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
IMER • INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

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Immigration patterns, economic integration and residential segregation: Sweden in the late 20th century

Invandringens mönster, ekonomisk integration och boendesegregation: Sverige på slutet av 1900-talet



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# IMMIGRATION PATTERNS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION: SWEDEN IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY

Pieter Bevelander

This paper offers an overview of immigration to Sweden in the last decades of the twentieth century, including the labour market integration and residential segregation of immigrants. The character of immigration has gradually changed from primarily labour migration up to the middle of the 1970s to refugee immigration and family reunification during the last decades of the twentieth century. Since the 1970s economic integration of immigrants has gradually decreased while residential segregation has increased. This development reached its peak in the early 1990s, when refugee immigration increased considerably at the same time as the economy deteriorated. Integration policies have not blocked this negative process.

KEYWORDS: international migration, economic integration, residential segregation

## Introduction

From the middle of the 1980s, increasing amounts of asylum seekers have been looking for protection in quite a number of European countries. Like many of its neighbouring states, Sweden has been affected by this dramatic increase in refugee movement worldwide. The large inflow of people seeking refuge during the 1980s and 1990s, together with a huge increase of unemployment and a low employment integration of immigrants, has provoked a debate about regulating immigration and adjusting integration policies in Sweden. The deep economic recession of the early nineties obviously fuelled this attention and directed it particularly towards the economic adjustment of immigrants and refugees.<sup>1</sup>

Historically, Sweden has received a substantial number of immigrants. In this sense, immigration is not new to Sweden. From the Second World War up until the mid seventies, the larger part of this migration was attributable to the high demand for foreign labour in the growing industries and service sectors. Only a minor part of the total migration was composed of refugees from non-European countries. Immigration to Sweden has thus consisted almost entirely of European labour immigrants. However, since the seventies the decline in economic and industrial growth has removed the need for foreign labour. This has changed the composition of the immigrant population. Sweden has recently seen a large increase of refugees from Eastern Europe and from non-European countries. In turn, this new immigration

has generated an increase of tied movers (relatives to earlier immigrants). In the year 2000, the foreign born part of the Swedish population numbered over one million, which amounts to 11.3 percent of the total population.

One of the central goals of the economic and social policies of the welfare system in Sweden has been to counteract spatial concentration of immigrants to certain areas and to ensure full employment for all Swedish residents, immigrants included. Linked to the equality aims<sup>2</sup> of the integration policies of the Swedish governments since the mid-70s, it is interesting to study the integration and possible non-integration of immigrants, and especially refugees, in the Swedish labour- and housing markets.

The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the migration flows into Sweden during the last decades as well as the employment and spatial integration of immigrants and refugees by country of origin during the same period. The paper therefore gives an overview of the immigration to Sweden since the Second World War and a specific account of the numbers of immigrants by admission status for the last decades. It also discusses the integration policy measures implemented during the same period and the extent to which these policies serve to integrate immigrants and refugees into the Swedish labour- and housing markets. This is followed by a discussion of the integration, settlement policy and housing situation over time for native- as well as foreign-born in these same decades, focusing on asylum seekers and refugees and their employment situation. Finally there are some concluding thoughts on the immigration experience of Sweden.


### **Immigration history**

A simplified view of immigration to Sweden would divide the post-war period into two distinct periods; the first primarily characterized by labour-force immigration, and the second by a shift towards refugee and tied immigration. This first period is usually said to have begun in 1945 and ended in the first half of the 1970s. During this time, Sweden's economy expanded rapidly, partly due to the reconstruction of her neighbouring countries after World War Two. Accordingly, the labour shortages were solved in the 1950s through the import of skilled labour, which served to complement the native labour force. This skilled labour was mainly recruited from North-Western Europe with the majority coming from Western Germany and the Nordic countries.

But the 1960s saw the beginnings of a rationalisation phase in the Swedish economy. Now, the type of labour sought after shifted towards unskilled or low-skilled workers. In contrast to their counterparts a decade earlier, these workers were used more as a substitute for the native workforce than as a complement. While earlier immigrants allowed the economy to grow in size, the immigrants of the 1960s facilitated a widening of the economy. As they

arrived, these new immigrants found employment in jobs vacated by Swedes during the expansion of the service sector. The fact that these newly vacated jobs could be filled by unskilled workers was a result of massive industrial investment aimed at increasing international competitiveness and reducing costs (Ohlsson 1975 and Lundh & Ohlsson 1999). Labour force immigrants during this decade came largely from Nordic countries but also from Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

**Figure 1: Immigration to Sweden 1946 – 2001.**  
(Absolute numbers)



Source: Sweden Statistics, Population statistics

By the end of the 1960s, however, the situation began to change for immigrants. The trade unions began to view immigration as producing a number of negative side effects. One such side effect was the delaying of industrial transformation through the steady supply of workers to replace Swedes who had moved into the service sector. This supply of labour also served to depress wage increases within industry, which would otherwise have occurred due to the scarcity of labour. In this way, immigration was criticized for preserving the traditional industrial structure at a time when it would otherwise have been forced to undergo significant transformation. The government responded to these criticisms through a change in the rules governing entrance into Sweden. The new rules began to apply in 1968, and meant that future applicants for work and residence permits from non-Nordic countries had to apply before they entered the country, and at the same arrange for both a job and a place to live. This dramatically cut down the labour immigration of non-Nordic countries during the next decades.

As stated earlier, Swedish economic growth dropped to a lower level fol-

lowing the crisis of the early 1970s. Simultaneously, the economy passed through a period of structural change with a decreasing industrial sector and an increasing service sector. Nordic labour migration – especially Finnish – gradually declined, mainly because of a diminishing gap in the standard of living between Sweden and Finland, and an increasing demand for labour in Finland. While labour migration dwindled during the 1970s, and more significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, other types of migration started to increase. These new groups were predominantly tied movers and various categories of refugees, with a greater share of non-European immigrants having other motives than work for their migration. This also led to a major shift in the country of origin-mix amongst the immigrant population. In the 1970s, the major contributors to the immigrant population in Sweden were primary refugees from Chile, Poland and Turkey. In the 1980s, the lion's share of this new immigration came from Chile, Ethiopia, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. Individuals from Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe countries dominated the 1990s. Table 1 also shows the population decrease for native-born Swedes between 1995 and 2000. This population decrease is, however, compensated for by the net-inflow of migrants during the same period.

*Table 1: Stock of Native Born<sup>3</sup> and Selected Groups Foreign Born 1960-2000*

| Country/year   | 1960      | 1970      | 1980      | 1990      | 1995      | 2000                 |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|
| Sweden         | 7,195,250 | 7,539,318 | 7,690,282 | 7,800,185 | 7,901,474 | 7,878,994            |
| Denmark        | 35,112    | 39,152    | 43,501    | 43,931    | 40,506    | 38,190               |
| Finland        | 101,307   | 235,453   | 251,342   | 217,636   | 205,710   | 195,447              |
| Norway         | 37,253    | 44,681    | 42,863    | 52,744    | 44,852    | 42,464               |
| Germany        | 37,580    | 41,793    | 38,696    | 36,558    | 35,731    | 38,155               |
| Greece         | 266       | 11,835    | 15,153    | 13,171    | 12,098    | 10,851               |
| USA            | 10,874    | 12,646    | 11,980    | 13,001    | 13,834    | 14,413               |
| Italy          | 4,904     | 7,268     | 6,062     | 5,989     | 5,926     | 6,337                |
| F.Yugoslavia   | 1,532     | 33,779    | 37,982    | 43,346    | 70,516    | 131,772 <sup>4</sup> |
| Turkey         | 202       | 3,768     | 14,357    | 25,528    | 29,761    | 31,894               |
| Chile          | 69        | 181       | 8,256     | 27,635    | 26,979    | 26,842               |
| Poland         | 6,347     | 10,851    | 19,967    | 35,631    | 39,373    | 40,123               |
| Czechoslovakia | 3,562     | 7,392     | 7,529     | 8,432     | 8,072     | 7,304                |
| Ethiopia       | 59        | 346       | 1,797     | 10,027    | 13,436    | 11,907               |
| Vietnam        | 1         | 195       | 1,602     | 6,265     | 9,393     | 10,898               |
| Iran           | 115       | 411       | 3,348     | 40,084    | 49,040    | 51,101               |
| Iraq           | 16        | 108       | 631       | 9,818     | 26,361    | 49,372               |

*Source: Statistics Sweden, Population Statistics.*

## Asylum and Admission


Like many other countries, the Swedish refugee policy is based on the UN Geneva Convention of 1951 (which Sweden signed in 1954), and established in the Swedish Alien Act of 1989 (1989:529). According to this act (which has been amended and reinterpreted considerably), Sweden may give asylum to one category of refugees only, so called *convention refugees*. These are individuals who are either stateless or outside the country of their nationality or former habitual residence, and who have a well grounded fear of persecution in that country due to their race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, religious beliefs or political opinion. These refugees have entered Sweden individually, applied for asylum and subsequently obtained a residence permit. Outside this act, Sweden obviously cooperates with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, and admits its share of *quota refugees*. In contrast to convention refugees, the quota refugees are asylum seekers who often come directly from a refugee camp and who have not individually entered the country. The size of the quota is decided yearly upon by the Swedish government and in agreement with UNHCR.

Also since that time, the Swedish Alien Act of 1954 has been interpreted in a wider sense than the Geneva Convention, creating an established practice that has enabled other refugees than convention and quota refugees to obtain permanent residence in Sweden. If not being granted asylum according to the restricted interpretation of the Geneva Convention, asylum seekers could be granted refuge as so-called *de facto refugees* or as *war-rejecters*. De facto refugees are individuals that can refer to political conditions or other circumstances in their country of origin that weight heavily in support for claiming asylum. War-rejecters are individuals that have fled war or impending military service. Both these categories were codified in 1976. Since 1997 a new category has been created called *refugees in need of sanctuary*<sup>5</sup>, which mainly include the earlier de facto refugees. Individuals can also obtain a permanent residence for *humanitarian reasons*, for example, a state of war in their home country. In addition, the Swedish government has also the possibility to grant *temporary protection* to individuals.

More specific data on the admission status of refugees and the number of asylum seekers in Sweden is available first from the early 1980s. This was the time when countries in Western Europe started to observe the increase in asylum seekers, and at the same time where faced with few and mainly unreliable statistical sources about the actual numbers (Appelqvist 2000). In figure 2, the relation between asylum seekers, refugee, and other types of admission status (tied movers, labour migrants, guest students, EU/EES nationals, and adoptees) from non-Nordic immigration is shown. From the figure a clear connection between the number of asylum seekers and the

number that are granted refugee status can be established with a lag of one to two years. Like other European countries, Sweden has seen an increase in the number of asylum seekers during the second half of the 1980s. However, if it were not for the civil war in former Yugoslavia and the subsequent increase in asylum seekers all over Europe during 1992 and 1993 (see also tables 2 and 3), the number of refugees would have decreased up until 1996 after which the figure increases again from 1997 to 2001. In connection to figure 2, table 2 shows that over 50 percent of all asylum seekers are accepted for humanitarian reason. The table also suggests that the number of convention refugees as well as the number that gained asylum as de facto refugees or in need of protection decreased in real numbers and in percentage in the analysed period.

**Figure 2: Asylum seekers, Refugees and Humanitarian reasons and immigrants with other admission status, 1980-2001. (Absolute numbers).**



Source: The Swedish Migration Board

Figure 2 also indicates that over time other immigration than refugee immigration increased. This was mainly family reunification. Almost 50 percent of all non-Nordic immigrants that gained a residence permit in Sweden between 1980 and 2001 (see also table 2) were of this category. To some extent, this increase could be due to the entrance of Sweden into the EES/EU in 1994/1995 (see also table 2). Almost 25 percent of those who gained access to Sweden as tied mover were connected to an individual who had a residence permit based on refugee status in some other European country.

Table 2: Residence permits by admission category, 1980-2001 (Absolute numbers)

| Year                    | 1980-1990 | 1991-1995 | 1996-2001 | 1980-2001 |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <b>Total</b>            | 248,855   | 247,466   | 234,707   | 731,028   |
| <b>Refugees</b>         | 109,951   | 118,453   | 46,705    | 275,109   |
| BY CATEGORY             |           |           |           |           |
| - UN quota              | 5947*     | 15,458    | 7,072     | 28,477    |
| - UN convention         | 11,270*   | 3,977     | 4,002     | 19,249    |
| - war-rejecters         | 2999*     | 49        | -         | 3,036     |
| - de facto refugees     | 21,351*   | 14,724    | 1,65†     | 37,726    |
| - in need of protection | -         | -         | 4,496     | 4,496     |
| - humanitarian grounds  | 30,213    | 84,257    | 29,484    | 143,954   |
| <b>Tied movers</b>      | 119,218   | 106,370   | 128,444   | 354,032   |
| <b>Labour migrants</b>  | 4,896     | 965       | 2,288     | 8,175     |
| <b>Guest students</b>   | 7,005     | 6,403     | 16,676    | 30,084    |
| <b>Adoption</b>         | 7,785     | 4,560     | 4,818     | 17,163    |
| <b>EU/EES</b>           | -         | 10,689#   | 35,776    | 46,465    |

\*) Since 1987    •) Since 1997 in category in need of protection    #) Since 1994    Source: Swedish Migration Board

Table 3: Asylum seekers by country of citizenship, 1984-2001 (Absolute numbers)

| Country of citizenship | 1984-1990 | 1991-1995 | 1996-2001 | 1984-2001 | Percentage |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| Bulgaria               | 5,422     | 494       | 553       | 6,469     | 0,02       |
| F. Yugoslavia          | 6,393     | 124,386*  | 24,444*   | 155,223*  | 0,39       |
| -Bosnia-Herzegovina    | -         | 38,476    | 9840      | 48,316    |            |
| -Yugoslavia            | -         | 63,452    | 13,166    | 79,618    |            |
| Poland                 | 4,161     | 1,738     | 324       | 6,274     | 0,02       |
| Rumania                | 5,900     | 1,637     | 247       | 7,844     | 0,02       |
| Russia                 | -         | 1,174     | 2,543     | 3,717     | 0,01       |
| Ethiopia               | 8,184     | 824       | 392       | 9,394     | 0,02       |
| Somalia                | 3,365     | 6,595     | 2,100     | 12,060    | 0,03       |
| Uganda                 | 645       | 1,290     | 54        | 1,989     | 0,01       |
| Togo                   | 53        | 547       | 12        | 602       | 0,00       |
| Cuba                   | 15        | 1,846     | 99        | 1,960     | 0,00       |
| Chile                  | 11,707    | 282       | 167       | 12,156    | 0,03       |
| Peru                   | 621       | 2,444     | 449       | 3,514     | 0,01       |
| Afghanistan            | 422       | 867       | 1,972     | 3,261     | 0,01       |
| Bangladesh             | 1,270     | 846       | 471       | 2,587     | 0,01       |
| China                  | 198       | 204       | 213       | 675       | 0,00       |
| India                  | 561       | 337       | 197       | 1,155     | 0,00       |
| Iran                   | 31,924    | 3,191     | 3743      | 41,315    | 0,10       |
| Iraq                   | 8,347     | 11,230    | 21,738    | 38,858    | 0,10       |
| Lebanon                | 11,139    | 898       | 740       | 12,777    | 0,03       |
| Pakistan               | 1,073     | 311       | 737       | 2,121     | 0,01       |
| Sri Lanka              | 316       | 1,104     | 360       | 1,780     | 0,00       |
| Syria                  | 3,327     | 951       | 1,542     | 5,820     | 0,01       |
| Turkey                 | 6,203     | 1,576     | 1,581     | 9,360     | 0,02       |
| Stateless              | 8,707     | 1,850     | 2,024     | 12,581    | 0,03       |
| Other countries        | 14,532    | 10,014    | 12,412    | 36,958    | 0,09       |
| <b>Total</b>           | 138,564   | 176,637   | 79,308    | 394,509   |            |

\* Including asylum seekers from Bosnia- Herzegovina and Yugoslavia

Source: Swedish Migration Board

Almost 400.000 individuals sought asylum in Sweden between 1984 and 2001 (table 3). 40 percent of them originated from former Yugoslavia. Together with Iran and Iraq, who both stand for 10 percent each, these countries are the main contributors to the total numbers of asylum seekers during the years 1984-2001. Asylum seekers from Chile, Iran, Lebanon and Ethiopia dominated in the period 1984-1990. Individuals from former Yugoslavia and Iraq have the highest percentage among asylum seekers in the subsequent periods, 1991-1995 and 1996-2001. Almost two thirds of the total number of asylum seekers obtained a residence permit in the period 1984-2001.

### **Integration and Settlement Policy**

Earlier, it was claimed that immigrants were warmly welcomed up until the middle of the 1960s, when Sweden still advocated a liberal integration policy due to its labour shortage. However, there was no clear political objective as to how immigrants and refugees should be integrated until the middle of the 1970s. According to Lundh & Ohlsson (1995), the main goal of the policy to assimilate the immigrants as quickly as possible and to authorize residence permits, often permanent, were heavily related to existing labour demands. A more distinct integration policy is discernible in the late 1960s, when a more restrictive immigration policy was implemented simultaneously. In 1965, the first steps were taken to facilitate the adaptation of immigrants to the Swedish society. These measures were taken through an initiative by LO (the Swedish Trade Union Confederation) and SAF (the Swedish Employers Confederation), and consisted mainly of education in the Swedish language, but also of general information about Sweden in several foreign languages, and the establishment of immigrant offices. In the early 1970s, further initiatives were taken to alleviate the increasing need of education in the Swedish language for immigrants. This led to legislation in 1972, in which immigrants had the right to paid leave of absence by the employer in order to study Swedish for a minimum of 240 hours.

Since the middle of the 1970s, a policy of ethnic or cultural pluralism was implemented based on three pillars: equality, freedom of choice and partnership (Hammar 1993, Westin 2000). Equality reflects a fundamental principle of the Swedish welfare state, and in the context of immigration it rejected the guest worker system. Immigrants were to enjoy the same social and economic rights and standards as native Swedes. Freedom of choice reflects the idea that individuals determine their personal and cultural affiliations and identities to the Swedish society. Partnership can be seen as the need for mutual tolerance and solidarity between immigrants and native Swedes. In 1998, the immigration policy was replaced

by an integration policy aimed at the whole population, and a new central government agency, the Integration Board (Integrationsverket), was established with the special task to oversee integration efforts throughout the Swedish society. The focus of this new organisation is to monitor and evaluate trends in integration, promote equal rights and opportunities for everyone, and combating xenophobia, racism and discrimination (Jederlund 1998).

Another watershed can be dated to the middle of the 1980s when Sweden reorganised its refugee reception programme. Before this reform, a majority of refugees travelled directly to a municipality and applied for asylum there. A vast majority arrived in the regions of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The National Immigration Board (SIV-Statens Invandrarverk) took over primary responsibility from the National Labour Market Board (AMS-Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen). This reorganisation had the following principles:

- 1. Refugees should enjoy the benefits of Sweden's integration policy in the same way as other immigrants. The National Immigration Board should be responsible for this.*
- 2. Asylum seekers and refugees should be placed in a municipality as soon as possible and obtain education in the Swedish language and society as well as housing and social benefits according to "general" Swedish standards.*
- 3. Around twenty percent of all municipalities (they are 280 in total) should be selected and made suitable to integrate refugees. Large municipalities should be avoided because they had already taken a disproportionate annual number of asylum seekers and refugees. The Board should negotiate with the selected municipalities and the state should pay for the costs of the integration programme as well as the fixed costs for the asylum seeker or refugee including housing costs and social benefits during the first three years.<sup>6</sup>*

In practice, this policy meant that depending on the circumstances, an individual could seek asylum or a residence permit directly at the border, or later at the local police station in the municipality where they chose to stay. The police, who forwarded the matter to the Swedish Immigration Board for further investigation, did the first hearing.<sup>7</sup> The Board was further responsible for the reception of the asylum-seeker, which at first was placed at one of the clearance centres.<sup>8</sup> Due to the waiting time for a residence permit, the asylum-seeker could be placed in a more permanent refugee camp facility as well as staying with relatives waiting on a residence permit. The latter had to be approved by the municipality and the Immigration Board. Non-approval by these authorities could lead to the loss of financial support for the asylum-seeker. Up to 1990, the only activity for refugees in the refugee camps was language education and courses on the

Swedish society. During 1991, more compulsory activities were allowed encompassing at least four hours a day. In 1992, it was decided to allow asylum-seekers to work if the waiting time on a residence permit was estimated to take at least four months (SOU 1992:69). The main idea with these organised activities was to counteract passivity and to increase the possibilities of integration after a resident permit was obtained. In the end, the focus of the activities became more a sort of “contribute to your own support” than an actual effort towards integration into the Swedish society (Swedish Immigration Board 1997).<sup>9</sup> Work outside the refugee camp has been less than 20 percent of the total supply of activities. The main activity here has been trainee places which are strongly influenced by the economic situation in the local labour market. Increasing competition for trainee places by the indigenous population during this period could explain this low percentage for asylum-seekers.

The Swedish Immigration board was responsible for the transfer of the refugee to the municipalities once a residence permit was obtained. The board also had the responsibility to negotiate with municipalities for the settlement of refugees. The municipality involved could reapply for social grants from the state during the refugees’ first three years in the municipality

and also receive a once only compensation for each refugee received to cover extra costs. The integration responsibilities of the municipality include housing, language courses, and an introduction plan with the focus on how to reach self-sufficiency. During 1985-1990, the municipalities were reimbursed for their actual expenditures. From 1991, however, the municipalities are given a standard reimbursement per received refugee.

This reform never functioned in its original form mainly due to the sharp increase of refugees granted a residence permit in Sweden during the period (see figure 2, tables 2 and 3). The waiting time for a resident permit and the following settlement in the municipality, as well as the amount of municipalities involved in settlement, increased during the years (table 4). The reform became known as the “Sweden-

*Table 4: The average months in application system and number of municipalities involved in settlement policy.*

| Year | Months | Municipalities |
|------|--------|----------------|
| 1985 | -      | 137            |
| 1986 | -      | 197            |
| 1987 | 3,4    | 245            |
| 1988 | 4,5    | 265            |
| 1989 | 6,6    | 276            |
| 1990 | 5,8    | 278            |
| 1991 | 11,7   | 277            |
| 1992 | 15,5   | 271            |
| 1993 | 14,7   | 273            |
| 1994 | 12,9   | 273            |
| 1995 | 23,6   | 258            |
| 1996 | 28,0   | 247            |
| 1997 | 26,0   | 240            |
| 1998 | 14,8   | 251            |
| 1999 | 15,7   | 205            |
| 2000 | 11,9   | 214            |
| 2001 | 10,4   | 206            |

*Source: Swedish Board of Immigration and Swedish Board of Integration.*

wide strategy” or “The Whole of Sweden Strategy”.

More and more municipalities, even the less suitable ones with net out-migration because of a depressed local economy, became involved and persuaded to rent their surplus housing to refugees. This also led to a new strategy of a temporary, three-year integration into these municipalities, and a subsequent, compulsory dispersal with little consideration given to the individual’s interests. Basically, refugees were sent to municipalities with fellow countrymen. Secondary migration of refugees to other municipalities can be seen in different ways. Some advocate a failure of the local integration policies while others see this as an indication of individuals having the ability to act as agents (Hammar 1993). Soininen (1999) suggests that the implementation of this reform became a conflict between the social services in the municipalities having their ideas about the care of clients and the ideas of the integration policy, which tried to meet every individual in a spirit of co-operation, equality and freedom of choice. Also, little incentive was given to local governments to pursue a policy of labour market integration during the first period of the reform. Together, it could be claimed that this reform shifted the focus away from labour market integration.


The effect of the compulsory dispersal policy was also subject to economic analysis. Comparing immigrants arriving before and during the reform, Edin *et al.* (2000a) suggests that eight years after arrival, earnings were 25 percent lower because of the new policy. Idleness had also increased by about six percent for those groups that came during the reform (from 1985), relative to immigrants that came between 1982 and 1983. Franzén (1997) discusses the same problems but refers to how refugees were treated by local labour market authorities. In a follow-up study, she finds that the implemented integration strategy by the employment offices did not have the expected results. Seeing the refugees as a homogenous group instead of a diverse population, the various authorities’ lack of interest in scrutinising earlier labour market experience, together with a generally negative attitude towards the skills of the immigrants, led to a destructive pattern of clientisation of refugees to the social security system.

### **Economic Integration**

Studies on the economic integration of immigrants in Sweden show a very high labour market attachment during the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, incomes and employment rates were relatively high, with consequently low unemployment rates (Wadensjö 1973; Ekberg 1983). During the 1970s and 1980s, the unemployment was quite low in Sweden compared to most other OECD countries. Nevertheless, dating back to 1977, when unemployment began to be reported separately for different nationalities, the unemployment rate for foreign citizens was at least double that of


Swedish citizens. In the first half of the 1990s, however, the unemployment rates of both Swedish and foreign citizens increased dramatically, mainly because of the deep crisis in the Swedish economy. From 1993 to 1995, unemployment among foreign citizens was three times higher than for Swedish citizens. Since 1997, however, there has been a sharp decline in the unemployment rate for both natives and foreign citizens (Lundh *et al.* 2002).

**Figure 3: Age Standardised Employment Rates for Foreign Born and Native Born Men Aged 16-64, 1960 - 2000. (Percent.)**



Source: Bevelander (1995) and Statistics Sweden

**Figure 4: Age Standardised Employment Rate for Foreign Born and Native Born Women Aged 16-64, 1960 - 2000. (Percent.)**



Source: Bevelander (1995) and Statistics Sweden

Current research into the employment situation of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, however, shows a different picture. Gradually, there has been a decline in immigrant employment rates for both men and women compared to natives. In figure 3 and 4, a negative trend can be observed in the employment rates for immigrants, which starts in the 1970s. After 1970, the employment rate for foreign-born men decreased gradually compared to native-born men. Foreign-born women showed an increase in employment over time but the increase was not in parity with the increase of native-born women. It seems clear that the deep economic recession of the early 1990s widened the gap between natives and immigrants even more, whereas the economic recovery of the late nineties seems to have served to reverse the negative development to some extent. This general trend for both immigrant men and women was also observed in studies focusing on metropolitan areas of Sweden (Bevelander *et al.* 1997).

*Table 5: Age Standardised Employment Rate for Selected Groups Foreign Born, 1970, 1990 and 2001. (percent)*

| Country/year | M E N |      |      | W O M E N |      |      |
|--------------|-------|------|------|-----------|------|------|
|              | 1970  | 1990 | 2001 | 1970      | 1990 | 2001 |
| Denmark      | 88    | 80   | 71   | 52        | 75   | 67   |
| Norway       | 85    | 78   | 72   | 49        | 73   | 67   |
| Finland      | 88    | 75   | 72   | 58        | 76   | 70   |
| Germany      | 88    | 80   | 74   | 54        | 74   | 64   |
| F.Yugoslavia | 87    | 67   | 62   | 59        | 58   | 51   |
| Poland       | 74    | 70   | 68   | 48        | 64   | 65   |
| Iran         | -     | 46   | 57   | -         | 32   | 48   |
| Iraq         | -     | 48   | 48   | -         | 32   | 29   |
| Turkey       | 80    | 55   | 64   | 59        | 41   | 40   |
| Chile        | 74    | 75   | 75   | 47        | 64   | 64   |

*Source: Bevelander 2000; Lundh et al., 2002*

Table 5 shows the development in employment integration for selected groups of foreign-born men and women 1970 to 2001. In general, it shows that non-native men had a decline of roughly 15 percentage points in employment during this period. Foreign-born men from the Nordic countries, Germany and Chile still have an employment rate of over 70 percent in 2001, while foreign born men from Poland, Former Yugoslavia and Middle Eastern countries like Turkey, Iran and Iraq were below this level. Irrespective of admission status, almost all of the groups show a gradually decreasing

employment rate after the 1970 census, with the exception of foreign-born from Chile.

The development of the employment rate for native- and foreign-born women showed a different pattern when compared to men. With the exceptions of women from former Yugoslavia and from Turkey, most groups of foreign-born women show an increase in employment attachment between 1970 and 1990. The decline in employment rates between 1990 and 2001 is for some groups almost 10 percent, not including women born in Poland, Iran and Chile.

The difference in employment integration is to some extent due to the fact that Nordic immigrants dominated the immigration cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s. These immigrants came as labour migrants and adjusted fast to the growing industrial labour market. A look at table 6 shows that immigrant cohorts with a generally shorter “time in the country” have lower employment rates. Refugees from Asia, Africa and South-East Europe dominate the cohorts that entered the country since the beginning of the 1980s. Variations in employment adjustment are thus partly explained by “time of residence” and partly by the motivation for migration. The change in country of origin mix, however, cannot by itself explain the lower employment adjustment for immigrants in general. Nor can it account for the differences in employment integration between immigrant groups.

The majority of studies dealing with the economic integration of immigrants use human capital theory as their approach, in which different demographic and human capital characteristics are expected to explain the

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
*Table 6: Age Standardised Employment Rates for Foreign Born by Immigration Cohort, 2001 (percent)*

|              |           | MEN | WOMEN |
|--------------|-----------|-----|-------|
| Natives      |           | 71  | 68    |
| Foreign Born |           | 57  | 49    |
| Cohorts      | -1970     | 72  | 67    |
|              | 1971-1975 | 69  | 61    |
|              | 1976-1980 | 63  | 55    |
|              | 1981-1985 | 60  | 62    |
|              | 1986-1990 | 59  | 45    |
|              | 1991-1995 | 50  | 36    |
|              | 1996-2001 | 40  | 31    |

Source: Lundh et al., 2002

labour market integration of immigrants. In this framework, education is seen as an investment by the individual made in order to increase his or her productivity, which later supposedly results in improved labour market careers. Differences in the level of education could therefore explain variations in the employment integration of immigrants. However, aggregated data shows that this is not the case. Instead, we see how immigrants basically have the same educational level as natives. Figure 5 shows the share of natives and foreign born by educational level. It can clearly be seen that even if we control for age structure, the differences are marginal although immigrant women are somewhat overrepresented in the category primary education.

**Figure 5: Age standardised Educational levels Native and Foreign Born men and Women, age 25-64, 1995. (percent)**



*Source: Educational records, Statistics Sweden.*

Consequently, the difference in educational level could be the main explanatory variable for differences in the employment integration of immigrants groups in the Swedish labour market. Several studies based on individual data basically point towards the same conclusion; namely that a higher educational level increases the probability to obtain employment for both immigrants and natives between 1970 and 1990. Having a Swedish degree also implies advantages compared to having a foreign degree. But variations

in educational level do not explain the differences in the chances to obtain employment for individuals, neither by itself nor together with other individual characteristics (Schröder & Wilhelmsson 1998; Bevelander & Nielsen 2001; Rooth 1999).

Indeed, other studies suggest that institutional and demand side factors, and not only supply side factors, may help to explain the varying labour market attachment, which for some immigrant groups may be characterized as very weak. Firstly, a lower level of economic growth was experienced during the last two decades compared to the earlier period, entailing a decreasing demand for “extra” labour. Secondly, on the aggregate level, there has been a structural change of the economy, where a declining industry sector has given way to an increasing service sector requiring higher education and language proficiency. This means that the number of low skilled industry jobs have been decreasing steadily in recent years, jobs which traditionally have been filled by immigrants. Thirdly, the policies pertaining to immigration, integration and the labour market, as mentioned earlier, have influenced the labour market integration of immigrants on entry and long afterwards (Bevelander *et al.* 1997; Blos *et al.* 1997; Edin *et al.* 2000). Fourthly, more information- and communication-intensive working processes were introduced in both the industrial and the service sectors of the economy. This development increased the demand for employees with a higher general competence, while unskilled labour was made redundant by efficiency improvements. One effect of this increased demand for general competence has been to upgrade the importance of informal skills without reducing the importance of formal education and skills. Such informal skills include country-specific skills, for instance language skills, and the understanding of different behaviour in teamwork and in relations with authorities and labour markets organisations worldwide (see Chiswick & Miller 1996 for a discussion of the importance of language skills). This structural change made it more difficult for immigrants with the same general formal human capital stock as Swedes to obtain employment and earnings on the level as natives, see Scott (1999) and Bevelander (2000; 2001). Together with the shift in immigration towards what is perceived as culturally more distant from the Swedish society (Lange & Westin 1993), this structural change may have entailed more discrimination by authorities, employers, and employees towards the new immigrants (Broomé *et al.* 1996; Bevelander 2000; Schierup & Paulsson 1994). Quantitative multivariate analysis (Bevelander 2000; Bevelander & Nielsen 1999) and qualitative analysis (Knocke 1993) show that these changes also affected the employment integration for immigrant women.

Concluding this section, it is obvious that the employment integration of immigrants in Sweden has deteriorated since the last decades. This lack of

integration has in turn had negative effects on the relative income of the various immigrant groups (Scott 1999). Due to the fact that unemployment benefits, parental leave and various pensions are based on earlier income, immigrants have also a weaker welfare inclusion (for overview see Gustafsson 2002). Self-employment among some groups has partially counteracted the situation (Bevelander *et al.* 1997), but the social security payments directed towards certain immigrant groups show a harsh reality and a strong exclusion from the labour market. This can also be linked to the residential patterns for immigrants in Sweden.

### **Spatial Segregation**

The housing policy is one of the linchpins of the Swedish welfare policies since the 1950s. The main goal of this policy is a general concentration on good housing for everyone. To come to terms with the housing shortage in Sweden, an ambitious construction programme was set up by the government in the 1960s. One million apartments should be built. From the middle of the 1960s to the middle of the 1970s, this goal was achieved. New suburbs, with a relatively high standard, arose on the outskirts of most larger cities, and especially in the capital, Stockholm. However, soon criticism was levied against these new developments, primarily for their insufficient social and aesthetic design. Over time, this also made the new residential areas unattractive to middle class Swedes.

As mentioned in earlier sections, large inflows of labour immigrants in the 1960s and refugees since the end of the 1960s increased the population of the larger cities and especially the new suburbs. From the beginning, Swedish working class families settled in the new suburbs, but fairly soon, however, a process of ethnic segregation started to establish itself, where immigrants moved in and Swedes moved out. The dispersal policy of 1985 is partly a reaction to this situation, trying to decrease the new inflow of resettled refugees in the new suburbs. In comparison to other countries the most striking element of segregation in Sweden seems not to be so much a situation of ethnically distinct housing areas, i.e. ethnic concentration, but rather that foreign born persons are lumped together in residential areas with very few Swedish born inhabitants, i.e. a residential mix. At the end of the millennium, almost 30 percent of the immigrants live in the three largest cities of Sweden: (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö), and almost one fifth of the population of these cities consists of immigrants.

In the following table (7) the index of segregation is shown for Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö for the years 1986, 1990 and 1993. Not surprisingly, it shows large differences in segregation between different immigrant groups.

Table 7: Index of Residential Segregation, Selected Groups of Foreign Born in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmoe, 1986,1990 and 1993.

| Country/year  | STOCKHOLM |      |      | GOTHENBURG |      |      | MALMOE |      |      |
|---------------|-----------|------|------|------------|------|------|--------|------|------|
|               | 1986      | 1990 | 1993 | 1986       | 1990 | 1993 | 1986   | 1990 | 1993 |
| Finland       | 10.6      | 9.1  | 7.8  | 32.1       | 33.2 | 31.3 | 13.3   | 9.9  | 10.0 |
| Norway        | 4.7       | 5.1  | 4.9  | 11.7       | 13.0 | 10.4 | 5.2    | 7.6  | 7.1  |
| Denmark       | 6.7       | 5.7  | 6.0  | 13.6       | 12.6 | 11.4 | 8.2    | 6.5  | 5.6  |
| Germany       | 8.5       | 8.2  | 8.4  | 7.5        | 6.7  | 5.7  | 6.4    | 7.4  | 7.6  |
| USA           | 19.3      | 21.5 | 21.8 | 18.8       | 18.0 | 17.2 | 15.4   | 20.4 | 20.9 |
| Chile         | 45.3      | 40.0 | 40.5 | 37.6       | 36.1 | 36.0 | 33.3   | 29.3 | 30.1 |
| F. Yugoslavia | 22.8      | 22.0 | 24.1 | 43.2       | 42.4 | 42.5 | 37.3   | 36.1 | 34.1 |
| Poland        | 17.2      | 15.8 | 15.3 | 25.0       | 23.0 | 21.3 | 24.5   | 23.7 | 20.1 |
| Greece        | 46.9      | 46.2 | 44.4 | 28.8       | 26.4 | 27.4 | 36.4   | 33.5 | 31.4 |
| Ethiopia      | 42.3      | 39.0 | 45.6 | 34.8       | 33.1 | 44.7 | -      | 29.3 | 37.5 |
| Turkey        | 65.7      | 61.2 | 59.2 | 52.7       | 53.0 | 56.9 | 46.3   | 47.0 | 57.2 |
| Iran          | 56.1      | 47.6 | 45.8 | 30.9       | 30.4 | 28.9 | 28.4   | 30.8 | 29.3 |
| Iraq          | 48.4      | 44.5 | 51.3 | 44.5       | 45.1 | 50.0 | 45.2   | 46.5 | 52.0 |

Source: Bevelander et al., 1997

Immigrants from the Middle East (especially from Turkey and Iraq) and Ethiopia are the most segregated, and immigrants from the Nordic countries and Germany live the least segregated. Differences can also be seen between the cities. The Nordic immigrants live more segregated in Gothenburg than in Stockholm and Malmoe (this is true especially for immigrants from Finland). Immigrants from Greece and Iran are more segregated in Stockholm than in the other cities, whereas immigrants from former Yugoslavia are less segregated there. Regarding the development over time, it is difficult to discern a particular pattern. For Nordic immigrants the segregation decreases somewhat. Foreign born from Chile show a decrease at the end of the 1980s, especially in Stockholm and Malmoe. The segregation of immigrants from Greece also declines, but this happens in the late 1980s in Gothenburg, and in the beginning of the 1990s in Stockholm, whereas it occurs continuously in Malmoe throughout the periods studied. Ethiopians show a decline in Stockholm at the end of the 1980s but an increase in all cities in the beginning of the 1990s. Foreign-born from Turkey have a decrease in Stockholm and an increase in Gothenburg and Malmoe, which means a convergence over time in segregation between the cities. For immigrants from Iran the segregation declined substantially in Stockholm but has stayed constant in Malmoe and

Gothenburg. The Iraqis show a decline in Stockholm at the end of the 1980s, but an increase in all cities between 1990 and 1993.

The spatial segregation of ethnic groups is a complex question with several dimensions – cultural, social, economic, demographic – that in due course have generated different theoretical hypotheses (For an overview, see Van Kempen & Özüekren 1998). Also for Sweden, several hypotheses have been brought forward to explain the spatial segregation of ethnic groups. One of the hypotheses is that the ethnic segregation is mainly due to the socio-economic position of the individuals of an ethnic group. But also, ethnic networks, discrimination by institutions and structural conditions are commonly used explanatory concepts in the literature.

Bevelander *et al.* (1997) argue that the economic upturn in the late 1980s and subsequent downturn in the early 1990s only to some extent have had an effect on the spatial segregation in Sweden, whereas other studies indicate that both socio-economic and ethnic segregation has grown dramatically since the beginning of the 1990s. High-income areas and low-income areas have both increased in numbers during the period, at the same time as the native-born part of the population have decreased in the parts of the cities which already were overrepresented by foreign-born in the beginning of the 1990s. High-income earners live more concentrated relative to low-income earners. These concentrated areas are also dominated by natives and lack the ethnic diversity that characterises the cities in general (Integration Board 2001). Over time, the continuing spatial segregation along with what for some groups has been a positive development in economic integration has brought forward hypotheses that stress the importance of various structural and institutional barriers in society which force ethnic groups into certain, mainly unattractive parts of the cities. Molina (1997) sees the patterns of segregation in Swedish cities in ethnic terms, with foreign born from outside Europe living more concentrated than immigrants from Europe. She explains this division in racial terms, where the housing segregation primarily is explained through stigmatisation of and discrimination against ethnic groups in society at large. An ethnic division operates in the housing market and constrains ethnic groups from moving to more attractive parts of the city. Molina argues this in contrast to other studies, which suggest that the ethnic segregation to some extent is dependent on “cultural” differences between ethnic groups (Andersson-Brolin 1984). For example, Bevelander *et al.* (1997) show that even though some ethnic groups are relatively weak in terms of resources, they do not live segregated. This explanation could as well hold in the case where recently arrived immigrants take advantage of established ethnic networks in orienting themselves into the new society. Furthermore, Edin *et al.* (2000b) show that ethnic concentration also gives rise to improvements in *relative income*.

### **Some concluding remarks**

Studying the immigration experience to Sweden diachronically shows that migration, as well as integration into the labour market, and the spatial patterns of settlement of the newly arrived immigrants, have changed character over time. A majority of the immigrants arriving to Sweden in the first decades after the Second World War were labour migrants from mainly Nordic and other European countries. For the most part, these migrants were driven by economic factors. On recommendation from the Labour Organisation of Sweden (LO), a change in the admission legislation took place at the end of the 1960s, where a relatively liberal policy was replaced by a more restrictive one mainly towards non-Nordic labour migrants.

Internal conflicts, warfare and various geo-political developments have led to a general increase in the number of asylum seekers in the world. Unaffected by the change in admission policy, and based on a relatively greater willingness to grant asylum, together with a liberal family reunification policy, most immigrants who arrived during the 70s, and especially the 80s and 90s were refugees from East European and non-European countries and tied movers from both labour migrants and refugees. Statistics reveal that tied movers and refugees both make up for 50 percent of those granted a residence permit in the last decades. The economic crisis of the early 90s and the dramatic increase of asylum seekers during the same period paved the way for adjusting the refugee policy towards a more restrictive attitude, where temporary protection of asylum seekers replaced what formerly would have been the authorization of permanent residence permits.

The assimilation policy towards immigrants also changed, and since the middle of the 1970s the integration policy of Sweden is based on cultural pluralism and the slogans of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Integration into the labour market and counter balancing of spatial segregation has been important goals of the policy. The settlement policy implemented since the middle of the 1980s, spreading refugees who gained a residence permit to a number of municipalities, and especially those with a favourable local labour market, can be seen as a way to attain both these goals.

Whereas the labour migrants adjusted relatively well into the labour market and the concentration in settlement of various immigrant groups were seen as a way of retaining certain cultural elements of these groups in a new environment, the economic integration of immigrants in general declined gradually and for some groups deteriorated dramatically, resulting in an increase of spatial concentration for some immigrant groups.

Human capital and personal skills, occupational transferability, structural changes in the labour market, various types of discrimination, integra-

tion policies towards immigrants and labour market policies in general are all factors that can be seen as increasing the transaction costs for immigrants relative to natives to adjust in the labour market. Especially the structural change of the Swedish labour market into a service society demanding higher general skills and stressing language skills are likely to increase the cost for new immigrants to acquire these skills. Potential employers are placed in a position of increasing hiring costs and this affects the discrimination towards certain groups of immigrants. Exclusion from the labour market will necessarily increase the total cost of social assistance.

Weak labour market integration of the individual will have consequences for the possibility to choose region of residence, but ethnic segregation is also a problem for the welfare state since many social services, schools, education in general, health care, day care and welfare programmes are organised according to spatial principles. So, once segregated areas have come into existence, they tend reinforce inequalities both social and economical.

In this sense, the integration policies in Sweden have not been effective during the last decades. The “multicultural” society does exist in Sweden only if we look at the number of foreign-born relative to native-born. However, when it comes to the two prominent measures of integration, employment integration and spatial segregation, it becomes clear that large groups of immigrants are marginalized by the Swedish society.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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## NOTES

1. See for example SOU (Official Public Commission) 1996:55 including several supplements, 1997:118, 1997:152, 1997:174, 1998:25, 1999:8 and 1999:34.
2. With the equality aims of the Swedish integration policies is meant that the various immigrant groups should be given equivalent conditions of life as the Swedish population in general.
3. Including individuals born in Sweden by at least one foreign born parent.
4. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Macedonia are here together Former Yugoslavia. For the year 2000, 683 individuals are from Slovenia, 5,229 from Croatia, 51,526 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 71,972 from Yugoslavia and 2,362 from Macedonia.
5. This includes individuals with "refugee like" reasons, such as mass flight situations due to environmental catastrophes or civil war, and individuals who fear risk for persecution due to their gender and sexuality.
6. For further reading see Hammar (1993).
7. Prior to July 1, 1992 the police and the Immigration Board did this investigation and the final decision was entirely based on the police file (SOU 1992:133).
8. In 1992 there were four of these centres located in Malmö, Mölndal, Flen and Upplands Väsby.
9. These activities could be anything from cleaning the camp, being an assistant in a day-care centre, and holding information meetings for new asylum-seekers, to organizing theatre groups, producing newspapers, and taking different kind of courses, such as language, computer knowledge, civics, *et cetera*.

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# INVANDRINGENS MÖNSTER, EKONOMISK INTEGRATION OCH BOENDESEGREGATION: SVERIGE PÅ SLUTET AV 1900-TALET

Sammanfattning

Den ”mångkulturella” samhället finns i Sverige om vi bara ser till på antalet utlandsfödda i förhållande till födda i Sverige. När vi däremot undersöker två viktiga mått på integration, sysselsättningsintegration och boendesegregation, visas tydligt att stora grupper av invandrare är marginaliserade i det svenska samhället. Sett ur detta perspektiv har den svenska integrationspolitiken misslyckats de senaste decennierna. Hur har denna situation uppkommit?

Såväl invandringen som arbetsmarknadsintegrationen och boendemönstret av nyligen anlända immigranter har över tiden fått en förändrad karaktär. Majoriteten av invandrarna som kom till Sverige under de första decennierna efter andra världskriget var från de nordiska och de andra europeiska länderna. Invandrarna kom huvudsakligen på grund av ekonomiska skäl. I Sverige ändrades invandringspolitiken under slutet av 1960-talet till stor del som en följd av påtryckningar från fackföreningsrörelsen (LO). En relativt liberal politik ersattes med en mer restriktiv politik som begränsade fri arbetskraftsinvandring från de icke-nordiska länderna.

Under senare delen av 1900-talet har interna konflikter, krig och geopolitiska förändringar lett till ett ökat antal flyktingar i världen. Invandringspolitiken gentemot flyktingar och familjeåterförening var fortfarande relativt liberal i Sverige under denna period. Detta innebär att de flesta invandrare som kom till Sverige på 1970-talet, men framförallt under 1980- och 1990-talen var flyktingar från Östeuropa och icke-europeiska länder och familjer från tidigare invandrade flyktingar och arbetskraftsinvandrare.

Statistiken visar att familjeåterförenare och flyktingar står för vardera hälften av dem som har fått uppehållstillstånd de senaste decennierna. Den ekonomiska krisen under första halvan av 1990-talet samt den dramatiska ökningen av asylsökare under samma period gjorde att flyktingpolitiken skärptes.

Sveriges integrationspolitik förändrades också med tiden och är sedan mitten av 1970-talet baserad på kulturell pluralism och på honnörsorden, *jämlikhet*, *valfrihet* och *samverkan*. Arbetsmarknadsintegration och att motverka boendesegregation har varit högt prioriterade mål i denna politik. Bosättningspolitiken som implementerades under mitten av 1980-talet och som fördelar flyktingar som fått uppehållstillstånd över ett flertal kommuner kan ses som en sätt att förverkliga dessa mål.

Under 50- och 60-talen integrerades arbetskraftsinvandrare relativt väl på arbetsmarknaden. Koncentrationen i boende av en del av dessa invandrargrupper sågs som ett sätt att behålla vissa kulturella särdrag i en ny omgivning. Den successivt minskande ekonomiska integrationen av senare invandrargrupper medförde för vissa grupper en mycket stark ökning av boendesegregationen.

Human- och social kapital, överförbarhet av yrkesskicklighet, strukturella förändringar på arbetsmarknaden, olika typer av diskriminering, generell integrations- och arbetsmarknadspolitik kan ses som faktorer som ökar transaktionskostnaderna för att som invandrare lyckas på arbetsmarknaden i jämförelse med svenskar.

Framförallt den strukturella förändringen inom den svenska ekonomin i en tjänstekonomi som efterfrågar högre generella kunskaper och ökad tonvikt på språkkunskaper har ökat kostnaderna för nya invandrare att förvärva dessa färdigheter. Ökande rekryteringskostnader för potentiella arbetsgivare medför att vissa grupper löper risken att diskrimineras. Utestängningen från arbetsmarknaden ökar socialbidragskostnaderna.

Svag arbetsmarknadsintegration påverkar på ett negativt sätt individens möjligheter att välja bosättningsort. Etnisk segregation är även ett problem för välfärdsstaten i och med att många sociala tjänster som skola, förskola, vård av olika slag och andra offentliga tjänster är organiserade enligt geografiska faktorer. Så, när segregerade områden väl har uppstått är risken stor att både social och ekonomisk ojämlikhet förstärker varandra.

SÖKORD: internationell migration, ekonomisk integration, boende segregation

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