct security as a prevention strategy focuses the resources of the organization in deterring both external and internal crime, according to Traub.⁹⁸ The most common strategies used by all of the organizations in order to keep internal crimes low, seems to be within the category which emphasizes prevention through hiring practices and employee awareness/education programs.⁹⁹ As all of the businesses uses this kind of strategy. As none of the organizations really had any specific examples of (more severe) employee crime, one could conclude that this sort of strategy is effective. By sorting out the best possible employees, some business representative stressed the importance of having trust in the employees. Furthermore, none of the businesses reported any use of the features within the “whistleblowing” strategy that emphasizes the reporting of criminal activity within the organizations.¹⁰⁰ It could be seen as a result of the success of the other strategies within the businesses, as there are no internal crimes to be reported. Having these sorts of strategic approaches might even have the opposite effect according to I2, saying that it could create dissatisfaction among the employees and make them feel more alienated. And, according to previous research, these kinds of conditions increase the likelihood of employees to commit crimes against the business owner.¹⁰¹

5.3 The fear of crime among the business representatives

As the fear of crime is defined as an emotional response of anxiety to crime victimization¹⁰², the first questions asked to the interviewees concerned the different emotions they had experienced when their organizations felt victimized of crime. To then continue with the process by going in to the fear of the different types of crime in detail. However, some of the interviewees claimed that fear was not the emotion they felt when their organization had been victimized of crime; neither on a daily basis do they feel fear regarding potential victimization of crime for their business. Instead, the emotions were considered to be frustration and awareness, here are some examples:

You just feel incredibly violated when it happens, but it is nothing personal in any way... (I3 when talking about prior burglary)

It just feels so pointless. ... Like when will they give up?It was a struggle, it really was. [...] It is so meaningless. (I1 talking about repeated vandalism)

The fear.... it is not so great, but the fact that we be victimized is. [...] It is not like you go around and are afraid, more like annoyed. (I4 on theft, vandalism and burglary)

⁹⁸ Traub. *Battling Employee Crime. A Review of Corporate Strategies and Programs.*

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Mars, G. (2006) “Changes in occupational deviance: Scams, fiddles and sabotage in the twenty-first century.” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 45: 285–296.

¹⁰² May, David C. Fear of Crime. *Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention*, Bonnie S. Fisher & Steven P. Lab (red.), 391-392. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. 2010.

Nothing I fear or worry about, no. (I1 on burglary and vandalism)

The relative little or no fear shown by the interviewees, in regards to their organization could be explained by the simple reason that they do not take it personal, because they are not getting emotionally affected by it. It could also be explained through the vulnerability perspective, claiming that the three factors of, probability, seriousness and powerlessness of the crime victimization affect the level of fear. Here the probability of crime victimization among the business representatives (with an exception of the retailer) is considered so low, that it does not affect their fear at all. The seriousness of the anticipated consequences of crime victimization among the businesses are also considered so low, it does not affect their level of fear. The interviewees mention that the loss of money as a result of theft or burglary attempts and vandalism is not enjoyable, but the sums are relatively small, which may explain why they are not considered as a serious consequence of crime victimization. However, there might be moments or certain crimes, which cause greater seriousness, for example, affecting the employees physically. These types of crimes and the level of fear will be discussed in the following. Nevertheless, the power to control the aforementioned factors is rated as high within the organizations, making them have low levels of fear in relation to most type of crimes. Considering the fact that the organizations crime prevention strategies aim to lower the opportunities and motivations for crime i.e. lower the probability of victimization, gives the organizations a sense of being in control, which directly decreases the level of fear. If the prevention measures are effective, the levels of fear are decreased even further. This seems to be the case for all of the businesses involved.

The other perspective of fear of crime is the one of direct and indirect encounters of victimization of crime. As all of the businesses in the study have been targeted for the same type of crime several times, one cannot say that it increases their fear of those types of crimes. Rather, as mentioned before, it is seen as something unavoidable and annoying, but yet not damaging for the businesses. An interviewee puts it like this, when talking about vandalism:

You just have to deal with it when it happens, not that I fear it, but it just makes me angry and it takes energy, but you just got to keep on going, otherwise it will make you stupid. (I4)

When it comes to previous crime victimizations effects on the security measures of the organization, I2 gives an example:

Many years ago we had a couple of incidents where computers suddenly disappeared, but now we list everything, so we know who lends/have what, and when they return it. (I2)

In preventing the internal thefts within the organization, the security measure of *rules settings* adopted varied as a direct action of that problem. But again, this was not done out of fear, just as a risk-precaution of previous victimization. The high risk businesses have had incidents, which according to the interviewees made them fearful of that specific type of situation/crime. It involves drug-related robberies and threats with weapons. This is how the interviewees described the situations:

When one of the staff became knife threatened when he opened the door one morning, and the offenders were really high... I thought that was so terrible. (I2)

I've had stores in different areas where the clientele is worse, where drugs are the main problem, things are more messy and when they are high they are difficult to assess, and often very physically strong. (I4)

This incident was one of the reasons why I2:s business changed their staffing policies, to always be at least two or more within the businesses in case of emergency. These kinds of crimes, where the employees themselves are exposed of getting physically harmed, has just occurred at the high risk businesses, and explains why they have an increased fear of these type of crimes, while the low risk businesses do not fear those type of crimes at all. Considering high and violent offenders, the probability and the seriousness of the crime causes fear of the high risk business representatives. First of all, the unpredictable features of a high offender is considered scary, since they do not mind security measures, making the business representatives feel out of control, which increases fear. Also, the consequences of an intoxicated, unpredictable and violent armed offender could result in severe violence, or even worse outcomes, and this uncertainty is fear inducing in the businesses representatives view. This is highlighted in the following quote:

The problem is the case of a high fella is in dire need of cash; they will commit no matter what, then it is really important to have the right system in motion. (I4)

The ecological perspective in the fear of crime literature focuses on individual residents and their perceptions, and not organizations. However, the contextual settings of the property rental business and the service business are considered to be closed to, or within “problem” estates. The ecological perspective suggests that the higher levels of incivilities within such a neighborhood, the higher levels of fear of crime will follow. Conversely, both of the business has not only focused on SCP, but taken an open approach in their areas, establishing contacts and relations, creating a safer environment for both residents and business associates. This kind preventive measures and work surely influences the business representatives’ level of fear of crime against their organizations.

6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

This study has aimed to investigate how business representative's fear of crime is altered in regards to their crime-preventive business strategies and programs and vice versa. Throughout this thesis the following questions have been guiding: What effects does victimization and risk-perception have on Swedish business representatives' fear of crime? And what sorts of crime-preventive measures are used within the business in Sweden, and in what ways does it alter the business representative's fear of crime?

It was clear that businesses within this study all faced different conditions in regards of crime against their businesses, depending on their location, the customers, their products and services, and the employees. Therefore, they all conducted different type of security measures in order to tackle their specific problems. For example, the businesses that were situated in problem areas, tended to adapt a more open and communicatory approach towards their neighborhoods and communities, whilst the other businesses which were not located at such areas tended to focus more on formal surveillance and standardization of rules within the organization to deal with potential crime more effective. Either way, it is hard to measure how security measures are effective or not, but considering the general low fear of crime of the business representatives, it could be considered as effective, at least in that sense.

Furthermore, based on the features of the businesses location, the customers, their products and services, and the employees, two of the four businesses within the study could be described as high risk businesses. Because of their high risk features, there were more exposed to being victimized by certain types of crimes. Some of which (the most frequent) did not cause or inflict fear among the business representatives, while one type of crime did: crimes that in particular involved offenders under the influence of drugs and with violent behavior. Because of the high risk businesses prior experiences with the victimization of these type of crimes, and the potential consequences they cause, they had a higher fear of this type of crime. The other, low risk businesses, did not have such experiences, and did neither think that their business would be victimized by such crime, their fear of those type of crimes were none.

The security measures used within the organizations are based on a mix between a general risk-analysis, standards, prior victimization, but not out of fear. In that way, the fear of crime did not really affect the specific security measures. However, the other way around, the security measures do provide a certain stability and sense of being in control, as they lower the probability of victimization for the organizations and therefore lower the fear of crime perceived.

In conclusion, the level of fear considering crimes that does not harm persons, physically and mentally, was by the business representatives not seen as fear inducing at all. Because of these sorts of crimes pure economical and time consuming consequences, they were only experienced as annoying. Another factor for this was that all of the businesses were pleased with authorities and police efforts if victimized. For this reason, the security measures applied by the businesses were not really considered to affect the level of fear of the organizations, yet were seen to be needed and useful. However, regarding crimes that involve unpredictability and possible violent outcomes, where e.g. employees might get hurt, were more fear inducing. But only for the businesses that have had previous direct victimization of these types of crimes before. In this matter, security measures focusing on employees well-being and safety does affect the level of fear, for example rules within organization stating there must always be two or more employees together, especially during opening and closing, on evenings and weekends. Because of the unpredictability of these crimes, i.e. they happened despite all the formal surveillance and target hardenings, two of the organizations applied a different kind of security measure,

trying to get on a good foot within the communities where they are functioning, having an open and communicative approach, which has yield results.

Measuring fear of crime “from the eyes of an organization” could be seen as problematic, since the fear of crime is something personal and emotional, and comes from within. However, I felt like this problem was avoided, in the sense that the interviewees were owners or at high levels within their organization, making them more emotional attached to their organizations. The use of qualitative interviews was considered as positive, since the general fear of crime were none existent for most crimes, I could change the direction during the interview, focusing on the crimes and situation where the levels of fear was higher.

There are both advantages and disadvantages in terms of the theoretical perspectives. The SCP strategies were relevant to gain insight in what sort of security measures the businesses are using, in order to see what type of strategies they are focusing on. This gives information on how they protect themselves against different type of crimes, and the strategies they put most efforts in, those crime are likely the ones they fear the most. However, the nature of the SCP strategies, made the strategies easy to explore, being used like a “checklist”. Thus this was a good way of finding out about the businesses preventive strategies as it derives from many criminological theories. However, it does not include different strategies on crime prevention in a community context, which, according to the businesses in those types of areas, represent a large scale of their crime preventive work.

While using the fear of crime perspectives on the businesses, several perspectives were excluded in the study, because of irrelevance, such as gender and racial features, as they cannot be applied to organizations in that sense. However, features like this, but in an organizational context would perhaps yield more and different results, involving the business age, employees’ gender etc. Furthermore, the use of Situational Crime Prevention strategies, to identify and capture the respondents own work, tended to be limited, as some of the strategies used by the respondents could not be identified and concluded in the analysis. Nevertheless, for further research this would perhaps be interesting to investigate to develop the SCP strategies.

Another limitation of this study is that it is based on previous research which could be considered as old and out of date. Most of it also derives from USA, where there are completely other circumstances and principles. However, as mentioned in the background chapter of this thesis there is a gap in this research field in regards to Scandinavia. Moreover, there is a limited body of newer research in this area. This study hopes to have contributed to this filling some parts of this gap.

Based on the results of this study, it would be interesting to focus on high risk businesses, and the type of crime that induces most fear, that is, violent crimes. It would be beneficial to include employees in these types of studies, since they are the most exposed. Doing a triangulation of methods, in order to capture a width would be optimal. Investigate what kind of security measures are considered as safer for employees who work in organizations, which are more exposed to workplace violence than others, and develop methods for this.

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APPENDIX I – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

I1 13/05 2015

I2 17/05 2015

I3 18/05 2015

I4 18/05 2015

APPENDIX II – INTERVIEW GUIDE

Background

Name:

Position:

Industry and company:

Location:

Opening hours:

Customer contact:

Crimes that the business deals with

How exposed is your business to crime?

What is the most common crime you deal with?

Can you give an example of such an incident?

Is this type of crime industry specific?

Do you think others deal with the same type of crime?

What has been the worst crime incident you've dealt with?

Fear of crime

Would you consider businesses a more frequent target of crimes than others?

How would you consider the risk and fear of your business to be targeted of any of these crimes:

Embezzlement

Theft/shoplifting

Burglary

Vandalism

Aggressive/violent behavior

Others?

On a daily basis, do you consider your business a crime target that is in need of protection?

Based on the recent months, do you often feel scared of being target of crimes?

If victimized by a crime, do you feel like correct help will be given to the business?

Preventive measures

Describe briefly, what the businesses security philosophy is.

What kind of preventive measures do you use?

Why did you choose them in particular?

How confident are you in the security strategies?

Do you think crime would increase if you decreased the security measures?

If you would have had more resources, would you considered to apply more security measures?

Do you have any specific co-operation with other businesses or governmental organizations in regards to security?

Do you apply any kind of employee training or program, to get the employees involved in the security strategies?

What is the worst case scenario, internal or external crimes?

Do you have any type of employment screening?

Do you have any types of prevention programs?